| Original Full Text | www.ssoar.infoSocial Forms of Religion: European and AmericanChristianity in Past and PresentFreudenberg, Maren (Ed.); Reuter, Astrid (Ed.)Veröffentlichungsversion / Published VersionSammelwerk / collectionZur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:transcript VerlagEmpfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:Freudenberg, M., & Reuter, A. (Eds.). (2024). Social Forms of Religion: European and American Christianity in Pastand Present (Religious Studies, 38). Bielefeld: transcript Verlag. https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839468265Nutzungsbedingungen:Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zurVerfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen findenSie hier:https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.deTerms of use:This document is made available under a CC BY Licence(Attribution). For more Information see:https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-96949-1Maren Freudenberg, Astrid Reuter (eds.)Social Forms of ReligionReligious Studies Volume 38Maren Freudenberg, born in 1983, is a sociologist of religion at the Center for Reli-gious Studies, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany. She obtained her PhD in soci-ology at Freie Universität Berlin, where she was a member of the Graduate Schoolof North American Studies. Her research focuses on contemporary religion in theUnited States, global Charismatic Christianity, the connections between religionand the economy, and theoretical approaches in the sociology of religion.Astrid Reuter, born in 1968, is a professor for religious studies at Universität Mün-ster and principal investigator at the Cluster of Excellence Religion & Politics. Hermain research areas are the history and theory of religious studies, religion and lawin Europe, Charismatic Catholicism and African religions in Latin America (withspecial focus on Brazil).Maren Freudenberg, Astrid Reuter (eds.)Social Forms of ReligionEuropean and American Christianity in Past and PresentFunded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foun-dation) underGermany’s Excellence Strategy -EXC2060 Religion andPolitics.Dy-namics of Tradition and Innovation” - 390726036.Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche NationalbibliothekTheDeutscheNationalbibliothek lists this publication in theDeutscheNationalbib-liografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at https://dnb.dnb.de/This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (BY) license, whichmeans that the text may be remixed, transformed and built upon and be copied andredistributed in any medium or format even commercially, provided credit is given to theauthor.https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Creative Commons license terms for re-use do not apply to any content (such as graphs,figures, photos, excerpts, etc.) not original to the Open Access publication and furtherpermission may be required from the rights holder. The obligation to research and clearpermission lies solely with the party re-using the material.First published in 2024 by transcript Verlag, Bielefeld© Maren Freudenberg, Astrid Reuter (eds.)Cover layout: Maria Arndt, Bielefeldhttps://doi.org/10.14361/9783839468265Print-ISBN: 978-3-8376-6826-1PDF-ISBN: 978-3-8394-6826-5ISSN of series: 2703-142XeISSN of series: 2703-1438Printed on permanent acid-free text paper.“Printed by: ElandersWaiblingen GmbH,WaiblingenContentsIntroductionMaren Freudenberg and Astrid Reuter.................................................7The Four Phases of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal (1967–2017)Valérie Aubourg .................................................................... 25‘Catholic’ and ‘Charismatic’Two Logics of Legitimization and the Negotiation of Belongingin the German Catholic Charismatic RenewalHannah Grünenthal ................................................................. 49“I am happy to be Catholic”The Catholic Charismatic Renewal and the Dynamics of the Religious Field in BrazilAstrid Reuter....................................................................... 79Everyday Familialism in the Emmanuel CommunitySamuel Dolbeau ....................................................................107The Capital of Closed ChurchesHeritage Buildings as Social Entrepreneurship in QuebecHillary Kaell ........................................................................ 131God Is Not at ChurchDigitalization as Authentic Religious Practice in an American MegachurchAriane Kovac...................................................................... 153Shapeshifting the Christian RightThe Moral Majority as a Faith-Based Organization and the Immanent Turnof Evangelicalism in the Late 20th CenturySebastian Schüler ................................................................. 183Social Forms in Neo-Pentecostal Prosperity ContextsFrom Network to Market ExchangeMaren Freudenberg................................................................ 207Pentecostal Social Engagement in Contemporary GuatemalaVirginia Garrard ................................................................... 225Social Forms in Orthodox Christian Convert Communities in North AmericaSebastian Rimestad and Katherine Kelaidis .........................................251Forever Into EternitySocial Forms of Religion in the Temple Wedding of The Church of Jesus Christof Latter-day SaintsMarie-Therese Mäder .............................................................. 273Organizing “Private Religion”Types of Governance in US ProtestantismInsa Pruisken ..................................................................... 299Authors .......................................................................... 323IntroductionMaren Freudenberg and Astrid ReuterAbstract This introduction briefly sketches the aims and scope of the present volumebefore providing an overview of existing typologies of social forms in the sociology of reli-gionandbeyondandpresenting the volume’s theoretical framework,whichassumes (1) acongruence between social forms and religious semantics, (2) a shift from organizationalto community structures in the religious field, and (3) a marked influence on the emer-gence of particular social forms as a result of competition, both within the religious fieldand on the border to other fields.Thefinal section summarizes themain arguments of thevolume’s contributions against this theoretical backdrop.Keywords Social forms of religion, religious semantics, organization, group,market ex-change, network, movement, church, sect, mysticism, cult1. Aims and scope of the volumeThe present volume sheds light on the various social forms Christianity in Eu-rope and the Americas takes and has taken since the mid-20th century. It ex-amines the religious, cultural, social, and historical context of diverse empir-ical cases, from Charismatic Catholicism to Evangelicalism and Pentecostal-ism,andaskshowdifferent social formshave contributed to the success or fail-ureof the respectiveChristiancommunities.Social formscanbeunderstoodasthe ways in which people come together to shape social interaction. Religioussocial forms are then the modes in which people congregate to structure as-pects of their religious lives, such as religious practices or social practices thatare religiously motivated. Religious social forms include not only religious in-teraction per se, as during aworship service or groupprayer, but also the ‘back-ground coordination’ that makes religious interaction possible, such as main-taining a congregation or organizing an event. Social forms in this sensemust8 Social Forms of Religionbe seen as ‘ideal types’ as Max Weber defined them (Weber 2012 [1904]). Idealtypes, in line with Weber, are concepts with an extremely high degree of ab-straction.Theydonot exist in empirical reality in their ‘pure’ forms,nor do theyserve as a scheme to simply classify social complexity. Rather, they are pointsof reference towhich social phenomena are compared.They are heuristic tools:by observing correspondences and divergences between real phenomena andideal types, we gain a better understanding of social and historical reality.In this introduction, we begin by providing an overview of existing ty-pologies of social forms in the sociology of religion and beyond (2.). Next, wepresent the volume’s theoretical framework (3.), which assumes a congruencebetween social forms and religious semantics, a shift from organizational tocommunity structures in the religious field, and a marked influence on theemergence of particular social forms as a result of competition, both withinthe religious field and on the border to other fields. The final section (4.)summarizes the main arguments of the volume’s contributions against thetheoretical backdrop.2. Typologies of social forms in the sociology of religionand beyondVarious typologies of social forms exist in the sociology of religion (both itsGerman-speaking and anglophone variants) and beyond. In this section, weprovide a brief overview of central literature on the subject.The older sociology of religion, in the form of MaxWeber and, interactingwith and building onWeber’s work, Ernst Troeltsch, differentiates church, sect,andmysticism as three main social forms of religion. Broadly speaking, mem-bership in a church (as an ideal type, withWeber) is usually not based on a per-sonal decision or vocation, as people are born into the religious community;churches, as inclusive social forms, tend by and large to accommodate the val-ues of majority society in order to retain adherents; expulsion is correspond-ingly rare; leadership positions require specialized training and are renumer-ated; church structures are hierarchical and bureaucratic, their practices tra-ditional in the sense of being closely oriented towards liturgical rituals (Weber2011 [1920; 1905]; Troeltsch 1931 [1912]).Membership in sects, on the other hand,is voluntary; people elect to join the group in an act of conversion and are eli-gible only through personal qualification, i.e., by adhering to strict behavioralrules; sects, as exclusive social forms, correspondingly reject many values ofMaren Freudenberg and Astrid Reuter: Introduction 9majority society and are swift to punish transgressions with expulsion; lead-ership requires no specialized training but a sense of calling and charisma,structures are more flexible and practices less ritualistic (Weber 2011 [1920];Troeltsch 1931 [1912]).While Troeltsch expandedWeber’s types of church and sect, he addedmys-ticism as a separate social form to refer to the “insistence upon a direct inwardand present religious experience” which “takes for granted the objective formsof religious life inworship, ritual,myth, anddogma” (Troeltsch 1931 [1912]: 730).AlthoughTroeltsch’s acknowledgment of individual spirituality as (potentially)existing separately fromorganized,communal religion ishighly important,weargue that mysticism does not present a genuine social form in its own right,as it designates an individual’s personal, inner religious experience instead ofa mode of social interaction. It is only the act of relaying this personal experi-ence verbally to another individual or a group that gives it a social dimension.The conversion experience in Evangelicalism, Pentecostalism, or CharismaticCatholicism is a fitting case in point: The individual convert typically acceptsJesus “in her heart” as her personal savior before recounting the experience ofbeing saved to fellow believers. But the act of sharing the conversion experi-ence with the group is crucial to gain legitimacy as a ‘true’ believer, as withoutthe confirmation of the group the experience is essentiallyworthless, at least interms of socially integrating the individual believer in the larger collectivity ofthe “saved”.Thenagain, itmayalsobe the case that thegroup itself opensup thespace for conversion experiences in the first place. Thus, in many Pentecostalor Charismatic groups, conversion experience – “baptism in the Spirit”, as it isusually called – is prayed for together.The tension between religious individu-alism and communal integration deserves deeper exploration in its own right(cf. e.g. Hervieu-Léger 2007) and will not be elaborated on here for reasons ofscope. We wish to point out that, in our view, Troeltsch’s mysticism does notqualify as a social form as lacks the dimension of social interaction.This doesnot exclude, however, the possibility ofmystic experiences shaping specific so-cial forms of religion.Weber’s and Troeltsch’s typology received appreciation and critique inequal amounts over the past century. It has been labeled as Eurocentric andtoo strongly molded on Christianity (cf. Dawson 2011 for an overview), and weadd to this the observation that their typology comprises generically religious so-cial forms instead of a range of social formswhichmay ormay not be religious(such as the social form of organization,whichmay be religious or secular) (onthis point, cf. also Petzke/Tyrell 2011). These observations notwithstanding,10 Social Forms of Religionvarious scholars of religion have expanded the typology in different ways sinceits inception, the first being H. Richard Niebuhr, American historian andtheologian (2005 [1929]). In the attempt to apply Troeltsch’s typology, whichwas derived from the European context, to the American religious landscape,Niebuhr added denomination as an additional type to capture the internaldiversity of Christian traditions in theUnited States.TheAmerican sociologistHoward Becker (1940), in turn, proposed an alternative that included thetypes ecclesia, sect, denomination, and cult, while another American sociologist,J. Milton Yinger, distinguished between universal church, ecclesia, denomination,established sect, sect, and cult (Dawson 2011: 528–29). In both cases, inclusive-ness decreases the further one moves from church to cult, but for Becker, thedenomination and cult are both sub-types of sects (with different degreesof formalization). British sociologist Bryan Wilson (1970) offered a sevenfoldsub-typology of sectswhich includes the conversionist, revolutionist, introversionist,manipulationist, thaumaturgical, reformist, and utopian types; each has a differentunderstanding of its role vis-à-vis majority religion and society. Along similarlines, British sociologist Roy Wallis (2019) developed a threefold sub-typologyof cults that also denotes differing relationships to majority society: world-affirming, world-rejecting, and world-accommodating cults. American sociologistsRodney Stark andWilliamS.Bainbridge (1985) distinguish between churches asestablished forms, sects as schismatic forms, and cults as independent forms.More recently, the term new religiousmovement (NRM) has increasingly becomea substitute expression for the term cult, because the latter was deemed toopejorative for academic use due to its everyday connotations. However, NRMas a term and category is also disputed, raising questions of how new NRMsneed to be to qualify as such and where the limits of what qualifies as religionshould be drawn (Cowan 2016; Fox 2010; Dawson 2008). Importantly for thetopic at hand, many of these (and other) expansions of Weber and Troeltsch’stypologies look to degrees of organization, the dynamics of social or reli-gious movements, and the role of communitizing forces, i.e. of deepeninginterpersonal relations.The Austrian-American sociologist Thomas Luckmann displays a very dif-ferent understanding of the social forms of religion, namely as dependent onthe type of society in which a given religion develops.He argues that the socialforms that religions take correspond to wider, non-religious social structures.In this regard, he distinguishes undifferentiated religion in “archaic” societies,religion in “early high cultures”, religion in functionally differentiated soci-eties, and privatized forms of religion in functionally specific, plural societiesMaren Freudenberg and Astrid Reuter: Introduction 11(Luckmann2003).This approach is located on adifferent scale, in termsof bothgeographical and temporal scope, than the preceding typologies.Canadian so-ciologist Peter Beyer follows a similarly global approach, yet his typology of thesocial forms of religion is more closely aligned with organizational sociology.He distinguishes between organized religion, politicized religion, social movementreligion, and communitarian/individualistic religion (Beyer 2003). This brings usto newer approaches in the sociology of religion which partially draw from or-ganizational sociology to distinguish between the social forms of organization,group,market exchange, network,movement, and event, among others.This frame-work is analytically situated on the meso-level of society, between micro-levelsocial interactions and macro-level societal change or stasis, and functions tomediate between themicro andmacro by way of coordinating and structuringsocial activity.This newer perspective on social forms also draws from classical sociology.Social forms are subject to processes of Vergemeinschaftung (communitization,or communal relationships) and Vergesellschaftung (societalization, or associa-tive relationships) and may, in turn, participate in shaping these processes.These terms were coined by Ferdinand Tönnies (1999 [1912]) and developedfurther by Max Weber (2013 [1922]), who emphasized their procedural na-ture, associating communitization with tradition, emotions, and personalrelations, and societalization with rationality, reflexivity, and objectified re-lations. Particularly in his later works, Weber defined communitization as asocial relationship based on a subjective sense of solidarity and shared iden-tity, and societalization as a social relationship focusing on pursuing sharedinterests, emphasizing that all social relations contain elements of both (ibid.).The corresponding social forms in which the dynamics of communitizationand societalization become manifest are (1) the group, defined by personal re-lationships between members, relative stability and durability, shared normsand values that forge a collective identity, and generalized reciprocity, and(2) the organization, defined by fixed membership criteria, the purpose ofattaining specific goals, internal differentiation of tasks and responsibilities,formalized participation procedures, and a hierarchical structure (Krech 2018;Schlamelcher 2018; Lüddeckens/Walthert 2018). Group and organization rep-resent two ends of a continuumof social forms,with others –network,marketexchange, event, etc. – located between them.German sociologists VolkhardKrech, Jens Schlamelcher, andMarkusHerodifferentiate between group (or community), organization, and market exchangeas three main types of social forms as well as between movement and event as12 Social Forms of Religiontwo sub-types (Krech et al. 2013). According to them, the group as the oldest ex-isting social form is characterized by the personal inclusion of its members,the close emotional bond between them, their collective identity and generalreciprocity to stabilize social relationships, its informal structures, and its re-sulting limitations regarding growth. The organization, in contrast, includesmembers based on their roles instead of their personalities, is characterized byformal structures, and is able to make decisions regarding its programmaticgoals, structure, and staff via its personnel. As we elaborate in the next sec-tion, the fact that organizational roles are taken on by ‘real people’, individualswith their own personalities and preferences, presents a dilemma for organi-zations, as their formalized, rational structures are confrontedwith individualattitudes,opinions,andoutlooks.Whilegroupsandorganizations canexist foran unlimited amount of time, Krech et al. argue, themarket exchange is a tem-porally limited social form that, like organizations and unlike groups, includesexchange partners based on their roles not personalities, because the exchangeis a rational formof interaction. Socialmovements are constituted by both com-munal and organizational coordinationmechanisms:The former serve to inte-grate members while the latter serve to propel themovement’s aims and goalsforward.Events, in turn,present amix ofmarket exchange and communitizingritual (Krech et al. 2013: 54–58).A similar typology is offered by German sociologists Patrick Heiser andChristian Ludwig (2014) in their volume on the transformation of social formsof religion. In the introduction, they distinguish five social forms of religion:religious organizations,which emerge fromsects or charismaticmovements andcoalesce into formal organizations through institutionalization and denom-inalization; religious networks (including religious movements) with porousboundaries and the ability to integrate various actors, roles, and identitiesthrough communication via local and global channels; religious communitiza-tion, or alternatively, individualized forms of religious community (akin to thegroup discussed above); marketization as an exchange relationship betweenindividuals and groups based on both a cost/benefit rationale and commu-nal norms and values; and eventization as a spatially, temporally, and sociallycondensed form of communal religious experience which provides sensorystimulation that goes beyond everyday impressions (ibid.: 6–10). Regardingevents, the authors draw from the extensive work of German sociologistsWinfried Gebhard, Ronald Hitzler, and associates (Gebhard et al. 2000; e.g.Hitzler 2011; Hitzler et al. 2009; Gebhardt 2018).Maren Freudenberg and Astrid Reuter: Introduction 13Interestingly, Ludwig and Heiser categorize movements as a sub-type ofnetworks instead of as a social form in its own right. In this sense, they some-what parallel Krech et al.’s perspective on social movements as a type in be-tween group and organization (on this, cf. alsoRoth/Rucht 2008). Socialmove-ment theory has of course long become a distinct field of research in the socialsciences, and it is beyond the scope of this introduction to delve into it exten-sively.As it has been integrated in the sociology of religion as a social form, reli-gious socialmovements (amore general category than new religiousmovements,briefly mentioned above) is defined as networks of groups and organizationsthat establish a collective identity, frame a common goal, and mobilize avail-able resources in order to bring about societal and/or political change that isguided by transcendental aims (Kern/Pruisken 2018). Religion acts as a mobi-lizing force in seeking to give rise to societal transformation in that it typicallyprovides the organizational structures necessary to coordinate action, the ide-ological framework to sustain participants over longer periods of time, and theresources to engage with the broader social environment it is situated within(Williams 2003). In these broad definitions of movement as a social form inthe religious field, it becomes clear that social forms are first and foremost an-alytical categories that help understand and organize empirical reality from asociological perspective.They do not exist in their ‘pure’ analytical form on theground; as we elaborate in the next section, while a given social form may bedominant in a given religious context – such as the type organization is in theRomanCatholic Church –other social forms are evident in the same empiricalcase, such as group,movement,or event ondifferent levels of theCatholic hier-archy. Against the background of these debates about social forms of religion,briefly sketchedhere,wewill nowoutline theguidingquestions and theoreticalideas that we address in this volume.3. Framework of the volume: Theoretical considerations on socialforms of religionIn this section, we propose three central arguments regarding social forms ofreligion: (1) As traditionally structured religions – by which we mean hierar-chical and bureaucratic organizations – are declining both in terms of mem-bership and of public relevance, these same organizations are trying to inno-vate and transform by strengthening community elements and downplayinghierarchy and bureaucracy. This attempt at more community, less organiza-14 Social Forms of Religiontion may be called the societalization of communitization (Vergesellschaftungvon Vergemeinschaftung). (2) This approach brings with it an approximation ofthe social form of community with the core idea of giving power to the people,i.e. empowering laypeople to voice their individual religious convictions andshape their own religious practices. In other words, congruence is sought be-tween the social structure of religion and its semantics: religiondevelops socialforms that correspondwith its religious ideas, and these forms, in turn, struc-ture religious interaction. (3) The aspect of competition thus has a crucial in-fluence on the emergence and consolidation of social forms, as those religionsthat are most successful influence others in terms of dominant social formsand central semantics. In addition, competition plays a decisive role not onlywithin the religious field, but also on the borders between religion and othersocial fields, such as between religion and economics, religion and health care,religion and (pop)culture, or religion and education.Let us discuss these three arguments in more detail now. Our fundamen-tal assumption (basically drawn from Troeltsch) is that religions try to developsocial forms that correspondwith their respective religious ideas (ideas of sal-vation, a God-pleasing life, etc.). In other words: they seek congruence of reli-gious semantics and social structure.This correspondence between semanticsand structure is not unique to social formsof religion, specifically.Social formsof religion, however, tend to be characterized in a particular way by the respec-tive religious self-logic.This can be exemplified by the social form of church: Interms of the sociology of organization, the social form church can be describedas organization.However, churches are atypical organizations (cf. Petzke/Tyrell2011), and in several respects: One aspect is that churches are organizationsthat want to be more than organization. In terms of their religious ideas, theypicture themselves as e.g. a community of sisters and brothers, God-chosenpeople, corpus Christi mysticum, etc.Churches are thus hybrid social forms, characterized by a profound ten-sion of community logics (motivated by religious ideals) and organizationallogics (strictly functional), in other words – and that brings us to our secondargument – by a tension between communitization and societalization. Thistension strengthens a paradox that all organizations (religious or not) have incommon: While the ideal type organization requires including members ac-cording to their function, i.e. not as the individuals they are, the thus formallyexcluded individual is nevertheless de facto present because roles and func-tions are necessarily taken on and carried out by people.Consequently, againsttheir organizational logics, organizations ‘host’ people–with personalities, at-Maren Freudenberg and Astrid Reuter: Introduction 15titudes, preferences, and so on.This paradox is particularly pronounced in reli-giousorganizations,at least inChristian churches, for these claim to“call” everysingle “soul” to salvation by belonging to the church as the individual personthey are.Another aspect of the atypical character of churches as organizations isthat while non-religious organizations usually reduce contingency by makingdecisions according to (ideal-typically) transparent formalized procedures, re-ligious organizations, through sacralizing membership roles, leadership, andthe decision-making process itself, make contingency invisible.The responsi-bility for decisions anddecision-making procedures, for rituals, ethical princi-ples, etc., is thus delegated to an authority beyond this world which is unavail-able. It is precisely this mechanism that reduces the feeling of uncertainty andhelps cope with contingency.Despite the tension between community logics and organizational logicsdescribed above, organizations, including churches, may themselves be com-munity-productive at the same time. As research on Mainline Protestantismin the United States has shown, denominations have responded to their mas-sivemembership decline by launching top-down, community-building initia-tives on the congregational level in the attempt to get more people involvedin local churches (Freudenberg 2018). Church organizations thus play a rolein implementing the program ‘more community, less organization’. Tensionsbetween the religiously regulative idea of community and the requirement ofthe organization of this communalitymay also set religious change inmotion.Thus, the longing for ‘more community, less organization’ as well as the long-ing for shared personal conversion experiences instead of rigid ritual practiceseems to be an isomorphic tendency of our times in the Christian field in theAmericas and, though less pronounced, in Europe. The Evangelical LutheranChurch in America, the country’s second-largest Mainline denomination, forinstance, has exhibited a strong orientation toward the congregational auton-omy and pronounced community culture so prevalent in American Evangeli-calism (ibid.). As community logics increasingly spread and are embedded ona societal scale, ‘more community’ seems to become a goal and ideal even forhighly societalized formsof religion,e.g. religious organizations.We thereforesuggest considering the societalization of communitization (Vergesellschaftungvon Vergemeinschaftung) as a central framework in contemporary global Chris-tianity.If we now look at the dynamics of social forms of religion in a given reli-gious field (Bourdieu 1985; 1987 [1971]; 1991 [1971]; Bourdieu/SaintMartin 1982),16 Social Forms of Religionwemust take into account that each religious field is composed of different re-ligious ‘sub-fields’ (including e.g. the Catholic field, Protestant field, Christianfield, Islamic field, Jewish field, etc.). Both levels of the field are entangled, andthe dynamics of religious social forms within a sub-field (such as e.g. Catholi-cism) must be analyzed in the context of the dynamics (of social forms) in thebroader religious field. This brings us back to our third argument regardingsocial forms of religion: The competition between religions or denominationsor between religion and other social fields may lead either to the adoption ofsuccessful social forms from competing (religious or non-religious) actors orto their deliberate rejectionwith the aimof sharpening one’s ownprofile.Whatis a given community’s position in the respective religious sub-field, in thebroader religious field, and in the structure of different social fields in relationto each other? And what role does its dominant social form play in the processof its positioning in the (sub-)field? If a given community fails, how might itsdemise be connected to theways inwhich its adherents organize(d) to practicetheir faith? Religious or denominational competition is thus a decisive factorin the emergence and consolidation of social forms of religion.Clearly, social forms are communally productive. When individuals cometogether to practice their faith, this creates and strengthens interpersonal re-lationships and community ties.At the same time,different social forms createdifferent kinds of space for individual and collective religious experience andvalues to emerge. Social forms enable individual religious experience, whichin Christianity requires communal grounding and validation to become legit-imate and authentic. In this way, the tension between individual religion andreligious community is negotiated by way of different social forms. This vol-ume’s case studies offer a range of empirical examples of the social forms to befound in Christianity and are briefly introduced in the next section.4. Outline of the volumeThe contributions bring together case studies that demonstrate the pluralityand dynamics of Christianity in Europe and the Americas, with a focus on its(changing) social forms.In The Four Phases of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal (1967–2017), ValérieAubourg focuses on the development of the Catholic Charismatic Renewalin light of its changing relationship to Pentecostalism. While the first phase(1967–1982) was characterized strongly by Pentecostal experience that enteredMaren Freudenberg and Astrid Reuter: Introduction 17Catholicism through grassroots religious communities, the second phase(1982–1997) saw a routinization of charisma and a renewed emphasis on theCatholic Church as an organization. In the third phase (1997-early 2000s),the Charismatic Renewal sought renewed proximity to (neo-)Pentecostalismby adopting experiential practices; the fourth stage (since the early 2000s) ischaracterized by the continued adoption of typically Pentecostal elements overand above the Charismatic Renewal in the strict sense and the ‘infiltration’of Charismatic-style elements into conventional Catholic practice. In termsof social forms, Aubourg traces a shift from organization to group and net-work, reflecting a larger process of adopting religious social forms to religiousindividualization within the Catholic Church.In ‘Catholic’ and ‘Charismatic’: Two Logics of Legitimization and the Negotiationof Belonging in theGermanCatholic Charismatic Renewal,HannahGrünenthal an-alyzes this very tension between organization and network/group within theGerman Catholic Charismatic Renewal (GCCR). Tracing the GCCR’s twofoldlogic of legitimization – the ‘Catholic’ and the ‘Charismatic’ logic – she showswhich strategies are necessary formembers to assert their positionwithin twovery different contexts: recognizing hierarchy, structure, tradition, and thedoctrine of the Catholic Church, on the one hand, and emphasizing personalreligious experiences and the experience of the Holy Spirit, on the other. Or-ganizational logics are at times at oddswith network or group logics,meaningthat GCCR members require flexibility to adapt to a range of social forms tomaintain adherence to both the Catholic and the Charismatic world.In “I am happy to be Catholic”: The Catholic Charismatic Renewal and the Dy-namics of the Religious Field in Brazil, Astrid Reuter looks at ongoing changeswithin Latin American Catholicism, namely in Brazil. She takes as her pointof departure the fact that Charismatic movements have experienced an unex-pected boom in Brazilian Catholicism since the 1970s and increasingly sincethe 1990s and interprets this growth as resulting fromboth the dynamics of thereligious field in Brazil as a whole and from the dynamics of the Catholic sub-field. She argues that the rise of Pentecostalism since the 1950s and 1960s hasset in motion a previously unknown dynamic of competition which coincideswith converging religious beliefs and demands (beliefs in spiritual beings andaspirations for personal spiritual experiences). Competition and convergenceare thus interconnected, which, Astrid Reuter argues, fosters a dynamic of‘mimicry’ both in relation to the style of piety and to the religious social formsthat support this style.18 Social Forms of ReligionIn Everyday Familialism in the Emmanuel Community, Samuel Dolbeau fo-cuses on the family as the guiding model for social relations within CatholicCharismatic communities in Europe, as becomes evident in the EmmanuelCommunity. Here, familialism structures community life in various ways, in-cluding not only day-to-day activities but also religious, political, and socialinvolvement in broader society. This serves to support recent Catholic initia-tives on sexuality and gender issues. Members are involved in and committedto the community todifferentdegrees, fromsporadic to full-timeengagement,which results in a range of social forms – from dyad and group to networkand organization – and a distinct gender regime influencing not only familydynamics but also the perception of clerical roles. As the Emmanuel Commu-nity is the largest Catholic Charismatic community in Europe, the dynamicsdescribed by Samuel Dolbeau could point to future changes in the CatholicChurch as a whole.In Capital of Closed Churches: Heritage Buildings as Social Entrepreneurship inQuebec,Hillary Kaell highlights urban, historic churches that often also housecommunity organizations and run the danger of closing as resulting in com-munity hubs as a new social formwithin North American Christianity. She ar-gues that such hubs derive value from their location on the border of histor-ically religious forms (heritage churches), economic forms (corporate invest-ment), and the public sphere,drawing froma case study in inner-cityMontrealas an example. Showing that churches in decline are seizing the opportunity toleverage tax-free land as their primary asset, the chapter emphasizes social en-trepreneurship as a key area where religion and market intersect: communityhubs are framed as a smart real estate investment for private investorswith so-cial purpose goals, while Christian property, supported by private investment,becomes central to reinvigorating Christian influence in the public sphere.In God Is Not at Church: Digitalization as Authentic Religious Practice in anAmerican Megachurch, Ariane Kovac investigates how digitalization has fun-damentally transformed the organizational structure of Churchome, anAmerican Evangelical megachurch, and how the church justified this processand incorporated it into its theology. She argues that Churchome uses itsdigital approach to emphasize the ideal of communitization and to presentitself as an authentic and exciting organization. The resulting changes inmembership structure have led to a diversification of how members relate tothe church and an eventization of church life. In this way, Churchome is ableto counter internal and external criticism against megachurches per se andMaren Freudenberg and Astrid Reuter: Introduction 19its move into the digital in particular. Kovac’s case study reveals the manifoldways in which changing social forms influence religious semantics.In Shapeshifting theChristianRight:TheMoralMajority as aFaith-BasedOrgani-zation and the Immanent Turn of Evangelicalism in the Late 20th Century, SebastianSchüler looks at nonprofit organizations as a specific religious social form.Theauthor starts from the premise that religious movements would hardly sur-vive or gain social and political influence without organizations.He illustratesthis assumption by using the Moral Majority as an example of how the Chris-tian Right evolved from a loose network of church organizations into a politi-cally successful movement by adopting new forms of organization.The Chris-tian Right thus underwent an immanent turn, increasingly adapting its so-cial forms and semantics to secular forms of organization and legal discourse.With his contribution, Schüler sheds light on a somewhat hidden aspect of so-cial forms of religion by expanding the understanding of this concept to thesocial forms that allow religions to act efficiently in the political sphere. Hiscase study is right-wing American Christianity, but his approach could also beapplied to other religious settings.In Social Forms in Neo-Pentecostal Prosperity Contexts: From Network to MarketExchange, Maren Freudenberg discusses the various social forms that play arole in prosperity theology. In these contexts, religious interaction andpracticeis coordinated byway of groups, events, organizations, networks,movements,and market exchanges, while the market exchange is a particularly salient so-cial form due to its congruence with prosperity semantics. Freudenberg high-lights that prosperity theologies teach that investment not only in one’s per-sonal faith and one’s congregation, but also and importantly on the secularmarket, will be rewarded by God, and that these semantics are mirrored ona structural level by themarket exchange as a form of transaction between twoparties. She concludes that because financial risk-taking and success on thesecularmarket are coded religiously as signs of depth of faith and divine grace,the market exchange complements these core tenets by translating semanticsinto structure.In Pentecostal Social Engagement in Contemporary Guatemala, Virginia Gar-rard discusses emerging social forms in the context of Pentecostal socialengagement in Central American Guatemala. Pentecostals in recent decadeshave shifted from a hermeneutics of separation from the world to a stancewhich embraces social and political participation, cohering into social formsthat emphasize collective mobilization and participation. As Garrard shows,this development corresponds to a shifting emphasis on religious ideals and20 Social Forms of Religiontheologies that become self-reinforcing logics within the vertical and horizon-tal networks of the church. Pastors build strong vertical patriarchal relationswith their congregants and purposefully encourage strong lateral networkswithin “small groups” that strengthen group cohesion and the church as an in-stitution. As these social relationships evolve, Garrard argues, they transformthe role of the church as an organization to one of increased, outward-facingsocial action.In Social Forms in Orthodox Christian Convert Communities in North America,Sebastian Rimestad and Katherine Kelaidis examine conversion dynamics inthe Orthodox Church in North America, which is a refuge from liberalism andperceived social relativism formany.OrthodoxChristian convert communitiesuse various social forms in order to create this image of the Orthodox Churchasadivinely inspired counterculture,with the effect of challengingexistingOr-thodoxChristian communities,who are oftenmore concernedwith ethnic andcultural affiliation and wish to integrate intoWestern culture.The authors ar-gue that this kind of individualization of North AmericanOrthodoxy indicatesthat hierarchical structures are becoming less important while community el-ements are gaining in prevalence, suggesting a dynamic of societalization ofcommunitization.In Forever Into Eternity: Social Forms of Religion in the Temple Wedding of TheChurch of JesusChrist of the Latter-daySaints,Marie-ThereseMäder introduces usto theMormonwedding ritual of the “sealing” ceremony at the temple to illus-trate not only the profound significance of this event in the life of a Latter-daySaint but also to highlight the dyad of the martial couple as well as processesof religious communitization that occur during the ritual and its eventizationas important social forms of religion in present-dayMormonism.Through in-terviews with long-married members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the largest branch of Mormonism,Mäder retrospectively uncoversthe impact of the collectively experienced temple ceremony.Insa Pruisken’s contribution Organizing ‘Private Religion’: Types of Gover-nance in American Protestantism shifts the focus from empirical perspectivesto systematic considerations. Pruisken adds a governance perspective to thesocial forms approach as we outline it in this introduction, discussing threeelementary mechanisms of governance forms (mutual observation, influ-ence, and negotiation) and relating these to types of actors in the AmericanProtestant field, including individual believers, communities, congregations,denominations, and special purpose groups. Building on constellations ofmutual negotiation, she then distinguishes six types of governance formsMaren Freudenberg and Astrid Reuter: Introduction 21in American Protestantism –denominational regulation, democratic self-governance, hierarchical self-governance, stakeholder guidance, competition,and network governance – and discusses the role of organizations for what,followingThomas Luckmann, she calls the “private form” of religion.AcknowledgementsThis anthology is the result of a cooperation between the two editors as partof the Cluster of Excellence ‘Religion and Politics’ at the University ofMünster.Funded by the Cluster, we were able to organize two international workshops:In June 2022, we discussed the history and present of ‘Charismatic Catholi-cism in Europe and the Americas’ at the University of Münster. ‘Religious So-cial Forms in American Christianity Yesterday and Today’ was the topic of thefollow-upworkshop held at theCenter for Religious Studies at RuhrUniversityBochum inMarch 2023.The Cluster not only provided funding for both work-shops, but also made the publication of this volume possible through coveringthe printing costs.We are grateful for the generous support.We also wish to thank all participants of the workshops for their presenta-tions, their active engagement in the discussions, and their willingness to de-velop their presentations into contributions for this volume.Weare very grate-ful for the fruitful cooperation with every contributing author!A big thank you also goes to the administrative staff and student assistantswho made the workshops possible. 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(1970): ReligiousSects: ASociological Study,London:Weiden-feld & NicolsonThe Four Phases of the CatholicCharismatic Renewal (1967–2017)1Valérie AubourgAbstract This article focuses on the Catholic Charismatic Renewal by looking at its de-velopment from 1967 to the present day through the prism of its social forms in light ofits relationship to Pentecostalism. I identify four phases: the first (1967–1982) duringwhich the Pentecostal experience entered Catholicism and translated into the birth anddevelopment of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal; followed by a phase of retreat into itsCatholic identity and ‘routinisation’ of charisma (1982–1997); then, in the third phase,theCharismaticRenewal sought tofindnew impetus bymoving closer to neo-Pentecostalnetworks (since 1997); and, finally and simultaneously, a ‘post-charismatic’ stage (sincethe early 2000s) corresponding to thewide introduction of typically Pentecostal elementsintoCatholicism, over andabove theCharismaticRenewal in the strict sense of the term.Keywords Catholicism, Charismatic Renewal, Church, Evangelicalism, Pentecostal-ism, Protestantism1. IntroductionOn June 3, 2017, the Charismatic Renewal celebrated its jubilee in Rome. Fiftythousand pilgrims from 120 countries were gathered for the vigil of Pentecost.TheCircusMaximuswas deliberately chosen over the Roman basilicas or SaintPeter’s Square in order to accommodate the dozens of representatives of vari-ous Christian churches invited for the occasion.They were seated on the plat-formor in the front rows.Among them,Giovanni Traettino,pastor of theEvan-gelical Church of Reconciliation in Caserta, spoke for about 15 minutes. Not-1 This article is based on the book “Réveil Catholique. Emprunts évangéliques dans lecatholicisme” (Aubourg 2020).26 Social Forms of Religioning that 2017 was also the year of the 500th anniversary of the Reformation, hestressed that “Catholics andEvangelicals share a similar experience of theHolySpirit”. He went on to cite the various papal initiatives that had fostered “anunprecedented development” of relations with many pastors: “the visit to theEvangelical Church of Reconciliation in Caserta, asking Italian Pentecostalsfor forgiveness, the encouragement given to US pastors, and even this historicPentecostal meeting … Since the election of Cardinal Bergoglio as pope, an-other seasonhas begun”2.WhenPopeFrancis’ turn at themicrophone came,hestressed the importance of interfaith relations: “Today Christian unity is moreurgent than ever […] we desire to be a reconciled diversity”3.The Pope went onto preach conversion, a transformed life, and Baptism in the Holy Spirit.This event provides an opportunity to look back at the history and devel-opment of the Charismatic Renewal through the prism of its links with Pen-tecostalism. As Pastor Traettino’s words suggest, this is a long-standing rela-tionship, since the Catholic Charismatic movement has its origins in Pente-costalism. Nevertheless, the Catholic Church was long suspicious of CatholicCharismatics, many of whom distanced themselves from Pentecostalism.TheRoman event shows the extent to which the situation has changed.In fifty years, the Charismatic Renewal has been through different phases,different ‘seasons’, to take up the Italian pastor’s image, going from the open-ing up of springtime to the retreat into theCatholic identity ofwintertime.Thehistory of the Charismaticmovement is generally divided into threemajor pe-riods4: first, the blossoming years (1967–1982), during which the Pentecostalexperience entered Catholicism in the form of an initial ‘renewal’, followed bya retreat into its Catholic identity (1982–1997). This second period led to itsroutinization. In a bid to reassure the ecclesiastical institution, certain Pen-tecostal practices were abandoned (demonic deliverance, resting in the spirit,etc.), emotional expressions became less and less exuberant, prayer meetingsfollowed an increasingly repetitive format, turning into real paraliturgical as-semblies. Finally, a period of rapprochement with the neo-Pentecostals fol-lowed with the aim of reviving the Renewal (since 1997). To this, I will add a2 Pastor Traettino’s statement, Rome, June 3, 2017, personal notes.3 Pope’s statement, Rome, June 3, 2017, personal notes.4 In North America as in Europe, the number of years allocated to each period variesby country and by observer (in Quebec, for example, Côté and Zylberberg date thesecond period from 1974 to 1978, and the third from 1978 to 1982), but the substanceof each phase is comparable.Valérie Aubourg: The Four Phases of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal (1967–2017) 27fourth so-called ‘post-charismatic’ phase which corresponds to the introduc-tion of typically Pentecostal elements into Catholicism outside of the Charis-matic Renewal sensu stricto.Since its birth, the Charismatic Renewal has taken the form of prayergroups and communities. We are dealing with believers who emphasize theHoly Spirit so that they, and through them, the world they live in, can betransformed. However, Jean-René Bertrand and Colette Muller note that thesocial forms of this current “are so different, it is difficult to provide a completediagnosis and classify this whole variety of communities. Each one is activein its own way, spreads the evangelical message according to its ways of livingand engaging, most often within the known ecclesiastical structures of themovements, the parish, the diocese, but also sometimes within the widersociety in which members are involved, investing of their time and energy”(Bertrand/Muller 2004: 225). 5 As also underlined by Martine Cohen “at firstthe Charismatic Renewal was not a movement of social reconquest under-taken in the name of a Catholicism that saw itself as homogeneous. Rather, itwas a kind of religious explosion whose social manifestations quickly becamedistinct” (Cohen 1986: 66). In France, when the Catholic Charismatic Renewalwas born, the social form that dominated in the Catholic Church was that ofactivists invested in society, like “the salt in the dough” of the earth (Matthew5:13-16).Theywere grouped around age or social classes: children, young farm-ers, workers, health professionals, pensioners, etc. In contrast, Charismaticactivism brought together lay persons, ordained individuals, youths, families,workers, and senior executives around praying.The first two phases have been widely documented in North America(Csordas 1995; Côté/Zylberberg 1990; Ciciliot 2019), in Italy (Pace 2020), andin France (Landron 2004, Pina 2001; Cohen/Champion 1993). We have bene-fitted from precise surveys in which several researchers have described oneor several aspects of the Charismatic Renewal: healing (Charuty 1987), prayerassemblies (Parasie 2005), glossolalia (Aubourg 2014), prophecy (McGuire,1977), the exercise of authority (Plet 1990), its meaning and significance (Vetö2012), etc. We have also benefitted from quantitative studies which estimatethere were 119 million charismatic Catholics in the world twenty years ago(Barrett/Johnson 2005). They show how the Renewal grew rapidly during itsfirst twenty years, corresponding to the first stage of its development (thefocus of the first part of this article) and the beginning of the second (the5 All translations by the author unless indicated otherwise.28 Social Forms of Religionfocus of the second part), before seeing a decline in the Western countries.In response, interdenominational initiatives were taken to revive religiousenthusiasm. These will be presented in the third part of this article. Finally, Iwill conclude by showing how groups and parishes describing themselves ascompletely foreign to the Charismatic Renewal are now taking up Pentecostalpractices (Aubourg 2020), demonstrating a certain “evangelicalization” ofChristianity (Willaime 2011: 346). Throughout this paper, I will draw on datamainly from Europe (France and Italy) and North America.2. Birth and development of the Charismatic RenewalIn January 1967, four lay teachers and students from Duquesne University inPittsburgh, Pennsylvania, experienced “baptism in the Holy Spirit” among agroup of Episcopal Pentecostals.This experience quickly spread to student circles at theUniversity ofNotre-Damedu Lac in SouthBend, Indiana, theUniversity ofMichigan in AnnArbor,and the Franciscan University of Steubenville, Ohio. It then extended beyondthe academic world through the creation of prayer groups in traditionalparishes. In 1973, there were 855 prayer groups in the United States and 65in Canada. 200.000 people had joined the movement in 1972, and 670.000in 1976 (Barrett 1982). Edward Denis O’Connor’s estimations arrive at a lowernumber. According to him, an American priest and theologian, by June 1974,100.000 people had joined the movement in North America (O’Connor 1975:19). The movement simultaneously traveled abroad, beginning with Anglo-Saxon countries.There were prayer groups in 13 countries in 1969, in 25 coun-tries in 1970, and in 93 countries by 1975. In less than ten years, the movementhad become established on all continents. In regions such as Africa, it was sosuccessful that it led the Jesuit anthropologist Meinrad Hegba to speak of a“veritable tidal wave” (Hegba 1995: 67).The Catholic Charismatic Renewal spread in a relatively spontaneousmanner, thanks to laypersons, priests, or monks and nuns who discovered themovement whilst visiting the United States and then introduced it to theirhome countries. It also spread throughAmericanCharismatics who promotedit during their travels abroad. Finally, some groups that were initially formedoutside the Catholic Charismatic Renewal subsequently joined it.The Charis-matic Renewal included a verywide range of individuals all over theworldwhooccasionally took part in various groups and activities: prayer assemblies, con-Valérie Aubourg: The Four Phases of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal (1967–2017) 29ferences, conventions, spiritual retreats, evangelization schools, publishinghouses, new communities, etc.The first phase of this Catholic Pentecostalism was characterized by “in-dividual entrepreneurship and sacred effervescence” (Côté/Zylbergberg 1990:84). It translated into a profusion of highly diverse prayer groups, several ofwhich gave birth to so-called new communities: in theUnited States,TheWordof God (1969); in France, L’Emmanuel (1972; cf. Dolbeau’s chapter in this vol-ume), Le Chemin Neuf (1973), La Théophanie (1972), Le Pain de Vie (1976), LePuits de Jacob (1977) etc. Prayer groups and communities organized regularjoint gatherings fostering relations between Catholics and Pentecostals. Thissocial formwas directly inherited from Pentecostalism and,more broadly, theEvangelical tradition of camp meetings (large revival conventions held in the18th century).Charismatic entities borrowed from Pentecostalism its emphasis on con-version (or reconversion), the proclamation of the Gospel, the experience of“baptism in the Holy Spirit”, and the charismatic manifestations that are be-lieved to flow from it (healing, glossolalia, prophecy).Charismaticprayersweremainlyprayersofpraise,withanemphasis on re-ligious emotions, real-life testimonies, and spontaneous expressions of faith.The body played a central part through rhythmic chants, dancing, and manygestures and postures such as clapping hands.This type of prayer attracted in-dividuals in search of all kinds of divine favor, including healing, fertility, andmarital success.Apart from Pentecostal practices and beliefs, most of the communitiesemerging from the Charismatic Renewal adopted a strict orthopraxy char-acteristic of Evangelical circles: strong condemnation of behavior deemedimmoral, such as adultery, prohibition of drinking and smoking, wariness ofmusic (particularly rockmusic), a ban on gambling, as well as a condemnationof yoga, divinatory astrology, and spiritism. Proof of the condemnation of thistype of practice in France can readily be found in themany books sold in Evan-gelical libraries. Authors bear witness to the way in which they categoricallyrenounced astrology, New Age, esotericism, etc. (cf. Doerin/Von Der Wense2009; Beekmann 1998; Foucart 2015).Going beyond the strictly religious sphere, the changes linked to the expe-rience of “baptism in the Holy Spirit” had to involve the whole life of a Catholicconvert: from one’s social relations through one’s daily attitude to one’s rep-resentation of society. This ethical dimension also affected gender relations:not only did women wear skirts and men grew beards, but male authority30 Social Forms of Religionwas ascribed to greater value. There was a strong distinction between maleand female roles.Thematernal function was highly valorized and charismaticwomen usually had more children than their fellow countrywomen and oftenchose to stay at home to raise them. They followed an ethic that placed mis-trust of ostentatious attitudes over their bodies: hardly any make-up, tattoos,perfume, eccentric hairstyles, bare shoulders, visible knees, or tight-fittingclothes. However, the Charismatic Movement (like Pentecostalism) did itsbest to simultaneously endorse the symbolic advantages of male domination(in terms of both ethics and confessional practice) and promote the femalevirtues expounded by a theology that encouraged emotions (Malogne-Fer/Fer2015: 13).Nevertheless, while appropriating the major features of Pentecostalism,Charismatics retained their Catholic identity: they defended Catholic doc-trine, attended parish services regularly, and respected the Church hierarchy.Distancing themselves from political issues and the progressivism of theirCatholic coreligionists, Charismatics preferred to revive traditional prac-tices abandoned in the post-conciliar years: recitation of the rosary, Marianpilgrimages, individual confession, prostration, adoration of the BlessedSacrament, etc. From the point of view of their ecclesiastical integration, evenif the new communities’ way of life was similar to that of religious orders(vow of obedience, sharing of goods, daily life punctuated by the recitationof offices), Charismatic communities enjoyed the status of “associations ofthe faithful” (private or public) and were placed under the authority of thebishop of the diocesewhere theywere set up. Some of themwere subsequentlyrecognized as international associations directly linked to the Dicastery forthe Laity, Family, and Life,while others set up clerical associations of pontificalright. Since 1993, the Bishops’ Conference of France has done an inventory ofCharismatic communities and distinguished between several types of com-munities based on how they are organized andwork and, secondarily, on theiractivities (Bertrand/Muller 2004).The Charismatic Renewal was born in a church that was grappling withthe effects of Vatican II. Indeed, the Council introduced reformswhose effectswereperceptible in thebirth of theCharismaticRenewal, such as openingup toother Christian denominations, the importance given to lay persons, and therenewal of the liturgy. InFrance, itwasa continuationof thepost-1968 counter-cultural protestmovement. In this favorable context, the Renewal representeda formof social and religious protest. It challenged aCatholicism thatwas per-ceived to have become too prosaic, too alignedwith the normsof global society,Valérie Aubourg: The Four Phases of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal (1967–2017) 31having eliminated all wonder and sensitive emotions from one’s personal en-gagement and from the liturgy (Cohen/Champion 1993: 79).However, unlike inPentecostalism, at that point, the protest occurredwithin the Church since thegroups that belonged to this movement remained faithful to Rome.TheCatholic Church’s view of the Renewal was largely skeptical, if not neg-ative.The important role given to the laity in running the movement and theirclaim that they acted directly under the influence of theHoly Spiritmade themuncontrollable in the eyes of some in the hierarchy. The Charismatic Renewalwas viewed critically because of its tendency towards an emotional Christian-ity that seemed to devalue engagement in society, and because of the perceivedarrogance of these new converts who presented themselves as the future of theChurch.Even though, unlike Pentecostal converts, Catholic Charismatics did notabandon the pews of theChurch anddidnot breakwith their “lineage of believ-ers” (Hervieu-Léger 1999), they neverthelesswent through a process of individ-ualization of their religious experience. This phenomenon manifested in theemergence of “elective fraternities”made up of Renewal prayer groups and thenew communities. Indeed, their adherence to these groups represented a per-sonal choice that emancipated them from the communities they belonged to,particularly their parishes. These voluntary affiliations further changed theirrelations with their family circles.But over time, contrary to what the religious authorities feared, theCatholic Charismatics became integrated into the Church. The Jesuit theolo-gian Sullivan even noted the opposite trend: “On the contrary, the evidencesuggests that their Pentecostal experience turned Catholics into more faith-ful participants in the life of the Church” (Sullivan 1988: 87). This fidelity tothe Catholic Church explains the fact that, after being called “Catholic Pente-costalism”, “neo-Pentecostalism”, or the “Pentecostalmovement in theChurch”(O’Connor 1975: 18), the movement was finally referred to as the “CharismaticRenewal” and, soon after, the “Renewal”. It also explains the fact that sev-eral church leaders gradually began to look favorably upon the Charismaticmovement and give it their support. On May 18 and 19, 1975, on the feastof Pentecost, 12.000 people from more than 60 countries took part in thethird international Catholic Charismatic Renewal conference in Rome, wherePope Paul VI asked them this question: “How could this Renewal not be anopportunity for the Church and for the world? And how, in this case, could wenot do everything possible to ensure that it remains so?” (La Documentationcatholique 1975: 562). By calling the Renewal an “opportunity”, the Pope not32 Social Forms of Religiononly offered the Charismatic Movement the legitimacy it hoped for, but healso encouraged the development of this “new spring for the Church”. Thisevent illustrates the opening up to Pentecostalism, but also the institutionalassertion of control over the Charismatic Renewal. Pauline Côté and JacquesZylberberg underline these two aspects: a “Protestant expansion and accul-turation”, on the one hand, and the beginning of an exogenous control closelyinterwoven with the endogenous structuring of the Charismatic Renewal, onthe other (Côté/Zylberberg 1990: 83–84).The years that followed, and especiallythe 1980s, would be particularly marked by this second aspect: its integrationinto the Catholic matrix.3. Retreat into Catholic identityThe 1980s represent a second stage in the development of the Renewal. Aftera difficult start between the Charismatic Movement and the Catholic Church,relations became easier. As Christine Pina points out, these pacified relationswere “proof of a twofold movement whereby the Renewal mellowed and theCatholic Church adopted a more moderate stance as it wished to both makeuse of the vigor and mobilizing potential of this current and permanentlyanchor the Renewal in the universal Church by lessening its protest-orientedaspect” (Pina 2001: 29). It is true that some of the Renewal’s innovations were“potentially destabilizing for the institutional system” (Cohen 1990: 144).Thus,in order to become lessmarginal and at the same time reassure theChurch, theCharismatic Movement made a number of pledges to the Roman institution,namely that it would use emblematic figures (saints,mystics, popes), reappro-priate the history of the ecclesiastical tradition and bring back devotions thathad fallen out of favor. Pentecostal practices were either abandoned or trans-formed. Prophecies – particularly those related to the end times – becamerare. There were fewer and less visible healings. Their conception changed to“conversion” or “inner healing”.The ecclesiastical institution, which sought toregulate charismatic practices, issued warnings about them. In particular, theChurch issued recommendations concerning certain practices such as exor-cism, which it reserved for priests, or “resting in the Spirit”, which it banned.According to Martine Cohen, this evolution led these Charismatic practicesto become markedly less spectacular (Cohen 1986: 69). Delivery practices, forexample, became more cautious.The Dominican Jean-Claude Sagne, an exor-cist in the diocese of Lyon and a member of a charismatic Community, urgedValérie Aubourg: The Four Phases of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal (1967–2017) 33believers to be wary of “grand, noisy, and violent displays” and instead favor“detachment, silence, and adoration”. He emphasized “discernment”, whichaimed to distinguish mental disorders from supernatural elements (Sagne1994: 124). As for the idea of conversion associated with ”baptism in the HolySpirit”, this was euphemized: groups such as the Emmanuel community re-placed it with the term “outpouring of the Spirit” to clearly distinguish it fromthe Pentecostal experience. Prayer meetings became increasingly repetitive informat. In several French prayer groups, it was noted how, over time, thesemeetings turned into real paraliturgical assemblies. It was therefore clear thata process of “routinization of charisma” (Weber 1947) was at work.The regulation of theCharismatic Renewalwas attended by a restructuringof the movement. The Catholic charismatic landscape was organized aroundtwo main types of religious groupings: communities, on the one hand, andprayer groups,on the other.The communities themselveswere subdivided intothree categories: firstly, there were covenant communities, which brought to-gether individuals that continued to be part of working life and civil society,including those who had taken vows.Then there were life communities, whichbrought all categories of people together in one place in order to engage incontemplative forms of prayer while observing rules of life similar to thoseof monasteries. Finally, a third category includedmixed forms, that is, house-holds that followed various rules and groups that met periodically to pray, forexample (Bertrand/Muller 2004).The communities were more visible, and their organization was more for-mal than that of the prayer groups. Inmost communities, irrespective of theirspecific social form, members made a solemn commitment, were subject tothe obligations imposedby a codeof conduct, and renderedmutual services. Inthese communities, the founder played a key role.Themembers of these com-munities were generally younger than those of the prayer groups and their in-volvement within the community was more restrictive than in a simple prayergroup.On the other hand, in prayer groups, the leader – called a “shepherd” –did not play a major part.This second type of assembly did not require inten-sive commitment from its members. However, even if their membership wasmore fluid and mobile, prayer groups made the effort to structure themselvesby setting up national coordination bodies. In France they took the name Fra-34 Social Forms of Religionternité Pentecôte (‘Pentecostal Fraternity’).6 Local Renewal delegates were ap-pointed with the aim of “establishing dependence on the Bishop”. An “ecclesi-astical subsystem”was thus set up (Côté/Zylberberg 1990: 85).This institutional evolution of the Charismatic Renewal was criticized byProtestants, who also noted that the movement had clearly distanced itselffrom ecumenism. “With a few exceptions, it was always the Protestants whotook the initiative of organizing major interdenominational meetings. TheCatholic authorities kept encouraging the charismatics of their denomina-tions to organize themselves and invite their leaders to Rome”, notes OlivierLandron (2004: 251). As Valentina Ciciliot has shown in her study on therelations between Catholic Charismatics and other US Christian groups inthe late 1960s and 1970s, “the abundant interconnections between Catholiccharismatic and Protestant leaderswere put in the background, if not partiallycensored, for the sake of acknowledgement and acceptance” (Ciciliot 2021: 2).In North America, the Charismatic Renewal predominantly involved mid-dle and upper classes. In France, it also appealed to marginalized populations(homeless people, patients of psychiatric hospitals, backpackers, former drugaddicts, conscientious objectors). It offered weekly meetings with a friendlyatmosphere, helped by the norms of behavior implicitly prescribed in these as-semblies: they calledeachotherby theirfirstnames,used informal formsof ad-dress, kissed upon arriving and leaving, and did notmake anymention of theirprofessions… All these elements marked the fact that they belonged to a mi-crosociety founded on a familial metaphor that erased the differences of gen-eration and position within the social hierarchy. Furthermore, prayer groupsand regional gatherings enabled followers to form relationships of friendshipand mutual aid outside their families and professional circles (Charuty 1990:75).This created a sense of psychological security and personal reassurance.As for the new communities, they were characterized by the fact that theyencouraged relations of solidarity rather than competition betweenmembers.They distanced themselves from modern societies’ conception of social tiescentered on individual will. This solidarity may be interpreted as an attemptto counteract the fragmentation experienced by societies in modernity. From6 Founded in 1976, the group was initially made up of representatives of Charismaticcommunities and two representatives of prayer groups. Since 1988, it has brought to-gether 23 individuals in charge of coordinating prayer groups not affiliated to com-munities. There are currently 1200 groups linked to this body, which is advised by apriest.Valérie Aubourg: The Four Phases of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal (1967–2017) 35a sociographic perspective, the leaders of these Catholic communities wereable to gather around them a number of followers who were sufficientlymotivated and stable (they were in general better equipped culturally thanprayer group members) to implement their innovations. That is why mostfounders belonged to the bourgeoisie or middle classes (Landron 2004: 85;Cohen 1990: 144).In terms of the governance of the Renewal, RalphMartin had set up a firstInternational Communications Office (ICO) in Ann Arbor, USA, in 1972. Ea-ger to strengthen the link between this entity and the Catholic authorities,in 1976, Cardinal Suenens transferred the ICO to the Bishopric of Mechelen-Brussels and, in 1978, changed it into the International Catholic CharismaticRenewal Office (ICCRO). The 1980s saw the institutionalization of this officeand the consolidation of its links with the Roman authorities. It first moved toRome in 1981, and finally to the Vatican in 1985. In 1993, the Pontifical Coun-cil for the Laity granted it pontifical recognition (i.e. approval of its statutes asan international service organization), and its name was changed to Interna-tional Catholic Charismatic Renewal Services (ICCRS), thus emphasizing thatit was a pastoral ministry service rather than merely an administrative office.Theorganization’s aimwas to promote relations betweenCatholicCharismaticentities and liaise with the Holy See.7Throughout his pontificate (1978–2005), John Paul II gave his constantfirm support to the Charismatic Renewal.The Polish Pope saw themovement’sevangelizing potential and stressed its capacity to promote Christianity insocieties “without God”8 “infected by materialism”9. He interpreted the move-ment as “risposta provvidenziale” (‘providential response’) to secularization.10However, although he encouraged it, Pope John Paul II constantly remindedthe Charismatic Renewal of “the importance of being rooted in that Catholicunity of faith and charity which finds its visible center in the See of Peter”.117 Cf. https://dev-iccrswp.day50communications.com/wp-content/uploads/ICCRS-STATUTES_EnOFFICIAL.pdf.8 https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1998/may/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19980530_riflessioni.html.9 https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/it/speeches/1986/november/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19861115_rinnovamento-spirito.html.10 Cf. https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1998/may/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19980530_riflessioni.html.11 https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1981/may/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19810507_rinnovamento-carismatico.html.36 Social Forms of ReligionHe entrusted the leaders of the CharismaticMovement with “the primary taskof safeguarding the Catholic identity of charismatic communities”.12The following two decades saw the continuation of the process of theCharismatic Movement’s integration into Catholicism. New communitieswould increasingly take their place within the Church as they were entrustedwith parishes, abbeys, and ecclesiastical responsibilities. Thus, several bish-ops came directly from within their ranks: Michel Santier (Créteil) founded“Réjouis-Toi” (‘Rejoice’); Msgr. Dominique Rey (Toulon), Msgr. Guy de Kérimel(Grenoble), andMsgr. Yves Le Saux (LeMans) weremembers of the EmmanuelCommunity. At the same time, however, another trend was emerging thatsought to turn the tide.4. The Charismatic Renewal’s neo-Pentecostal reloadA third period began in the 1990s and continued into the 2000s.The Renewal’smembers were getting older, and the number of its prayer groups was begin-ning to decrease (Barrett/Johnson 2005).13 However, there was a new impetusunder the influence of the Pentecostal “third wave” which emphasized thepower of a Holy Spirit that was supposed to manifest itself more stronglythrough “signs,wonders, healings,miracles”14 and deliverances fromdemonicentities. New initiatives, taken from the fringes of the Catholic Renewal,reactivated Pentecostal-Charismatic emotions. They led to a transdenomina-tional effervescence which the ecclesiastical institution struggled to control.In France, the Bishops’ Conference devoted a seminar (in May 2009) and abook to this subject (CEF 2010). With the Toronto Blessing – a Canadian neo-Pentecostal movement which came to France in late 1997 – old Charismaticpractices were updated, and new bodily phenomena promoted: resting in theSpirit, prolonged laughter, crying out, and even animal-like behavior (Poloma2003). These phenomena occurred mainly during large group meetings or-ganized by various Christian churches (Catholic, Protestant, Evangelical,12 https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1998/october/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19981030_carismatici.html.13 This slowing down, particularly noticeable in North America and Europe, did not pre-vent the Catholic Charismatic Movement from continuing to grow in Latin Americaand Africa.14 http://www.laguerison.org/presentation/vision.Valérie Aubourg: The Four Phases of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal (1967–2017) 37Pentecostal), such as the “Embrase nos cœurs” (‘Fire up our hearts’) confer-ences (since 1996) as well as gatherings at the Charlety Stadium in Paris (1998)and in Villefranche-sur-Saône (1998). Groups and entities bringing togetherCharismatics from different denominations were then set up.Beginning in 1997, the Burning Bush initiative started by Kim Kollinsspread throughout the Italian Renewal and then, in the course of 1999, in Eu-rope, as it sought to achieve three goals: Christian unity, evangelization, andthe renewal of the Church.The following year the interdenominational associ-ation ‘Intercession France’ was created,which encouraged fasting and prayingfor France. At the same time, the movement Dans la Gloire (‘In the Glory’) wasintroduced in France by Deborah Kendrick, a disciple of Ruth Ward Heflin.Beginning in 2002, there was a symbiosis between the intercessory networks,the Toronto Blessing, the annual Embrase nos cœurs-conventions, and thepromotion of evangelization between Christians of different denominations(Chieux 2010: 65). The new way of conducting a prayer assembly, focusingon healing and praising, was gaining widespread acceptance, although therewere still significant reservations.Thehealing practices prompted theCatholicChurch to react by publishing, in 2000, Instruction on Prayers to Obtain HealingfromGod, a text written by Cardinal Ratzinger, Prefect of the ‘Congregation forthe Doctrine of the Faith’.15All these new practices and initiatives brought together preachers workingwithin interdenominational networks. The association called Paris tout estpossible (‘Paris, everything is possible’), established by Pastor Carlos Payan, isa good example. It set up training courses, prayer meetings, and evangeliza-tion days which focused on three areas: “Unity, Unction, Healing”.16 Anotherexample is the healing methods introduced in Lyons, which brought togetherCatholic and Evangelical Charismatics in healing rooms and for monthlyMiracles and Healing evenings. These initiatives were supported by the Con-sultation Charismatique Œcuménique Lyonnaise (CCOL) (‘Lyon EcumenicalCharismatic Consultation’), whose activities were also part of the “third wave”movement. In 2004, this Lyons-based association began holding small inter-cession meetings for the city every month, as well as larger evening eventsevery three months. The latter would begin with a long session of worship in15 Cf. https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20001123_istruzione_fr.html.16 Unité Onction Guérison (“Unity, unction, healing”), a pamphlet written by Pierre Cranga2004. Flyer quoted by Chieux 2010: 71–72.38 Social Forms of Religionthe neo-Pentecostal style and be followed by a dual Catholic and Evangelicalsermon. Neo-Pentecostalism, also known as third-wave Pentecostalism orthe neo-Charismatic Movement, is characterized by the promotion of ex-traordinary divine manifestations under the effect of “power evangelism”. Agreater variety of spiritual experiences was encouraged: uncontrollable laugh-ter, intense sobbing, screaming and roaring, shaking, falling to the ground,showers of gold confetti, etc.Miracles, healings, and deliveranceswere alreadyobserved in “classical” Pentecostalism and the Catholic Charismatic Renewal,but the various movements that made up the “third wave” (Freston 1995) ac-centuated their importance. Their theology was accompanied by a particularemphasis on spiritual struggle, giving rise to new religious notions such as“spiritual warfare”, “spiritual mapping”, and prosperity theology (Coleman2000).Aside from the prayer groups and new communities whosemembers werepartly active in these networks, this newCharismatic impulse went far beyondthe Catholic Renewal: it involved the wider Evangelical Movement. In somecontexts, the termCharismatic evenwentas far as todesignate an interdenom-inational (and even transdenominational)movement that no longer referred tothe ‘borders of institutions’ (Gonzalez 2014).In terms of social forms, there was the novelty that those who participatedin this movement did not seek to form interpersonal relationships that werelikely to extend beyond the worship setting. Studies conducted among thosewho attended (Aubourg 2020) show that people came primarily in search ofanswers to personal or family needs (healing,well-being, resolving a difficulty,spiritual recharge). They would be re-energized by these collective meetingsbut then return to their homes as if nothinghadhappened.Theprayer evening,prayer meeting, or Sunday’s Eucharist service did not lead to the creation ofnew social ties. The attitude of these laypeople seemed in a sense more con-sumerist (ibid.). That said, these same individuals could belong to anotherCatholic group (Scouts, Itinéraires Ignatiens, familyministries,ÉquipesNotreDame, etc.), where they developed close and sustained relationships. Theirengagement with these groups sometimes reflected a high level of integrationin the church institution. In other words, the difference from the CharismaticRenewal (in its initial and then routinized form) lay in the fact that the par-ticipants in the groups that were studied (“third wave”) no longer combinedspiritual regeneration with building community ties within the same entity.Furthermore, there was a significant difference in the formation of each ofthesegroups.Whilst in its early stages theCharismaticRenewalwas character-Valérie Aubourg: The Four Phases of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal (1967–2017) 39ized by amix of social backgrounds, theMiracles andHealings events reachedprimarily individuals of modest means and believers from immigrant back-grounds (ibid.).5. Towards a ‘Post-Charismatic’ period?While the Charismatic Renewal corresponds to a churchmovement identifiedas such, many Evangelical and Pentecostal elements have spread within theCatholic Church beyond its Charismatic section. They have ‘infiltrated’, as itwere, the parish as the basic social form of traditional Catholicism.They take the form of prayer groups, healing assemblies, training courses,individualized arrangements, musical aids, books, body techniques, objects,etc. As noted by Henri Couraye, “a certain charismatic sensibility in thebroadest sense has reached the Church by capillary action, without all thefaithful always being aware of it” (Couraye 2011: 38).This includes, for example,the Mothers’ Prayer Groups founded by the English Charismatic VeronicaWilliams (Williams 2004),17 which brings women together for weekly prayersessions (Aubourg 2016). Unlike Renewal prayer groups, there are no charismsand prayers are extremely formalistic. As certain gestures could look incon-gruous and surprising in a European cultural context (raised, clasped, or openhands), aspects that could threaten the respectability of the groups’ membersthe most have been discarded. Nevertheless, Pentecostal features are stillevident in several practices. Firstly, these meetings encourage spontaneousprayer and emphasize praise. When a biblical text is looked at, there are notheological discussions, but rather commentaries based on the participants’experiences and feelings. Secondly, as with Pentecostal-Charismatic circles,the rhetoric of salvation is favored and the proclamation “Jesus Christ is Lordand Savior” is at the heart of the message contained in prayers. Thirdly, theentity of the devil has been reintroduced. This phenomenon has been amplydemonstrated in extra-European societies: in Africa, the Mascarene Islands(Boutter 2002), and SouthAmerica (Boyer 1996). It isworth stressing the extentto which conceptions of Satan have accompanied religious revivals, including17 Veronica Williams regularly attends charismatic conventions in Walsingham and herbook mentions typically charismatic practices such as “perceiving inner images” orrandomly opening one’s Bible and attributing the text one’s eyes land on to the HolySpirit (Williams 2004: 15).40 Social Forms of Religionin groups of Anglo-Saxon origin. As noted by Birgit Meyer, the figure of thedevil has proven to be “remarkably resistant to ideas which, ever since theEnlightenment, have criticized belief in its existence” (Meyer 2008: 4). Finally,it is worth noting the place given to lay people, who can address God directly,away from the presence of a priest and outside parish premises.Parishes are also a goodplace to observe this ‘Pentecostalisation’ofCatholi-cism. From Baltimore (Mallon 2016) to Halifax (White/Corcoran 2015), Lyons,Hyères, Senlis, and Sophia-Antipolis, several Catholic parishes have adoptedfeatures that havemademegachurches successful.Manyof themhave engagedin a process of “pastoral conversion” in order to produce “missionary disciples”.Emphasis is laid on individual experience and personal appropriation of theChristian faith. The term “church” itself has replaced the term “parish”. Thissemantic shift reflects a particular representation of the Church, conceivedas a grouping of converts who evolve within networks made up of convincedChristians; this is the case of Amazing Parish,18 an international networkwhich brings together more than 200 parishes committed to renewing theirpastoral project.Since its beginnings in France in 1998, so-called “Alpha courses”have playeda key role in disseminating Pentecostal practices and tools in Catholic circles,building an interdenominational and international network of leaders, andimplementing a new model for organizing parishes. Alpha courses, whichwere started in an Anglican parish in London and take place over dinner, “arean evangelization tool characterized by the conviviality they seek to introduceand their well-honed logistical organization” (Rigou-Chemin 2011: 355). WithAlpha, it is a whole vocabulary (related to conversion and evangelization), aset of practices (prayer of the brothers or even baptism in the Holy Spirit,Bible reading, small discussion groups, testimonies, welcome), and a way ofrunning things (centered on the user, valuing lay people’s input, presentingthe faith with humor and in a relaxed way) which Catholic parishes have be-come familiar with over the last twenty years. Since 2012, Alpha has partneredwith the Talenthéo Association of Christian Coaches to provide so-called Despasteurs selon mon cœur (‘Pastors according to my heart’) courses.The aim ofthese training courses is to obtain the support of the church authorities andinvolve all parishioners in a new evangelizing dynamic. Currently in France,Des pasteurs selonmon cœur have already brought together 710 priests and vi-18 Cf. https://amazingparish.org.Valérie Aubourg: The Four Phases of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal (1967–2017) 41cars general, 29 bishops, and two cardinals committed to a process of “pastoralrenewal”.Meanwhile, thediocesanprayer groupsof theCharismaticRenewal–gath-ered within the Fraternité Pentecôte – have continued to lose ground: theirmembers are aging, their numbers are dwindling, while social circles with astrong socio-cultural capital (who had previously provided the movement’sleaders) are abandoning them. Charismatic prayer groups were initially seenas posing a threat to parish structures.Their members then emerged asmajorplayers thanks to their involvement in various parish services, while elementsof Charismatic piety came to spread quietly through the parishes. In the end,the parish structure was not weakened by the Charismatic Renewal and itsextensions (particularly the Alpha course) since it all happenedwithin a sphereof Catholic membership that has steadfastly maintained its doctrinal andliturgical apparatus.The Catholic institution has tried not so much to excludeas to channel believers’ energies, synthesizing doctrines, regulating practices,and bringing actors together under the banner of a unity it promoted withthe watchword “visible communion”. Thus, for centuries, parishes have beenthe “social core unit” of Catholicism. At first, the Charismatic Renewal wasseen as a challenge and even a danger to parish structures. Today, Charismaticpiety is a part of parishes and the latter even develop links with internationaland transdenominational networks. It is interesting to note here the unionof two seemingly opposed rationales: the territorial organization of Catholiccommunities within the parish and their integration into a network.For their part, the new communities have continued to develop on a globalscale while showing real dynamism. As major places for priestly and religiousvocations, they create an attractive pastoral offer for Catholic youth.The eccle-siastical institution has recognized this strength of theirs, going as far as ap-pointing one of their priests in charge of youthministry in France, after havingconstantly given an increasingly important role to charismatic communitiesduring youth gatherings, especially World Youth Days.However, Charismatic communities have not remained on the sidelinesof the initiatives mentioned above. Indeed, they were the first to promote Al-pha courses.The first course in a French Catholic environment was run by theChemin Neuf community (1998) in the parish of Saint Denys de la Chapelle(Paris, 18th arrondissement).The following year,Marc and Florence de Leyritz,who were in charge of the program in France, trained Alpha course leaders atParay-le-Monial in collaboration with the Emmanuel community. “It is a uni-fying project which draws together many charismatic communities”, a mem-42 Social Forms of Religionber of the “Fondations du Monde Nouveau” (‘New World Foundations’) noted(De Galzain 1999). Furthermore, charismatic communities have engaged theparishes under their care in “pastoral conversion”-projects by drawing directinspiration from the North American megachurch model,19 or by participat-ing in the training courses offered byDes pasteurs selonmon cœur. In the caseof this latter association, it should be noted that several coaches are alsomem-bers of one or another of the establishedRenewal communities.Thus,while re-taining an important and well-defined place within Catholicism, Charismaticcommunities have taken part in this “process of developing a transdenomina-tional Christianity centered on the individual and their personal conversion”.They have joined the vast field of an “evangelizing ecumenism” (Willaime 2011:349).From an organizational point of view, Pope Francis has set up the Inter-national Catholic Charismatic Renewal Services (CHARIS) to replace the Inter-national Catholic Charismatic Renewal Service (ICCRS). The statutes of thisnew service begin by noting, in their preamble, the ecumenical dimension ofthe Charismatic Renewal.They go on to emphasize “the same fundamental ex-perience of ‘baptism in the Holy Spirit’” shared by all those belonging to thismovement. Finally, they reflect a desire to restore flexibility to its organizationand to encourage a plurality of charismatic expressions.206. ConclusionThe Catholic Charismatic Renewal is “a child of North American Pentecostal-ism” (Pina 2001: 26). Thus, in its initial form, it was characterized by itsemphasis on religious emotions and closeness to Pentecostal circles. In thesecond phase, as it became institutionalized, the Renewal lost its momentumand left the margins of the Church. In reaction to this institutionalization ofthe Renewal, in the third phase, initiatives were taken with the aim of recon-necting with the Evangelical world and encouraging more intense emotionalexpressions. Currently, Pentecostal practices are being introduced into the19 Some of them even went to the Saddleback Valley Community Church in California,founded by Rick Warren, and used the tools suggested by this pastor in The PurposeDriven Church (Warren 1998).20 Cf. https://www.nsc-chariscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/7_Charis-Statutes-Final-Text-Protocol-06.03.2018.pdf.Valérie Aubourg: The Four Phases of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal (1967–2017) 43Catholic world again by groups who do not wish to be identified with theCatholic Charismatic Renewal. Could this fourth stage be a “post-charismatic”one?In the end, we can ask ourselves what face of the Charismatic Renewal theabove discussed developments reveal.Unlike rationalized faith, formalized re-ligiouspractice,andabstract religious language, this typeofCatholicismgaveachance to spontaneity, spiritual exigency, and the involvement of the believer’sbody. It favored the immediacy of faith’s realities.Believers soughtnot somuchfuture salvation as a pragmatic response to the desire to lead a successful lifehere and now. Echoing contemporary individual aspirations, the CharismaticRenewal rejoined the space of health and the desire for wellbeing by focusingits offer on healing and personal reassurance. This development of an enthu-siastic type of Catholicism had obvious consequences in terms of political dis-engagement. Just as Veronica Williams renounced her work with the Houseof Lords to create mothers’ groups, political activism was abandoned in favorof worshipping and praying. It was by transforming themselves that, along-side their coreligionists, these Catholics aspired to change society.The way inwhich theirmeetingswere run left little room for debates.Conflicts and strug-gles were minimized, and tensions shifted to the psychological register.Later, the Charismatic Renewal was increasingly marked by mobile formsof belonging. In its third (closer to neo-Pentecostalism) and fourth (post-Charismatic) phases, allegiances have become unstable and membershiploose. Whether in relation to individuals searching for healing, women at-tending mothers’ prayer, or laypersons and clerics following the US-Americanmegachurch model, significant permeability is observed between these dif-ferent groups, where commitment is reversible. Regardless of any pyramidallogic, individuals follow their own personal religious paths. Previously, theCatholic appropriationof thePentecostalmovement reflecteda religiousentitywhose objectives, organization, orthodoxy, and orthopraxy corresponded to avery precise mission.The ICCRS statutes are ample proof of this (Pesare 2005:141–142). Today, the Catholic Charismatic Renewal has become completelysplintered. It has taken the form of international and interdenominationalnetworks.Manyof its practices (testimony,prayer of the brothers,musical repertoire,etc.) have been adopted by parishes or Catholic movements not affiliated withtheRenewalmovement.Thus, theCharismatic Renewal’s social formspartiallyevolved with time: at first, they gave rise to elective assemblies (life communi-ties and prayer groups) which became institutionalized. Today, it rather takes44 Social Forms of Religionthe form of a network, attracting believers who do not place themselves ex-clusively under its banner, while its practices permeate very diverse Catholicrealities. Networks, individual pragmatism, scattered forms of belonging, re-ligious dissemination – all these features are echoes of “ultramodernity” (Gid-dens 1994; Willaime 1995).BibliographyAubourg, Valérie (2014): Christianismes charismatiques à l’île le La Réunion,Paris: Karthala.Aubourg, Valérie (2020): Réveil Catholique. 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Williams, Veronica (2004): La joie de s’abandonner à Lui!, Caterham (GB):TransformManagement Ltd.Web ReferencesAmazing Parish. “Amazing Parish.” Accessed March 10, 2024. https://amazingparish.org.Association Internationale des Ministères de Guérison. “Notre vision.” Ac-cessed September 16, 2016. http://www.laguerison.org/presentation/vision.48 Social Forms of ReligionCHARIS. “Statutes.” April 6, 2018. Accessed February 23, 2024. https://www.nsc-chariscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/7_Charis-Statutes-Final-Text-Protocol-06.03.2018.pdf.Congrégation pour la Doctrine de la Foi, instruction, « Sur les prières pour ob-tenir de Dieu la guérison », September 4, 2000Congrégation pour la Doctrine de la Foi. “Instruction sur les prières pourobtenir de Dieu la guérison.” September 4, 2000. Accessed March 10,2024. https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20001123_istruzione_fr.html.International Catholic Charismatic Renewal Services. “Statutes.” AccessedMarch 10, 2024. https://dev-iccrswp.day50communications.com/wp-content/uploads/ICCRS-STATUTES_EnOFFICIAL.pdf.Pope John Paul II. “Address of the Holy Father to the Participants in theInternational Conference for Catholic Charismatic Leaders.” LibreriaEditrice Vaticana. October 30, 1998. Accessed March 10, 2024. https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1998/october/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19981030_carismatici.html.Pope John Paul II. “Speech of the Holy Father Pope John Paul II. Meeting withEcclesial Movements and New Communities.” Libreria Editrice Vaticana.May 30, 1998. Accessed March 10, 2024. https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1998/may/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19980530_riflessioni.html.Pope John Paul II. “Discorso di Giovanni Paolo II. Ai partecipanti al convegnonazionale del «Rinnovamento nello Spirito».” Libreria Editrice Vaticana.November 15, 1996. Accessed March 10, 2024. https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/it/speeches/1986/november/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19861115_rinnovamento-spirito.html.Pope John Paul II. “Address of John Paul II to the Participants in theFourth International Leaders’ Conference of the Catholic CharismaticRenewal.” Libreria Editrice Vaticana. May 7, 1981. Accessed March 10,2024. https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1981/may/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19810507_rinnovamento-carismatico.html.‘Catholic’ and ‘Charismatic’Two Logics of Legitimization and the Negotiationof Belonging in the German Catholic Charismatic RenewalHannah GrünenthalAbstract This article explores how theGermanCatholic Charismatic Renewal (GCCR)navigates itspositioning in theCatholicChurchaswell as in theCharismaticMovement.Focusing on themovement’s two logics of legitimization – the ‘Catholic’ and the ‘Charis-matic’ logic – this paper delves into the strategies employed by itsmembers to assert theirpositionwithin these two contexts. In order to be recognizedwithin the Catholic Church,theGCCRneeds to adopt a ‘Catholic’ logic of legitimization,which is based on thehierar-chy, structure, tradition, and doctrine of theCatholic Church.With regard to theCharis-matic Movement, the GCCR legitimizes its practices based on personal religious experi-ences and the experience of the Holy Spirit.The question of legitimization is tied back tothe question of social forms inwhichGermanCatholic Charismatic practice takes place.TheGCCRprovides itsmemberswith awide variety of social forms and opportunities forparticipation.Byanalyzing the two logics of legitimizationconnected to social forms, thisarticleprovides insights into themultifaceted strategies employedby theCatholicCharis-matic RenewalMovement inGermany to navigate its intricate dual identity and foster asense of belonging in both spheres, the Catholic Church and theCharismaticMovement.Keywords Belonging, Catholic Church, Charismatic Catholicism, CharismaticMove-ment, German Catholic Charismatic Renewal, logic of legitimization1. IntroductionScene 1: ACatholicChurch, the smell of incense and the age of centuries lingersin the air. Approximately 300 people are gathered here, more than usual.Theysit in the pews, looking at the altar where an elderly priest celebrates the Holy50 Social Forms of ReligionMass.A song is sung, then the sounds transition toamutteringandmumbling.No recognizable words are spoken, but people utter syllables andmake noises;some stand up and open their armswidely, andmany have their eyes closed. Itgrows louder, and their voices fill the high, gothic ceilings.After a fewminutes,it grows silent again, and the priest continues his celebration.Scene 2: Six people sit in a circle at the apsis of a small church around thealtar. It is dark in the nave and only the apsis is illuminated. One after theother, sentence by sentence, they read out the gospel of the week. After the lastone finishes, they remain silent.The Paschal candle flickers next to the icon ofMother Mary in the middle of the circle, next to the altar. Suddenly, one of theparticipants repeats a word from the gospel that has just been read. Someoneelse repeats a whole sentence, three times, with gravity.Then it is silent again.After a fewminutes, onewoman, the leader, begins to sing a song, and the oth-ers join her one by one.Scene 3:Aman inhis early fortieswalksdynamicallyupanddownthe stage,wearing tight jeans, a casual jacket, and brand-new sneakers. He draws cir-cles, lines, and arrows on a flipchart to illustrate hismessage:Men aremen andwomen are women; they are created as such by God and must behave accord-ingly. In theaudience, therearearound500peopleof all ages,sittingonpaddedchairs, applauding, cheering, and nodding in agreement. After the presenta-tion, a worship band begins to play. The stage is illuminated in bright green,yellow, and blue light.The people in the room stand up from their chairs, jointhe singing, clap their hands, andmove to the rhythm.All three of these scenes, though very different inmood, content, and char-acter, were taken from meetings of the GCCR, the German Catholic Charis-matic Renewal. GermanCatholic Charismatics go to theHolyMass in their lo-cal parish,hostBible readinggroups,andgo tonational and international faithevents. They celebrate the sacraments and practice charisms.They are part ofthe Catholic Church aswell as of the CharismaticMovement. In between thosetwo, the GCCR has developed its own strategies of positioning itself withinthe Catholic Church on the one hand and the Charismatic Movement on theother.Those strategies include debates about legitimate and illegitimate prac-tices and arguments as well as authority constructions, and the establishmentof specific, yet fluid social forms according to the respective goals and needs.Members of the GCCR are typically involved in several different religioussocial forms and contexts – some of them organized bymembers of the GCCRitself (like GCCR regional meetings), some situated in the Catholic Church(such as parish prayer groups with worship elements), some situated in theHannah Grünenthal: ‘Catholic’ and ‘Charismatic’ 51Charismatic Movement (like weekend seminars on the charisms), and somesituated somewhere in between (like Catholic Charismatic life-communitiesthat are recognized by the Holy See). To grasp the GCCR’s predominant socialform is therefore not an easy task. In addition to the fluid social forms ofGCCR activities, membership is also widely fluid.In 2017, the Catholic Charismatic Renewal in Germany stated on its web-site that “currently about 12.000 Catholic Christians of all ages meet in about500 prayer groups, house groups, and new spiritual communities”,1 and listed32 Charismatic communities, initiatives, and ministries in addition to localprayer groups. Since the GCCR “does not accept ‘members’ in the manner ofan association”, there are neither membership statistics nor fixed criteria forwho is part of the GCCR andwho is not. It is merely the leaders and those whohold offices within the GCCR who are “tangible […] – and these only as longas they participate in a ‘binding’ way” (Baumert 1998: 599). Elected commu-nal, diocesan, and national spokespersons organize communication and net-working on the regional and transregional level and form the ‘Council of theGCCR’ (Rat der CE), where matters of importance – structural as well as con-tent-related – are discussed and decided.These structures are very much par-allel to the Catholic diocesan structure. Furthermore, many members of theGCCR are actively involved in their local Catholic parishes and participate inCatholic activities.On the other hand,GCCRmembers are frequently involvedin (non-Catholic) Charismatic group meetings, workshops, worship services,and other events. These social forms – or ways of coordinating interaction –are shaped by the different organizational structures in the Catholic Churchand the Charismatic Movement: while the Catholic Church as an organiza-tion is hierarchically structured, the Charismatic Movement has the form of anetwork of individual churches, communities, and groups.The roles of hierar-chy, authority, andmembers follow the respective organizational logics. As theGCCR positions itself in both contexts, this results in different points of con-tact with the two contexts. Apart from that, there are other, equally importantsocial forms within the GCCR, such as prayer circles, religious life communi-ties, open prayer meetings, blessings, praise services, seminars and lectures,and regional and national GCCR events.As seen from these examples, theGCCR refuses to adopt one specific socialformthat canbeunderstoodas typical,permanent,or evenexclusivelyCatholic1 https://www.erneuerung.de/wer-wir-sind. All translations from German (writtensources and empirical data) by the author unless indicated otherwise.52 Social Forms of ReligionCharismatic. Is the GCCR a network, event community, group, organizationwithin an institution, ormovement? I argue that the GCCR can be understoodas all of the above, and adapting different social forms in different contexts isone of the GCCR’s core strengths. The GCCR, although bound together by ahead association, is not a static construct. Rather, it is a crowd of individualsand groups meeting in different, changing contexts and social forms, shap-ing and maintaining their collective identity, ascribing religious authority indifferent contexts, and facing different challenges.They are, as I will argue inthis article, bound together not only by a strict sense of belonging, but also bythe simultaneous application of two parallel, yet exclusive, logics of legitimiza-tion: the ‘Catholic’ logic and the ‘Charismatic’ logic.The decision which logic isapplied in which situation is a matter of constant negotiation, which at thesame time embeds and demarcates the GCCR from both reference groups: theCatholic Church and the Charismatic Movement.The data and reflections presented here were derived from a researchproject on positioning processes and the construction of religious authorityin the case of the GCCR (Grünenthal 2021). The project covered a wide rangeof data: on the one hand, ethnographical data was collected and interpreted(extensive fieldwork in 2016–2017 with 43 protocols of participant observationand eight qualitative interviews). On the other hand, the media discourse ofthe GCCR between 2015 and 2018 was evaluated (the website2, 16 issues of thequarterly journal “CE Info”, an e-mail newsletter, and six publications by thetheological committee).The total number of documents analyzed was 860.2. Academic perspectives on the Catholic Charismatic RenewalIn academic literature, there are, aside from theological discussions about thecharisms and Catholic Charismatic theology3, three main perspectives on theCatholic Charismatic Renewal: empirical studies that explore certain aspects2 https://www.erneuerung.de.3 Although those debates are academic and important to understand the CharismaticRenewal Movement, they depict more internal debates and negotiations about thevalidity of Catholic Charismatic theology as well as their belonging to the Church.These debates are not included into the overview on academic literature about theCCR; they are, however, an important element of the negotiation of the place of theCCR in the Catholic Church.Hannah Grünenthal: ‘Catholic’ and ‘Charismatic’ 53of the CCR in specific contexts, scholarly research on ‘EPC Christianity’4, andthe German theological discourse.Empirical studies, mainly anthropological or sociological case studies,usually focus on the CCR in one specific (often national) context or explore onespecific aspect of Charismatic Catholicism. Oftentimes, these studies are setin contextswhereCharismatic practices are a strong factor in localCatholicism(which is not the case in Germany). In this area, mainly psychological studiesabout conversion and religious experience of Charismatic Catholics have beenconducted (e.g.Halama/Halamová 2005; Siekierski 2012; Zarzycka et al. 2015).They found that, on the one hand, religious experience plays an important rolein religious actors’ self-conception as Charismatic Catholics, and on the otherhand, conversion is perceived as a turning point in their religious biographythat strengthens their connection to the Catholic Church. Anthropologicalstudies have focused more on local forms of Charismatic Catholicism andits relation to Catholic hierarchy and structure (e.g. in Italy: Pace 2006) orthe relation between local and global forms of Charismatic Catholicism (e.g.Theije/Mariz 2008; Hoenes del Pinal 2017; Lado 2017; Pace 2020). One aspectthat surfaces again and again in these studies is that Charismatic Catholicshave a strong sense of belonging and a generally positive attitude toward theCatholic Church. Furthermore, they aspire to attain institutional recognitionby Church authorities (Turco 2016).The Catholic Charismatic Renewal is also a focal point in the context ofPentecostalism research or research on EPCChristianity. In these approaches,the Charismatic Movement in the Catholic Church is usually subsumed underCharismatic movements, although it is a special form of Charismatic Chris-tianity. EPC research usually focuses on the transnational and transdenom-inational entanglements of EPC Christianity. The history and developmentof global EPC Christianity is narrated as “one of the great success stories ofthe current era of cultural globalization” (Robbins 2004). The perspective onCharismatic Christianity as one form of EPC Christianity, and on CatholicCharismatics as one type of Charismatic Christianity, is characterized by twopremises: the narrative of growth and the concept of Pentecostalismas a globalphenomenon.4 Evangelical, Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity. As distinctions between thoseforms of Christianity are difficult, EPC Christianity is used for the whole spectrum.54 Social Forms of ReligionPentecostalism in all its multi-faceted variety, including the ‘Pentecostal-like’ independent Churches and the Catholic Charismatics, is one of themost significant forms of Christianity in the twentieth century. Accordingto oftquoted but controversial estimates, there may have been over fivehundred million adherents of these movements worldwide in 2000, foundin almost every country in the world and spanning all Christian denomi-nations. In less than a hundred years, Pentecostal, Charismatic and asso-ciated movements have become a major new force in world Christianity.(Anderson 2006: 106)While Charismatic Catholicism is frequentlymentioned as the largest Charis-maticmovement, especially active in Latin America and the Philippines (John-son/Zurlo 2020), the focus usually lies on non-denominational EPC Churches.While the core narrative in the discourse on global EPC Christianity is oneof growth and globalization, the discourse on the Catholic Church in Germanyis characterized by the narrative of the decline of Catholicism in times ofdecreasing membership and increasing secularization (Gabriel 1996: 11). TheGCCR isdiscussedmainly in twocontexts: first,as anewcommunity anda signof pluralization of Catholicism – these perspectives on the GCCR are mostlysociological – and second, as a connecting point between the Catholic Churchand EPC Christianity – usually with more practical theological implications.Theearlier,mostly sociological studieson thefield sawnewcommunities asalternative forms of Catholicism that are partly independent from traditionalparish structures and parish priests. They offer what is perceived as new andappealing forms of spirituality, theology, and religious practice (Hochschild2005).Their sociological interest was to formulate a Sociology of Catholicism.These new communities therefore were seen as examples of non-traditionalsocial forms of Catholicism in Germany; the GCCR, in this context, serves as acase to discuss whether it is a movement or not (Lehmann 2003).More recently, the second debate has become more prominent: there havebeen several publications on Charismatic Catholicism as a Catholic form ofPentecostalism and the dogmatic and theological questions that arise in thiscontext (e.g. Krämer/Vellguth 2019). The aim of these publications is twofold:on theonehand, they try tofindsolutions as tohowtoattract people toCatholi-cism and stop membership decline; on the other hand, they discuss the dog-matic and practical implications of Charismatic Catholicism and its place inthe Catholic Church.Hannah Grünenthal: ‘Catholic’ and ‘Charismatic’ 55Overall, the academic discussion of Charismatic Catholicism is charac-terized by the tension between being Catholic while at the same time beingCharismatic. The question of belonging is asked and answered on two differ-ent levels. First, on the individual level – do individual actors in the CatholicCharismatic Movement perceive themselves as members of the CatholicChurch? Second, on the level of the local groups – do they identify more asCatholic or Charismatic, and what does this mean for the Catholic Church?The goal of these debates is to categorize the GCCR and solve the questionof belonging. I, however, will not try to sort them into one box or the otherbut rather take a closer look at how they themselves maintain this two-foldpositioning. The abovementioned social forms, between which members ofthe GCCR move frequently, serve as lenses through which their oscillationbetween these two positions can be observed.3. Strategies of positioning and two logics of legitimizationWhile the position and belonging of the GCCR is debated in the literature,there seems to be no struggle for the actors themselves. They see themselvesas belonging to both the Catholic Church and the Charismatic Movement. Bybelonging, I refer to the actors’ understanding of being part of a group. Po-sitioning, on the other hand, refers to social practices to explicate, reinforce,change, or claim affiliation to a social form and, therefore, make belongingsocially visible. Positioning and belonging therefore are tightly connected. Inorder to defend their belonging to the Catholic Church and the CharismaticMovement, the GCCR and its members must develop positioning strategies,that is, a set of practices and narratives to legitimize their strategies, claims,and values. The recognition of belonging as well as the strategies of position-ing need to be negotiated internally, among themembers of the GCCR, as wellas externally, with regard to other groups, namely the Charismatic Movementand the Catholic Church. In order to legitimize actions and practices, actors ofthe GCCR refer to elements from both interpretative frames, the CharismaticMovement and the Catholic Church.They apply two different logics: a Catholiclogic on the one hand and a Charismatic logic on the other.In the following, I will explore Catholic Charismatics’ strategies of posi-tioning themselves in theCatholic Church and theCharismaticMovement andthe two different logics of legitimization which actors apply to legitimize andreinforce their positions and thereby negotiate belonging.Additionally, the so-56 Social Forms of Religioncial forms in which the examples take place speak to these logics of legitimiza-tion and serve as markers of belonging.3.1 Strategies of positioning the GCCR in the Catholic ChurchTheGCCRfirmly positions itself within the Catholic Church. To underline thisclaim of being Catholic, members and texts frequently reference elements ofthe Catholic symbol system and interpretive framework, such as Catholic the-ology, structure, and ecclesial hierarchy, but also doctrine, tradition, Catholicliterature, liturgy, and the sacraments. Furthermore, the Catholic Church asan institution is referenced. Although the reference to the Catholic Church asan institution implies the notation of the Church as established by God on onehand,while being a societal institution on the other, these implications are notdiscussed in the data. It seems that the status, form,andnature of theCatholicChurch are not seen as topics of debate in the GCCR. At a time when the sta-tus of the Church in society is repeatedly discussed and questioned, this lackof debate hints at a strong loyalty towards the institution in both aspects.The GCCR’s fundamental positioning in the Catholic Church is first of allexpressed in the explicit statement to be part of the Church and the under-standing that there is amission that theGCCR–and theCCR ingeneral–mustfulfill: to renew the Catholic Church in the name of theHoly Spirit.TheChurchin its current state is seen as “dried up” and “not on fire.” It is perceived as theGCCR’s task to “bring the flame of the Holy Spirit back into the Church.” Flo-rian5 explains how people who experienced the Holy Spirit change and bringthat change back into the Church:Florian: And then there are these charisms, of which we can read a lot in theBible, and which we have experienced again and again in our movement,that they come from God, that a life with these charisms is possible [...].I: hmhm. That would mean that the change would come from the roots,so to speak, right? So it is always people...Florian: A change of the humans’ inner nature. Like, people have a personalencounter with God, experience God’s work in their own life, in their owninner being, in their everyday life, and with that they change themselves,5 The names of all interview partners and field contacts have been changed foranonymity.Hannah Grünenthal: ‘Catholic’ and ‘Charismatic’ 57but they also change their environment, their family, and with that alsothe Church. Yes.6The “renewal” that is aimed for in the GCCR, however, is expected to take placepurely on a spiritual level. It explicitly does not result in any demands forchanges at the structural or hierarchical level of the Catholic Church. Neitherstructure, hierarchy, nor Catholic doctrine is questioned in the GCCR’s publi-cations and articles at any point. On the contrary, one strategy to position theGCCR within the Catholic Church is to explicitly subordinate it to the Churchand its structures. In one interview,Manfred, a leadingmember of the GCCR,described the strategy in the early days of the CCR in Germany:So in the early days of the Charismatic Renewal, Herbert Mühlen was verysignificantly involved, they tried to integrate it very well into the CatholicChurch. Therefore, good statutes were quickly established, and a good the-ological policy paper was quickly written, which was then also recognizedby the bishops, so much effort was made. I think in other movements, theyjust developed over time, and at some point, someone looked at what theyhad become and put it into papers. These papers were drawn up very, veryquickly and quite uncharismatically. However, perhaps also out of fear thatit is so new, and we do not want to be seen as a cult and we want to beCatholic, so that they made such papers very quickly. And then they said,OK, so let’s have a diocesan structure.7What Manfred points out here is a) that for the GCCR, it was and is very im-portant to be acknowledged as being part of the Catholic Church and b) thatthe GCCR tried to achieve this goal by developing a “good” theological posi-tion (meaning a position that holds up to Catholic standards) and structure,as affirmed by the Catholic hierarchy (meaning the bishops and the pope), andintegrating their structure and organization into theCatholic structure of dio-ceses.This integration canalso be seen in the fact that theCatholicCharismaticBible reading and prayer groups I attended during my fieldwork took place inlocal Catholic parishes with the agreement of local priests and parish leaders.Thus, they were firmly embedded in Catholic institutional contexts.Another strategy to strengthen the GCCRs claim of being part of theCatholic Church, while at the same time practicing charisms, was to for-6 Interview (I#7) with Florian, member of the GCCR leaderboard, March 08, 2016.7 Interview (I#8) with Manfred, member of the GCCR leaderboard, March 09, 2016.58 Social Forms of Religionmulate a Catholic theology of charisms. In the Charismatic Movement or inPentecostalism, the formulation of a theology of charisms in an academicsense did not play amajor role for a long time (Chan 2020: 39). In the circles ofthe CCR there were efforts from the 1970s onwards to classify the experiencesof the actors theologically and to have them recognized by the Church. Suchattemptsweremade (and partly successfully so) by leadingCCRmembers suchas Kilian McDonnell, Edward O’Connor, and Kevin and Dorothy Ranaghan(Anderson 2014: 166). The formulation of a distinct Catholic Charismatic the-ology began as early as the 1960s and early 1970s in the USA (Ciciliot 2019), butfrom the mid-1970s, it was advanced locally, especially in Germany (Hocken1999, 406).With the establishment of theTheological Committee of the GCCR,a body was set in place to accompany developments within the GCCR the-ologically. Peter Zimmerling notes that “given the Protestant counterpart[...] the theological clarification of the Charismatic spiritual experience in theCatholic sphere is significantlymore advanced” (Zimmerling 2018: 25, originalemphasis). In this context, Zimmerling identifies the professors of CatholictheologyHeribertMühlen,Norbert Baumert, andOtto Knoch, the theologiansLucida Schmieder and Michael Marsch, as well as “a number of pastors andretreat masters known in the Catholic field” (ibid.) as formative figures of theGCCR. In their publications, they firmly based Catholic Charismatic practiceon Catholic tradition and theology.Thewritingswere directed not only towardthemembers of the GCCR themselves but especially toward Catholic externalsand critics. Parallel to and partly interwoven with this more academic-theo-logical debate, leaders of the GCCR constantly reflect on and discuss their owntheology and practice, their foundation in Catholic Theology and Tradition,and communicate those debates to GCCR members and groups at meetings,in books, faith courses, and seminars. The multiple platforms and ways ofcommunication within the GCCR reflect, like the multitude of social forms,its fluidity. There is not one medium through which to stay theologically andreligiously informed, but many; there is not one social form to practice faithand have religious experiences, but many. It is the individuals’ responsibilityto pick and choose the subjectively most adequate one. Though in this sense,the GCCR is an individualistic, post-modern phenomenon, the individual’schoices are not arbitrary but rooted in their faith and shared interpretiveframe.Like structural integration and the theology of charisms, sacraments playan important role in theGCCR’s positioningwithin the Catholic Church, espe-cially Eucharist and Confession. Frequent emphasis on the importance of theHannah Grünenthal: ‘Catholic’ and ‘Charismatic’ 59sacraments implies and enhances the acknowledgment of the Catholic hier-archy, as sacraments can only be given by ordained priests. For example, theEucharist can only be granted by ordainedCatholic priests.While there are or-dained priests among the members of the GCCR,most of the members of theGCCR attend the usual Catholic Mass to receive the Eucharist. Therefore, theHolyMass is aCatholic social form inwhichmembers of theGCCRparticipate.Especially in the context of GCCR events, mass is either held by GCCR priestsor by non-Charismatic priests or bishops,making this a distinctly Catholic so-cial form in which the GCCR gathers.3.2 Strategies of positioning the GCCR in the Charismatic MovementThe GCCR’s positioning in the Charismatic Movement is as firm as in theCatholic Church, though it manifests very differently; while its positioning inthe Catholic Church occurs in the dimensions of structure, hierarchy, theol-ogy, and tradition, its positioning in the Charismatic Movement takes placeat the individual level of personal experience.Therefore, it is characterized byfluid, individual patterns of attribution and justification in specific situations.Members frequently refer to personal and subjective experiences and theworkof the Holy Spirit. The social forms in which these experiences take placeare also more fluid and individualized, such as weekend seminars, irregularworship services, or Charismatic prayer conferences or events.The unifying element across denominational boundaries in the Charis-matic Movement is the shared emphasis on the experience of the Holy Spirit,the “baptism in theHoly Spirit”, and charisms as themost visible andobviouslydistinguishing Charismatic features.Another aspect that connects the GCCR with the Charismatic Movementis its attitude towards the Bible. In the interviews and during field research,it became clear that most of the actors read the Bible for themselves, both ina weekly prayer group and at home on their own. In doing so, the Bible or se-lectedbiblical passages are repeatedly referencedas aguide and instruction forquestions of everyday life and for shaping one’s own life. In prayer groupmeet-ings, reading the Bible together takes a lot of space, with the focus on relatingthe Bible passages to one’s own questions and individual needs:When we have concrete questions about life, we may look for correspond-ing answers in the Bible. It is an ingenious guide to life, as God intended60 Social Forms of Religionand willed it to humans. Thus, God can speak into our lives through hiswritten word. (Hemberger 2012: 34)The Bible, from the GCCR’s point of view, is not to be understood primarilyas a historical text, but as the “Word of God” and a guide for everyday life.Thus, there are many actors within the GCCR who distance themselves froma hermeneutical approach to the Bible, which is present in German Catholictheology and the Church, and instead push for amore personal and literal un-derstanding of the Bible, which is characteristic of the Pentecostal and Evan-gelical context (Buchard 2014: 141).Many members and also the GCCR as a group are committed to ecu-menism, especially in the form of joint events and projects. Ecumenicalcooperation is not without tension, for example regarding theology or therole of the Pope. Personal experience, however, is regarded as being at a dif-ferent level than the debate between Catholic and non-Catholic CharismaticChristians.The underlying religious experience is identified as the same in allCharismatic groups:The Holy Spirit works in all Christian Churches and ecclesial communities,and often in the same way, despite their different and sometimes contra-dictory theologies. (ThO#5, p. 30)Against the background of a similar experience, the GCCR sees itself simul-taneously as part of the interdenominational Charismatic Movement and asdifferent from the others, as something “special.” Florian points out:So, what I find quite exciting is that the Charismatic Movement exists inall denominations, all over the world, and we are the only movement thatexists in all denominations. Sometimes that makes us special, but some-times it is [...] that it becomes normal, so you can be interdenominationaland always meet someone who thinks similarly. And then there are stilldifferences. And you notice them again and again.8This ambivalent attitude between affirmation and demarcation fundamen-tally characterizes the positioning of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal in theCharismaticMovement. It allowsmembers of theGCCR to drawa line towards8 Interview (I#7) with Florian, member of the GCCR leaderboard, March 08, 2016.Hannah Grünenthal: ‘Catholic’ and ‘Charismatic’ 61Charismatic and Pentecostal theology and doctrine, while still recognizingtheir experience as being the same. At gathered events, Catholic Charismaticsdo not regularly meet as a subgroup, but just take part, pray, listen, worship,etc. In reports about such events in the CE-Info, the quarterly journal, the de-nominational affiliations of organizers, speakers, and participants are usuallymentioned.No judgement is attached; it is more of a contextualization,whichagain leaves the interpretation to the individual actors.Subtle commonalities between the GCCR and the Charismatic Movementcan be found with regard to positions on everyday religious life and the sur-rounding society, where the statements of members of the GCCR show stronglinks toEPCpatterns of interpretation. In theGCCR’s publications, topics suchas gender roles and family values, aswell as immigration,Christian values, andthe “right” way to deal with Islam, are explicitly addressed in only a few pro-grammatic texts (Grünenthal 2021). However, in more informal discussions,they are a recurring theme and are addressed and discussed, for example, atprayermeetings in connectionwith biblical passages.However, the leadershipof the GCCR is reluctant to make public statements on socially controversialissues.The GCCR positions itself in the Charismatic Movement mainly throughreligious practices and attitudes in daily life, such as worship, the charisms,the significanceof prayer as a formof communicationwithGod,a vibrantBiblestudy practice, an emphasis on personal relationships with God, and the im-portance of God in everyday life.3.3 The double logic of legitimization: Catholic and CharismaticThe strategies of legitimization that have been discussed above are, however,not effective in themselves, but have to be enacted, applied, andmaintained byconcrete members in concrete situations. In encounters with other Catholics,aswell as otherCharismatic andPentecostal Christians,members of theGCCRneed to explain themselves and demarcate and justify their position on a regu-lar basis. In these statements, theydrawon the strategies of legitimization thatare establishedwithin the GCCR and apply them to the situation at hand.Theythereby switch between two different modes of legitimization, the Catholicand the Charismatic modes of legitimization.I argue that in the positioning of the GCCR, but also in the everyday reli-gious life of its members, there are two basic logics at work at the same time:on the one hand, the Catholic logic, which is based on the institution and hi-62 Social Forms of Religionerarchy of the Catholic Church, and on the other hand, the Charismatic logic,which is based on the experience of the Holy Spirit. Depending on situationand context, actors within the GCCR use either one or the other logic to legit-imize their positions, actions, andprinciples and substantiate themwithin theCatholic Charismatic framework.As shown above, the Catholic logic is characterized by references that areassumed to be valid for actors in the Catholic Church. These include not onlyreferences to theology, structure, and ecclesial hierarchy, but also doctrine(represented, for example, in publications of the bishops or the papal Con-gregation for the Doctrine of the Faith), tradition (e.g., saints or mariology),historical situations (such as the Second Vatican Council), Catholic literature(e.g., the Book ofHours or other pious literature), liturgy and sacraments, andthe Catholic Church as an institution with all its implications: the organiza-tional aspects as well as the understanding of the Church as a holy, perennial,and eschatological body.The Charismatic logic, on the other hand, is characterized by referencesthat relate to and are validated through the experience of the Holy Spirit.Therefore, it is characterized by fluid, individual patterns of attribution andjustification. The validity of the references and their position in the GCCR’sshared frame of reference are actively negotiated, with the basic standard ofevaluation being the individual experience of the actors.Within the GCCR, both logics are available at the same time within thesame shared interpretive framework.They can be used flexibly, depending onthe context and situation. For example, a decision by the bishop of Passau toraise the age of Confirmation to sixteen years can be argued to be legitimatebecause he is the leader of the diocese who made the decision, or because itis presumed that Confirmation at an older age means that the candidates forconfirmation aremore likely to be ready for a personal relationshipwith Jesus.However, the application of the logic is not arbitrary: which references can bemade in which situation by whom is subject to constant negotiation processeswithin the GCCR.These negotiation processes take place all the time when ac-tors of the GCCR meet as such. Their shared framework is negotiated in in-formal conversations as well as in religious seminars, theological guidelines,articles in the quarterly journal and reading recommendations, the implemen-tation of expected behavior as well as forms of organization and meetings. Ofcourse, there are cases where it is clear which mode to apply, but more inter-esting are cases where it is not clear, where ascriptions are contradictory or inconflict. In two examples, I will analyze how actors apply one or bothmodes ofHannah Grünenthal: ‘Catholic’ and ‘Charismatic’ 63legitimization in the discussion of topics in the example of the negotiation ofreligious authority.3.4 Sacraments and charismsWhenaskedaboutwhatwas special about beingCatholic in aCharismatic con-text, one participant at a regional prayer meeting answered:In contrast to the independent Churches, where you also sing and also ex-perience the Holy Spirit, Catholicism is more serious, and more grounded,deeply rooted in tradition and the sacraments. Especially in the sacra-ments. It’s not just worship, but it is also confession and eucharist. (FP#4)The importance of the sacraments, especially the Eucharist and Confession,also becomes apparent when looking at reports about events at HolyMass andwho celebrated it. The emphasis on sacraments is one of the most prominentdistinguishing traits of Catholic Charismatics in the EPC Christianity, as arethe charisms in the Catholic Church.Regarding sacraments, the GCCR is interested in proving that the Charis-matic understanding of the works of the Holy Spirit does not contradict theCatholic understanding of the sacraments. In the Catholic Charismatic un-derstanding, the charisms are considered to be worked by the Holy Spirit,but unlike the sacraments, no universality or generality is assumed. Whilethe charisms in the GCCR’s view are dependent on the respective person andconcrete situation, i.e. “subjective”, the sacraments are “objective” in the sensethat they work independently of the person and situation. Accordingly, in theCatholic Charismatic view, the sacraments are “superior” to the charisms. Atthe same time, “one reckons that the sacraments themselves can also becomeplaces of spontaneous and spectacular spiritual experience” (Zimmerling 2018:133–134). The coexistence and parallel use of the two logics mentioned abovebecome evident in the GCCR’s discussion about sacraments and charisms.In the publications of the Theological Committee of the GCCR, the prac-tice of charisms is clearly restricted and subordinated to Catholic doctrine andstructure. As charisms are understood as “gifts of the Holy Spirit” to individ-uals, Charismatic practices elude external control: neither “prophetic impres-sions” nor the “baptism in the Holy Spirit” nor the personal experience of Godcan be objectively verified. When talking about the charisms, the GCCR con-sistently applies the Catholic logic and subordinates personal experience un-64 Social Forms of Religionder the rules and hierarchy of the Catholic Church. For example, in the areaof “prophecy”, where actors claim to receive impressions or images sent by theHoly Spirit, theGCCRemphasizes theneed for examination and refers, amongother things, to the teaching of the Church as an important standard:Received impressions are always subject to examination: Do they agreewith the Word of God, with the commandment of love, with the teach-ing of the Church, and with the criteria of the discernment of spirits? (CE-Info#330)Elsewhere it is clearly stated that:If something violates the commandments of God, the standards of HolyScripture, or the doctrine of faith and morals of the Church, then it is notof God. (ThO#2, p. 14)The teachings of the Church are thus mentioned – along with the Bible – asthe decisive standard against which “prophecies” would have to be measuredin order to test their authenticity and validity. If statements are marked asprophetic that are not compatible with the teaching of the Church, then fromthe GCCR’s point of view this is an indication that the corresponding impres-sion does not come fromGod.The “spontaneous working of the Spirit”, whichis emphasized again and again in the GCCR, is thereby subordinated to theteaching of the Church. Here, the Charismatic logic of legitimization is sub-ordinated to the Catholic logic: if the Catholic logic is not applicable, it is notlegitimate.The case is a little bit different when it comes to “baptism in the HolySpirit”. According to Catholic doctrine, the sacraments of Baptism and Con-firmation confer to the recipient a “stamp” of belonging to Christ and hisChurch when they are administered. In the Catholic understanding, thisimprint is unrepeatable and cannot be changed, which is why these twosacraments can only be received once. According to Catholic dogmatic un-derstanding, renewed baptism – and therefore, “baptism in the Holy Spirit”– is impossible. Narratives of baptism in the Holy Spirit are, however, onefundamental pillar of Pentecostal and Charismatic spirituality. There is anentire genre of literature on testimonies and the experience of conversion.Catholic Charismatic theologians dealt with this conceptual problem alreadyin the early days of the GCCR. As a result of these disputes, the understandingHannah Grünenthal: ‘Catholic’ and ‘Charismatic’ 65of the “baptism in the Holy Spirit” as a “reactivation” or “actualization” of thesacraments of baptismand confirmation has become established in theGCCR:Theologically, the main effect of the educated leaders was to help inte-grate the CCR into existing ecclesial structures and to argue that baptismin the Spirit was a “release” of the Spirit or, at any rate, functioned in a waythat was compatible with the sacramental theology of Christian initiation.The argument was that the Holy Spirit is first given at infant baptism butsubsequently released at the time of Spirit baptism. (Kay et al. 2011: 330)This integrationof theCharismatic experience into theCatholic doctrine of thesacraments,whichwas pushed by early leaders and theologians,was an essen-tial prerequisite for the recognition of the GCCR in the Catholic Church by thebishops and the Pope. In today’s GCCR thematter of baptism in theHoly Spiritdoes not play a role, though nearly everybody has their own narrative of per-sonal conversion, albeit slightly different:While the Pentecostal narrative typi-cally describes life before the experience of theHoly Spirit as sinful, in GermanCatholic Charismatic narratives life before conversion is described in terms ofmembership in theCatholicChurch,but stillmissing ‘something’; thatmissing‘something’, i.e. the personal experience of theHoly Spirit and the personal re-lationshipwithGod, isfilled throughconversion.Here, theCharismatic logic isappliedwhile the subject of legitimization ismovedout of reach of theCatholiclogic.Similarmechanisms are at work in cases wheremembers of the GCCR im-plement Charismatic alternatives to priestly or sacramental practices, for ex-ample the “prayer for deliverance” as an alternative to exorcism or “pastoralconversation with lay people” as a Charismatic alternative to confession. In allthree examples, laypersons assume tasks and roles that are functionally sim-ilar to those reserved for priests in the Catholic Church without questioningpriestly actions or their importance. Formally and theologically, the Charis-matic, spirit-given alternatives are strongly demarcated from priestly prac-tices. However, in practice, there is a great overlap in terms of content andfunction. Although it seems natural that the different practices take place indifferent social forms, this is not always the case. Prayers for deliverance takeplace in the context of Charismatic faith courses as well as in Holy Mass or-ganized by GCCR members; confession is taken in the context of large prayerevents, even interdenominational events. Again, the social forms are fluid andreflect the fluidity of the logics of legitimization.66 Social Forms of ReligionIn the first example, the case of exorcism and the “prayer for deliverance”,theTheological Committee of the GCCR, formed of elected priests and theolo-gians with the role of supervising and supporting theological developmentsin the GCCR, published aTheologischeOrientierung (‘TheologicalOrientation’) withthe title Gebet um Befreiung. Ein Beitrag zum innerkirchlichen Gespräch (‘Prayer forDeliverance.Acontribution to thedebatewithin theChurch’).Theauthorsdistinguishclearly between the responsibility and authority of the layperson and those ofthe priests:For laypeople [who enact the prayer of deliverance], the following applies:According to the law of the Catholic Church, insight into the actions of evilor evil powers does not automatically lead to a vocation to the exorcistministry. This is reserved for some priests who are expressly called to it bytheir respective bishop. Exorcism is a special case of the Church’s liberatingactions. (ThO#2, p. 34)From the perspective of the GCCR, laypeople may have insight into the “ac-tionof evil powers”,but the exorcisticministry is explicitly reserved for specificpriests who are called to it by their bishop.Thus, the exorcisticministry is inte-grated into theecclesiastical hierarchyandmarkedas inaccessible to laypeople.The “prayer for deliverance”, on the other hand, is distinguished fromexorcismand thus available for non-priests. The lines drawn indicate that, in contrastto exorcism, Satan is not directly addressed, but conspicuous annoyances aremet without directly addressing invisible powers. In the Theological Orienta-tion “Prayer for Deliverance” (ThO#2), the Theological Committee sets out toshow in detail how to deal with “demonic activity” and the practice of “prayerfor deliverance”, and discusses not only biblical foundations, systematic-dog-matic considerations, Church tradition, and magisterium, but also describesvarious formsand causes of “demonic activity”,possibilities of “anamnesis anddiagnosis”, and “healing methods”. In doing so, the text constantly refers, onthe one hand, to Catholic tradition and doctrine, and, on the other, to the spir-itual effects of “prayer for deliverance”, thus separating the formal frameworkfrom the practical application in concrete situations.A ratherpragmatic approach toquestionsof spiritual competencebecomesclear in the following interview excerpt:Hannah Grünenthal: ‘Catholic’ and ‘Charismatic’ 67Manfred: I can also consciously say in prayer, ‘Power of evil, depart fromme,’ if I feel somehow attacked, why not. […] And then there’s always thisdiscussion, may non-priests command demons directly.I: hmhmManfred: Well. I also find it to be a bit of an idle academic discussion. Imean, the form can be quite different. If someone does not want to say:‘Spirit of lies, leave me!’, then he should pray the Lord’s Prayer and ‘Deliverme from evil’. I think you shouldn’t be so anxious.9Without fundamentally questioning the meaning of an exorcism or the sep-aration between “exorcism” and “prayer for deliverance”, Manfred bases hisevaluation on the question of the concrete effectiveness of spiritual action.He attributes such effectiveness both to a direct address, for example, of the“spirit of lies” within a prayer, and to the formula “Deliver us from evil” in theLord’s Prayer, which anybody can pray at any time. In the further course of theinterview, Manfred emphasizes that he is not talking about explicit “demonicpossessions”, which, according to Catholic doctrine, require an exorcism, butrather about “nuisances”, which, in his view, can arise in everyday life andwhich he understands as an expression of the “spiritual struggle” betweenGodand the devil.A similar evaluation, based on the effect of spiritual action, is also found inrelation to spiritual andpastoral support and, inparticular, “pastoral conversa-tion with lay people” as an alternative to confession.The ‘Theological Orientation’‘ReceivingForgiveness.Repentanceand forgiveness of sins inpastoral conversationswithlay people’ describes the following:Spiritual accompaniments are being increasingly valued and sought. Chris-tians look for believers as companions with whom they can talk about theirlives. [...] Trust, grown from common spiritual experiences, opens a spacefor fearless personal encounters. Weakness, guilt and sin are given a name.One believer confesses his sins to another. There are people with a pro-nounced pastoral charism. One goes to them. It is all like confession. Whathappens here in terms of spiritual consummation must be recognized andnamed in its true value. [...] What is ‘missing’ in the sense of the sacra-ment of penance is an authorized minister of the sacrament. The ‘absence’9 Interview (I#8) with Manfred, member of the GCCR leaderboard, March 09, 2016.68 Social Forms of Religioncan have several reasons. Sometimes a priest is simply unavailable. Or thepriest may well have the official authority to administer the sacrament, butnot the conversational and contact skills. A space of trust as a prerequisitefor the free opening of oneself does not exist. (ThO#3, p. 3, emphasis H. G.)As a prerequisite for the sacrament of penance, that is, confession, a personalprerequisite is addressed here in addition to the “official authority to admin-ister the sacraments”with the “ability to talk andmake contact”, which createsa “space of trust”. For cases in which this personal requirement is not fulfilledby the priest, the GCCR points out the alternative of conducting conversationsabout guilt and atonement with laypeople who fulfill these personal require-ments. Although they are not ordained and therefore have no “official author-ity”, they are endowed “with a pronounced pastoral charism”. Even if it is not aconfession in the sacramental sense, there is a “spiritual consummation” thatmust be “recognized and named in a true value”.The importance of the priestand the sacramental confession is not disputed,but a “Charismatic alternative”of equal value is pointed out. The legitimation of the people in question takesplacefirstly via anauthorizationbyGodor theHoly Spirit, secondly via theper-sonal prerequisite, and thirdly via the effect, i.e. the “success” of the spiritualact.These aspects are closely connected to the question of authority, which inturn is connected to the question of the organization of the social, and there-fore with social forms.3.5 Legitimizing and questioning religious authorityAuthority, as understood here, is not a quality that people ‘have’, nor can au-thority be taken away from them. Rather, authority takes place where actorstake into account the positions of others and consider them in their own deci-sions, actions, attitudes or opinions (Sofsky/Paris 1991).Authority, therefore, isascribed by actors to authority figures, acknowledged, and can be withdrawn.However, the attribution of authority in social contexts is a matter not merelybetween two actors – the one that ascribes authority and the one authority isascribed to–but is negotiatedwithin social groupswith recourse to a commonframe of reference. Thus, both recognition and denial of authority are closelylinked to the negotiation of group identity and,moreover, to the relation of thegroup to its environment (ibid.; cf. Grünenthal 2021). Therefore, religious au-thority is also ascribed or denied in connection with the social form in which aspecific practice takes place.Hannah Grünenthal: ‘Catholic’ and ‘Charismatic’ 69In the case of the GCCR, the ascription and recognition of religious au-thority are tightly connected to processes of legitimization. As the GCCRneeds to argue for its belonging to the Catholic Church as well as to theCharismatic Movement, the recognition of authority that is also recognizedby other actors in the respective fields indicates the GCCR’s belonging to thefield. By acknowledging the authority of, for example, the Pope, Bishops orCatholic priests, members of the GCCR indicate that they acknowledge theshared Catholic frame of reference and thus belong to the Catholic Church.By not opposing recognized authorities, they indicate that they do not opposethe Catholic frame of reference. In the Charismatic setting however, that sameacknowledgment of the Pope’s and the Bishops’ authority sets them apartfrom non-Catholic Charismatics. For example, at the interdenominationalCharismatic Congress ‘pfingsten21’,which took place in 2016 inWürzburg andwas organized by Catholic, Protestant, and non-denominational CharismaticChristians, there were specifically Catholic activities, such as a Holy Mass onSunday morning.In themedia discourse of the GCCR, there are quite often references to es-pecially Catholic authority figures, such as bishops or cardinals, or the popes,that merely mention themwithout further elaborating or substantiating theirauthority.This indicates that their authority is not up fordebate,but rather set.References to Charismatic leaders aremore often accompanied by an explana-tion or elaboration; for example, their expertise on the topic at hand, their deepconnection with the Holy Spirit, their religious affiliation, or their reputationin the Charismatic field.At first glance, it seems clear that Catholic clergy is legitimized in theCatholic mode and that Charismatic actors are legitimized in the Charis-matic mode. At a second glance, however, it is not quite that simple. In thenegotiation of religious authority, that is, whether and to what extent views,positions, and opinions are considered for one’s own decisions, one or twomodes of legitimization are applied depending on the situation at hand. Insome cases, the person’s authority is legitimized in one mode but delegit-imized in the other. In some cases, both modes of legitimization are appliedto support a person’s authority. I will illustrate this using three examples.Thefirst example is how amember of theGCCR talks about aGermanBap-tist leader.Askedwhomhe considers an authority,Florian answers, after amo-ment’s thought:70 Social Forms of Religion[T]he former leader of the Spiritual Renewal in the Baptist Church, Dr.Heiner Rust, he is someone, a very sought-after speaker, really competenttheologian, and an extremely gifted, prophetic man. So his main focus isreally the prophetic gift, so the charisma of prophecy, and how to dealwith it, and so on. And he also is a totally humble person. So, he impressedme very much recently. We were in a group, before an event which was tostart soon, and we simply prayed before, as a preparatory prayer, prayedthe Lord’s Prayer. I asked, is there anything else? Does anyone want tosay anything here? And then he answered tersely, “yes, well, I have theimpression that God wants to say something to you, and to you…” That wasso very clearly prophetic as I have experienced it very rarely in someone.[…] He really spoke into their lives. And into mine, too. And deep truththat he could not know. But he spoke things with a determination andcourage, though he could not know if they were right or wrong. Just outof God’s impulse Yes.10In narrating this episode, Florian first characterizes Rust with reference tohis affiliation and position, outreach, and theological expertise, but also as a“humble man”, thus characterizing him as a man of Christian values. The ac-tual basis for the ascription of authority, however, are not these traits, but thesubjective acknowledgment of Rust’s Charismatic, i.e. spiritual, actions whenhe utters prophetic words in an unexpected situation that were experiencedas being ‘real,’ that is, as indeed coming from God. In this case, a Charismaticleader doing charisms is legitimized in the Charismatic mode.That it is not always so simple will be shown in the second example, wherea Catholic local priest’s authority, although not questioned in principle, is im-plicitly questioned by the application of the Charismatic mode of legitimiza-tion. Rüdiger, a GCCR group leader and part-time deacon, describes his ex-periences in trying to establish specific Charismatic social forms in his localparish:I thought at some point, just a few years ago, now it’s time, now I wouldlike to offer a new possibility and have a Charismatic worship service, notin the Church, but next door in the parish hall… No, our pastor didn’t wantthat. He somehow got cold feet, like that something could happen thatslipped away from him, where he no longer had any control over it… and,no, he did not allow it. […] He also did not allow for a course of faith. Our10 Interview (I#7) with Florian, member of the GCCR leaderboard, March 08, 2016.Hannah Grünenthal: ‘Catholic’ and ‘Charismatic’ 71pastor saw that as competition to his faith course, which he didn’t evenhold personally, but invited someone from the vicariate general. Hmmm,no, that did not go very well.11The pastor’s structural authority in prohibiting – or permitting – the worshipservice as well as the faith course is not at all questioned in this account: NoCharismatic worship service took place, and the faith course was chosen tothe pastor’s preferences.TheCatholicmode of legitimization is applied. At thesame time, however, the Charismatic mode of legitimization was applied, inwhich his authority was highly questioned: Rüdiger attributes the refusal ofCharismatic social forms to a fear of losing control, which from a Charismaticperspective can be interpreted as the pastor not trusting the work of the HolySpirit. His formulation that the pastor “got cold feet” stands in a strong con-trast to the “determination and courage” which was ascribed to the Baptistleader in the first example. Furthermore, by pointing out that the pastor hadnot even held the faith course he chose himself but had invited someone fromthe vicariate general to do so,Rüdiger suggests that the pastor could not or didnot want to give testimony of his own faith but retreated to hierarchies andformalities.The third example shows how authority is negotiated and legitimizedwithin the GCCR: The ecclesiastic office of leadership, which is reserved forthe clergy, is contrasted by the charism of leadership, an equally “spirituallybased” leadership competence, which is not bound to ordination or clericalstatus. Norbert Baumert, priest and former chairman of the GCCR, addressesthis in an interview on the occasion of the CCR’s 50th anniversary:I always resisted the tendency that – typically Catholic – the priests wouldhave the say. Leadership should be given to those who have the charism ofleadership, including some priests. And I noticed that women in particu-lar often received this charism. So I saw my task rather in discovering andsupporting such vocations. (CEInfo#246)Not only is the charism of leadership attested to laypeople, it is also separatedfrom priesthood. This means that from the GCCR’s perspective, there can bepriests who are ordained but do not have the charism of leadership. Baumert11 Interview (I#2) with Elisa and Rüdiger, diocesan spokespersons for the GCCR, March21, 2014.72 Social Forms of Religionexplains that he had often experienced this “charism of leadership” especiallyin women, who are systematically excluded from priesthood in the CatholicChurch.He continues that he himself withdraws to the status of a promoter ofthese charismatically gifted women. With respect to leadership roles and de-cisionmaking, no difference is made between ordained priests and laypeople.It is, however, considered very useful to have ordained priests within themovement.Thomas, who is a priest himself, explains:It does not matter so much that I am a priest. It’s practical, because we cancelebrate the Eucharist together when we come together, which of course isnot possible without a priest, but… yes. Also, the first […] sacrament is bap-tism, that’s the most fundamental of all. Without baptism there is nothing.We also need priests, and I would also still ask people to pray for priestlyvocations, but above all we need people who let themselves be addressedby God, let themselves be addressed by Christ, and who are ready to followhim.12Thomas defines his role as priest in terms of its usefulness for the community– namely, that it is “practical” because it allows celebrating the Eucharist to-gether – and otherwise emphasizes the equality between all members of theGCCR.When he emphasizes that the first andmost fundamental sacrament isbaptism, he implies that after being baptized, every human being is called byGod, one of the possible vocations being that of a priest.Thomas thus presentshis vocation – and his status as priest – as equal to other vocations and rela-tivizes the special status of priests in the Catholic Church, which is expressed,for example, in their authority for spiritual (sacramental) action and access toresources andministries.Another practical aspect of having priests in the group was brought up ina conversation over lunch during a diocesan election meeting. Two membersof the GCCR, laypeople, talked about a Charismatic priest they knew who hadlived in the area but had moved away. They said it was a shame because theycould really do with a priest like him. When I asked why, they explained thatpriests arebeneficial because they representGCCRideas in thepriests’ councilsand the higher bodies to which the laity has no access (FP#4). Here it becomesclear that the hierarchical position of priests, also of priests in the GCCR, byno means goes unnoticed, but that it is considered not to be important with12 Interview (I#5) with Thomas, member of the GCCR leaderboard, October 15, 2015.Hannah Grünenthal: ‘Catholic’ and ‘Charismatic’ 73regard toGCCR religious life, other than representing theGCCR in the Churchstructure and administering the sacraments.On the other hand, personality verymuch adds to the ascription of author-ity, as the following interview segment illustrates:Julia: this course, it’s so beautiful. Have you ever heard of Hans Buob?I: I have a CD, yes, where he talks about the Gospel of Mark, I think. I thinkhe has a pleasant way of speaking, right, so very, vividly.Julia: Yes, exactly. Very simple. And when he celebrates Mass…Well. That’s…There, really, heaven and earth connect. Heaven and earth are one. He alsoconveys that well. He also has humor. He is matter-of-factly. He always saysit doesn’t depend on feelings. It doesn’t depend on feelings. God is real, youcan believe that, he is there, it doesn’t depend on feelings. […] Because thefeelings pass away. And he’s totally right about that.13What is remarkable about this interview is that Julia hardly responds to thesuggested legitimization of his authority –namely that he speaks well and canconvey things vividly. Instead, she highlights another aspect: the experienceshe associates with his services. Buob’s authority is also based on his quali-ties and abilities (“can communicate well”, “has a sense of humor”, “matter-of-factly”), but her focus is on the content he conveys and his actions, for example,the way he celebrates Mass and how this affects her.To tie these three examples of the construction of religious authority backto the question of social forms, some observations need to be made. First,Charismatic leaders are usually referred to in a Charismatic context. Theirauthority is acknowledged and negotiated in the Charismatic mode of legit-imization.The social forms in which charismatic leaders’ authority is enactedare workshops, events, lectures, and social forms that are characteristic ofthe Charismatic Movement. Second, the Catholic clergy’s authority is notnegotiated or questioned when it comes to the sacraments or their office inthe Church.The Catholic mode of legitimization is applied whenever it comesto sacraments and Church hierarchy. Third, the Catholic clergy’s authorityis subject to negotiation in questions of experience. When GCCR membersdiscuss a priest’s or bishop’s impact on their personal faith and experience,13 Interview (I#6) with Julia, member of a GCCR prayer circle, February 02, 2016.74 Social Forms of Religionthey discuss their authority in the Charismatic mode of legitimization, butwithout questioning their authority in the Catholic mode of legitimization.4. ConclusionHow do members of the GCCR position themselves and the GCCR in theCatholic Church as well as in the Charismatic Movement? How do they ne-gotiate their belonging in concrete situations and topics? And what does thatmean for the social forms the GCCR takes?As I have shown, members of the GCCR negotiate their position in bothcontexts, the Catholic Church and the Charismatic Movement, by applyingboth a ‘Catholic’ logic – a logic that is oriented to the Catholic Church, itshierarchies, structures, theology, and practices – and a ‘Charismatic’ logic – alogic that is oriented towards personal experiences.These two logics, althoughindependent of each other in principle, are often combined or, in some cases,played off against each other. While in official texts the Catholic logic is oftenstressed, in private religious practice there are more pragmatic solutions.Thebasis for this flexible construct of legitimization is the wide range of socialforms in which Charismatic Christianity in Germany takes place: the simul-taneity ofHolyMass andWorshipWeekends,weekly Bible groups,EPC events,seminars, and community meetings. In these different events, members oftheGCCRnegotiate their positions and arguments and thus establish a sharedframe of reference that consists of both Charismatic and Catholic elements,which can be referenced in the Catholic as well as in the Charismatic logic tolegitimize actions and arguments.The religious experience, the experience ofthe Holy Spirit, is explicitly not tied to one social form or the other in GCCRpractice but can occur in different situations and contexts. The wide varietyof social forms found in the GCCR reflects the emphasis on subjective beliefsand the individual experience of the Holy Spirit within the GCCR.Hannah Grünenthal: ‘Catholic’ and ‘Charismatic’ 75BibliographyAnderson, Allan H. (2014): An Introduction to Pentecostalism. Global Charis-matic Christianity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Anderson, Allan H. (2006): “The Pentecostal and Charismatic movements.” In:Hugh McLeod (ed.), The Cambridge History of Christianity. 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Bromiley (eds.), The encyclopedia of Christianity, Grand Rapids, MI.:Eerdmans, pp. 404–408.76 Social Forms of ReligionHoenes del Pinal, Eric (2017): “The Paradox of Charismatic Catholicism.Rupture and Continuity in a Q’eqchi’-Maya Parish.” In: Kristin Norget/Valentina Napolitano/Maya Mayblin (eds.), The Anthropology of Catholi-cism, Oakland: University of California Press, pp. 170–183.Johnson, Todd M./Zurlo, Gina A. (2020): World Christian Encyclopedia, Edin-burgh: Edinburgh University Press.Kay, William K./Slijkerman, Kees/Pfister, Raymond et al. (2011): “PentecostalTheology andCatholic Europe.” In: AnneE.Dyer/WilliamK.Kay (eds.), Eu-ropean Pentecostalism, Leiden, Boston: Brill, pp. 313–331.Krämer, Klaus/Vellguth, Klaus (eds.) (2019): Pentekostalismus. 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A compar-ative analysis of the Neocatechumenal Way and the Catholic CharismaticHannah Grünenthal: ‘Catholic’ and ‘Charismatic’ 77Renewal.” In: Journal for Perspectives of Economic Political and Social In-tegration 21/1-2, pp. 91–114.Zimmerling, Peter (2018): Charismatische Bewegungen, Stuttgart, Göttingen:UTB GmbH; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.Primary SourcesCEInfo#246. Fleddermann, Josef (2017): “50 Jahre Charismatische Erneue-rung – Interview mit Prof. Dr. Norbert Baumert SJ.” In: CE-Info 2017(2),pp. 6 + 11.CEInfo#330.Hemberger,Christof (2018): “Charismen inderGebetsgruppe.” In:CE-Info 2018(1), pp. 11–13.FP#4. Field Protocol of election of diocesan spokespeople, 16. 01. 2016.I#2. Interview with Elisa and Rüdiger, diocesan spokespersons for the GCCR,March 21, 2014.I#5. Interview with Thomas, member of the GCCR leaderboard, October 15,2015.I#6. Interview with Julia, member of a GCCR prayer circle, February 02, 2016.I#7. InterviewwithFlorian,memberof theGCCR leaderboard,March08,2016.I#8. Interview with Manfred, member of the GCCR leaderboard, March 09,2016.ThO#2.Theologischer Ausschuss der Charismatischen Erneuerung in der Ka-tholischenKirche (2011): Gebet umBefreiung.Ein Beitrag zum innerkirch-lichen Gespräch.Theologische Orientierung.ThO#3.Theologischer Ausschuss der Charismatischen Erneuerung in der Ka-tholischen Kirche in Deutschland (2008): Vergebung empfangen. Umkehrund Sündenvergebung im seelsorgerlichen Gespräch mit Laien.Theologi-sche Orientierung.ThO#5.Theologischer Ausschuss der Charismatischen Erneuerung in der Ka-tholischen Kirche in Deutschland (2005): Zu auffallenden körperlichenPhänomenen imZusammenhangmit geistlichenVorgängen.TheologischeOrientierung.78 Social Forms of ReligionWeb ReferencesCharismatische Erneuerung. “Charismatische Erneuerung in der Katholi-schen Kirche.” Accessed December 1, 2018. https://www.erneuerung.de/.Charismatische Erneuerung. “Wer wir sind.” Accessed December 1, 2018. https://www.erneuerung.de/wer-wir-sind/.“I am happy to be Catholic”The Catholic Charismatic Renewal and the Dynamicsof the Religious Field in BrazilAstrid ReuterAbstract Since the 1970s and increasingly since the 1990s, Charismatic movementshave experiencedanunexpectedboominBrazilianCatholicism.Thisdevelopment canbeinterpreted as resulting on the one hand from the dynamics of the religious field inBrazilas a whole, and on the other from the dynamics of the Catholic sub-field.The paper aimsto situate the rise of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal in Brazil in this dual context. Iwill argue that the rise of Pentecostalism since the 1950s and 1960s has set in motion apreviously unknown dynamic of competition both in Brazil’s overall religious field andin its various sub-fields.This competitive dynamic, it is claimed, coincides with converg-ing religious beliefs and needs: beliefs in spiritual beings (be they good or evil) and aspi-rations for deeply personal spiritual experiences (of “baptism in the Spirit”, possession,exorcism, deliverance).Competition and convergence are thus interconnected,which fos-ters a dynamic of ‘mimicry’ (isomorphism) in the religious field: mimicry in relation toboth styles of piety and those religious social forms that facilitate personal spiritual ex-periences. Particular attentionwill be given to social formswithin Charismatic Catholi-cism; it will be argued that these provide a flexible new type of institutional access to thetraditional infrastructure of the church.Keywords Brazil, Catholic Charismatic Renewal, community, event, mimicry, neo-Pentecostalism, organization, religious field, singing priests, spiritual warfare80 Social Forms of Religion1. Introduction1“Eu Sou Feliz por Ser Católico” (‘I amhappy to beCatholic’) – this is the title of abook by the Brazilian priest Marcelo Rossi which was published in 2000 (Rossi2000). Marcelo Rossi is one of the most prominent figures of the so-calledCatholic Charismatic Renewal (CCR) in Brazil: He is considered not only a fas-cinating priest but also famous as a singer and songwriter and is omnipresentin both church and private media (Carranza 2011; Clarke 1999). Thus, to givean example, the renowned weekly journal Veja featured a long report on himentitled “Uma estrela no altar” (‘A star at the altar’; Junqueira 1998).The Renovação Carismática Católica (RCC) has since experienced an un-foreseen boom,especially since the 1990s.As part of this boom, it has producedquite a number of such “singing priests”, who – as “stars at the altar” and onthe stage–have contributed significantly to themovement’s success (Carranza2011; Clarke 1999; Fernandes 2005; Souza 2005). All of them praise the happi-ness of being Catholic.2 Now, happiness is not what we would readily iden-tify as the core message of Catholicism. However, the slogan ‘I am happy tobe Catholic’ sums up what distinguishes Charismatic Catholicism from otherstyles of Catholic piety: Charismatic Catholics enjoy their faith!What is the status of Charismatic Catholicism within the religious field inBrazil in general and in the Catholic sub-field in particular? What is its rolein the religious dynamics and what social forms are set up to live CharismaticCatholicism? In the following, I will explore these questions.My conceptual approach is based on Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory. Whilenot reconstructing it in detail here (Reuter 2018), I will however clarify some ofits central features. In fact,whenBourdieu (inspired by his reading ofMaxWe-ber) conceptualized the religious field (Bourdieu 1987 [1971]; 1991 [1971]), he didnothave inmind theplurality of different religions in agiven context–which ishow his concept ismostly applied today. Rather, Bourdieu was concernedwiththe dynamics of competition and conflict within religions or denominations.His prototype of the religious field was the French Catholic field. Still, Bour-dieu’s approach can be also applied to contexts of religious diversity. In this1 I thank David West and Paula König for their thorough editorial assistance.2 To give another example besides Pe. Marcelo Rossi: João Carlos Almeida, better knownas Padre Joãozinho, also sings about the happiness of being Catholic. His song “Soufeliz por ser Católico“, which he composed in 2009, became the leitmotif of a successfulCD (Pe. Joãozinho SCJ 2009).Astrid Reuter: “I am happy to be Catholic” 81contribution, I try to intertwine both perspectives: I will look at the dynamicsof Brazil’s very diverse religious field as a whole as well as (and specifically) atthe dynamics of its Catholic sub-field.In the first part, I will identify the main actors in the overall religious fieldin Brazil, namely Catholicism, Protestantism (or, rather, Pentecostalism), andAfro-Brazilian religions,providing somewhatmoredetail about theProtestantand the Afro-Brazilian sub-fields (1.). The second part focuses on the Catholicsub-field, and in particular on the role of the Charismatic Renewal in its in-ternal dynamics (2.). In my final considerations (3.), I will again zoom out tolook at the broader religious field of Brazil: The point here is to show how therise of Pentecostalism since the 1950s has set in motion a previously unknowndynamicof competition in thisfield (cf.Chesnut 2003).Butwhat is this compe-tition about? I will argue that this competitive dynamic coincides with a cross-religious and cross-denominational converging of religious beliefs and needs:beliefs in spiritual beings of whatsoever character (good or evil) and intenseaspirations for personal spiritual experiences (“baptism in the Spirit”, posses-sion, deliverance, exorcism). Taking up an expression from R. Andrew Ches-nut (2003: 64), I will refer to this as an “option for the spirit[s]”. I will arguefurther that this interconnectedness between competition and convergence ofreligious beliefs and needs fosters a dynamic of ‘mimicry’ between religionsand denominations. Thus, I claim that there are isomorphic tendencies bothin relation to styles of piety and in relation to social forms that enable much-longed-for personal spiritual experiences. Particular attention will be given tosocial forms within Charismatic Catholicism; I will argue that these provide anew, flexible type of institutional access to theCatholic Church (cf.Hero 2009).2. The religious field in Brazil: Main actorsBrazil has always been considered a Catholic country par excellence. Althoughthis is not completely incorrect, it doesn’t show the whole picture. After all,while 92 per cent of Brazilians still self-identified as Catholic in 1970, that fig-ure had dropped to 65 per cent by 2010, and to 54 per cent by 2017. Remarkably,during the sameperiod, theproportionofProtestants rose substantially from5to 27per cent, this growthobviously beingmainly at the expenseof theCatholicChurch.Among the remaining 19 per centwho are neitherCatholic nor Protes-tant, the largest and fastest-growing group comprises the non-religious (at 14per cent). The remaining 5 percent are made up of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews82 Social Forms of Religionand Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists, indigenous and other religions (at 2.7per cent), and, not least, Afro-Brazilian religions, including Spiritism (at 2.3per cent) (Chesnut 2016: 77, 80; da Silva 2016: 490; Engler/Schmidt 2016: 5; Lati-nobarómetro 2017; Pew Research Center 2013: 2; 2014: 27; Schmidt 2016).If we now look for the main players in this field, two are obvious immedi-ately: Catholicism and Protestantism. The third is less evident: It is the Afro-Brazilian religions, including the many variants of Spiritism. In terms ofstatistics, Afro-Brazilian religions are marginal players. But statistics in thiscase are misleading since they hide the common practice of many Braziliansto identify as Catholic while practicing Afro-Brazilian religions alongsideCatholicism. Afro-Brazilian religions thus play a far more important role thanthe data suggest.To achieve a better understanding of the competitive dynamics in Brazil’sreligious field, we must first take a closer look at these main actors. Follow-ing Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptualization, we can speak of a ‘Catholic field’, a‘Protestant field’, and an ‘Afro-Brazilian field’ as ‘sub-fields’ within the broaderreligious field.Protestantism was of minor importance in Brazil for centuries (Cam-pos 2016; Dove 2016; Dreher 2016). It was only in the early 19th centurythat Protestantism succeeded in gaining a foothold in Brazil. At that time,Lutherans (predominantly Germans) settled in southern Brazil, where theyfounded rather ‘closed’ religious-ethnic communities. As they largely re-frained from proselytizing, Brazilian Protestantism at that time basically keptits European character. Missionary ambitions were first developed by NorthAmerican Protestants (Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, members of theEpiscopal Church, and others), who started to proselytize in Brazil in themiddle of the 19th century. Their success remained modest – and yet theirendeavors represent a turning point in the history of Protestantism in Brazil.Since they successfully recruited converts among local people, the growth ofProtestantism became ever more independent of immigration. The constantexpansion of Protestantism since the early 20th century is thus due not toimmigration but to conversion. However, so-called historical Protestantism(i.e. mainly Lutheranism and Calvinism) did not profit from this ‘turn’, butremained a minor segment within Brazil’s Protestant sub-field. Instead, itwas the Pentecostal churches that benefitted from the high conversion ratesand were consequently able to establish themselves permanently in Brazil.The Pentecostal movement emerged in the United States at the beginningof the 20th century (Anderson 2014: 40–70) and reached Brazil soon afterwardAstrid Reuter: “I am happy to be Catholic” 83(Anderson 2014: 78–83; Chesnut 1997; 2003: 39–63; Rivera 2016).Thefirst Pente-costal church in Brazil, Assembléia de Deus (“Assembly of God”), was foundedby Swedish-American missionaries in Belém (in the northern state of Pará) in1911 (de Alencar 2019 [1998]; Correa 2020 [1998]). The many, mostly small localPentecostal churches that emerged at this junction did not achieve high con-version rates in the first half of the 20th century. In the second half, however,they experienced rapid growth. Crucially, this growth was mainly on accountof Brazilian converts who themselves now founded new churches. As a conse-quence, the prevailing North American influence gradually diluted.Moreover,the spread of the movement was accompanied by its internal diversification,and this led to the emergence of a new variant, called “neo-Pentecostalism”, inthe 1970s.Unlike themostly small, independent local churches of the first Pen-tecostal “wave”, neo-Pentecostalism tends to organize itself in megachurches(Chesnut 2016; Freston 1998; 1999; 2016), which claim theological dominanceand rule by means of strict church control and, not least, at great financial ex-pense.The most important neo-Pentecostal church in Brazil is the Igreja Uni-versal do Reino de Deus (IURD; ‘Universal Church of the Kingdom of God’;UCKG), founded in 1977 in Rio de Janeiro by EdirMacedo.Managed like a busi-ness, theUniversalChurch conducts evangelizationwithmarketing strategies.Thus, it has invested an enormous amount of money to gain public influence,especially through mass media: At great financial expense, it has establishedsuccessful media groups of its own, including TV and radio stations, publish-ing houses, and so forth. Moreover, immense efforts have been taken to bevisible in the public sphere, not least through prestigious church buildings –which are in sharp contrast to the predominantly verymodest local Pentecostalchurches throughout the country.The best example is the so-called Templo deSalomão in São Paulo (‘Solomon’s Temple’). Built according to what is thoughtto be known about the plans of the first Jewish temple in Jerusalem, this over-sized church can seat 10.000 people.3Neo-Pentecostalism sees evangelization in terms of what is called “spir-itual warfare”. And this concept has greatly influenced not only Pentecostal-ism itself or the Protestant sub-field but the dynamics of the religious fieldas a whole (Chesnut 2003). “Spiritual warfare” has a double meaning: On the3 The 2014 inauguration, which was broadcast nationwide on the private channel TVGlobo, was attended by Brazil's entire political leadership, including then-President ofthe Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party), Dilma Rousseff; cf. the official versiondistributed on the church’s own Youtube channel: Igreja Universal 2014.84 Social Forms of Religionone hand, it concerns inner conversion, i.e. the fighting against one’s innerdemons. On the other (and above all), it relates to proclaiming the exclusivityof (neo-)Pentecostalismwith regard to other religions and other Christian de-nominations. The Universal Church thus stigmatizes certain practices of folkCatholicismas superstitious (suchas the verypopular cult of theVirginMary4).Most of all, however, spiritual warfare aims its sights at Afro-Brazilian reli-gions,whose deities and spirits it labels as demons andwhich it fights aggres-sively (Macedo 2019 [1989]; da Silva 2007; 2016).The term ‘Afro-Brazilian’, examining this sub-field now, denotes a num-ber of heterogeneous religious groups that are institutionally autonomous andoften compete with each other (da Silva/Brumana 2016; Engler 2016; Engler/Brito 2016; Engler/Isaia 2016; Prandi 2010). It is a spectrum which stretchesfromCandomblé groups (that claim to be firmly committed to the African reli-gious heritage) andUmbanda groups (integrating new elements into the Afro-Brazilian religious matrix) to groups that hardly differ from Spiritism, whichcame to Brazil from France in the 1860s and very quickly found great success(Aubrée/Laplantine 1990).Despite these differences, most Afro-Brazilian groups share basic fea-tures, first and foremost the cult of African deities and spirits that came toBrazil during the transatlantic slave trade from the 16th to the 19th century.In Brazil, these deities are included in a common ‘pantheon’ together withCatholic saints, indigenous spirits, and other spiritual beings of differentorigins. Another common feature of themany Afro-Brazilian religions is theirfocus on healing practices: Indeed, Candomblé and Umbanda groups, as wellas Spiritist centers, serve as points of contact for people seeking help withregard to everyday health, family, or work problems.Over the course of centuries, the Catholic side, despite its dogmatic con-demnation, has developed a rather pragmatic ‘tolerance of ambiguity’ towards4 Cf. as an example the incident “Chute na Santa” (,Kicking the Saint‘). It took placein a religious TV program broadcast nationwide by Rede Record (the TV station ofUCKG) on October 12, 1995, which is a national holiday in honor of Brazil’s patronsaint Nossa Senhora Aparecida. A UCKG bishop, Sérgio von Helder, who had brought astatue of Nossa Senhora Aparacida along, led through the program; he walked aroundthe statue and made remarks about how ugly it was, questioning how anyone couldbelieve that such a figure could even have anything to do with God. He then insultedthose beliefs as idolatry and kicked the statue repeatedly. The incident set off a largecontroversy about religious tolerance. Cf. the report on the incident on Jornal Nacional(1995).Astrid Reuter: “I am happy to be Catholic” 85thewidespread habit ofmergingCatholic andAfro-Brazilian practices and be-liefs. On the Protestant side, such pragmatic tolerance is found less with Pen-tecostal and neo-Pentecostal churches strongly rejecting Afro-Brazilian reli-gions.Their special offer of salvation is, as previously stated, strictly exclusive,and in addition acts increasingly aggressively towards competing religions, es-pecially those of African provenance (da Silva 2007; 2016; Oro 2005).This concludes our brief look at the Protestant and Afro-Brazilian sub-fields and the emerging competitive dynamics in the overall religious field. Inthe next part, I focus on what is still the most important religious sub-field inBrazil, at least in terms of statistics, namely Catholicism.3. The Catholic field in Brazil with a special focuson the Catholic Charismatic RenewalBrazilian Catholicism is remarkably diverse.We can distinguish (at least) fourcurrents: Folk Catholicism, Romanized Catholicism, LiberationTheology, andCharismatic Catholicism.Folk Catholicism developed since the beginning of the colonial periodin the 16th century. It is a particular Catholic culture rooted in the IberianCatholicism of the early modern period and shaped by the counter-refor-matory ideas of the Tridentine Council (1545–1563). Its central feature is theworship of the saints – first and foremost: the Virgin Mary – which is ex-pressed in shrines, offerings, pilgrimages, belief in miracles, etc.This specificdevotional culture was, in a sense, the first religious ‘export’ from Europe toLatin America. Once there, however, it developed a life of its own, mergingwith local religious (and non-religious) customs and profane festive culture(González 2016; Larkin 2016; Steil 2016).Towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, theimpact of European Ultramontanism also took hold of the non-Europeanbranches of the Catholic Church. Brazil was no exception: Here, too, a RomanCatholic culture based on the Europeanmodel would be established.Themaincharacteristics of this Romanized Catholicism (as Ultramontanism came tobe called outside of Europe) are prioritizing the magisterium and the clergy(first and foremost the Pope) as well as focusing pastoral care on providingthe so-called holy sacraments (de Roux 2014; Steil 2016). An entirely differentpastoral concept was favored by the third current in Brazil’s Catholic sub-field:LiberationTheology.86 Social Forms of ReligionInfluenced by Marxism and other anti-capitalist theories, LiberationThe-ology emerged in various Latin American countries in the early 1960s andgained wide influence in the 1970s. Among its core tenets is the convictionthat there is a preferential divine “option for the poor” (Hartch 2014: 57–72,73–82, 134–136), i.e. the idea that God loves the poor, the deprived, those whosuffer, more than the rich and privileged and that he empowers the poor tofight in solidarity for their rights in order to overcome oppression, poverty,and hunger. Liberation theology thus radically challenged clerical RomanizedCatholicism. Priests and lay people in this movement founded so-called localbase communities, the idea being to come together to read and interpret theBible in the light of the “option for the poor”. Instead of focusing on providingthe holy sacraments, these base communities aim at empowering the poor,both religiously and socially: religious practice is thus combined with socialwork (with the landless, the illiterate, street children, prostitutes, industrialworkers, etc.). Liberation Theology was supported by the Latin Americanbishops (Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano; CELAM) at their conferences inMedellín (1968) and Puebla (1979) before it was systematically (and effectively)suppressed by Rome, especially since the pontificate of John Paul II (since1978).Much more successful than Liberation Theology is the Catholic Charis-matic Renewal. Launched in the US with the so-called “Duquesne Weekend”in 1967 (Ciciliot 2019: 252f.; 2020: 131f.), the Charismatic wave spilled over toBrazil soon afterward. In a pioneering study, Brazilian sociologist BrendaCarranza (2000) identifies 1969 as the founding year of Brazil’s RenovaçãoCarismática Católica (RCC). In 1969, a US Jesuit, Harold Rahm, who hadbeen working in Brazil since 1964, initiated Brazil’s first Catholic Charismaticprayer group in Campinas (São Paulo state) – a group which should becomethe nucleus of a highly successful movement. In 1971, alongside Harold Rahm,two other priests became involved in establishing the RCC in Brazil: EduardoDougherty, also a US Jesuit, and Jonas Abib, a Brazilian Salesian priest ofLebanese origin. Both contributed to the rapid growth of themovement in thefollowing years by encouraging the creation of many such local prayer groups(Carranza 2000; Chesnut 2003; 2016; Cleary 2011: 96–151; Prandi 1997).Howdid the surroundingCatholic sub-field react to the charismatic “awak-enings”? Actually, the pioneers of themovementwere invited to a firstmeetingwith the Brazilian bishops in May 1973. The bishops declared that the Charis-matic movements were “um novo modo de ser Igreja” (Carranza 2000: 37; ‘anewwayof being church’).On theonehand,with this phrasing themovement’sAstrid Reuter: “I am happy to be Catholic” 87claim to renew the church as awhole was taken up and, in a sense, legitimized;at the same time, however, the bishops thereby also verbalized their expecta-tion for the Charismatic Movement to take its place within the institutionalstructure of the Church and to submit to the magisterium. And this is whathappened in the following years.The further organizational development of the movement took placerapidly; in the course of 1974, starting from local prayer groups and regionalprayer meetings, transregional coordination groups were established. In thesame year, the RCC held its first national congress in Itaicí (São Paulo state); anationwide representation, the Conselho Nacional da Renovacão CarismáticaCatólica, was created to support the movement’s further development. Or-ganizational units and “ministries” with specific tasks were established atdifferent ecclesiastical and political levels (parish, diocese, federal states) – inshort, the movement institutionalized and professionalized.The fact that after initial hesitation, both the ‘National Conference ofBrazilian Bishops’ (Conferência Nacional dos Bispos Brasileiros; CNBB) andthe Vatican5 eventually gave their “blessing” to the RCCmight partly be due tothe fact that they finally saw it as an opportunity to “save” Catholicism from itsleftist politicization represented by LiberationTheology. But it was clearly alsomotivated by the rapid rise of an efficient competitor outside the Catholic sub-field: namely, Pentecostalism. Supporting the Charismatics thus seemed to bea good strategy to fight both competitors, inside and outside the Catholic sub-field. And it was effective – certainly relatively effective, for statistics are clearabout one point: the RCC has not succeeded to any significant extent in win-ning back former Catholics (who converted to Pentecostal churches or optedfor non-religion). Instead, its success so far remains limited to the shrinkingCatholic sub-field, which is witnessing ‘conversions’ from Romanized or FolkCatholicism or from base communities to Charismatic Catholicism.6In terms of geography, the RCC has spread all over Brazil since the 1970s,and particularly since the 1990s, with a focus in the southeast (namely São5 The Vatican supported the Charismatic Renewal through the establishment, of a cen-tral service unit called International Catholic Charismatic Renewal Service (ICCRS) in1978, which changed its name to Catholic Charismatic Renewal International Service(CHARIS) in 2019. For the development of the CCR from its beginnings in the US, itsglobal spread and the changing attitude of the Vatican cf. Ciciliot 2020.6 Chesnut (2016: 77) estimates that at least 50 percent of Brazilian Catholics belong tothe Charismatic spectrum.88 Social Forms of ReligionPaulo) and south. In the following, a few examples from the extremely broadspectrum of Catholic Charismatic communities in Brazil shall be presented(for the following: Cleary 2011: 96–131).I start with a preliminary remark: After the first spillover of the Charis-matic impulse from the US at the end of the 1960s, it was initially Charismaticcommunities operating internationally that gained a foothold; nevertheless,soon after Brazilian Charismatics themselves began to establish a variety ofnew communities of their own. Among them,we can distinguish between “lifecommunities” and “covenant communities”.Themembers of life communitiesare expected to share their entire lives with each other, which often includesgiving up their private property for the benefit of the community towhich theyhave bound themselves by certain vows.The members of covenant communi-ties, in contrast, usually carry onwith their lives outside the communitywherethey gather exclusively for specific communal activities. Some communitiescombine both types.One of the first international communities to take root in Brazil is the Co-munidade Emanuel.7 Founded in France in the early 1970s, it is also success-ful in Europe (cf. Dolbeau’s chapter in this volume). Its Brazilian branch wasfounded by the Benedictine Father Cipriano Chagas in Rio de Janeiro in 1976.The Comunidade Emanuel combines life community with covenant commu-nity features. It counts diocesan priests as well as married people among itsmembers, and likewise lay people who feel called to celibacy and to placingtheir lives at the service of the community. As the name of the community sug-gests (‘Emanuel’ means ‘God is with us’), members see their specific vocationin joyfully proclaiming and praising God’s presence in the world.Canção Nova (‘New Song’), one of the most successful Charismatic com-munities in the country, was founded by the above-mentioned Jonas Abib inCachoeira Paulista (São Paulo state) in 1978 (Cleary 2011: 106–109, 120f.; deOliveira 2009).8 At the center of this covenant community’s vocation is – as itsname indicates – music, which Jonas Abib identified as a special instrumentof evangelization and mission. Canção Nova thus promotes composers andsingers and the production and dissemination of popular Christian music.Starting in its early days, the community established its own radio station, andtoday runs one of the largest Catholicmedia groups in theworld, including ra-dio and television stations that broadcast around the clock, a publishing house7 Cf. https://emanuelnobrasil.com.br/.8 Cf. https://www.cancaonova.com/.Astrid Reuter: “I am happy to be Catholic” 89and, unsurprisingly, a professionalized internet presence, naturally includingsocial media. Cancão Nova also sells a wide range of products, from books,CDs, and DVDs to clothing, devotional objects, and merchandising items. Atits headquarters in Cachoeira Paulista, the construction of one of the largestreligious meeting places (called Centro de Evangelização) in Latin America(seating 30.000 people plus 44.000 standing) was completed in 2004. CançãoNova is successful not only in Brazil, but worldwide; it also has branches inEurope, especially in Portugal (Gabriel 2009).One of the first communities active in northern Brazil is Shalom, whichwas founded in 1982 in Fortaleza (state of Ceará) – and not, like the two pre-viously mentioned communities, by a priest, but by a layman: Moyses Lourode Azevedo (Cleary 2011: 112f.; Mariz/Aguilar 2009).9 Azevedo was influencedby Jonas Abib and the Canção Nova community. It is thus no surprise thatShalom also draws onmusic as a central missionary tool. It runsmore than 50community houses in Brazil, which organize religious orientation days andsummer camps; it is also present on the radio and television with its own pro-grams and has spread internationally, including to France, Italy, Switzerland,Canada, and Israel (Cleary 2011: 112f.). Once a year, it organizes the annualmusic festival Halleluya (cf. below).Very successful is also the community Toca de Assis, which again origi-nated in the southeast of the country, in Campinas (São Paulo state) (Cleary2011: 113f.; Portella 2009).10 Founded in 1983 by a priest (Roberto José Lettieri),its members see their specific vocation in following the footsteps of Fran-cis of Assisi, i.e. in a simple lifestyle and in caring for the poor, especiallythe homeless; accordingly, they call themselves “filhos da pobreza” (‘sons ofpoverty’). Toca de Assis is a lay congregation that maintains more than 100houses throughout Brazil, with a focus on the state of São Paulo.The boundaries between the numerous Charismatic communities, ofwhich only a few have been mentioned here, are blurred; membership isoften not formalized and specific cross-community events contribute to theemergence of an overarching Charismatic sense of community. Among themare the large-scale worship services for which stadium-like meeting placeshave been created (modeled on Pentecostal megachurches, thoughmostly lessrepresentative).The best-known example is the SantuárioTheotókos –Mãe deDeus (‘Shrine of the God-bearer – Mother of God’) in São Paulo, initiated by9 Cf. https://shalombrasil.com.br/.10 Cf. https://tocadeassisirmaos.org.br/.90 Social Forms of Religionthe aforementioned singing priest Marcelo Rossi.11 The Santuário Theotókosis Brazil’s second largest church in the country; it can accommodate about25.000 people inside and 100.000 people outside.12 The Holy Mass is readhere several times a week and broadcast by both church-owned and privateTV stations.13 When celebrated by Marcelo Rossi, it resembles a staging thatalternates between pop concert and Sunday service, i.e. secular pop culturalforms are adopted and embedded in a Catholic context. I shall come back tothis further on.This melting of Catholic elements with pop-cultural ones is also the recipefor the success of religious music festivals such as those hosted by CançãoNova or Shalom. Shalom organizes an annual five-day festival of Catholic mu-sic called Halleluya in Fortaleza (northern Brazil): more than a million peoplegathered for more than 40 individual events as part of this festival in pre-COVID years. On the professionally designed website, the festival is adver-tised with the slogan “Mais que um Festival. Uma experiência!” (‘More than afestival. An experience!’).14 A similar three-day event –namedHosana Brasil –is organized annually by Canção Nova in Cachoeira Paulista (in the southeast;São Paulo state) and brings together hundreds of thousands religious ‘fans’from numerous different communities and local prayer groups.15Within Brazil’s Catholic sub-field, the RCC provides an alternative to theother styles of Catholic devotion: Its dynamic and emotional approach toliturgy, which is focused on a belief in the actual presence of the Holy Spirit,is in sharp contrast with the rigid clerical culture of Romanized Catholicismas well as with the rather ascetic liturgical style practiced in Liberationist base11 Cf. https://padremarcelorossi.com.br/ and the Facebook and Instagram accounts ofthe Santuário Theotókos.12 The largest being the Sanctuary of the national patron Santa Maria Aparecida (SãoPaulo state). The Santuário Theotókos was financed exclusively by donations and theproceeds from the sale of CDs, DVDs, books, etc. Its 2012 inauguration was broadcastby Brazil’s largest TV-station Rede Globo (cf. the report: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHZAYyFuFXw&t=47s).13 According to the website “Horários de Missa em todo o Brasil” the Holy Mass is read atthe Santuário Theotókos twice on Sundays (5:45 a.m.; 8:45 a.m.) and once onWednes-days (7:45 p.m.) and Saturdays (3:00 p.m.); all four masses are broadcast either by theprivate TV- and radio-station Rede Globo or by the Catholic TV station Rede Vida orby Web TV; cf. https://www.horariodemissa.com.br/igreja.php?k=Ag7U9.14 Cf. https://www.festivalhalleluya.com/festival.15 Cf. https://eventos.cancaonova.com/edicao/hosana-brasil-17/.Astrid Reuter: “I am happy to be Catholic” 91communities (Oro 1996: 89–119; Prandi 1997: 97–157). What distinguishes theRCC from other currents in Brazilian Catholicism, however, is not just itsexpressive, enthusiastic style of piety (which strongly resembles Pentecostalforms), but also the social forms that Charismatic spirituality takes on. It isnoteworthy that, in terms of social structure, the basic social form of Charis-matic Catholicism – the usually small local prayer group (“grupo de oração”) –resembles the base communities and thus the social form invented by Libera-tionTheology, themain competitor of Charismatic Catholicism in the Catholicsub-field (Prandi 1997: 97–121). However, Charismatic prayer groups and basecommunities fill their respective basic social forms, which are similar in someregards, with fundamentally disparate religious messages and completelydifferent devotional styles: The primarily sober spirituality observable in basecommunities reflects experiences of suffering and oppression. Base commu-nities apply the biblicalmessage to the living conditions of the poor in order toobtain religious guidelines for social action – social action that aims at chang-ing those unjust social conditions. Charismatic prayer groups, in contrast,concern personal experiences of the Holy Spirit (“baptism in the Spirit”) andthus individual spiritual renewal. Charismatic religiosity is joyful, its focusis on praising God and on the personally (not socially) liberating experienceof the Holy Spirit. ‘I am happy to be Catholic’ – this slogan, brought to life bysinging priests like Marcelo Rossi, sums up what Charismatic Catholic pietyis about, and how it differs from all other types of Catholicism in Brazil: WhileRomanized Catholicism is experienced as ritually petrified, Folk Catholicismis marked by magical ideas, and Liberation Theology takes a rather rationalapproach to religion, while Charismatic piety simply makes Catholics happy!In Charismatic prayer groups, the “baptism in the Spirit” as an experienceof being personally called, is longed for, prayed for, and sung for together. It isexperienced as spiritual empowerment to cope with the given life conditionsand thus acknowledged as a path to healing. Healing is understood both in aconcrete sense, as recovery from physical or psychological suffering, and in afigurative sense, e.g. as turning away from alleged sexual or religious aberra-tions, namely homosexuality, promiscuity, or the practice of Afro-Brazilian re-ligions (Maffi 2019).The experience of being “baptized in theHoly Spirit” is alsointerpreted as a divine calling for further commitment – commitment both inthe sense of developing one’s own faith (inwardly) and of actively engaging inmissionary work (outwardly). This is far from trivial: In a country where notlong ago (as recently as the early 1970s) more than 90 per cent of the popula-tion still identified with Catholicism, both concerns point to a profound reli-92 Social Forms of Religiongious change.The Renovação Carismática Católica is both part of that changeand a response to it. This unprecedented zeal for evangelization and missionchallenged the established pastoral praxis, which could not rely on approvedmodels.The Charismatics thus first had to invent practices and build up socialforms appropriate to their evangelization andmission goals – or borrow themfrom other contexts.In this regard, the RCC’s representatives proceed methodically. An exam-ple of this is a document entitled “Planejamento Estratégico de Evangelização”(‘Strategic Planning of Evangelization’), authored by the National Council ofthe RCC in 2014.16 The document, which was presented at a national meet-ing of RCC leaders, unfolds a general agenda to be implemented nationwidein anticipation of the (then upcoming) 50th anniversary of the global CatholicCharismatic Renewal in 2017. It displays a range of activities based on sevenpillars: evangelization, pastoral care, spirituality, formation (of multipliers),communication, administration, and mission.These pillars are in turn struc-tured according to the criteria (general) intention, (concrete) objective, (possi-ble) action, and responsibility. In addition, a structure for self-assessment isprovided (not yet implemented; ongoing implementation in per cent; alreadyimplemented). It should not be considered a coincidence that this seven-partspectrum is framed by the pillars evangelization andmission, since one’s ownanchoring in the faith is considered the prerequisite for effective missionaryactivity.Besides, the document exemplifies how a religious renewal movementwhich began from below might gradually become controlled from above.Here, we can observe the particular tension between microsocial religiouscommunity building and meso- or macrosocial religious organization: Whileit is correct that organizational logics risk inhibiting the dynamics of spon-taneous Charismatic experiences and community building, especially thosebased on eruptive experiences such as the “baptism in the Spirit”, this is onlyone side of the story.Theother is that religious organizationsmight also createconditions that make Charismatic experiences and subsequent processes ofcommunity-building possible in the first place. This somewhat paradoxicaleffect can be observed in the case of the RCC.16 Cf. https://novoportal.rccbrasil.org.br/blog/planejamento-estrategico-de-evangelizacao/.Astrid Reuter: “I am happy to be Catholic” 93For instance, the RCC’s website17 provides not only general information onthe movement and its organizational structure, but also contains interactivepages that allow committed adherents to register their prayer groups,18 and,as a result, interested people to find a prayer group in their neighborhood.TheRCC thus uses its organizational structure (which is supported by the churchhierarchy) topromotegrassroot activities, i.e. to encourage local people to startCharismatic prayer groups or to participate in existing ones. At the same time,it also channels this process by providing general explanations about the re-ligious purpose of prayer groups and offering suggestions for prayer or com-munal activities as well as pictures and videos visualizing such activities.19 Asa result, a certain standardization of piety is being pushed:The RCC as a well-structured organization (on themacro-level) provides amodel that individualsand local Charismatic prayer groups (on the micro- and meso-level) are sup-posed to follow.In contrast to Max Weber’s line of argumentation, who assumed thatthe Charismatic character of a movement would be lost (by routinization)when the movement is transformed into an organization (Weber 1968 [1922]:246–254), the RCC exemplifies that setting up professional organizationalstructures does not necessarily slow down the initial Charismatic impetus,but might even promote further Charismatic experiences and initiate pro-cesses of Charismatic community-building – because of and not despiteefficient church organization. Thus, typical events which can only take placewith a great deal of professional organizational effort, such as the above-mentioned music festivals Halleluya and Hosana Brasil, transregional ornational prayer meetings (“cenáculos”), local ‘Jesus bars’ (“barzinhos de Je-sus”) or ‘Christotheques’ (“cristotecas”), or the alternative carnival (“Carneval17 Cf. https://novoportal.rccbrasil.org.br/.18 Cf. https://novoportal.rccbrasil.org.br/cadastre-um-grupo-de-oracao/; https://novoportal.rccbrasil.org.br/o-que-e-grupo-de-oracao/. In this way, data on the spread of theRCC is collected. At the beginning of 2022, a total of 14.313 prayer groups were listedon this website, broken down by states; according to this, the greatest density wasfound in the south and southeast. These numbers were no longer publicly accessiblein August 2023; the call to register groups and the possibility to find groups in one’sneighborhood are still in place.19 Cf. the websites “O que é Grupo de Oração e como participar?” (‘What is a prayer groupand how can I take part?‘) and “Grupo de oração – Formação” (‘Prayer group – Formati-on‘): https://novoportal.rccbrasil.org.br/o-que-e-grupo-de-oracao/; https://novoportal.rccbrasil.org.br/grupo-de-oracao-formacao/.94 Social Forms of Religionde Jesus”), open up new social spaces for Charismatic experiences for bothindividuals and groups.What is more, these events bring something else to light that is typical ofthe social forms that Charismatic Catholicism in Brazil takes on: they are hy-brid.We can observe amingling of (1) distinct Catholic practices, symbols andsocial forms (such as the Eucharist, the rosary, the Virgin Mary, reverence forthe pope, etc., and, not least, the social structure of base communities) with(2) historically successful social forms from other religious origins (especiallyfrom Pentecostalism, such as prayer groups or the campmeetings) and (3) so-cial frames drawn from pop culture (discotheque, bar, concert, camping, evensports, etc.). For instance, “cenáculos” (‘prayermeetings’) typically take place inlarge sport arenas or as campmeetings and resemble, for one thing, the GreatAwakenings that tookplace in theUS in the 18th and 19th centuries; at the sametime, however, they make use of basic social elements from present-day popculture (just think ofmusic festivals). Even theHolyMasswith its core ritual oftheEucharist is not exempt fromthis hybridization.ThesingingpriestMarceloRossi actually stages the HolyMass like a pop show.20Thepoint here is that weare dealing with highly organized religious events that facilitate individual aswell as communal Charismatic experiences.Music plays an important role in (almost) all of this. In Brazil, CharismaticCatholicism has developed its own style of music, which is popularized by the“barzinhos de Jesus“, the “cristotecas“, and not least the festivals of religiousmusic, and has become successful on the commercial music market. In fact,music is at the heart of the dynamic process of Charismatic community-build-ing in Brazil today, and this dynamic is driven by a figure exclusive to Charis-matic Catholicism, namely, the singing priest.Singing priests are key figures for the movement’s success (Cleary 2011:1–29, 96–151; Clarke 1999; Chesnut 2003: 64–101; Souza 2005). One reasonmight be their ability to perform smoothly in highly different social fields:they are big names in the pop-cultural scene and renowned personages in thereligious field. They perform proficiently both at the altar and on the stage;they turn Holy Mass into an event that oscillates between show and Sun-day service; they run daily radio and television programs, sell their own CDs,DVDs, and books, stream theirmusic,maintain personalwebsites, Instagram,and Facebook accounts, etc. And they are successful. In 2002, themost famous20 His latest videos can be watched via his personal website: https://www.padremarcelorossi.com.br/WebTV.php.Astrid Reuter: “I am happy to be Catholic” 95of Brazil’s singing priests, Padre Marcelo Rossi, received a nomination for theLatin Grammy.The singing priests represent a style of joyful piety that is compatible withthe modern world and its ‘well-being’ ideals. They act as ambassadors of arenewed Catholicism whose core message is that Catholicism is about beinghappy, andmoreover about being happy in thisworld!To conclude this part: The reason that the RCC does quite well in gain-ing followers among Catholics might be that Charismatic Catholicism (inBrazil) has created a joyful culture of piety that combines traditional Catholicelements with new non-Catholic practices, ideas, and social forms. Popularelements from outside the Catholic sub-field are thus embedded within aCatholic framework and invested with a Catholic meaning. Particularly im-portant in this regard is not least the devotion to Mary, which connects theCharismatic current with the other three currents in the Brazil’s Catholicfield. This is most evident in the case of Marcelo Rossi. Not only did he namethe huge religious arena that he founded in São Paulo after Maria SantuárioTheotókos (‘Shrine of the God-Bearer’); Mary is also iconographically om-nipresent there as well as on his website and in his books. She is a constantpoint of reference in his songs, and the prayer of the rosary is a preferred andrecommended devotional practice, streamed every day through his personalwebsite, thus creating a virtual community of praying believers.214. Final considerations: ‘Option for the spirits’:Dynamics of competition and convergence in the religious fieldin BrazilNow that we have taken a closer look at the heterogeneous Catholic sub-fieldand especially the role of the Charismatic Renewal in its dynamics, I will again‘zoom’ out of the Catholic sub-field and cast a glance at the dynamics of theentire religious field of Brazil. Let’s take a quick look back: Even though Pen-tecostal churches had begun growing in the 1950s, the Catholic Church onlystarted taking other religious actors seriously in the 1970s, and even then, only21 Cf. https://www.padremarcelorossi.com.br/IndiceDoRosario.php. In a 2003 film enti-tled “Maria, Mãe do Filho de Deus” (‘Mary, Mother of God’s Son’) Rossi even partici-pated as an actor; cf. Moacyr Góes (dir.) 2003.96 Social Forms of Religionreluctantly. As a result, the church was late in realizing that it had come un-der competitive pressure in the religious field and, consequently, was late inactually taking care of the faith and inner devotion of Catholics themselves.As ‘newcomers’ in the religious field, Pentecostal churches, in contrast,have presented themselves from the beginning as an alternative to Catholi-cism, thereby triggering adynamic of competition in the overall religiousfield.They did so not only by offering alternative beliefs, but also by introducingalternative social forms of religion, with Pentecostalism organizing itself into‘sect’-like social forms rather than ‘churches’. By ‘sects’, I understand (in linewithMaxWeber’s andErnst Troeltsch’s definition;Weber 2011 [1920]; Troeltsch1960 [1912]; cf. the Introduction to this volume) exclusive communities whosemembers are expected to be deeply devout and to live a life that consistentlypleases God.Pentecostal sects thus represent a social alternative to the ‘church’and thus to the dominant social form of Catholicism in Brazil until at leastthe mid-20th century. Unlike sects, churches (still according to Weber andTroeltsch) follow an inclusive model of membership, i.e. membership doesnot necessarily require an inner commitment. Religious communities thatfollow the sect-type and its corresponding devotional style (which in the caseof Pentecostalism consists of a combination of emotional religiosity and strictlifestyle) proved to be very successful in Brazil. It is therefore not surprisingthat Catholics should have imitated sect-like social forms, based on the per-sonal calling as experienced in the “baptism in the Spirit”, the key moment inthe religious life of Charismatics.Yet, to fully comprehend the religious dynamics in Brazil we must realizesomething else: All three main actors share a fundamental conviction, namelya belief in the power of spirits – be it the (one and only) Holy Spirit of Chris-tians or the many spirits of African, indigenous, or other provenance that areworshipped in the Afro-Brazilian religions. Just as important as this sharedbelief in the existence of powerful spirits, however, are the differences in thebackground beliefs about the character of these spirits. While the Holy Spiritof Christians (as an aspect of the divine trinity) is imagined as unambiguouslygood, the African, indigenous, and other spirits, for their part, are without ex-ception highly ambiguous, i.e. neither good nor evil, or both good and evil atthe same time. Christianity, by contrast, has split off all evil from the idea ofGod and transferred it to the figure of the devil.This is no theological hair-splitting. Rather, it is crucial if we want tounderstand how (neo-)Pentecostalism and Charismatic Catholicism relateto Afro-Brazilian religions: They imagine the African spirits as demons, andAstrid Reuter: “I am happy to be Catholic” 97therefore see ritual trance as demonic possession, as the bestseller Orixás,Caboclos e Guias: Deuses ou Demônios?22 (‘Orixás, Caboclos and Leaders: Godsor Demons?’) authored by Edir Macedo (2019 [1989]), founder of the neo-Pentecostal Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, testifies; this highlyaggressive bestseller was first published in 1989 and relaunched in 2019. Neo-Pentecostal churches, in particular, are highly aggressive towards Afro-Brazil-ian religions, even physically attacking their centers and their adherents (daSilva 2007; 2016). There are no reports yet of Catholic Charismatic groupsbehaving in a similar way, but Charismatic Catholics are also increasingly dis-tancing themselves from Afro-Brazilian religions (Maffi 2019), interestinglymuchmore so than representatives of Romanized Catholicism and in contrastto Folk Catholicism and LiberationTheology.We can thus state that there actually is a dynamic of competition in Brazil’sreligious field – a dynamic that emerged with the rise of Pentecostalism, andthat has since then impinged upon other actors.What determines this competition? In his book Competitive Spirits (2003),R. Andrew Chesnut noted the prevalence in the Catholic sub-field in Brazil ofwhathe calls a “PreferentialOption for theSpirit” (ibid.: 64–101)–“Spirit” in thesingular, referring to the Holy Spirit.What he (alluding, needless to say, to theliberation theologists’ phrase of a ‘preferential option for the poor’) describesas the basic logic within the Catholic sub-field, however, seems to apply to thereligious field as awhole: it is the search for personal spiritual experiences thatdetermines the religious dynamics in Brazil – whether these experiences canbe tracedback to the one andonlyHoly Spirit or to themanyother spirits of anyorigin.The logic of the religious field in Brazil is thus dominated by an ‘optionfor the spirits’ – this time in the plural.As a result, religious ‘providers’, so to speak,will do their best tomake suchexperiences available. The convergence of religious beliefs (in powerful spir-its) and demands (the search for personal experiences of those spirits) thusleads to competition among religious providers. Convergence and competi-tion are mutually dependent. And this – which is what I am getting at – fa-vors a dynamic of ‘mimicry’ (or ‘isomorphism’) in Brazil’s religious field: stylesof piety and their corresponding social forms (actually, social forms that allowfor spiritual experiences) are being reproduced across religious and denom-22 “Orixá” is the name for the deities of African origin; a “caboblo” is an indigenous spirit;“guia” is an umbrella term for a variety of spirits that are worshipped in Umbanda.98 Social Forms of Religioninational boundaries, namely across Pentecostalism, Catholicism, and Afro-Brazilian religions. I shall explain this a little further.I will start with the ‘mimicry’ of devotional styles: actually, trance experi-ences, possession – and its counterpart: exorcism – are at the center of thedevotional culture of all successful religious providers in Brazil. They are ac-companied by certain patterns of bodily expressions, such as glossolalia, phys-iognomic changes, falling, clumsy movements or spasms, etc. (which usuallyturn into harmonized body performance after a while). Significantly, a posi-tive tone underlies this style of piety: It is not only ‘I am happy to be Catholic’ –we could replace Catholic with Pentecostal, Spiritist, or Afro-Brazilian to ob-tain a motto which concisely expresses the basic attitude of those who, to re-fer to Chesnut, ‘opt for the spirit(s)’ and corresponding devotional styles. Suc-cessful religion in Brazil is thus about being happy and healthy, namely: beinghappy and healthy in this world – not primarily about eternal ‘salvation’ (suchas preached by both ‘RomanizedCatholicism’ and historical Protestantism, thetwo ‘losers’ in Brazil’s religious field).The mimicry of devotional styles is accompanied by a second form of‘mimicry’: mimicry of social forms of religion. This becomes obvious whenwe compare the social structure of Charismatic Catholicism with that ofPentecostalism: both have developed a scheme of religious social forms andactivities that ranges from themicro- to themeso- to themacro-level, i.e. fromsmall local groups (with high interactive commitment) to regional worshipgatherings (with medium commitment) to, eventually, large transregional oreven national religious events (with only loose personal commitment). Un-surprisingly, the macro-level receives the greatest recognition in CharismaticCatholicism: the RCC has gradually adapted to the hierarchical organizationalstructure of the Brazilian church, thus securing the Vatican’s approval as well.This, however, has set off its own dynamic: the more Rome has supported theCharismatic “awakenings” in Brazil (and worldwide), the more the movementand its social forms have come under the control of the papal magisteriumand thus have been standardized.I will conclude: In Brazil, those religious ‘providers’ that respond to theprevalent ‘option for the spirit(s)’ are most successful. These are: Afro-Brazil-ian religions, Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal churches – and CharismaticCatholicism.The latter, as we have seen, is prospering, but its success remainslimited to the (otherwise shrinking) Catholic sub-field. Despite the backingof the Brazilian bishops and the Vatican, the RCC has so far failed to winback former Catholics. Instead, it has succeeded in gaining ground amongAstrid Reuter: “I am happy to be Catholic” 99Catholics themselves. The number of Catholics identifying with Charismaticgroups is currently estimated as being as high as 50per cent (Chesnut 2016: 77).Whether the trend towards Charismatic piety will stop the ongoing erosionof the Catholic sub-field is almost impossible to predict. Yet, one observationpersists indisputably: The Charismatic Renewal has significantly changed thesocial forms of Catholicism in Brazil.BibliographyAnderson, Allan Heaton (2014): An Introduction to Pentecostalism: GlobalCharismatic Christianity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Aubrée, Marion/Laplantine, François (1990): La Table, le livre et les esprits:Naissance, évolution et actualité dumouvement social spirite entre Franceet Brésil, Paris: J.C. 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Joãzinho SCJ (2009): Sou feliz por ser Católico. CD: MC Produções e Even-tos.Moacyr Góes (dir.) (2003): Maria,Mãe do Filho de Deus. DVD: Sony Pictures.Everyday Familialism in the Emmanuel CommunitySamuel DolbeauAbstract Familialism is generally understood as a conceptual framework aimed atorganizing political life, manifesting throughmobilizations in the public sphere. RecentCatholic mobilizations in Europe, focusing on issues related to sexuality and gender,have brought attention to the importance of familialist networks that intersect with reli-gious, associative, and political spheres. Within the French context, several researchershave underscored the pivotal role played by the Emmanuel Community, the largestCatholic Charismatic community in Europe. This paper aims to direct attention to thedevelopment of familialism within the Emmanuel Community, from a sporadic formof activism to the scaffolding serving for the construction of social forms within theEmmanuel Community. Referred to as everyday familialism, this phenomenon canbe identified through the dissemination of religious resources that specifically targetfamilies, as well as through organizational dynamics and the promotion of a distinctclerical gender regime.This article builds upon broader doctoral research that examinedthe institutionalization of the Emmanuel Community. The materials used here consistprimarily of semi-structured interviews conducted with members of the organization,as well as archival sources from the movement and its publications. All interviews wereconducted in French; quotes were translated into English by the author.1Keywords CatholicCharismaticRenewal,Catholicism,Community, familialism,NewEcclesialMovements, Sociology of Religion1 Many thanks to Petre Maican for reviewing and refining my English. I also thankMaren Freudenberg and Astrid Reuter for their suggestions.108 Social Forms of Religion1. IntroductionTheEmmanuel Community originated as a Catholic Charismatic prayer groupthat was established in Paris in 1972 by two lay individuals: Pierre Goursat(1914–1994) and Martine Laffitte-Catta (1942). Currently, the Emmanuel Com-munity is present in approximately 60 countries and boasts a membershipof around 12.000 individuals.2 It is regarded as one of the most vibrant NewEcclesial Movements3 in Europe (Landron 2004). Of the 12.000 members ofthe Community, most of whom are from upper social classes, approximatelyhalf reside in France. Out of the total membership, 275 individuals are priests,while 225 are “consecrated in celibacy”.4 Notwithstanding, the Community’sactivities extend beyond these numbers, encompassing various associationsand affiliated companies.The influence of the Emmanuel Community can alsobe noticed in the ways of expression ofmainstreamCatholicism. For instance,Emmanuel hymns are sung on a weekly basis in numerous French-speakingEuropean parishes.In the 2010s, during the period of heightened politicization of genderand sexuality issues, in which religious groups, especially Catholics, activelyengaged, the organization gained public prominence in France (Béraud2020: 241). During the Catholic mobilizations against same-sex marriage(2012–2013), several researchers highlighted the significant political roleplayed by the Emmanuel Community, particularly through its yearly gath-erings in Paray-le-Monial, Bourgogne5 (Brustier 2014; Béraud and Portier2015; Dolbeau 2021). Through a range of rhetorical strategies and repertoiresof action (Stambolis-Ruhstorfer and Tricou 2018), these Catholics sought to2 Source: https://emmanuel.info/qui-sommes-nous/ (accessed on September 5, 2023).3 Broadly speaking, this term refers to communities that emerged in the wake of theSecond Vatican Council (1962–1965). Catholic Charismatic communities are integralcomponents of these New Ecclesial Movements.4 In the 1970s, the concept of ‘consecrated celibacy’ gained significant traction amongNew Ecclesial Movements, encompassing a diverse array of commitments that var-iously approximate a religious lifestyle. Individuals committed to this path under-take to live by the evangelical counsels of poverty, obedience, and chastity – expressedthrough continence – via vows whose canonical status can differ markedly from onemovement to another. Often, these individuals wear distinctive attire and generallylive in communal settings. Beyond this basic definition, the lifestyle is marked by anotable degree of heterogeneity. For further reading on the subject, cf. van Lier 2022.5 Organized since 1975.Samuel Dolbeau: Everyday Familialism in the Emmanuel Community 109defend a concept of ‘family’ (nuclear, heteronormative, and often large), thatcan be aligned with the category of familialism.Ina 1999 article,French sociologistRémiLenoir provided the followingdef-inition of familialism: “[familialism is] the totality of political movements andactions primarily carried out through the mobilization of local and nationalelites (lobbying, orchestrated press campaigns by private associations, occa-sionally recognized as having public utility), with the objective of ‘defendingthe family’” (Lenoir 1999: 77). Lenoir distinguishes two sources of this familial-ism within the French context: one stemming from the state, which the ThirdRepublic relied upon starting from the late 19th century (the family as ameansof “preserving political order throughmorality” in response to the issue of “de-population”6), and the other originating from theCatholicChurch,which,dur-ing the late 19th and early 20th centuries, emerged “in the formof various phil-anthropicmovements associated with social Catholicism” aiming to “reinstatea Catholic moral order” by promoting “large families” (ibid.: 77).The objective of my contribution is to slightly shift the focus of familialismfrom a form of Catholic activism in the public sphere on issues related tomar-riage, sexuality, and gender, towards a form of everyday activism. FollowingSylvie Ollitrault’s work on environmental activists (Ollitrault 2008), I proposeto study everyday familialism as a central driver of the construction of socialformswithin theEmmanuel Community.Although everyday familialism is nota social form in itself, it operates as an interpretivemodel of pre-existing socialforms (cf. Introduction to this volume). Indeed, everyday familialism operatesboth at the local level, where the dominant social form is that of the group,and within the overarching governance of the Emmanuel Community, wherethe dominant social form is that of the organization. Furthermore, across thevarious tiers of the Emmanuel Community, the pronounced centrality of themarried couple underscores the significance of the dyad.In order to study these different levels, I first will demonstrate how ev-eryday familialism manifests in the religious offers targeted at families (e.g.6 “The concept [of familialism] was indeed part of a movement aimed at promoting na-tality. Following the defeat against Germany in 1870, depopulation was construed asboth the cause of this calamity and a calamity in its own right. Terms such as ‘declin-ing birth rates’ and ‘depopulation’ were reflective of a prevailing sentiment amongcertain sectors of the French elite at the time, who viewed France as a nation in de-cline” (ibid.: 76).110 Social Forms of Religionprinted materials, specific events), as well as from an organizational perspec-tive. To do so, I will focus on the parish level. I will illustrate how the practicalorganization of parishes and the process of couples’ commitment, shaped byeveryday familialism, influence local group dynamics. In the second section,focusing on a more meso-social level, I will delve into the internal governanceof the Emmanuel Community. I will illustrate how the governance model ofthis organization, predicated on the dyad of themarried couple, leads to a dis-tinct division of religious work. Lastly, I will demonstrate how everyday fa-milialism is also manifested in the priestly masculinity promoted among theclergy members, which aligns quite closely with the ‘spousal’ model describedby sociologist Josselin Tricou (Tricou 2021: 349).72. “You don’t feel like creeps who bring in their bawling kids”:The parish and the familyThe first aspect, which is arguably the most immediately apparent, is the em-phasis placed on the nuclear family and marital relationships in the discoursepromoted by the Emmanuel Community, both internally and externally, at thegroup level (e.g. parish, prayer group) or the organization level (the Commu-nity as a whole). This emphasis is manifested through the regular publicationof prescriptive materials on marital relationships and the upbringing of chil-dren and teenagers. It is important to note that this promotional effort shouldbe understood within the broader context of the Catholic Church’s increas-ing emphasis on family and marital relationships since the 1980s.8 However,following Anthony Favier’s observations (Favier 2021: 57–58), it is worth men-tioning the Catholic Church’s historical influence on family and couples coun-seling prior to the 1980s, particularly through the development of the profes-sion ofmarriage counselor.9The involvement of Catholics, particularlywomen7 In his doctoral thesis, Josselin Tricou examines the four main regimes of “clerical gen-der” at play in contemporary Catholicism. The spousal regime is one of these regimes.8 Especially following the 1980 Synod on the Family, from which the apostolic exhorta-tion Familiaris Consortio was derived.9 Anthony Favier draws upon the work of Geneviève Valla-Chevalley in this context. Inher book on the history ofmarital and family counseling, she elaborates: “Even thoughit has been institutionally developed in France since the 1970s, marital and familycounseling gradually emerged in France, as well as in other American and Europeancountries, in the first half of the 20th century. It has been constructed from severalSamuel Dolbeau: Everyday Familialism in the Emmanuel Community 111working in the healthcare sector, in promoting “integral education for couples”(ibid.: 58), represents a significant aspect of the forms of activism observed inmy field. This promotion extends beyond printed material. For instance, thefamily sessions organized annually since 1983 are consistently the most pop-ular weeks during the summer gatherings in Paray-le-Monial.These religiousoffers, which are open to a broad Catholic audience, are also accessible in localparishes through a series of courses affiliated with an Emmanuel associationcalled “Amour et Vérité” (‘Love and Truth’10).The second point worth mentioning pertains to the organization ofparishes entrusted to community priests. These priests place a primary focuson the families within the parishes (whethermembers of the Emmanuel Com-munity or not), offering specific activities for parents (e.g. dinners, courses),teenagers and young adults (e.g. prayer groups, weekends), and children (e.g.dedicated liturgy of the Word during Mass, nurseries). This family-orientedreligious approach, reminiscent of the tailored group approach observed inEvangelical Protestantism11, is not exclusive to the Emmanuel Community.Similar tendencies can be found in other New Ecclesial Movements as well asnumerous ordinary urban parishes (Aubourg 2016). However, in the case ofthe Emmanuel Community, the emphasis on the family dimension emergesas a significant factor influencing the choices of the interviewed parishioners,whether they are members of the Community or not. Sophie, a woman in hermore or less ancient roots, both Anglo-Saxon and French, among which are two main‘parents’, quite different in nature, one being Catholic religious and the other secularfeminist. [...] One of these ‘parents’ has been the Catholic lineage ofmarriage prepara-tion, which offered – and later mandated for the religious celebration of marriage – aperiod of reflection with clergy members and other couples. This movement reflectedas early as the 1920s a growing awareness of the importance of marital life, particu-larly through the Association of Christian Marriage (founded by Abbé Jean Violet in1918)” (Valla-Chevalley 2009: 13–14).10 Founded in 1981, this association is dedicated to the pastoral care of couples and fam-ily. Source: https://emmanuel.info/france/amour-et-verite/ (accessed on September 5,2023).11 “From this array of activities emerges the impression of mass sociability, yet tailoredto meet a multitude of individual needs. [...] One must be cautious of appearances:the megachurch is not a train station or a supermarket where individuals can get lostin the crowdwithout ever being called to account for their motivations. Megachurchesuniformly emphasize the identification of newcomers and underscore the importanceof directing them towards groups and activities that are likely to suit their needs.”(Fath 2008: 39)112 Social Forms of Religionforties from an aristocratic background, describes how she transitioned froma parish led by another New Ecclesial Movement to joining a parish under theguidance of the Emmanuel Community:Sophie: That was also one of the very strong reasons for me, because when Ifound this parish [run by Emmanuel], I arrived six and a half months preg-nant, so I quickly had a little girl, then we had a second one after that, andthe way the children are looked after is brilliant. So that already allows…already there are lots of other parents with children, so you don’t feel likecreeps who bring in their bawling kids. And that’s it. There were structures.[...] It wasn’t a pretentious thing at all, people came, there were lots of fam-ilies with lots of children, there was a little explanation of the Gospel forthe children during mass. There was even a nursery, and at first, I used totake them to the nursery. So that helped me to live my faith more serenelyon Sundays and to be a bit cooler during mass. [...] The priests have a wayof talking... and I think it’s linked to the Emmanuel approach, which is thatit’s very grounded in reality. In other words, they don’t give you moralisticspeeches about the fact that you’re really sinners, that “you’ve got to geta move on”, well if “you’ve got to get a move on” they tell you differently.I: And that was a difference from what you’d experienced [in your formerparish]?Sophie:Well completely... so [the New Ecclesial Movement in charge of thisparish], I don’t believe I stayed there long enough to... I thought it was notbad musically, but it was still very elitist as... I think I had to go to thisparish for two years and never speak to anyone. No one ever spoke to me.I: Elitist, in what sense do you mean that?Sophie:Well, like... I wasn’t married, I was a student, I was too old for youthgroups, and so maybe I didn’t do enough, but I really met... unlike what Ihave here [...] where there’s a community beyond the community peopleI mean, we have a parish community.12In Sophie’s remarks, it is evident that the emphasis on families goes beyondthe tangible structures mentioned earlier, such as the liturgy of the Word for12 Interview with Sophie, layperson, January 29, 2020.Samuel Dolbeau: Everyday Familialism in the Emmanuel Community 113children.This focus creates a pervasive sense of familiarity nurtured by an in-herent entre-soi dynamic that already exists within the Community (reinforcedby the recruitment of members from high social classes). This familiarity isalso fostered through a close relationship with the priestly team, which isthen contrasted with the group experiences from the previous parish settings,where there may have been a perceived distance between clergy and laity, ordisapproving looks directed towards parentswith noisy young children duringMass.This sense of familiarity within the group is accompanied by a rapidprocess of entrusting couples with responsibilities by the parish team. Newparishioners, as a couple, are quickly given the task of managing the coursesthey themselves have previously taken, such as baptism preparation or mar-riage preparation. This circular model, at times resulting in an accumulationof commitments, reflects the internal functioning of the Emmanuel Com-munity. The process is primarily based on an affinity between marital/familycommitment and religious commitment, as expressed more or less explicitlyin the interviews with my respondents. Several devoted women parishionersestablish a connection between the expectations associated with the differentroles they undertake in the parish and their role as mothers. They emphasizethenurturing and caring aspects inherent in their tasks, oftendescribing themas acts of “motherly care”. Devotion, solicitude, and compassion for others areall regarded as “feminine attributes” (Béraud 2007: 306) and are consistentlyrequired in these different contexts. Françoise, a woman in her fifties from anaristocratic background, is actively involved in a parish run by the EmmanuelCommunity in Belgium, despite not being a member herself:I’ve always been very touched by children, it’s always been... my field hasalways been children more than anything else. What touched me was tosee this [parish] team that was completely dedicated to children, with toolsthat I didn’t know, songs with gestures, very gentle words, very touching infact, and very oriented towards their daily lives. [...] And so I said to myself“I would have liked to have had this when I was a child too. And so, I wantthis for my children”. Because there’s a dimension in the Gospel, Jesus oftentalks about children. And then, little by little, that led me to meet peoplewho were involved in [an activity aimed at mothers]. So there too, I said tomyself “this is fantastic, I can be myself, I can have my time [...] with thesepeople”.1313 Interview with Françoise, layperson, January 30, 2020.114 Social Forms of ReligionIt is important to note that this affinity between marital/family commitmentand religious commitment should be understood in parallel with the “pro-cesses of reinvesting professional skills in activist activities” (Rétif 2013: 418),which is particularly notable among the men. However, it is noteworthy thatthe “social function of mothers” (ibid.: 421) continues to be of paramountimportance for my respondents in the perception and self-perception of thequalities they bring to the religious sphere. The frequent use of a dual voca-tional framework, encompassing both motherhood and Christian vocation,serves to reinforce this phenomenon.In summary, at the group level, the Emmanuel Community promotes a re-ligious offer specifically tailored to families, which is evident both through di-rect means such as publications and events, as well as inmore subtle ways, in-cluding the practical organization of parishes and the process of couples’ com-mitment.These commitments, typically following a circularmodel, are shapedby gender dynamics that emphasize a correspondence between family and re-ligious commitment, particularly for women. However, to gain a deeper un-derstanding of how everyday familialism shapes social forms within the Em-manuelCommunity, further explorations of the internal dynamics of theCom-munity are necessary, particularly the central role of conjugality in its gover-nance.3. Governing through the couple: A dyad-based organizationApart fromthegeneralmoderator14 and those responsible for specificbranches(i.e. for priests and consecrated celibates), most decision-making bodies14 While the position of moderator is canonically defined and cannot be shared by twoindividuals, it is worth noting the ambiguous status of the moderator’s wife, whichcan be loosely compared to the role of the “first lady” within the Emmanuel Commu-nity. In the context of Ghanaian Charismatic movements, British anthropologist JaneE. Soothill has studied the phenomenon known as the “first lady syndrome” (drawingon the works of political scientist Lisa Aubrey), which pertains to the wives of pas-tors (Soothill 2007: 154–163). The concept of the “first lady syndrome”, originally con-ceptualized by Amina Mama, is thus defined by Lisa Aubrey: “There are those in thestate and in alternative civil society that are able to reconcile greater democratic spacefor men only in public life, while women ingratiate themselves to men and the statethrough organizational arrangements that promote various forms of state feminism,such as ‘femocracy’ or the first lady syndrome […], both of which are systems in whichfemale autocracies parallel and serve male dictatorships while advancing conserva-Samuel Dolbeau: Everyday Familialism in the Emmanuel Community 115within the Emmanuel Community – regardless of the level of governance:weekly household, sector, province, summer session at Paray-le-Monial –are led predominantly by married couples, with occasional temporary excep-tions.15 While a mix of individuals in different ‘states of life’ is also commonin these bodies (i.e. priests, consecrated individuals, and laypeople), the cou-ple constitutes the fundamental unit of governance within Emmanuel. Thisorganizational characteristic is not entirely unique within the landscape ofNew Ecclesial Movements. However, the extent to which the Communityimplements this approach is noteworthy. By way of comparison, the secondlargestCharismatic community in France,CheminNeuf16, follows a somewhatsimilar structure by entrusting responsibility to couples at local and regionallevels. Nevertheless, at the international level, clerics and consecrated celi-bates tend to occupy the majority of positions of high responsibility. BeyondFrench Charismatic Renewal, the Focolare Movement17 adopts a governancemodel based on dyads, typically consisting of a single consecrated womanand a man (either a cleric or a consecrated man). Here, the woman holds thepreeminent position of president, with the man acting as co-president.Thesevarious configurations aim to promote, to varying extents, “a certain equalitybetween men and women, while respecting complementarity” (Tricou 2021:349). Although this emphasis on equality and complementarity is also evidentwithin the Emmanuel Community, the dyadic governance model employeddoes lead to a certain gendered division of religious work.To gain insight into this division, let us delve into the narrative of Nicole,a woman in her fifties. Nicole comes from a middle-class background, ismarried, primarily a homemaker, and has been a member of the EmmanuelCommunity for approximately twenty years. Alongside her husband, she hasheld several positions of responsibility within the organization. In an inter-view conducted separately from her husband (who participated in an initialinterview),Nicole reflects uponher involvement in theEmmanuel Communityand the division of religious work within her own relationship. I provide ative gender ideologies to the detriment of democracy and gender equality” (Aubrey2001: 105, original emphasis).15 There are in certain countries where the Emmanuel Community has a relatively smallpresence, only one individual serving as a manager or coordinator. This is the case incountries such as Cuba, Haiti, Chile, and Ireland.16 Founded in 1973 in Lyon by the Jesuit Laurent Fabre (1940).17 Founded in Trento by Chiara Lubich (1920–2008).116 Social Forms of Religionsubstantial excerpt from the interview below, as it sheds light on a recurringpattern within the Community.Nicole: In our relationship, clearly, I have a [master’s level] education, butI chose never to work because it didn’t work out that way, because he [herhusband] had his career, and given the direction his career was taking [...]it was incompatible with my job. And in the early years, with young chil-dren, I couldn’t do much. But I didn’t have any problems with it. And thenwe met the Community and got involved. The problem for a lot of womenis that they don’t feel useful if they don’t work. I didn’t feel that way be-cause we devoted ourselves fully. And I had the impression that it was forsomething useful, even if it wasn’t necessarily socially recognized, but itwas useful. So, I was satisfied with that. That solved a problem of identity,let’s say. Secondly, we’re very complementary. He [her husband] is very self-confident, likes to take responsibility, and when he makes a decision, hesticks to it. That’s not my style at all, I’m not used to that. As a result, I'mreassured to be able to take steps, knowing that he’s not going to collapsebefore I do. So, I’m pretty conscientious, I’m not afraid of working, but Ineed to be second rather than first, so all in all I’ve found my place in thisshared service. [...] So I see that with experience, this year in particular, I’mthe one writing the teachings, I’m the one drawing up the plans, and hefits in, and it’s worked really well like that. And it’s really me who’s takenover the teachings. [...] I travel a lot with him [her husband], not all thetime because I can’t, but quite a lot because our job is to liaise with localleaders who are also couples. And if they only talk to him [her husband],he is the salaried employee [...] and I’m a volunteer [...]. But I think it’simportant to be there. I can’t keep track of all the files here [...]. But whenI’m there, I can see that it’s very important for me to go. And when I’m notthere, the wives say, “but Nicole isn’t here”. So, it’s a lot about the frater-nal bond, because this communion between us for the mission has to beembodied at every level of the chain of responsibility. Otherwise, peoplesay “well, that’s not true”.I: Was there some sort of division of labor between you?Nicole: Yeah, we’re not really like that by nature. I think that’s because I findit a bit difficult to really take responsibility. Because I doubt myself a lot(laughs). And especially because I’m actually quite involved in the familyand household responsibilities, and we have seven children. I had to do alot of work when they were little, but I still have to pay a bit of attention tothem. He [her husband] is asking me to take on more of the support issuesSamuel Dolbeau: Everyday Familialism in the Emmanuel Community 117[in their community mission]. But I can see that in fact I still find it hard todo it seriously, to make the contacts I need to... So, all the administrativestuff as well, that’s not really my temperament, I’m not very methodicalby nature, and I easily put a lot of myself into human relationships. I’mprepared to give a lot of my time. But I don’t necessarily have to put it inwriting, it’s difficult for me to make files and all that. But I’m only repre-sentative of myself here. I know that there are couples where things aremuch more organized. She does this, he does that. Sometimes it’s morethe women who are going to be in contact, in community pastoral serviceresponsibilities, so provincial or sector responsibilities. That requires a lotof contact with people. So, it’s often telephone contact or personal contact.And it’s often the women who generally have a bit more time, but it reallydepends on the temperament of the couple.18One notable aspect to highlight is Nicole’s perception of her involvement in theEmmanuel Community as a source of personal fulfillment. For her, being partof the Community compensates for the sense of social uselessness that she be-lieves housewives can sometimes experience (“I didn’t feel that way becausewedevotedourselves fully. [...] So Iwas satisfied like that.That solved aproblemofidentity, let’s say”).As previouslymentioned in the case of the parish volunteer,this sense of fulfillment does not stem from the reinvestment of professionalskills, acquired through higher education, within the Emmanuel Community.Instead, it revolves around “essentially domestic skills” (Rétif 2013: 421), pri-marily relational in nature, tied to her social role as a mother and wife.The asymmetry in gender relations (with men associated with technical orpolitical skills oriented outward, and women associated with relational skillsoriented inward) reinforces the affirmation of sexual difference, thus justify-ing the emphasis on a certain division of labor within the Community (“[herhusband] is very self-confident, likes to take responsibility, andwhenhemakesa decision, he sticks to it. That’s not my style at all, I’m not used to that”). Thedifference is evenmore pronounced given that Nicole’s work, as mentioned inthe interview, is voluntary, whereas her husband’s work is paid.Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that the configuration of theEmmanuel Community heavily relies on the “privatization of sociability” (Bo-zouls 2021: 110)which is fostered through the regular anddiscreetmaintenanceof relational capital.Within this context, Nicole’s role and agency are far from18 Interview with Nicole, layperson, member of the Emmanuel Community, November18, 2019.118 Social Forms of Religionincidental. In fact, she epitomizes this phenomenon towards the end of thequotation when she discusses her presence in the “field” alongside her hus-band. Beyond the Catholic context, the significance of this relational work,particularly in fostering a sense of camaraderie, is akin to the role played bythe wives of soldiers or diplomats (Loriol 2009).However, it is important not to reduce this gendered division of religiouswork to a static configuration where women in these couples are foreverconfined to exclusively relational tasks. On the contrary, it seems that theagency developed by these women through their commitments in the Em-manuel Community encourages certain forms of “transgression of genderedassignments” (Rétif 2013: 434). In this regard, while Nicole emphasized in theinterview her perceived lack of organizational and decision-making skills(considered masculine), she acknowledges that in practice she has the lead inmany decisions (“I’m the one writing the teachings, I’m the one drawing upthe plans, and he fits in, and it’s worked really well like that. And it’s really mewho’s taken over the teachings”).This type of discrepancy between the gender representations associatedwith a particular form of gendered division of religious work and the actualday-to-daymanagement of commitments appeared regularly inmyfieldwork.While reproducing a ‘traditional’ asymmetry in gender relations, the womenin these relationships acquire an agency which in practice goes beyond mostof the conventional avenues for commitment offered by the Catholic Church(e.g. involvement in associations, parishes, or service to the diocese). My re-search corpus shows that in those cases where couples decide to join the Em-manuel Community, the initiative mostly stems from the women.This sexualdimorphism, to some extent reflecting a classic phenomenon within Catholi-cism (Langlois 1995), is also evident in the interviews conductedwith their hus-bands.Women often take the lead, even interrupting their husbands.The everyday familialism manifested within the Emmanuel Communityis reflected in its governance. While the organization promotes a certainlevel of equality between women and men, the governance structure centeredaround the dyad of the couple is influenced by gender representations thatresult in a gendered division of religious work. Men, who tend to reinvesttheir professional skills, are assigned more frequently to management tasks,while women, utilizing their relational skills, are primarily responsible for thediscreet maintenance of relational capital. However, the agency acquired bywomenwithin the Emmanuel Community tends to complicate this traditionalpattern. In addition to governance, which I have chosen to focus on, everydaySamuel Dolbeau: Everyday Familialism in the Emmanuel Community 119familialism also influences various aspects of marital life, including sexual-ity, through the promotion of “natural methods” of birth control within theCommunity (Dolbeau 2021).Nonetheless, as noted by British sociologist Jon Bernardes, “‘family ide-ology’ comprises, among others, the ideologies of masculinity, femininity,motherhood, fatherhood, and many more” (Bernardes 1985: 278). Within theEmmanuel Community, everyday familialism extends beyondmodels of mas-culinity and femininity for married couples. The case of the priests servingin the Community, who are themselves affected by these dynamics, deservesparticular attention.4. Community priests shaped by everyday familialismThe following excerpt from an interview with a former high official of the Em-manuel Community (now in his fifties and a member for about thirty years),carries significant implications and will serve as a guiding principle for myanalysis.I see priests who live all alone in presbyteries [...]. They have a lifestyle ofold bachelors; they go to bed at such and such an hour. So of course, youhave to pay attention to the lifestyle, but it’s almost a kind of imprison-ment on their lives, and in fact, who is attracted to this priestly way of life?[...] I met a young priest, well a young priest... in his forties, who said tome “you know, I haven’t given any vocations, I don’t have any children” hesaid, in the professional sense of course, and it was so sad... And in fact, ofcourse, I didn’t dare tell him because it was too violent, but when I saw hisway of life, I said to myself: “but what young person, normally constituted,is going to want to go through that?” In any case, I wouldn’t want my chil-dren to go through that. So, he said to me, “But I’ve put on a cassock” andso on (laughs). “Do you think the cassock will attract young people? That’snot what’s going to attract, lad”. I didn’t tell him like that, obviously. [...]So I’m not saying that Community life is a bulwark against all faults be-cause I can tell you that [since the start of his involvement] I’ve seen a lot.But I think it’s a more solid bulwark, stronger, with dikes that are strongeragainst rising waters. [...] In fact, we have quite a strong life. And I see inparticular the priests, the seminarians [...] I see they have something dif-ferent, they have a life of closeness, very, very strong, and then they arebrought together by lay people, the lay people say things to them, encour-120 Social Forms of Religionage them, say “well have you seen how you’re dressed there?” or “you smellof sweat” or I don’t know things like that. “Are you getting enough sleep?”and stuff like that. You can say that to a guy, or a girl for that matter if youknow that you love him. Otherwise, you’re a dull old bore.19Firstly, this excerpt clearly illustrates how the figure of the Emmanuel Com-munity priest is constructed in constant relation to the concept of the “com-munion of states of life”. This concept, which is disseminated within severalCharismatic communities, emphasizes a certain equality (in complementar-ity) between clergy and laypeople.Members of the Emmanuel Community areconsidered “brothers” and “sisters” of the Community before their clerical orlay status is mentioned. This “communion of states of life” is evident at thegroup level of theEmmanuelCommunity, through thepromotionof family life,with a particular emphasis on the figure of the father.This emphasis on father-hood draws inspiration from the ideal of priestlymasculinity that is promotedwithin theEmmanuel Community. In addition to theweekly household,whichserves as the primary setting for the dissemination of this “gender project”20within the group, the influence of the family can be observed at various lev-els of Community life, particularly in the training of seminarians. Frédéric, acleric of theCommunity, discusses the importance of thefigure of the father asa reference point for seminarians, positioning them tomature from “retardedteenagers” into future “fathers” after their ordination:It’s also a danger for seminarians to have their own little armchair, theirown little timetable, their own little life balance, to put their feet underthe table, the dishes are brought to them, and then they wipe the dishes.It’s a real danger. These are young people aged 27/28... Our friends at thesame age are engaged in life. So, we have to avoid turning seminariansinto retarded teenagers, through a suitable system. It’s a vision to have. [...]Well, here we have a generation that comes from divorced families for themost part, and I remember at one point in my seminary there were a goodnumber of young people whose parents were divorced. So how do we dealwith this kind of issue? It’s not easy. But I think we still need to improveon the quality of support, but support that is appropriate for today’s young19 Interview with Philippe, layperson, member of the Emmanuel Community, November7, 2019.20 This concept, originally coined by Australian sociologist Raewyn Connell (Connell1995), is employed by Josselin Tricou in his research (Tricou 2021: 47).Samuel Dolbeau: Everyday Familialism in the Emmanuel Community 121people. So, I’ve just mentioned the question of seminarians whose parentsare divorced. So how do we help them to become ‘fathers’ themselves?21This observation alignswith the findings of Josselin Tricou’s doctoral research,where he identifies various clerical gender regimes operating within contem-porary Catholicism. Specifically, Tricou refers to a “spousal” model promotedby several Charismatic communities, including the Emmanuel Community:In Charismatic communities that bring together individuals from variousstates of life […], the heterosexual married couple often assumes a centralrole and is presented as a sacramental model of the Church, symbolizingthe bride of Christ. This gender regime, which I will refer to as “spousal”, […]draws on nuptial symbolism and gained theological prominence with theinfluence of John Paul II. Within the context of the Church’s increasing em-phasis on “heterosexual culture” […], the term “spousal” is used to signifyGod’s plan, drawing an analogy between divine love and conjugal love. […]These communities, through their practices, prioritize the image of the tra-ditional couple (faithful and procreative) while incorporating modern ele-ments such as expressive culture and a negotiated balance between invest-ment within and outside the family. They also strive for a certain equalitybetween women and men while respecting the concept of complementar-ity, with Christ remaining the head and the Church his body. (Tricou 2021:349)As evident from the statements made by the first interviewee of this section,the spousal model serves as a safeguard against the unappealing image of the“old bachelor” priest that is seemingly favored within the traditional diocesancircuit. François, a cleric in his fifties, discusses how he manages his celibacy,employing the figure of the “old bachelor” priest (and, conversely, the “familyman”) in his reflection.For us in the Community, the people in charge have always been couples.That hasn’t been a problem for us, and I can see the human balance thatit brings. I mean as a seminarian, as a young priest, this contact with fam-ilies... For celibacy, it’s super important. I think it gives you a real balance.It prevents us from becoming old bachelors (laughs), clearly. And above all,it also avoids, well I mean living with families, we realize that it’s not any21 Interview with Frédéric, cleric, member of the Emmanuel Community, February 21,2020.122 Social Forms of Religioneasier to be married […], that married life, family life, is not easy. So, we’rethere to help each other. When I see a father who gets up very early everymorning to take his time in worship before going to work. And I find ithard to get up? There you go. There’s an emulation, a mutual support.22The invocation of the figure of the “old bachelor” priest reflects a dual criti-cism: first, it critiques a perceived flawed priestly masculinity characterizedby challenges inmanaging celibacy, emotional isolation, and immature behav-ior, among others. Secondly, it critiques pastoral and ecclesiological choicesconsidered outdated, such as the priest as the sole manager of the parish andtendencies towards “clericalism”. Furthermore, my respondents’ embrace ofthe spousal model helps distance themselves from competing local genderregimes.In the initial excerpt from the interview, the seemingly innocuous remarkmade bymy respondent about the priest’s cassock illustrates this phenomenon(“Do you think the cassock will attract young people? That’s not what’s goingto attract, lad.”). This criticism of the cassock, often expressed in a humorousmanner, alludes to the imagery associated with a gender regime described byJosselin Tricou as “neo-sacerdotal”:The restitutionist communities, on the other hand, have largely embracedthe idealized image of the “good priest” from the nineteenth century. Thisimage repositions the priest not as an equal, but as a superior to lay womenand men. In this sense, I would categorize them as a neo-sacerdotal gen-der regime. Within these communities, the reaffirmation of the distinc-tion between clergy and laity (based on the clerical monopoly over themanagement of salvation) is practically achieved through the resacerdo-talization of the cleric. This involves the revival of priestly attributes suchas the cassock and the sense of separation from the laity. As for the lay-men and women who gravitate towards these communities and draw in-spiration from them, they are expected to embody a traditional family andconjugal ideal. (ibid.: 285–286)In France, the Saint-Martin Community23 is perhaps the most prominent ex-ample of this regime. Jean-Joseph and Solène, who have been committed for22 Interview with François, cleric, member of the Emmanuel Community, September 3,2020.23 Founded by Jean-François Guérin (1929–2005) in 1976, in Genoa.Samuel Dolbeau: Everyday Familialism in the Emmanuel Community 123over thirty years in theEmmanuel Community and are in their seventies, spentseveral years in a parish run by priests from the Saint-Martin Community. Inan interview,theydiscuss thedifferences theyperceivebetween theSaint-Mar-tin Community and the Emmanuel Community.Solène: In the Emmanuel Community, a priest is a priest, of course, but he’salso a brother, and that’s a strong concept that’s not known in many places.And in the Saint-Martin Community, they are fathers. There’s no notion ofbrothers… I mean of being close as brothers. The priests of the EmmanuelCommunity are also fathers, but they are first and foremost brothers. [...] Inthe Emmanuel Community, you’re in a household with priests, for example,so they share something profound. If they share the Word of God, whatdoes it do in their lives? The priests of the Saint-Martin Community, wellif you’re in contact with a priest maybe, but it’s not the same thing.Jean-Joseph: Their community time is very important, and certainly bringsa lot to priests in general. It’s a way of life that we envy in our community.They set an example for us in that respect, and then we set an example forthem in other ways. [...]I: Any other differences?Jean-Joseph: Oh well, they have Latin for example. They like to have oneGregorian mass a week. Well, I went to a monastery when I was a kid andI’m delighted. But from a pastoral point of view, I wonder, do people un-derstand? Do they like it? So, statistically, they have a lot of vocations tothe priesthood, so there’s something about Latin, about the sacred, aboutI don’t know what. There’s something there. But for me, for us I think, Latinwas rejected. We found that all the texts we could read in French, the luckwe had, didn’t exist. So, we discovered that. [...]Solène: If only to experience mass. We used to experience it differently.Now that it’s in French, we understand what’s going on better. Well, wenever understand much. We experience it better. And when we have to goback to Latin, it’s a bit hard. In a monastery [...] it’s fine, I don’t know howto put it, but in the middle of the city, it seems more difficult. But that’sthe way they do things. [...]Jean-Joseph: And their all-black look (laughs).124 Social Forms of ReligionSolène: No, it doesn’t matter.Jean-Joseph: Oh it does...24It is important to highlight the interconnection between pastoral and ecclesio-logical choices and the clerical gender system for Jean-Joseph: the relationshipbetween clergy and laity, the use of Latin, the distinctive “all-black look”.Thisdeliberate departure from a neo-sacerdotal gender regime carries particularsignificance, especially considering the relatively competitive context betweenNew Ecclesial Movements (ibid.: 360–365). Indeed, several of these groups,including the Saint-Martin Community, share a similar socio-religious back-ground with the Emmanuel Community.Furthermore,within theEmmanuel Community itself, some youngpriestshave started wearing the cassock.This change in attire, which extends beyondthe Community’s context, is often met with a slight sense of mistrust, usu-ally accompanied by humor, from older Community priests who view it as asign of “clericalization”. It is worth noting that the criticism of the clerical-ization of younger generations of priests also extends to the laity, with oldermembers accusing them of maintaining an excessive reverence for the cler-ics of the Community. In an interview, a former member in his sixties, who isa layman, expressed his observations: “I’ve noticed that laypeople today showmore deference to priests than we did back in our days [with the EmmanuelCommunity].A priest was first and foremost a brother. But I see the new gen-erations referring to them as ‘Father so-and-so’”.25 This apprehension of cler-icalization underscores, in negative, the centrality of everyday familialism inshaping the Emmanuel Community as a group. Finally, it should be acknowl-edged that the egalitarian representation associated with the “communion ofstates of life”, similar to thegendereddivisionof religiousworkmentionedear-lier, needs some qualification due to the diverse situations experienced by myinterviewees in the field. In practice, interviews occasionally reveal a certaincompetition for authority between the couples in leadership positions and theCommunity priests.24 Interview with Solène and Jean-Joseph, laypeople, members of the Emmanuel Com-munity, June 11, 2019.25 Interviewwith Pierre-Henri, layperson, formermember of the Emmanuel Community,February 12, 2019.Samuel Dolbeau: Everyday Familialism in the Emmanuel Community 1255. ConclusionIn summary, everyday familialism serves as a significant driving force for theconstruction of social forms within the Emmanuel Community. It is primarilybased on the (re)production of a particular lifestyle prevalent among the up-per classes, which constitutes the background of the majority of its members.This lifestyle fosters a sense of communal familiarity among Catholics from asimilar background. Central to this lifestyle is the promotion of a “privatiza-tion of sociability” where the discreet maintenance of relational connectionsis primarily the responsibility of women within Community couples (Bozouls2021). This form of couple-to-couple sociability is accompanied by a religioushomogeneity that encourages a strong ethos of commitment.This everyday fa-milialism permeates all aspects of Community life, ranging from the organi-zation of Community parishes to the governance of the organization, and eveninfluences the model of masculinity promoted among clerical members.Outside the boundaries of the Emmanuel Community, everyday familial-ismsheds light on the transformationsoccurring in contemporaryCatholic so-cial dynamics.While therearepartial overlapswithother typologiesofCatholi-cism,suchas“observant” (RaisonduCleuziou2019) or “identity”Catholics (Du-mons and Gugelot 2017), everyday familialism stands out through several spe-cific characteristics. One of these features is the emphasis on catering to thenuclear family through the provision of services and the dissemination of dis-courses related to the nuclear family.This focus on the family unit is accompa-niedby apromotionof increased responsibility for laypeople,particularlymar-ried couples, supported by the idea of a certain equality with the clerics.More-over, everyday familialism fosters a form of privatization of sociability, wheresocial engagement is primarily channeled within the confines of the family.Furthermore, within the framework of familialism, specific sexual practicesare often propagated, notably the adoption of “natural methods” of birth con-trol.This reflects a broader interest in promoting a particular approach to sex-uality and reproduction within the context of family life.However, it is crucial to acknowledge that this everyday familialismwithinthe Emmanuel Community is not free from internal contradictions. Onenoteworthy example is the complex and challenging question of the life-long engagement with the Community and of the children raised in it. Thisissue has posed significant challenges and generated debates and discussionsamong Community members for an extended period. Starting from the sec-ond half of the 1990s, the first generation of members, who possessed strong126 Social Forms of Religionpersonal charisma, gradually stepped back from leadership positions withinthe organization. However, in addition to high-profile departures of long-standingmembers, the abandonment of religious practice among several chil-dren of these first-generation community members raises concerns withinthe organization. Faced with the relative failure of passing down the Catholicfaith within several families, an unprecedented internal reflection took placeregarding the status of children inside the Emmanuel Community. In thiscontext, and as part of a broader sequence of relaxing the prerequisites forcommunity engagement, several adjustments have been implemented sincethe 2000s.These include improvements in the “children’s service” duringCom-munity weekends and sessions in Paray-le-Monial as well as a moderation ofthe internal discourse on the primacy of Community commitment. However,in practice, tensions between community life and family life are not entirelyresolved and persist to this day. These tensions are particularly complex toaddress and grasp for the researcher. Indeed, the dissemination of rhetoricemphasizing the proper transmission of these Catholics, aligning with dis-courses on the proper reproduction of socioeconomic elites, contributes toestablishing a form of community silence (or at least discomfort) regardingfailures in transmission. Although examples of successful Community dynas-ties are regularly highlighted by my interviewees (and in the organization’sliterature), narratives of the failures in transmission, are less frequently andindirectly publicized. This observation aligns with the findings articulated byhistorian Claude-Isabelle Brelot regarding the lack of research on the phe-nomenon of social downward mobility among the elite. 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La permanence du di-morphisme sexuel dans le catholicisme français contemporain” In: Clio 2,unpaginated. http://journals.openedition.org/clio/533.Lenoir, Rémi (1999): “La Question Familiale: Familialisme d’Église, Familia-lisme d’État.” In: French Politics, Culture & Society 17/3-4, pp. 75–100.Loriol, Marc (2009): “La carrière des diplomates français: entre parcours indi-viduel et structuration collective.” In: SociologieS, unpaginated. http://journals.openedition.org/sociologies/2936.Ollitrault, Sylvie (2008): Militer pour la planète: Sociologie des écologistes,Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.Raison du Cleuziou, Yann (2019): Une contre-révolution catholique: Aux ori-gines de LaManif pour tous, Paris: Seuil.Rétif, Sophie (2013): Logiques de genre dans l’enseignement associatif: Car-rières et pratiques militantes dans des associations revendicatives, Nou-velle bibliothèque de thèses. Science politique, Paris: Dalloz.Soothill, JaneE. (2007):Gender, social changeandspiritual power:CharismaticChristianity in Ghana, Studies of religion in Africa, Leiden and Boston:Brill.Stambolis-Ruhstorfer,Michael/Tricou, Josselin (2018): “La lutte contre la ‘théo-rie dugenre’ enFrance: pivot d’unemobilisation religieusedansunpays sé-cularisé” In: RomanKuhar/David Paternotte (eds.),Campagnes anti-genreen Europe: des mobilisations contre l’égalité, Lyon: Presses Universitairesde Lyon, pp. 143-166.Tricou, Josselin (2021): Des soutanes et des hommes: Enquête sur la masculi-nité des prêtres catholiques, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.Valla-Chevalley,Geneviève (2009): Le conseil conjugal et familial, Trames, Tou-louse: Erès.van Lier, Rick (2022): “Forces et fragilités au sein des communautés nouvellescatholiques.” In: Laval théologique et philosophique 78/2, pp. 269-292.SourcesInterview with Pierre-Henri, layperson, former member of the EmmanuelCommunity, February 12, 2019.Interview with Solène and Jean-Joseph, laypeople,members of the EmmanuelCommunity, June 11, 2019.Interview with Philippe, layperson, member of the Emmanuel Community,November 7, 2019.Samuel Dolbeau: Everyday Familialism in the Emmanuel Community 129Interview with Nicole, layperson, member of the Emmanuel Community,November 18, 2019.Interview with Sophie, layperson, January 29, 2020.Interview with Françoise, layperson, January 30, 2020.Interviewwith Frédéric, cleric,member of the Emmanuel Community, Febru-ary 21, 2020.Interview with François, cleric, member of the Emmanuel Community,September 3, 2020.Web ReferencesCommunauté de l’Emmanuel. “Qui sommes nous?” Accessed September 5,2023. https://emmanuel.info/qui-sommes-nous/.Communauté de l’Emmanuel. “Amour&Vérité.” Accessed September 5, 2023. https://emmanuel.info/france/amour-et-verite/.The Capital of Closed ChurchesHeritage Buildings as Social Entrepreneurship in QuebecHillary KaellAbstract Across North America, historic churches are rapidly closing. The problem isespecially acute in urban areas where these buildings often house community organiza-tions.GrahamSingh, anAnglicanpastor andnon-profitCEOinMontreal, is promotinga solution: remake churches into community hubs. For Singh and his team, hubs are anopportunity for Christians to leverage their primary asset – tax-free land – and becomefull partners in the public sphere. Based on anthropological fieldwork, this chapter ar-gues, first, that more scholarship should consider social entrepreneurship as a key areawhere religion andmarketmeet, beyondmuch-studied neo-Pentecostal growth churchesand prosperity gospel. Instead, Singh and his team are working to define entrepreneur-ship as social by dint of its physical embeddedness in historic churches. Doing so, theyconsciouslyadapt cutting-edgefinancial trendsbypositioninghubsasa smart real estateinvestment for private investors with social purpose goals. In this view, church property,supported by private investment, becomes central to reinvigorating Christian influencein the public sphere. In keeping with the theme of this volume, this chapter’s second con-tribution is to suggest that community hubsmight therefore be considered an intriguingnew social form within North American Christianity, which derives value from its lo-cation at the border of historically religious forms (heritage churches), economic forms(corporate investment), and the public sphere.Keywords Christianity, economy, finance, heritage, material religion, public sphere,Quebec, social entrepreneur132 Social Forms of Religion1. IntroductionMontreal is a city of churches. While many religious congregations meet instorefronts or suburban new builds, the city is best known for large neo-gothicstructures graced with steeples and stained-glass. Those are the churches towhichMarkTwain (1881: 3) referredwhen,upon visitingMontreal, he famouslyquipped: “This is the first time I was ever in a city where you couldn’t throw abrick without breaking a church window.” Ever the satirist, Twain was exag-gerating. But he was right in identifying this feature as particular to an urbanenvironment that had been built by French Roman Catholics and expandedby British Anglicans. Both groups prized the construction of ornate stonechurches that, once ritually consecrated to God, were pictured as eternal.More than a century later, many such churches now figure in a grow-ing crisis across North America and Western Europe. Historic churches arerapidly closing as dwindling congregations cannot afford to maintain them.Across Canada, ten thousand churches are slated to close within the nextdecade, which comprises more than a third of the churches currently ownedby denominations; the situation is especially acute in Quebec (Okesson 2020:207).Enter Graham Singh. He is Rector of St. Jax, a Montreal Anglican Dioceseplant in a church inaugurated as St. James the Apostle in 1864. Since Singh ar-rived in 2015, St. Jax has grown, by his estimation, into the largest Anglicanparish east of Toronto with about 250 weekly worshippers. More importantlyfor Singh, the building is nowa community hub runby anon-profit calledCen-tre St. Jax –a systemhe believeswill contribute tomaking churches financiallysolvent and socially vital. In 2018, Singh founded another non-profit, Trin-ity Centres Foundation (TCF), to support innovative financial solutions alongthe St. Jax model. His work is thus divided into three overlapping branches inwhich several people, including Singh, circulate: St. Jax, the parish where heserves as pastor; Centre St. Jax, an autonomous administrative organizationthatmanages rentals and the community hub; and TCF,where Singh serves asCEO.In their introduction to this volume,MarenFreudenberg andAstridReuterposition “social forms” as a key conceptual framework in sociological studies ofreligion.At base, these forms refer to structures of social interaction,which, astheynote,derive fromaheuristic proposedat the turnof the twentieth century,initially by Max Weber (1958 [1905]) and elaborated by his friend, theologianErnst Troeltsch (1931 [1912]). Troeltsch’smodel identified three forms of organi-Hillary Kaell: The Capital of Closed Churches 133zation: church, sect, andmysticism.Over the intervening century, sociologistshave refined, rejected, and reclaimed the typology. For example, sociologist ofreligionLorneDawsonapplauds its universal applicability,whichhe sees as thegoal of any (social) science “with its regulatory ideals of generalization, theoryconstruction, empiricism, and even prediction” (2009: 534). Other contempo-rary sociologists, wrestling with how the legacy of these ideal analytical typescorrespond with empirical realities, have responded by multiplying variantsof the social form to include aspects such as community, event, and marketexchange. Sociologists have also studied how social forms blend, especially inorganizations that, as Freudenberg and Reuter put it during a workshop onsocial forms in Bochum, Germany, in March 2023, are located on the borderbetween social fields, such as religious charity organizations where economiclogics compete with religious ideas and semantics.While as an anthropologist I have little at stake in this debate, it providesan opening to examine Graham Singh’s model of overlapping churches andnon-profits, which is certainly located on the border between social fields.More particularly, Freudenberg and Reuter’s invitation to think about thecompetition between economic logics and religious ideas provides an op-portunity for me to reflect on the economic component of Singh’s work.Sociologists have pioneered an approach to economics that, paraphrasingFreudenberg and Reuter at the workshop in Bochum, is the quantification ofan originally economic idea that is religiously reinterpreted.What they meanis that sociologists have taken statistical data about churches and interpretedit through the lens of free-market competition. As an example, they notesociologist Robert Wuthnow’s metaphor of “church shopping” in U.S. Chris-tianity (2007) referring to how people seek out churches that suit them ratherthan retaining membership in the same institution as their parents. Anotherexample, especially prevalent among sociologists of North American religion,is the market exchange metaphor introduced and widely circulated as a “newparadigm” in the 1990s (Jelen 2002) to explain how denominational churchesdiffer from historic and state-funded churches across much of Europe. Thismetaphor-come-theory of religion proposed that denominationalism createdfree-market church competition, which resulted in more choices (supply) thathas led to higher rates of attendance (demand). I am certainly not the first toexpress reservations about thismodel (for example,Gauthier andMartikainen2016). Like other critics, I find troublesome the assumption that capitalistcompetition strengthens socio-religious commitments and, further, that onecan quantify church ‘health’ based on the number of members or attendees.134 Social Forms of ReligionSingh and his team likely agree with me on the first point and, as I discussbelow, they certainly agree with me on the second.Instead of using economic metaphors as an analytical tool, therefore, Iam interested in studying empirically through anthropological field workhow Christians, like Singh, consciously adapt market logics to the religioussphere. And this process is not one-way; it speaks to cutting-edge trendswithin investment circles too, as funders and private investors seek to pri-oritize “impact investing” and “social purpose” goals. This chapter offers apreliminary discussion of Singh’s work based on research being carried outin Montreal by myself and post-doctoral researcher Sam Victor, along withour graduate student assistants Alexandre Duceppe-Lenoir and Sophie Ji. Webegan preliminary fieldwork in autumn 2022 and more focused fieldwork inMarch 2023. In this article, which I am writing in August 2023, I mainly drawonmy early field notes related to TCF, some of Victor’s field notes about St. Jax(as cited in the text), and my review of the St. Jax/TCF team’s quite prodigiousoutput on social media and the web.More generally, I make the case that scholars of religion should devotemore attention to social entrepreneurship as a key area where the blurrededges of religion and market meet. Positioning Singh as entrepreneur servesto expand the category beyond what anthropologists and other scholars ofcontemporary Christianity have called the “pastorpreneur” (Jackson 2004,2011; Klaver 2015; Jennings 2017). The neologism, which combines “pastor”and “entrepreneur”, refers to a (nearly always) male pastor who valorizes risk-taking individualism in his quest to build a mega-church. It fits snugly withina broader emphasis on neo-Pentecostals, growth churches, and the prosperitygospel that is typical of how scholars of religion discuss money and faith.Such ministries generally either operate without owning a building or theyconstruct one in a hyper-modern style (Lehto 2020). A heritage building likeSt. Jax has no place in this literature, which is understandable since pastor-preneurs, as they have been defined, view attachments to such structures asirrelevant or even a problematic sign of stagnation. Clearly, then, neither thepastorpreneur nor metaphors of market competition are sufficient to capturethe less intuitive kind of economic logic Singh’s project suggests. As I show,hisentrepreneurship is embedded in neoliberal capitalism, but it rejects a growthor prosperity model. Nor is it place-agnostic. Instead, Singh and his fellowtravelers are working to define innovation and entrepreneurship as social bydint of its physical embeddedness in place. In keeping with the theme of thisHillary Kaell: The Capital of Closed Churches 135volume, I suggest that community hubs might therefore be considered anintriguing new social formwithin North American Christianity.2. Introducing St. JaxI borrow thephrase inmy title–“the capital of closed churches”–fromGrahamSingh,who used it with respect toMontreal in a newspaper profile on his work(Schwartz 2021). Capital can refer to a primary location, which is what Singhmeant, but it also refers to wealth in the form of money or other assets. Thisintersection of location, money, and assets is at the heart of Singh’s work toaddress a church crisis in Canada.Like most historic Anglican churches, a decade ago St. James the Apos-tle had a small standing congregation of older parishioners.The building wasgrand – a relic of a period when 80 per cent of Canada’s wealth was controlledby people living in the neighborhood – and it is legally designated as a her-itage site. While this designation adds social value, it creates an added eco-nomic burden as maintenance is more difficult and expensive. The congrega-tion repeatedly asked Montreal’s Bishop Mary Irwin-Gibson to fund repairs.The Bishop was unwilling to continue draining Diocesan coffers, yet she sawvalue in retaining the church and its land because of its location in one of thebusiest sections of downtown.The area is characterized by shopping, tourism,and high-rises housing thousands of students, especially new arrivals fromAsia.The land itself, the primary asset formost historic churches in Canada, isworth millions and the church benefits from a full property tax exemption.1In 2015, Bishop Irwin-Gibson temporarily suspended operations at St.James and recruited Reverend Graham Singh, a Canadian working in Eng-land, to pastor a new church. Singh is deeply influenced by Holy TrinityBrompton (HTB), the UK church where he was trained at the cutting edge ofthe Anglican missional movement. Its ethos celebrates historic buildings butdoes not shy away from closing them if they cease to serve a congregation’smission. Besides being an expert in church planting, Singh also has a stronginterest in social finance, having participated in Oxford Business School’s1 Properties designated for religious use are exempt from taxation in Canada. Historicchurches are grandfathered into this system but newer congregations in Montreal of-ten fail to qualify because they do not own their own property or because city officialsare unwilling to authorize exemptions for storefronts and other spaces.136 Social Forms of ReligionImpact Innovations program. A year later, under Singh’s guidance, St. Jamesre-opened as St. Jax, a zippier and more bilingual name recalling “Jacques”(the French version of James). Most of the old congregants left and St. Jax, theparish, now shares its space with multiple partners, notably a circus troupethat performs in the sanctuary. Post-doctoral researcher Sam Victor vividlydescribes his first impression of the space in his fieldnotes:The vaulted wooden ceilings, the wooden paneling and ornamental carv-ing, the storied engravings of the names of notable figures dating backto the nineteenth century, all contributed to what Graham likes to call the“wow effect.” […] The absence of pews (folding chairs instead) and the blackplywood stage juxtaposed the weighty historic feel of the rest of the spacewith a [sense] of temporariness, informality, dynamism, incompleteness,etc. Also, circus rigging was affixed to the wooden beams in the center ofthe ceiling…further adding to the porousness between backstage/produc-tion and front stage/performance.Inmanyways, Singh embraces the ambiguity between a historic buildingwitha “wow” factor and that informal and dynamic feel. It bespeaks his larger ethic.Church sharing is hardly novel, and many congregations rent or donatespace so it canbeusedby other congregations, charities, andnon-profits (Alco-holics Anonymous is ubiquitous). Yet Singh’s model differs from the norm in afewways.First,he emphasizes the valueofhigh-endprofit-generating renters,not just thenon-profits that church congregationsnormally identify as the eth-ically correct target group for their space. St. Jax rents space on a sliding scale,with events hosted by banks, for example, helping to subsidize other groups’use. Singh’s ultimate goal is not that the host congregation essentially under-writes other groups’ use of the space, but that the church itself – as a collec-tive hub – becomes self-sustaining. For Singh, a hub does more than generatemoney: it serves a spiritual purpose by making the church accountable to theneeds of the wider public. As he sees it, Christians have an important spiritualmessage to contribute to society but, because of the dismal recent history ofthe (mainly) Catholic Church in Quebec, all historic churches need to be given“permission”, as Singh often puts it, to re-enter the public sphere.2 Remakingchurches into shared hubs responds to the community’s needs and therefore2 I have heard Singh use this word multiple times in conversation as well as in moreformal sessions at TCF over the course of fieldwork.Hillary Kaell: The Capital of Closed Churches 137gives Christians a license to become full partners in reimagining how to rightsocietalwrongs, such as colonization (inwhichSingh recognizesChristian cul-pability), urban blight, and social isolation. Singh views hubs as an ethical im-perative if churches are going to share their privileged status as major land-holders, compounded by their exemption from property tax.Shortly after reopening St. Jax,Singh foundedTrinityCentres Foundation.As a non-profit, TCF aims to make land and buildings into positive assets forcommunities – both for the church congregations that own them and for thecommunities around them.Not surprisingly,oneofTCF’s favored solutions forhistoric churches with economic woes is the community hub. However, Singhand his team are not only speaking to Christian congregations.They also posi-tion community hubs as a smart real estate investment for private individualsand funderswhowant to broaden their portfolios to include “social impact” in-vestments. In sum, Singh views Christian real estate, supported by private in-vestment, as integral to retaining (or creating) Christian influence as an ethicalguide in the public sphere. In this respect, the community hub, as a new socialform, derives its value from its surprising location at the border of historicallyreligious forms (heritage churches), economic forms (corporate investment),and the public sphere. Just howChristians will guide the public seems to be ofless importance to Singh at this point than beginning the process of gainingpermission, as he puts it, to sit at the table again.3. Entrepreneurship, including that which is socialA social entrepreneur is usually defined as someone whomeets people’s needsthrough the marketplace, including generating income for shareholders, butwith the primary goal of doing “good” rather than turning a profit.While thiscategory of activitywould seem to lend itself to analysis through studies of reli-gion, very little recent social scientific work unites religion and entrepreneur-ship.Most relevant studies come from the fields of sociology, economics,man-agement, and business. Scholars of religion, including anthropologists, havewritten little on the subject, and there is criticism of their as-yet “unreflectiveuse of the term social entrepreneurship” (McVea/Naughton 2021).138 Social Forms of ReligionBased on my survey of recent articles on religion and entrepreneurship,this critique is correct.3 Most relevant studies define entrepreneurship as anindividual’s “predisposition” and “skills to create a business” and/or be self-employed (Paiva et. al. 2020: 2). In adding “social” to their analysis, they makethe basic point that entrepreneurial work should be better framed in socio-cultural contexts, which includes religion (Dana 2010). As “depositories ofvalues” (Dana 2009: 87), religions help complicate the classical economic as-sumption that rational individuals always maximize profits amid mechanicalmarket forces. Though I concur with the general sentiment, this literaturecreates a confusion of terms: because it considers religion to be ipso facto“social”, it assumes that religiously motivated entrepreneurship is always‘social entrepreneurship’. Thus, most studies I surveyed simply asked howan individual’s beliefs (a “social factor”) helped or hindered their economicactivity, mainly small-scale businesses (Rundle/Lee 2022).4Only 15 per cent (n=7) of studies in my survey used the definition of socialentrepreneurship that is widely accepted in other fields, referring to balanc-ing “business viability” (Kimura 2021) with socially useful outcomes (McVea/Naughton 2021). This definition accords with Graham Singh’s goal to createself-sustaining and even profit-generating church buildings. Some studiesalso suggest that to be considered a “religious” entrepreneur, one must man-ifest one’s beliefs at work (Roudy et al. 2016; Kimura 2021). A more intriguingdefinition, via a study of Belgian Catholicism, sees social entrepreneurshipless as integrating a pre-existing set of beliefs into one’s work and instead de-fines it as a set of personal qualities that can be developed much like spiritualexpertise: it is “the capacity to deal skillfully with uncertainties, to experimenton a small scale, to collaborate in a co-creative way, to gather scarce resources,to allow failure, and to dare to draw critical lessons” (Vandewiele 2021: 133–34).The emphasis on small-scale experimentation, co-creation, and failure is very3 Based on my analysis of a database compiled by my research assistant AlexandreDuceppe-Lenoir. It contains 48 social scientific articles published from 2018–2022 hefound with the search terms “social entrepreneur*” and “religion” (Scopus, EBSCO,ATLA, Google Scholar). Nine other articles date from 2010–2017. The earliest, from2009, corresponds with the first wave of studies on social entrepreneurship in busi-ness and associated fields.4 Most studies conclude that religionmotivates entrepreneurship by building networks,creating hope and confidence, and justifying economic actions (Agarwal/Jones 2022;Tovar-García 2022; Paiva et. al. 2020).Hillary Kaell: The Capital of Closed Churches 139much in keeping with the St. Jax ethos adapted from the Anglican missionalmovement.Neo-Pentecostal and Charismatic Christians are of significant interest toscholars; nearly a third of the articles (n=14) in my survey focused on thesegroups andmany othersmentioned them in passing.No other religious groupappears as often. As (often) independent congregations focused on growth,these churches fit easily with discussions of branding, marketing, and thesociological ‘marketplace’ metaphor, noted above, that is structured largelyon Evangelical forms of Christianity proliferating in a ‘market’ of religiouschoices. CEO pastors who build growth-oriented megachurches becomethe “obvious” example of the “market logic” of North American Christianity(Gorski 2022). The subset of this literature that emphasizes entrepreneurshipfocuses on economic self-determination and risk-taking, especially amongpastors who plant, market, and grow new churches (Foppen et al. 2017).5Religious Studies scholar Mark Jennings (2017: 243), using the neologism“pastorpreneur”, criticizes these pastors as celebrating “the risky neoliberalindividual” to valorize innovation, creativity, and economic risk as a godlymodel of leadership in service of church growth. In this literature, Africancase studies dominate (Agyeman/Carsamer 2018; Nyamnjoh/Carpenter 2018;Gusman 2021; Resane 2022), which anthropologist Séraphin Balla (2021) sug-gests is due to the rise of Pentecostalism during a continent-wide economiccollapse in the 1990s: the pastors’ success seemed so remarkable in this contextthat it prompted scholarly interest.While St. Jax is not an Evangelical or Pentecostal church, its model sharesaspects of the neoliberal economics that characterize these “personalised andembodied”ministries (Klaver 2015: 149). By neoliberalism, Imean the idea thateverything is potentially marketable, including oneself as a personal brandand “human capital” (Brown 2015: 36). A gifted leader who emphasizes col-laboration, Singh is nevertheless highly attuned to how his qualities – young,non-White, bilingual – represent St. Jax and TCF, especially in the media.He prizes professional-quality photos and good marketing. He leverages5 In the case of pastors, scholars imply that ‘entrepreneurship’ is social because it buildsreligious institutions. Studies on lay people imply it is social because religious valuesand networks support their (non-church) economic activities. In contrast to studies ofChristianity, relevant work on Islam rarely focuses on leaders. It emphasizes laypeople,often those with little formal economic power, notably women (Karimi 2018; Ouragini2019; Senda 2019) and/or migrants (Hüwelmeier 2013; Gusman 2021).140 Social Forms of Religionhis personality – gregarious, entrepreneurial, innovative – to grow the St.Jax/TCF brand (my word, not his). Beyond Singh’s personal style, however, hismodel is sharply differentiated from how scholars describe the “CEO pastor”and pastorpreneur.These paradigmatic types are often associated with digitalplatforms, emphasize churchgrowthwithout limit, and are place agnostic.Thelast point refers to how places, let alone a specific building, are rarely viewedas integral to the work. As one guide to church planting puts it, “steeples andstained glass” merely burden Christians with costs and the weight of history(Ringdal 2022: 56). Innovation and entrepreneurship are about beingmodern,nimble, digital, and constantly growing out of one building and into another –if one has a building at all.Theologically, this model is adapted to independentEvangelical churches, especially to those that are newly established. It is muchless compatible with historic congregations where church buildings are animportant legacy and, as Singh argues, a key asset for social and financialinnovation. Thus, Singh suggests an economic logic that is less intuitive, atleast for social scientists studying Christianity.4. The St. Jax Model of Social EntrepreneurshipThe St. Jax and TCF model adapts components of social entrepreneurshipto suit the challenges faced by many traditional mainline churches in NorthAmerica. The TCF website described its goal as “applying a new social busi-ness model that generates both societal and economic value…enabling churchproperties to continue to facilitate positive change,whilemaintaining a securefinancial future.”6 Church properties are essential in this process. Economi-cally, Centre St. Jax generates value in part by renting church space for high-end activities at market rates to generate a self-sustaining financial system.Because church congregations often lack the expertise to negotiate in thereal estate market, TCF also creates economic value through its consultancyarm: congregations in financial crisis can hire TCF to guide them throughnegotiations with buyers. These services are not free (initial assessments runfrom $15.000 to $20.000), but the promise is that professional consultants willhelp congregations attain their goals. One TCF recommendation is that con-gregations and denominations retain the land as an income-generating asset,even if the church building is sold.Working through TCF, Singh is also trying6 Cf. https://trinitycentres.org/en/about-us.Hillary Kaell: The Capital of Closed Churches 141to create a market for private investment. His hope is that high-end investorsand philanthropic foundations will invest in historic church buildings as partof diversified “social impact” portfolios.This strategy existsmore generally – itis sometimes called “purpose-driven property investment” – but Singh wantsto include churches as a viable, and even crucial, generator of social impact.As TCF’s website notes, economic viability is twinned with societal value.For example, when Centre St. Jax rents at market rates, it provides deepdiscounts for renters, such as other churches and non-profits, that it sees asgenerating social value (what it calls its “Robin Hood policy”).7 When privateinvestors make profits on their social impact portfolios, it provides infusionsof capital so churches can carry on as community hubs, which, as I noted,Singh views as part of churches’ ethical responsibility to share their space witha wider public. Ironically, then, private real estate investors become the keyto saving churches from being sold and made into private real estate, which(for Singh) negates the building’s capacity to act for the public good. Sellingchurches to developers is an outcome so frequent for buildings in lucrativeurban areas, like St. Jax, that I have heard TCFmembers refer to condominiumdevelopers as “wolves circling their prey.”The St. Jax/TCF model is rooted in the social goals typical of social en-trepreneurship. It also accords with how entrepreneurship values innovation,audacity, and risk-taking. This factor deserves more scholarly attention. Forexample, a recent study of Silicon Valley argues that its entrepreneurial cul-ture replaces more traditional religious commitments by providing analogousfeelings and attachments (Chen 2022). However, while it discusses the ‘pas-toral’ model of leadership in Silicon Valley where entrepreneur CEOs inspiredevotion from “faithful disciples” (ibid.: 42), it only implies that innovationmight have spiritual value in these circles. Scholars have more directly dis-cussed innovation and risk-taking – gendered as masculine virtues – in thecontext of studies of Evangelical/Charismatic Christian pastors cited above.In TCF’s case, it emphasizes church communities rather than individualleaders, promising to help groups find “innovative new ways of deliveringservices, while advancing social inclusion and revitalizing communities andlocal neighbourhoods.”8 At TCF’s eight-week introductory course for churchboard members, which I attended, Singh and his co-convenor Dave Harderrepeatedly made explicit the link between innovation and risk taking. In every7 Cf. http://stjax.org/our-story.8 Cf. https://trinitycentres.org/en/about-us.142 Social Forms of Religionsession, they pushed participants to forget the “fears” holding them back fromtaking the risks required to think “outside the box” about the future of theirchurch buildings.Sam Victor, post-doctoral researcher on this project, first alerted me tothe importance for Singh of Holy Trinity Brompton’s missional approach. Hisinsight is useful in the context of entrepreneurship as well. Being “missional”is an orientation that developed among British Anglicans in the 1980s andspread to North American Evangelicals (Bielo 2011: 269). Holy Trinity Bromp-ton, where Singh trained, is a flagship of this approach and it lists “audacity”as its first value.9 St. Jax is also positively referred to as “audacious” by mis-sional Christians with ties to Singh (Okesson 2020: 207). At a basic level, thisorientation refers to being a missionary in one’s own society, which missionalChristians define as a secular, post-modern one. In North America, this viewtranslates into harsh criticism of conservative, (often) suburban white Evan-gelicalism and its megachurches for being inauthentic and ineffective (Bielo2011: 278). Missional Christians hold innovation in high regard, which leadsto the idea that one must sometimes reject received norms and rules to makean impact. The main purpose is evangelism; one “breaks the rules” of secularsociety by creating clever communication strategies to spread the Gospel.These strategies – “ambient” forms, as per Matthew Engelke (2012) – aim tomeet people where they are (that is, outside church buildings). They are oftenirreverent and fun, but theirmain distinguishing feature is how they generallyavoid talking directly about God or church. For example, in one of his firstacts as St. Jax pastor, Singh dressed up in a blue bunny suit and frolicked withspectators at the St Patrick’s Day parade, posing for photos with a sign thatread “#MoreThanTheBunny / #Plus qu’un lapin.” As coverage in the local newsnoted, he did this “without bringing in notions of church or Jesus” – whichSingh would argue is precisely why it did, in fact, succeed in drawing peoplefor Easter Sunday worship (Schwartz 2021).In our conversations, Victor applied this basic concept from missionalEvangelicalism to the less intuitive realm of heritage governance. For Singhand his team, the same positive valuation of cleverness and innovation helpsstructure their approach to managing relations with bureaucratic partners inthe municipality and government-funded heritage councils. The St. Jax teamoften view these partners as stifling creativity since pragmatic bureaucratsrarely share their visionary plans for revitalizing religious heritage across9 Cf. https://htb.org/story.Hillary Kaell: The Capital of Closed Churches 143North America. More specifically, the Quebec heritage council often managesthe local projects it funds by imposing strong restrictions, such as mandat-ing that churches work with approved, and more expensive, contractors forrepairs.10 Clever ways around some of these systems include, for example,partnering with a circus that can apply for government arts grants for whichreligious organizations are not eligible. In 2023, these funds paid for improve-ments to the church, including new bathrooms. Another workaround washow the team slotted the bathrooms into a preexisting hallway that did notsignificantly alter the church’s interior, allowing them to skirt the need for abuilding permit which is a difficult bureaucratic undertaking in a heritagebuilding.Innovative solutions also serve missional teams well within their denom-inations where pastors fall under the aegis of larger structures, such as anAnglican Diocese.11 Singh demonstrated this ethos at a luncheon with leadersfrom Montreal’s Catholic Archdiocese.12 In response to one of the invitees,he suggested that Catholic Canon Law was unduly restricting churches frombecoming community hubs. “We need to findworkarounds”, he urged,with “apackage of short cuts” through which “clever” Catholic leaders could find ways“to bend Canon Law”. He illustrated with an example from his work in the UKwhere, as church planters, they faced an Anglican rule to prevent removingthe pews. Missional church planters dislike pews since they view them astoo ‘churchy’ and less open to mixed uses (Singh immediately removed allthe pews when he arrived at St. Jax). In the UK case, the clever workaroundconsisted of relying on Archdeacons’ capacity to grant a temporary licenseto remove 20 per cent of a church’s pews at one time.13 Singh and his fellowchurch planters would request a license, remove 20 per cent of the pews, thenwait six weeks and approach the archdeacon to authorize another temporary10 The Federal government is more hands off and private foundations can be flexiblenegotiation partners. Singh hopes to grow the latter funding stream, which is moreamenable to tackling innovative society-scale questions.11 The current Montreal Bishop supports Singh completely and it is she who recruitedhim. The situation could shift with a new Bishop, which points to the tensions of op-erating within an episcopal system. That said, it is a fiction that any entrepreneur actsalone; there are always social pressures and opportunities (Dana 2009).12 The lunch, which I attended as part of my fieldwork, took place at St Jax church onMay 11, 2023.13 An archdeacon is a senior Anglican clergy member responsible for the buildings inmultiple parishes.144 Social Forms of Religionlicense until the churchwas emptied. It took longer, but they were able to skirtthe official Diocesan rule.Thus, a certain amount of subversion is a virtue if itaccomplishes what Singh and his team view as socially productive ends.14 Atthe luncheon, however, Singh’s suggestion did not resonate: the Catholic lead-ers – likely because they lacked themissional esteem for audacity – respondedthat Canon Law posed no problem as far as they were concerned.5. Land as Privilege and AssetThemost important aspect of social entrepreneurialism is the ‘social’,which asI have noted inmy brief literature review is severely undertheorized in studiesof religion. Perhaps a reason for this lacuna derives from emic – that is, Evan-gelicalChristian–perspectiveson the social: fromthis vantagepoint,allChris-tian activities related to Evangelism are ‘social’ insofar as it addresses a press-ing societal need for salvation. Singh agrees that salvation is important, but hedefines his project in keepingwithmorewidely accepted views that the “social”in social entrepreneurship refers to something other than Christian witness.Singh also distinguishes his model from more typical “church sharing” wherecongregations rent out spacemerely to pay the bills. Instead,he views propertyas a privilege and an asset for historic congregations, through which they canmake social impacts.Singh’s emphasis on property derives partly fromhis training atHoly Trin-ity Brompton (HTB), where missional Anglicanism orients it toward historicbuildings. By contrast, the missional movement adapted by non-denomina-tional Evangelicals, as is most typical in North America, values physical placesinsofar as they create opportunities for Evangelism but does not value historicbuildings per se (Bielo 2011). Of its church plantingmission,HTBwrites, “His-torically significant and beautiful Anglican churches – often facing closure –have been restored and are now home to vibrant, growing, worshipping com-munities that have significant impact on their local areas.”15With HTB, Singhshares an emphasis on historic buildings as the impetus for vibrant commu-nities that impact the wider culture. However, HTB’s goal of “evangelizing thenation and transforming society” takes place in a countrywhere it is the estab-lished and majority church (represented on the same webpage by photos of a14 Wording in this sentence drawn from Sam Victor‘s fieldnotes.15 Cf. https://htb.org/story.Hillary Kaell: The Capital of Closed Churches 145visit from none other than King Charles).16 For Anglicanism in Canada the sit-uation is complicated. Itwasnever the established churchand it always cateredto a privileged minority. In Montreal, this is especially true. Singh is highlyaware that he speaks within a historic French Catholic-majority culture thathas traditionally viewed the English as its colonizers. He is also explicit aboutrepresenting a colonial system that divested indigenous people of land, whichis a key public issue in Canada. As a result, Singh creatively adaptsHTB’s focuson churches in a Canadian context to emphasize justice and access as socialvalues.Singh views societal ills, including power differentials between whitesettlers and indigenous people or more recent immigrants, as being partlyredressed if historic churches, like St. Jax, come to think of their access to un-taxed and centrally located space as a privilege that it is incumbent upon themto share. These privileges are not available to more recently arrived religiousgroups that cannot afford to buy land or qualify for property tax exemptionsunder restrictive government policies (on similar difficulties in Europe, cf.Cao 2022: 4). Singh also recognizes that historic churches stand because ofthe land and labor of others, including indigenous people, who were neverpart of the historically white, affluent, Anglophone congregation at St. James.Justice is making sure others now have access to the space, which, for Singh,makes real estate into a medium through which a traditional Anglican (andCatholic) concern with place can become a cross-denominational, and non-religious, Canada-wide issue about justice. It also signals another differencefrom missional Evangelicals who emphasize access to leadership for peopletraditionally excluded – for example, women, recent immigrants, or AfricanAmericans.The purpose is to make congregations internally stronger in orderto, ultimately, focus outward on attracting more adherents. Singh agreeson the need for more diverse leadership, but his focus is not on growing acongregation; it is on reorienting church buildings outward as a widely usableresource. As a result, TCF rejects classic indicators of church ‘health’ basedon the number of members or attendees. It also rejects the church growthmodel that scholars often criticize as a “market logic” (Gorski 2022). In TCF’sinvesting school, for example, Singh and Harder urge church board membersto change what they call the “limiting” or “doom”mindset that merely equateschurch success with questions such as, how do we get more families and howdo we grow our numbers? Instead, they urge a “wonder” or “delight” mindset16 Cf. ibid.146 Social Forms of Religionthat asks, how can we serve our neighbors’ needs, especially in terms of space?With this mindset, church health and success are measured according to howwell congregations share their land and buildings with others.However, land is not only a privilege: it is also churches’ main financialand social asset. TCF calls for “the development of inclusive social ecosystems,leveraging the land wealth of Canada’s faith communities as a foundation.”17The website describes one impetus for Centre St. Jax as a “new way […] to re-vive an older idea of a church’s role in society, which is to provide for the tem-poral needs of the community, but to do so in a radically open and inclusivemanner.”18 Scholars are often less sanguine. For example, sociologist DanièleHervieu-Léger bases her analysis of France on theWeber/Troeltsch triad fromwhich Freudenberg and Reuter derive the concept of ‘social form’ in this vol-ume.Hervieu-Léger (2002: 102) contrasts newer ‘sect-type’ religious groups inFrance with an established ‘church-type’ (Catholicism) that uses its inheritedhold over territory tomagnify “the fiction of being all-encompassing”. Power isobviously at stake in the context I have been discussing aswell. After all, Chris-tians are not proposing to give over land and walk away. In fighting privatiza-tion, they are reviving the foundational role of church in “social ecosystems”, asTCF puts it. By retaining historic structures in situ, Christian iconography, his-tory,andpresence remainvital in theurban landscape.Byopening thebuildingto those who have been traditionally excluded – albeit without asking them tojoin the congregation – these users are interpolated into a Christian story.However, unlike Hervieu-Léger’s model that sees the main source of ten-sion as intra-religious (that is, between ‘sects’ and a dominant ‘church’), St.Jax demonstrates how ‘church’ itself may in fact be a shifting constellation ofchurches, non-profits, diocesan actors, private investors, and philanthropicfoundations – all of which become stakeholders by dint of their social and/orfinancial investments in a single building. In his assessment of St. Jax, pas-tor and missiologist Greg Okesson calls it “a place with multiple expressionsof church” (2020: 215).19 If we think in terms of social forms, it is a constella-tion on the border of many social fields. With such a complex structure, it is17 Cf. https://trinitycentres.org/ecosystem.18 Cf. http://stjax.org/en/home.19 Singh recommended Okesson’s book to me as largely reflecting his own point of view.The two are also close colleagues, Singh having started a ThD at Asbury Seminarywhere Okesson serves as Provost.Hillary Kaell: The Capital of Closed Churches 147no surprise that St. Jax is unlikely to solve the tension between property as so-cial justice and church asset. In fact, leaving room for ambiguity is how the St.Jaxmodel succeeds. It can becomemultiple things formultiple people and– ingood entrepreneurial fashion – embraces change as a constant.6. Concluding ThoughtsTheSt. Jaxmodel is located onwhat this volume calls the border between socialfields. Historic church buildings are the tangible remnants of an era when‘church’ (the ideal type in Troeltsch/Weber’s sense) was not far from the em-pirical reality in Quebec.The community hub might thus be considered a newsocial form that aims to reconfigure ‘church’ as a constellation of people andprojects in response to contemporary society’s negative valuation of religion’spublic role in Quebec. Hubs also address a pragmatic issue at the heart ofthe church building crisis in North America: these historic structures benefitfrom central locations and tax exemptions yet are enormously expensive fordwindling congregations to maintain, especially if they are heritage sites.Sociological models that assume North American religious success mimicseconomic supply and demand (‘strong’ churches are defined by the numberof individuals seeking membership) would dismiss these historic churchesas moribund relics. By contrast, Singh’s entrepreneurial model recruits themarket – mainly in terms of real estate rentals and private investment – tofund heritage churches and thus secure historic Christianity’s enduring, butevolving, public influence.Devoting more attention to social entrepreneurship, and more carefullydefining the ‘social’ in this context, offers a novel way for scholars of religionto explore the permeable border of religious and economic social forms. Iden-tifying Singh as an entrepreneur helps broaden the category beyond the cur-rent emphasis in studies ofChristianity onwhat scholars have called “CEOpas-tors” and “pastorpreneurs”. As noted, the St. Jax model harnesses market log-ics embedded in neoliberal capitalism, most obviously in terms of private in-vestment, but rejects the church growth and prosperity gospel movements towhich anthropologists and sociologists so often turn to study Christianity andthemarket. Singh’s entrepreneurial embrace of audacity and innovation colorshis outreach as a pastor, his work with partners in the heritage sector, and hisintegrationof cutting-edge trendswhereprivate investors seek“impact invest-148 Social Forms of Religioning” or “social purpose” goals. Singh’s ambition for TCF is to position it as “oneof Canada’smost significant social purpose real estate investment offerings.”20The St. Jax/TCF model foregrounds property as a key privilege and assetof historic Christian congregations. In this respect, it contributes to the so-ciological project of identifying how new social forms emerge in response tochanges in thinking about religion. In Quebec, such changes have been dras-tic since the 1960s, resulting in a massive reorganization of institutional re-ligious forms. The St. Jax/TCF model also contributes to the ongoing interestamong anthropologists of Christianity to understand how historic churches,notably Anglicanism and Catholicism, reposition themselves as publicly rele-vant within the countries where they are historically rooted by using materialspaces and objects in ways that are “ambient” (Engelke 2012; Kaell 2017) and“banal” (Oliphant 2021). Singh’s model adds a new twist to this ongoing con-versation as it makes private rentals and investment into a major basis for re-taining church buildings as public spaces. Another twist lies in how it counselscongregations to devolve control over their buildings to the larger communityin order to reinvigorate the power of Christianity as a partner for social goodwithin the putatively secular city.BibliographyAgarwal, Ruchi/Jones, William J. (2022): “Social Media’s Role in the Chang-ing Religious Landscape of Contemporary Bangkok.” In: Religions 13/5, pp.1–17.Agyeman, E. A./Carsamer, E. 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Parsons, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.Wuthnow, Robert (2007): After the Baby Boomers: How Twenty- and Thirty-Somethings are Shaping the Future of American Religion, Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press.Web ReferencesCentre St Jax. “Our Story.” AccessedMay 21, 2023. http://stjax.org/en/home.Centre St Jax. “Our Story.” Accessed October 4, 2023. http://stjax.org/our-story.Holy Trinity Brompton. “Our Story.” AccessedMay 28, 2023. https://htb.org/story.152 Social Forms of ReligionSusan Schwartz. “What if Montreal’s shuttered churches became ‘centres ofgravity for joy’?” Montreal Gazette. February 19, 2021. Accessed October16, 2023. https://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/what-if-montreals-shuttered-churches-became-centres-of-gravity-for-joy.Trinity Centres Foundation. “About Us.” Accessed March 20, 2023. https://trinitycentres.org/ecosystem.TrinityCentres Foundation.“EcosystemDevelopment.”AccessedMay21, 2023.https://trinitycentres.org/ecosystem.God Is Not at ChurchDigitalization as Authentic Religious Practicein an American MegachurchAriane KovacAbstract In this article, I analyze how increasing digitalization changed the organiza-tional structure of anEvangelicalmegachurch in theUSandhow the church theologizedand idealized this transformation. My case study Churchome switched from a multi-site megachurch model to what I call a ‘click-and-mortar church’. It reduced in-personevents and worked on making all aspects of church life available online, enabling peo-ple in other cities or countries to not only passively consume content but to become ac-tive and committed long-distance church members. I show that this transformation inthe church’s membership structure led to a diversification of how members relate to thechurchandaneventizationof church life.Churchomepresents its digitalizationasaboldand possibly inconvenient but necessary move to make mission work more efficient andchurch life more authentic. I argue that Churchome uses its digital approach to empha-size the ideal of communitization and to present itself as an authentic and exciting orga-nization.Through this, Churchome can counter internal and external criticism againstmegachurches per se and itsmove into the digital in particular.Churchome’s self-presen-tation thus is an example of how a church theologizes its social forms or, in other words,for a congruence of religious semantics and social forms.Keywords Americanreligion,authenticity,digital religion,Evangelicalism,megachurches,organizational studies154 Social Forms of Religion1. Introduction: Empty pews, full Zoom callsI had been researching Churchome, a global megachurch based in the PacificNorthwest of the US, digitally for more than a year before first attending anin-person service. More than excited, I made my way to the church on Sun-daymorning –only to find the large auditorium almost empty. Shaking off thethought that I might have chosen the wrong case study, I returned the follow-ing Sunday. This time, the church was packed and excitement was in the air.I quickly learned why: Head pastor Judah Smith was in the house. Whereasthe week before, visitors had followed a pre-recorded sermon by Smith on thelarge screens toweringover the stage,wewouldnowget towatchhimpreach inperson.The previous week’s solemn tranquility was replaced with a noticeablebuzz.This pattern – a full auditorium when Smith preached live, empty pewson all other Sundays – repeated itself throughout my stay in Seattle. As thevideo shown in the church is also streamed online, many of Churchome’s fol-lowers enjoy the flexibility and convenience of staying homewhen Smith is notpresent and only visit the church on special occasions. Churchome not onlytolerates this, but even encourages its members not to come to church and toattend digitally instead. In fact, in a sermon he preached at the time of the30th anniversary of the church, JudahSmith announced that hewould also stayhome at some point in the future:I don’t expect any of you to be here 30 years from now. I hope you’re fol-lowing Jesus wherever he takes you. Now, if you are still here, I won’t be,but that’s awesome, seriously, that’s great. I won’t. But, I mean, I’ll still bepracticing with Churchome. It’ll be hopefully through the technology andit’ll be wonderful.1Churchome did not focus on digital technology for its church growth from thebeginning. What was founded as “City Church” in 1992 first grew into a localmulti-site megachurch until it was relaunched as “Churchome” in 2017. Thismove was primarily justified as an efficient evangelization strategy. While alocal church building was always limited, with digital technologies the church1 Sermon by Judah Smith. “God Pursues You.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UixDJthl7dU, 29:40-30:06.Ariane Kovac: God Is Not at Church 155could potentially reachmillions.Theportmanteauof “church”and “home” sym-bolized how the church’s new approach was supposed to restructure followers’religious practice: Churchome intended to make every aspect of church lifeavailable online. As the church reduced in-person events, members were en-couraged to watch live-streamed or recorded services from home, preferablytogetherwith fellowbelievers in small groups.Thedifferencesbetweenserviceswith live preaching and video recordings are just one example of how digital-ization changed the organization of religious practice at Churchome and theself-presentation of the church as an organization.Fromanorganizational perspective,megachurches are an interesting case.Scholars have generally considered religion and organization to have a prob-lematic relationship. In this perspective, religious entities strive toward closeemotional bonds between members. The pragmatic decisions and economicentanglements that comewithahigher level of organization runcounter to thisideal of communitization. Megachurches, however, have not only been com-pared to businesses by outsiders but consciously present themselves as orga-nizations that follow economic alongside religious logics.They appoint CEOs,publicly speak about having applied marketing strategies to grow their audi-ence, and take membership numbers as the primary marker for success. Still,megachurches are religious entities and thus follow ideals that gobeyond thoseof business organizations. If their organizational structures contradict theirreligious ideals, they risk being perceived as inauthentic by their followers.In this article, I analyzehow thedigitalizationofmy case studyChurchomechanged themegachurch as an organization and how these changes have beenreligiously interpreted and idealized. I am interested in howdigitalization hasaltered the social forms with which Churchome as an organization providesits followers and how Churchome uses its “going online” for its self-presen-tation. I argue that digitalization reinforces existing organizational develop-ments of megachurches.While all megachurch services are events, digitaliza-tion at Churchome has led to an eventization of church life in which in-personservices are specifically advertised as “church experiences”.2Megachurches of-fer their followers both the option for passive, occasional aswell as active, com-mittedmembership.Through digitalization,member roles become evenmorediverse. At Churchome, digitalization has led to a new membership category:2 Churchome: Churchome Experiences. https://www.churchome.org/monthly-experiences (accessed November 8, 2023).156 Social Forms of ReligionLong-distancemembers are committedmembers who follow the church digi-tally. Lastly, while megachurch attendees are known to be “promiscuous wor-shippers” (Abraham 2018: 39), digitalization makes it even easier for believersto follow several churches at the same time. Long-distance members at Chur-chome tend to approach their faith practice with a “mix-and-match” attitudeand use different churches and other institutions for different services.Churchome understands streaming from home as a means to integratefaith into everyday life and to build up an authentic religious practice that doesnot depend on spectacular in-person events. Churchome’s digitalization thusnot only altered the church’s social forms and the relation of members to theorganization but also the church’s self-presentation. I argue that Churchomeuses its digital approach to emphasize the ideal of communitization and topresent itself as an authentic and exciting organization. Churchome’s self-presentation thus is an example of how a church theologizes its social formsor, in other words, for a congruence of religious semantics and social forms.First, Churchome presents itself as boldly going to new places for evangelizingby developing a digital missional identity, which allows it to counter com-mon stereotypes and critiques against megachurches and to distance itselffrom other churches. Second, as it relocates religious practice from a churchbuilding into members’ homes, Churchome presents its approach to faith asparticularly authentic. In this perspective, by embedding faith into everydaylife, Churchome’s followers do not depend on an impressive building or anemotional worship performance for their religious experience.The following analysis draws on material collected for research on my dis-sertation which focuses on Evangelical boundary maintenance and identitywork. I worked with an ethnographic approach and designed my study ac-cording to Grounded Theory Methodology (Corbin/Strauss 2015). In the firstresearch phase in 2021, I participated in a digital small group set in Europe,conducted interviews with international Churchome members, and listenedto live-streamed Churchome services. This was not a conscious decision, asCOVID-19-related travel and contact restrictions made it impossible for me toenter the field in person (Kovac 2021). My second phase, in 2022, when travelrestrictions had been lifted, consisted of an in-person field research stay inSeattle and Los Angeles, where I participated in in-person small groups, ser-vices,andother church events,and conducted interviewswithpastors atChur-chome. Later in 2022, I concluded my data collection with several digital in-terviews with Churchome members in the US and analyzed relevant sermonsby Judah Smith from between August 2021 and November 2022. Going backAriane Kovac: God Is Not at Church 157and forth between digital and in-person ethnography allowedme to followmyinterlocutors, whose religious practice takes place in both online and offlinespheres (Laughlin 2022: 2). One important limitation of my research, particu-larly for this article, is that I started researching Churchome after the church’srebranding and digitalization.Thus, I did not personally witness the church’sdevelopment and transition from City Church to Churchome. For this article,I instead rely on interviews and conversations with long-timemembers.In the following, I first explore the particular case of social forms and eco-nomic logics at play atmegachurches (2). After turning tomy case study Chur-chome and shortly recounting how the local City Church has become the digi-tal and global Churchome (3), I analyze how digitalization has changed Chur-chome’s social forms, in particular events, groups, and the relation of mem-bers to the organization (4). My last subchapter aims at how Churchome usesits digital strategy for its self-presentation (5).2. The laughter of megachurch pastors: Megachurches’ religiousand economic logicsScholars on megachurches usually define megachurches according to the cri-teria of the Hartford Institute for Religion Research, that is, a megachurch isa Protestant church that has 2000 or more weekly attendants, possibly acrossmultiple campuses.3 Although individual large churches had of course existedearlier, megachurches emerged as a distinctive form of organizing Christianfaith practice in the US in the 1970s and 1980s, following suburbanization andthe surge in privately owned vehicles. Megachurches have been compared toshoppingmalls (Ritzer 2005: 23), but in contrast to their secular counterparts,they apparently do not see any sign of decline. Wellman et al. (2020: 5) haveargued thatmegachurches have now become “theway Americans ‘do’ religion”.The success story of megachurches cannot be understood separately fromsocietal and religious developments in the past fifty years. Megachurches,which are usually nondenominational or only have loose ties to a denomina-tion, both profited from and advanced the declining importance of denomina-tions (Wuthnow 1989) and the emergence of a generic Evangelical subculture(Du Mez 2020). Megachurches spread at the time when an Evangelical mediamarket was established, and many megachurches and their pastors became3 http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/definition.html.158 Social Forms of Religionsuccessful media producers. Starting with the televangelists of the 1970s and1980s,megachurches were often headed by famousmedia personalities.Manychurches succeeded in marketing their media products, such as music orbooks, not only to their members but to a more general Christian or evennon-Christian audience. This way, megachurches’ ideas and theologies trav-eled far beyond their pews. The idea that congregation size is an indicatorfor a church’s success and vitality, for example, can also be found in smallerchurches (Maddox 2012).Moreover, the trend towards a concentration of faith practice and the ex-tension of auditoriumsizes not only influenced theology but also created a dis-tinctive aesthetic and organizational style:Megachurches can usually be foundin car-friendly locations in the suburbs of big cities. Often, they congregate innondescript buildings that have little to no markers of their being a church.Services are multi-media events centered around a charismatic head pastorand contemporary Christian worship music performed by a band of profes-sional musicians.Most megachurches hold several services per week and haveawide array of differentministries and groups that providememberswith ser-vices and activities.Worshipministries, for example, producemedia productsto be circulated and sold beyond the church’s membership.Megachurches usually have a highly differentiated and hierarchical orga-nizational structure and rely on a host of staff that is not only trained in the-ology but also in areas such as finances, media production, or marketing. Of-ten, these structures resemble those of businesses in name or function, suchaswhenmegachurches appoint a CEO to oversee the church’s operational side.Arguably, the larger amegachurch gets and themore economic transactions itis involved in, the more it needs to function like a business. Examples wouldbe those megachurches that are at the same time global media empires whosealbums reach the tops of Billboard charts, such as the Australian Hillsong orBethel and Elevation Church in the US. However, functioning like a businessis not only a necessity that comes with higher membership numbers.Maddox(2012) and Sanders (2016), among others, have argued that an economic logic isinherent tomegachurches,whose primary goal,however theologically framed,is to grow their audiences.Scholars of organizations usually argue that religious entities do not vol-untarily engage in economic endeavors and that, when they have to, this leadsto tensions (Petzke/Tyrell 2012). In this perspective, churches do not under-stand themselves as businesses and are oriented toward otherworldly goalsthat run counter to the logics of the economic field. According to BourdieuAriane Kovac: God Is Not at Church 159(1998: 113), actors in the religious field have a “double consciousness”. Like allagents, they cannot avoid following an economic logic.However, to the outsideworld, they must pretend that economic rationales play no part in their deci-sion-making,or, inBourdieu’swords,play the“religiousgame”. Ifnot, they riskbeing perceived as unauthentic by their followers. In otherwords, churches arebusinesses that deny and conceal that they are businesses.When the Catholicbishops that Bourdieu observed spoke about economic matters of the churchor used economic terminology, laughter served to alleviate the tensions sur-rounding the gap between what the church actually did and what the churchwas supposed to do.Megachurches, however, do not only often openly associate themselveswith businesses and a corporate culture but also bring together economic andreligious rationales.Thus,on theonehand,one couldargue thatmegachurchessolve the tensions of organized religiosity by completely blending into theeconomic sphere. Some scholars of religion, like Berger (1990 [1967]), havepredicted that the increasing organization of religion contributes to the secu-larization of society. On the other hand, megachurches can be understood asan example of how a high degree of organization and vital religiosity do notneed to be mutually exclusive (Schlamelcher 2018: 499). Chang (2003: 127) hasrejected a clear-cut dichotomy between organizational and religious spheresas an outdated assumption that goes back to Weber’s church-sect typology.According to her, in perceiving organization, including economic rationales,and religion as antithetical, scholars make implicit assumptions about what itmeans to be religious and project these onto the churches they study. Instead,the relationship between religious and economic logics must be understoodto be complex and intertwined. For example, when a religious organizationwants to change the secular world, including its economy, its involvementin the economic field cannot be understood as entirely secular (ibid.: 129).Similarly, whenmegachurches interpret a high number of followers as a God-given sign of being on the right theological path, a decision to hire amarketingexpert is not exclusively grounded in economic logics.Megachurches’economic involvement,however, is subject to criticismbothinside and outside Evangelicalism.While some critics perceive megachurchesas soullessly commodified and suspect pastors to exploit their audience fortheir fame and fortune (Wellman et al. 2020: 216), others do not have prob-lems with megachurches per se but closely monitor how their church spendsits money or makes decisions. In my own research on Churchome, I got theimpression that most people had no problems with the church orienting it-160 Social Forms of Religionself toward fame and fortune but voiced criticism in those instanceswhen theyfelt like thisnegatively influencedcongregational life.For example,Churchomehas many celebrity members (among them, most notably, pop singer JustinBieber) and some ofmy interviewees argued that sometimes the pastors caredfor them at the expense of “normal” congregants.Thus, instead of understanding megachurches as simply reacting to con-tradictory sets of logics, scholars should be aware of the entanglements ofreligious and economic logics inherent in megachurches and their theologyand faith practice. Rather than asking whether megachurches lean more onthe economic or the religious side, it is therefore more promising to closelyexamine the intersections of the two, or in other words, which economicrationales are consciously presented and which are concealed, what mem-bers accept without question and what leads to internal criticism, or howmegachurches react to such criticism.3. From multi-site to click-and-mortar:Churchome as a case studyChurchome did not start with an emphasis on digital media or even an overtintention of global outreach.The name the church was founded under in 1992,“City Church”, reflected its rootedness in the Seattle metropolitan area. CityChurch’s founderWendell Smith grew thenondenominational church into oneof the largest churches in the regionwith several campuses in andaroundSeat-tle. In 2009,Wendell’s son Judah Smith took over the church as head pastor to-gether with his wife Chelsea because of the declining health of Wendell, whosuffered from cancer and died one year later. This second generation of pas-tors stylistically adapted the church for a younger audience. Judah andChelseaSmith started doing outreach in Hollywood, opening a church location in LosAngeles and befriending celebrities such as Justin Bieber. Regarding what waspreached, Judah Smith accentuated grace theology, a theological view that be-lieves salvation to solely depend on faith, not on actions or repentance. Theseinnovations turned out to be fruitful, as the church continued to grow and Ju-dah Smith became anEvangelical celebritywith a large socialmedia following.In 2017, however, the church changed its strategy and City Church was re-branded as “Churchome”, a portmanteau of “church” and “home”. Instead ofplanting further church buildings,Churchome intended to bring the church topeoples’ homes by digitally streaming services.Members were called to gatherAriane Kovac: God Is Not at Church 161in small-group settings (called “church at home”) and to watch live-streamedor recorded sermons together.The church started several digital small groupsinwhich people gathered via Zoom.Additionally, Churchome launched an appintended to replicate other aspects of church life in the digital sphere.Througha “pastor chat”, anyone interested in the church can seek pastoral care or findanswers to their questions. A prayer function in the app enables believers topublicly request prayers fromfellowcongregants and to react to these requests.Daily “guided prayer” exercises and recorded worship performances help peo-ple new to the church to align with Churchome’s theology and practice theirfaith online. Congregants can also give and tithe online, without ever beingphysically present in church. While online campuses and live-streamed ser-vices have become staple in most Christian churches since the COVID-19 pan-demic, at the time, Churchome’s approach was unusual if not pioneering, andprepared the church well for what happened later. In 2020, when contact re-strictions were issued and large gatherings prohibited, Churchome had notonly already successfully set up digital options for participation but these hadbecome a normal andmuch-used part of church practice.Churchome’s digitalization led to an increasing internationalization of thechurch. Judah Smith claims that services reach people in over 80 countries.4There are digital small groups hosted by people from all continents. Chur-chome, however, did not adapt much to integrate its international following.Sermons are, for example, exclusively in English, and YouTube videos do notcome with subtitles other than automatically generated English ones. Manyof Judah Smith’s examples and anecdotes only make sense in a US context andrequire an understanding of the country, its politics, and its culture. In myinterviews, it became clear that Churchome relies on the small groups andespecially the group hosts to adapt the church’s content to their respectivelocal culture. As a result, internationally, the church mainly attracts peoplewho are mobile, globally oriented, and highly educated.At the same time, Churchome sold or demolished the buildings they hadowned, keeping only the Kirkland church campus, and reduced the number ofin-person services.When large eventswere prohibited fromhappeningduringthe height of the COVID-19 pandemic, Churchome already had all technolog-ical necessities in place and ceased in-person services. When in-person ser-vices started again, as congregants toldme, the pews were not as full as beforethe pandemic. Many Churchomians who had previously attended services in4 Field notes, May 8, 2022.162 Social Forms of Religionperson enjoyed this enforced participation in digital church and did not wantto go back to “regular” church. In May 2023, Churchome offered one in-per-son service weekly at their Kirkland campus and one service per month in arented location in Los Angeles. At the Kirkland campus, one service a monthfeatured JudahSmithpreaching live on stage.Theother three Sundays, visitorswatchedapre-recorded sermonon theauditorium’shuge screensor listened toan in-person sermon by a local pastor, followed by a live worship performance.The services featuring a live in-person sermon by Smith are called “church ex-periences” and are specifically advertised. In addition to their regular servicesin Kirkland and Los Angeles, Churchome at times organizes services in otherU.S. cities.With its rebranding of the City Church to Churchome, Churchome hasswitched from a multi-site megachurch to a church model I designate, inparallel to the business administration term, click-and-mortar church. A click-and-mortar church provides its members with both digital and in-personopportunities for participation. It does not understand its digital campus assolely an optional add-on or a lesser alternative to in-person church atten-dance but instead sees both modes of participation at least equally justifiedand works on making all aspects of in-person church and faith life availablein the digital realm. As seen in the sermon excerpt at the beginning of thisarticle, Churchome plans to rely even more on technology in the future. It willbe interesting to seewhether the churchwill at some point give up its Kirklandcampus and focus on irregular events throughout the country, or even becomea fully digital church.4. Digital and hybrid social forms at ChurchomeIn going from amulti-site to a click-and-mortar church, Churchome not onlyreplicated offline social forms for an online audience but also saw changes inits existing, in-person social forms. In the following, I analyze these develop-ments regarding events, groups, andmembership in the organization.4.1 EventsIn May 2023, Churchome still held weekly services at its main campus in aSeattle suburb. Head pastor Judah Smith, however, was only present once perAriane Kovac: God Is Not at Church 163month. These services were specifically advertised as “church experiences”.5During other Sunday services at the Kirkland campus, Churchome would ei-ther show a pre-recorded sermon by Smith or have a local pastor preach thesermon. In both cases, sermons took up the largest part of the service, usuallylasting between forty minutes and over one hour. Announcements and pleasfor giving and tithing took place either before or after the sermon. At the endof the service, a live worship band played several songs. While church expe-riences were livestreamed directly and fully from the Kirkland auditorium, onother Sundays thosewho joined digitally saw the same recording as the churchvisitors, usually followed by music videos of worship songs.This similarity of the online and offline experience on regular Sundaysexplains why “church experiences” draw many more visitors than regularservices. While it did not make much difference for my interviewees whetherthey watched a video recording in church or at home, the experience of par-ticipating in a “church experience” could not be replicated in the same wayby attending online. “Church experiences” not only feel different than regularSunday services, but Churchome alsomarkets them as such.Digitalization forChurchome goes hand in hand with and provides a basis for an eventizationof church life. In-person services are not simply services but “experiences”,made special precisely because of their infrequency. In promoting theseevents, Churchome draws both on pastor Smith’s popularity and the live andin-person aspect of the services. Attendees of a “church experience” can besure to see pastor Judah Smith live on stage and come specifically to see him.At least in my own experience as a participant observer, Smith’s live preach-ing is not only longer but also more enthusiastic, emotional, and agitated.During church experiences, Churchome also puts more of an emphasis onthe parts of a church service that are hard to replicate online, like the worshipperformances. Instead of having an anonymous worship band, for example,the church invites musicians and uses their names for the promotion of itsevents.Whether or not attendees have heard of them before, the mention of aspecial act makes the event seem evenmore extraordinary.Hitzler (2011: 39) has argued that in parallel to a tendency to eventizationin general society, believers increasingly concentrate their faith practice onspecial events. By “eventizing” regular church services and marketing them assomething special, Churchome enables its followers to experience such eventswhile engaging in the conventional practice of church attendance. Moreover,5 Cf. https://www.churchome.org/monthly-experiences.164 Social Forms of Religionattending services monthly and not weekly appeals to the busy demographicof young professionals and young families that Churchome mainly attracts,and provides an incentive for people who live in the wider surroundings ofKirkland and would not travel to Churchome every Sunday.By livestreaming its services, Churchome enables all its members, spreadout all over the globe, to have a shared experience. Klaver (2021: 95) has arguedthat the livestreaming of services can contribute to a shared sense of belong-ing of a globally spread outmegachurch. Similarly, Campbell andDeLashmutt(2014: 276) and Hutchings (2017) have observed that churches explicitly refer-ence online visitors to make them feel included. At Churchome, this sense ofbelonging is encouraged by frequent references to the global membership ofthe church.When pastors Judah and Chelsea Smith address their audience di-rectly, they often add thephrase “wherever you are”and sometimes list possiblecities from where people might be watching. Also, they use many occasions tomention that people all over the world are listening to Churchome’s sermonsdigitally and present Churchome as a “church scattered all over the world”.64.2 GroupsSmall groups or house groups have been a fundamental feature of Evangel-ical church practice at least since seventeenth-century Pietism. Especially inmegachurches, they are a means to counter large, possibly anonymous ser-vices and to differentiate between occasional visitors and committed mem-bers. Usually, these groups meet either in one of the members’ homes or ina designated church space. While some groups discuss Bible passages, oth-ers speak about how to apply the content of the previous week’s sermon totheir current struggles in life, read Christian self-help books together, or prayfor and with each other (Bielo 2009). At Churchome, small groups are askedto watch the service together. Churchome staff provide group hosts with dis-cussion questions related to the sermon. However, as Churchome employeePhilipp7 explained in an interview with me, whether they use these questionsand “what they do before or after […] is really up to them”, as is themeeting lo-cation and the lengthof themeeting.With this flexibility, small grouphosts are6 Sermon by Chelsea Smith. “Let Jesus Serve You.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ewoVnnVMh08, 02:04.7 All names of interviewees in this article are pseudonyms.Ariane Kovac: God Is Not at Church 165expected to create a group that “serves their community the best”, or in otherwords, that appeals to as many people as possible.8Both in sermons and interviewswithme,Churchome’s pastors continuallyemphasized the importance of watching the digital recordings of sermons notalonebutwith a groupof fellowbelievers.Conversely, small groupswerehardlyever mentioned concerning in-person services. Churchome staff believes dig-ital participation to lead to a lack of togetherness and community that can becountered by watching together instead of alone. “Finding community” is anomnipresent goal at Churchome, often aimed toward people Churchome sus-pects must be watching the sermons alone. If someone watches from a placein the world where there is no small group, they are encouraged to start theirowngroup.Since 2022,Churchomehas also been producing a video series fea-turing mostly small group hosts outside of Seattle who speak about how theypracticed “community” with Churchome from afar.9 The emphasis on smallgroups especially for online participants might stem not only from the desireto combat the isolation of digital participation but also from an intention todraw occasional visitors into the church. Those who watch online are “free-riders” (Thumma/Travis 2007: 50) even more than those who occasionally visita service. By integrating digital members into small groups, Churchome notonly expands its number of loyal (and loyally giving) members but also gets in-sights into and control over the anonymous number of YouTube and app view-ers. Thus, groups help counter the anonymity of the megachurch crowd bothfor individual members, who can get to know fellow worshippers, and for thechurch as an institution, for whom digital attendees are hard to grasp.4.3 Organization and membershipDigitalization at Churchome has diversified the possible ways of relatingto and engaging with the church. All megachurches offer a variety of possi-ble modes of interacting with the church, some of them more distant andothers more active (Thumma/Travis 2007: 50). In megachurches, “low-cost”attendance (Wellman et al. 2020: 20) is tolerated more easily than in smaller,more tight-knit congregations, asmegachurch services tend to be anonymousevents that attract a lot of infrequent visitors and many megachurches en-courage people to consume their media products without ever attending a8 Interview with Philipp, Churchome pastor, January 14, 2022.9 Cf. https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLicUMmdCSpPjuC4NFk-JRzSlOxks5Z-eJ.166 Social Forms of Religionservice. Membership is usually not formalized but based on participation inchurch activities, giving and tithing to the church, and a feeling of belonging.In a local, non-digital megachurch, being an active church member usuallydepends on physical presence. Active members attend services regularly, arepart of a small group, and might even take on volunteering roles. In a click-and-mortar church, defining active membership becomes complicated: Cansomeone be considered an active member who regularly watches services onYouTube but has never gotten in contact with anyone at the church? Is in-per-son participation a sign of greater commitment than following the churchdigitally?Churchome has, through digitalization, attracted a category of followers Icall long-distance members. Long-distance members live too far from a churchcampus to regularly attend in-person services but extensively use the church’sdigital offers and consider themselves active and committed churchmembers.While some of them visit infrequently, others have never been to a physical lo-cation of the church, be it for financial, visa-related, or other reasons. Some ofthemmight have been local members before but moved away. Others stumbleupon a sermon or book by coincidence and decide to follow fromafar. At Chur-chome, the long-distance members I interviewed either took note of Chur-chome when they heard pastor Judah Smith speak at an event10 or when, af-ter watching other faith-related videos, YouTube’s algorithm recommendedone of Smith’s sermons. All of them followed Churchome for a while, watchingservices online and using the church’s app, before reaching out to the church,usually via the pastor chat function in Churchome’s app.The pastors referredthem to digital small groups or groups that met in their region or encouragedthem to start their own group. One example of such a trajectory is Diane, wholives on the US East Coast and had been following Churchome digitally forabout ten years before “getting involved”.11Whatnudgedher to reachout to thechurch was that someone at Churchome explicitly mentioned that they werelooking for people to host small groups outside the West Coast area.While allof the long-distance Churchomians I interviewed were enthusiastic about the10 Some large megachurches regularly organize events called conferences to which theyinvite several pastors to give a “guest sermon”. Judah Smith gained much of his famefrom preaching at conferences organized by the Australian global megachurch Hill-song.11 Interview with Diane, long-distance member, pastor, and small group host, December22, 2022.Ariane Kovac: God Is Not at Church 167church, some also reflected on having a limited perspective from afar. Sophia,a long-distance member from Europe, noted that, as an online participant,she did not get insights into church life beyond the digital small group she at-tended.12Thus, she could not know for sure whether the lived-out church cul-ture reflected Smith’s preaching.For some of my interviewees, attending a church digitally was a matter ofpersonal preference. Two of my interviewees, for example, told me that theyfelt socially anxious and experienced video calls as a relief. Others felt calledto Churchome and their missionary vision of reaching people through tech-nology. Some ofmy interviewees traveled ormoved a lot and found it practicalto be able to access the church fromwherever they had an internet connection.Long-distancememberCarmen, for example, hadworked as a flight attendantand considered Churchome to be “right in her wheelhouse”, as she identifiedas a “global traveler”.13Most of the long-distance members I spoke with, however, simply didnot find a church they liked as much as Churchome where they lived. Par-ticularly those living in countries where Evangelical Christianity is a fringephenomenon explained that they found local churches to be too conservative,services neither lively nor dynamic, and the overall atmosphere not as “unique”or “special” as at Churchome.14 This resonates with the fact that most of myinterviewees emphasized purposely choosing a church that fit their convic-tions and lifestyle. The internet made it easier for them to design their faithpractice, as they can choose from a broad array of church offers and religiouscontent from around the world. In other words, digitalization enormouslyexpanded their “spiritual marketplace” (Roof 1999). Sophia explained that sheclosely followed three US churches online because each of them focused on adifferent aspect that was important to her character and faith. In her view,“people are complex, and we all need quite a few things to kinda feed us […][spiritually]”.1512 Interview with Sophia, long-distance member from Europe, October 15, 2021.13 Interview with Carmen, long-distance member and small group host, December 15,2022.14 Interestingly, some of my non-American interviewees connected their fondness forChurchome with the physical location of the church. Sophia, who lived in a predom-inantly Catholic area, laughingly mentioned that she might move to Seattle one daybecause it “seems like it might be my town” (interview with Sophia, October 15, 2021).15 Interview with Sophia, October 15, 2021.168 Social Forms of ReligionLong-distance members are often “promiscuous worshippers” (Abraham2018: 39): Usually, they listen to sermons by several pastors online, and manyof them are members of and attend in-person services at a local church. Digi-talization has simplified and expanded the possibilities of such “split loyalties”(Coleman 2003: 19).While “church hopping” (Wuthnow 2007: 116), or spendingone’s Sundays in various churches, is a common practice encouraged by large,anonymous megachurch services, digitalization makes it possible to quite lit-erally be in several places and engage in several activities at once. Followers donot even need to commit to a single church on any given Sunday but can easilyclose the browser window if they do not like the digital service they are watch-ing and try out something different.Thus, long-distance Churchomians approached both their membershipat Churchome and their religious affiliation more broadly with a “mix-and-match” mentality that led them to consciously design their religious practicedrawing on several sources. This resonates with Campbell’s (2012) concept of“networked religion”, which intends to grasp how believers assemble theirreligious practice from both online and offline aspects. Churchome’s long-distance followers flexiblymake use ofwhat the church offers and listen to ser-mons on other days of theweek if they do not find time on any given Sunday orlisten to sermonswhile doing household chores, as one ofmy interviewees toldme. “Mixing and matching” one’s faith practice is, however, not only done outof preference or curiosity but also because there are things that Churchomejust does not provide its followers with. Especially for long-distancemembers,but also for those who come to in-person services, Churchome is not a “full-service church” (Roof 1999: 94). Carmen, for example, missed live worship andattended a local church to experience it.16 One ofmy interviewees got baptizedin a local church, although he was more actively involved in Churchome thanthe local church he chose for his baptism. Apparently, some of Churchome’sattempts to relocate religious rituals into the digital sphere, such as recordingsof worship performances or Zoom baptisms, do not satisfy all long-distancemembers. There are also some important Christian rituals that Churchomedoes not offer to its members, neither digitally nor in person, such as wed-dings. Not being able to meet pastors in person, however, was not an issue toany of my interviewees, many of whom were experienced followers of global16 Interview with Carmen, December 15, 2022.Ariane Kovac: God Is Not at Church 169megachurches with celebrity pastors. To Sophia, for example, it was clear thatshe “will never have a conversation with [the] pastors that I’m listening to”.175. More digitalization, less organization:Churchome’s digital self-presentationIn the following, I will turn to how Churchome religiously interprets and ide-alizes its digital practices and show how Churchome presents its digital ap-proach as not only efficient and bold but also more authentic than religiouspractice at other megachurches.5.1 Digital missional identityThe emergence and popularization of megachurches cannot be explainedwithout their suburban locations and embeddedness in suburban lifestyles.Bielo (2011: 168) notes that the “organizational invention” of the megachurchwas a result of a link between conservative Evangelicalism and suburbiathat solidified in the second half of the 20th century. Due to their size andcar-friendly location, megachurches, like the shopping centers they wereoften compared to, could draw masses of people who were already used todriving long distances for their daily chores (Loveland/Wheeler 2003: 117).Correspondingly, megachurches designed their buildings to fit the habits andpreferences of middle-class suburbanites (Laughlin 2022: 26–27).This ‘suburbian-ness’ of megachurches, however, evoked a range of criti-cism from inside and outside the Evangelical subculture.Due to their isolationfrom their surroundings and lack of any religious or denominationalmarkers,megachurches have been described as interchangeable “religious non-places”(Sanders 2016). The high level of maintenance (and thus the large amount ofmoney, usually through tithes and donations) needed to uphold megachurchinfrastructure has been criticized as inefficient and excessive. Evangelicalcritics, in particular, accuse megachurches of being inefficient evangelizers,more interested in filling their buildings than in bringing people closer to faithor in building up sustainable relationships with attendees. For representativesof the inner-Christian reform movement Emerging Church, for example,megachurches were a symbol of the conservative Evangelical conviction that17 Interview with Sophia, October 15, 2021.170 Social Forms of Religionit was enough to plant a building and wait for people to come through thedoor (Bielo 2011: 118). To counter this, Bielo’s Emerging Church intervieweesinitiated church activities in the urban, low-income areas they had chosen tobe their mission fields and sometimes even fully relocated there. What theydescribed as “being missional” was not only an ideal but also an identity actedout in everyday life (ibid.: 119).At Churchome, such criticisms against megachurches are taken up andcountered with reference to digital technology. Presenting its technology-fo-cused approach as a way to overcome the isolation of a suburban megachurchcampus, Churchome has developed a digital missional identity that works asan add-on to the conventional megachurchmodel of the church.In a sermon Judah Smith preached around the time of Churchome’s thirti-eth anniversary, titled “God Pursues You”, he laid out several arguments as tohowdigital technologywas not onlymore efficient but alsomeant being able tobring faith to people instead of waiting for them to come. In themonths prior,Smith had already begun advertising new “technologies” the church was plan-ning to develop and asking for donations, arguing that a little money put intocreating an app or launching a website could go a long way. In “God PursuesYou”, Smith condensed this to the formula that “we’re gonna spend thousandsto reach millions” by technology “instead of spending millions to reach thou-sands”, as would be the case with planting a new church campus.18 Spendingmoney on digital technologies meant that “we’re going to spend more moneyon people than buildings, […] we’re going to spendmoremoney on people thanevents”.19 Thus, Smith directly counters criticism against the inefficiency ofmegachurches. Churchome might own a physical campus, but it did not planto build another one. Instead, themoney thatmembers donatedwould be usedtoward “reaching millions” via technology.By regularly emphasizing that church, to Churchome, is not a building, Ju-dah Smith can refute accusations that he as a megachurch pastor is primarilyinterested in filling his pews.Moreover, in his sermons, Smith oftenmentionsthat not everyone needs to find their home at Churchome. He wants to bringpeople to Jesus, and if another church helps them strengthen their faith morethan Churchome, so be it. In “God Pursues You”, Smith explicitly states that18 Sermon by Judah Smith. “God Pursues You.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UixDJthl7dU, 1:02:13-1:02:18.19 Ibid.: 1:02:18-1:02:32.Ariane Kovac: God Is Not at Church 171“this isn’t about your allegiance to Chuchome”.20 Carmen, a long-time Chur-chomian who has experienced both living in Seattle and attending what wasthen calledCity Church and being a long-distancemember of Churchome,waspassionate about Churchome not tyingmembers to the church. She explainedtome thatwhen JudahSmith tookover as headpastor, the churchdroppeda lotof conservative ideas.One of the changes was letting go of the idea that “you’recommitted to this house and you need to stay in this house, this is where you’refed, and this is where you’re tied”.21Smith not only allows or even encourages attendees to get input fromvarious churches or to find their luck somewhere else if they do not like Chur-chome’s approach, but also calls on church members to stay home and notphysically come to church. In his “God Pursues You” sermon, Smith arguesthat God is not at church, either:Everyone thought that God would come and have church friends, but allof his friends didn’t go to the synagogue, so that really annoyed people,because they’re like, no, God should be in a robe in church putting littleWafers on everyone’s tongue for communion, right, it’s our picture of God.But instead, he’s up late [at] night with knuckleheads [and] drug dealers.22According to Smith, God cares about people, and for that reason, he joins peo-ple whowould not set foot into or have been excluded from a church.With thisquote, Smith makes an analogy to Churchome’s approach: With technology,Churchome can also reach people 24/7 and be everywhere at once, similar toGod. By not focusing on gathering everyone in a specific building, Churchomecan meet people in need instead of waiting for them to come to church. Di-ane, a long-distance member on the US East Coast who had recently come onthe staff of Churchome at the time of our interview, was enthusiastic aboutthis possibility. Her job position included attending conversations on “pastorchat”, a function in the Churchome app and website that connects people toChurchome pastors for spiritual care or more general questions. According toDiane, the availability of pastor chat enabled people to reach out in momentsof crisis:20 Ibid.: 29:34-29:40.21 Interview with Carmen, December 15, 2022.22 Sermon by Judah Smith. “God Pursues You.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UixDJthl7dU, 49:14-9:46.172 Social Forms of Religion[Before], there was nothing like that. There was nothing like that at all. Ex-cept, maybe you could call your pastor, but how many times are you gonnacall your pastor at night? And when you’re broken, […] you [need] someoneto be there […].23Smith’s idea of Churchome, like God, being awake at night helping “knuck-leheads and drug dealers”, however, is not only directed at external criticismagainst a perceived ignorance of megachurches. By comparing the effects ofChurchome’s mission to God’s omnipresence, Smith showed his congregationthe utmost importance of focusing on digital technologies. In his sermons,Smith regularly mentions that some congregants are not happy about thechurch’s transition fromCity Church to Churchome and especially the cutbackon in-person preaching, and counters such criticismby pointing to the signifi-cance and uniqueness of Churchome’s approach. Smith presents Churchome’sdecision to focus on digital technologies as a bold and risky move that peopleonly criticize because they are too comfortable to try out new ways. Just likeGod’s work is excitingly unpredictable, according to Smith, Christians need tobe open to trying out new things. In “God Pursues You”, Smith declared thatGod had called Churchome and its members to follow him, even if this meantgiving up things they had come to know and love, such as in-person services.In a particularly energized and emotional part of the sermon,Smith presentedthis need to let go of the familiar as a “prophecy” from God:Some of you need to hear that tonight, I’m talking to you, and this justwent from sermon to, like, prophecy. Your word is “go” and you know it.You gotta go, you got to do what God told you to do, you got to step out.[…] The goal is not that we all stay together, the goal is that we go with himwherever he takes us. […] This church was not set up to stay, this church wasset up to go. 30 years ago, we started with a goal. We’re not ending withthe word safe or stay or convenient or comfortable or predictable, we’re go-ing to keep going. […] People are worked up that Churchome doesn’t havea service every week where they can hear a live preacher. The word is go.The church is not an event where we come [to] hear a preacher, it’s a ro-mance and a journey and you follow Jesus wherever he takes you to. Go!It’s unpredictable, it’s wild, it’s fierce, it’s beautiful, it is painful, it’s won-23 Interview with Diane, December 22, 2022.Ariane Kovac: God Is Not at Church 173derful, it’s called your journey with Jesus. It’s not meant to be the same,it’s gonna be new challenges and new days and new seasons.24The Churchome members I spoke with mostly embraced Churchome’s focuson digital technologies.When theymentioned that theymissed in-person ser-vices or meetings, they often framed this as a sacrifice they were willing tomake to support Churchome’s vision. Diane, who had only been to in-personChurchome events twice, called technology a “miracle” thatGodwas able to usefor good, and compared it to the long history of media use for Christian evan-gelizing:I mean, being in person, you know, being able to hug people, […] that’sgreat, but even if we look at, like, you know, the original disciples, right?A lot of what they had to do was write letters, like, they would go out asmuch as they could, but it was hard to travel back then. […] And they didn’thave the internet, you know. […] We just happen to have the ability nowto reach people all over the world […].25Being a worshipmusician, Diane, however, not only missed “being able to hugpeople” but especially the live music during in-person services. After listeningto her passionate recount about reaching people through technology, I askedher whether she didn’t miss live worship. In her response, Diane subordinatedher preferences to the larger vision of Churchome:I am. […] I’m missing it. But I don’t think there’s anything wrong with miss-ing something. I’m, you know, I’m a worship leader, I would love to be lead-ing worship. It isn’t about me, though.26Churchome’s digitalization thus allows members to be part of something big-ger than themselves. By using digital media, they can reach people all over theworld and be part of a new and exciting endeavor that is still ongoing and con-stantly changing. Like this, Churchomians can counter the egoism and subur-bian-ness that megachurch-goers are often associated with.24 Sermon by Judah Smith. “God Pursues You.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UixDJthl7dU, 38:18-40:04.25 Interview with Diane, December 22, 2022.26 Ibid.174 Social Forms of Religion5.2 Streaming as the path to authenticityChurchome not only presents its technology-focused approach as an efficientevangelizing strategy and as proof of it caring about people instead of profitbut also as a means for people to practice their faith more authentically. Au-thenticity is a classic Protestant value.Lindholm (2008: 4) argues that themod-ern aspiration to authenticity was significantly shaped by Protestantism’s em-phasis on introspection and modesty. For Protestants, salvation could not beattained by performing rituals or following religious rules but through faithalone. Believers thus needed to constantly make sure that their faith was gen-uine (Scheer 2012: 180).Striving for authenticity fueled a Protestant reluctance to rely on mediaor other tools when evoking religious experiences or emotions (Scheer 2014).Believers who attend megachurches, which have been carefully designed tocreate an atmosphere enabling intimate religious experiences (Rakow 2020),seem to have overcome such skepticism. As my interviews show, however,megachurch services are an ambiguous activity for many attendees.My inter-vieweeswere aware of how the architecture ofmegachurches and the presenceof large crowds of other worshippers influenced their emotions. Even thoughthey were not critical of megachurches and their strategic usage of media andarchitecture per se and found live worship to be an important part of theirreligious practice, many of them emphasized that their faith should not anddid not depend on “putting on a show every weekend”.27 According to pastorKevin, while a building might draw people in for the show, church at homegroups attracted people interested in the same goal as the church, namelybuilding a sustainable and authentic community:[…] I’m hosting church in a donut and coffee shop […] and people aren’tturning up because we have this amazing building with lights and all thethings, they’re turning up there because they actually wanna meet genuinepeople […].28Fittingly, to the Churchomians I spoke with faith practice is more authen-tic when it takes place in locations not usually associated with Christianity.This is true for digital spaces but even more so for in-person meetings in27 Interview with Natalia, long-distance member, December 16, 2022.28 Interview with Kevin, local pastor, December 5, 2022.Ariane Kovac: God Is Not at Church 175unorthodox environments such as Kevin’s donut and coffee shop,whose usagethe livestreaming of services makes possible. The church at home group thatwas most frequently highlighted in my interviews and conversations withChurchomemembers was a group thatmet in a CrossFit gym andwatched theservice together after their workout.29ToChurchomians, staying at home to stream services and connectingwithother people outside of a church building in church at home groups was notonlymore authentic because it lacked the dubious showiness of amegachurchservice, but because it integrated faith into everyday life. As Kevin put it, “wesee a limitation in only gathering in a church building on Sunday morning.There’s just somuchmore to following Jesus than that”.30This “somuchmore”,at Churchome, takes on the form of building up a personal relationship withJesus and involving him in all life decisions. As Luhrmann (2012) has shown,inmuch of present-day Evangelicalism,God is perceived to be an always avail-able friend, andpracticing one’s faithmeansworking on this friendship.Chur-chome’s sermonsoftencenter around the idea thatGodwantspeople to includehim in their everyday lives, not only because he is desperately interested in ev-ery single human being but also because hewants to get in your dirt with you, […] he wants to be involved with […] allof the things that you’re facing, that you’re struggling, that you’re ashamedof, maybe the things you don’t even like about yourself.31Building up a relationship with God is so central to Churchome’smessage thatthe people I spoke with often used this idea to contrast Churchomewith otherEvangelical churches. Both my interviewees and Smith in his sermons con-structed a binary of churches that focused on relationships and churches thatfocused on rules. The latter, “legalistic”32 rule-focused churches that thoughtbehavior to be more important than belief, served as a negative other whomChurchomians could differentiate themselves from. In his sermon “Fruit OverWorks”, Smith made this binary explicit and explained that integrating faithinto everyday life was the basis for a relationship with Jesus:29 E.g. Interview with Philipp, January 14, 2021.30 Interview with Kevin, December 5, 2022.31 Sermon by Chelsea Smith. “Let Jesus Serve You.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ewoVnnVMh08, 10:56-11:12.32 Interview with Carmen, December 22, 2022.176 Social Forms of Religion[…] I’m a fruit over works person, […] I am relationship over rules. […] Ourfocus isn’t supposed to be our moral code or the rules we keep or the dis-ciplines we practice, it is to be [in] a relationship with the person of Jesus.I believe someone who focuses on the fruit of the spirit as opposed to theworks of the flesh is someone that truly believes that the person of Jesusis far more important than the principles of Jesus. Your focus isn’t aboutdisseminating or even assimilating [to the] principles of Jesus, it’s aboutstaying close and following the person of Jesus every day.33Integrating God into everyday life, to Churchomians, also means not beingable to hide anything from him. Smith’s sermons advise listeners to be com-pletely honest with God andmy interviewees strove toward opening up to himin prayer. Transparency and vulnerability are important values at Churchomethat are regularly acted out both in conversations between followers and inSmith’s self-presentation, as he often touches upon his faults and failures inhis preaching. In this perspective, reducing one’s faith practice to a Sundayservice impedes honesty and transparency, and driving to a designated build-ing for religious practice provides an opportunity for pretense. Practicingone’s faith from the intimacy and privacy of one’s home instead made it moredifficult to hide one’s shortcomings from oneself, other believers, and, ulti-mately, God. At Churchome, this was seen as not only intensifying believers’relationships with God but also with each other. Judah Smith’s wife and co-pastor Chelsea Smith mentioned in a sermon that when she thinks about the“significant change” from City Church to Churchome, “what comes to mind isthe quality of relationships”.34 This resonates with the emphasis Churchomeputs on small groups, particularly for those who digitally stream services.Manyofmy interviewees,and I argue that this observation canbe extendedto Churchome’s followership more generally, have grown up in Evangelicalchurches, often ones that were more conservative than Churchome and, intheir perspective,belonged to the “rule-focused” side of the binary.Rachel livedin Seattle but enjoyed the freedom of only driving to church for the monthly“church experiences” and streaming the services from home on the otherSundays. For her, Churchome’s approach of integrating faith into everyday lifevia technology opened awhole newperspective onChristianity.Rachel toldme33 Sermon by Judah Smith. “Fruit Over Works.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ElrUXVabrz4, 16:42-17:48.34 Sermon by Chelsea Smith. “A Gift From Jesus.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I6qLNlbFOZ8, 2:26-2:32.Ariane Kovac: God Is Not at Church 177that, having grown up in a rule-focused church, she had always experiencedSunday services as a time when she and her family had to pretend to be happyand pious and to hide their family’s “dysfunctionality”. Not “having to go tochurch to have a relationship with God” helped her understand that she didnot have to hide her everyday struggles because “Jesus wants to meet you inall of that”. As she could be more honest with Jesus, she also allowed herself totake off the “mask of perfection” she had previously worn to all church-relatedactivities.356. Conclusion: An ”authentic” and “exciting” organizationGoing online profoundly changed Churchome as an organization: The churchdiversified possiblemembership roles and integrated long-distancemembers,many of them from outside the US. Also, it differentiated between regular andin-person services and framed the latter as special events. The church’s fol-lowers increasingly consider Churchome as one tile in the mosaic of their re-ligious practice and combine their participation in Churchome with optionsfromother churches and services.Going “beyond a building” also helpedChur-chomedefine its identity as an authenticmegachurch.By presenting its digitalapproach as bold and unusual for a megachurch, Churchome can react to cri-tique against the commodification and isolation of megachurches. Paradox-ically, for Churchome and many of its members, digital religious practice ismore authentic than in-person church attendance.As they have emerged from modern consumer and event cultures,megachurches arguably depend more than other religious institutions onoffering their followers an exciting, unusual, and continuously new expe-rience. As Wellman et al. (2020: 73) put it, at megachurches, “wheneverthings become too comfortable, too stable, too predictable, the jig is up”.Megachurches have been a relevant part of the religious landscape of theUS at least since the 1980s. Having church services in large auditoriums canhardly be considered a wow factor anymore. Churchome’s digital approach,however, is something new and unique. As Evangelicals have become used tomegachurches, they have also become used to thoroughly structured religiousorganizations that often make decisions according to market logic. At the35 Interview with Rachel, Churchome member and small group host in Seattle, Decem-ber 5, 2022.178 Social Forms of Religionsame time, megachurches have received lots of criticism from believers andnonbelievers alike. Churchome, thus, does not see a need to generally concealits high degree of organization. Instead, it uses its digital approach to combineorganization and communitization, to specifically counter criticism againstmegachurches, and to present itself as an authentic and exciting organization.As it religiously justifies and idealizes its digitalization strategy, Chur-chomecan standas an example of howreligious entities seek to bring the socialforms they choose in alignment with their beliefs. By presenting its “church athome” approach as what God has intended, Churchome can counter criticismfrom church members unhappy with the church’s increasing digitalizationand from outsiders accusing the church of not being authentic. According toChurchome, God is not at church, and neither do humans need to be. Whenmore andmore of the church’s followers are not at church, however, there is ofcourse a risk of anonymity. Churchome’s emphasis on “community” for thosewho follow digitally and the creation of in-person meetings for long-distancemembers show the fragility of the church’s technology-focused approach anda longing to complement digital with in-person participation.BibliographyAbraham, Ibrahim (2018): “Sincere Performance in Pentecostal MegachurchMusic.” In: Religions 9/6, pp. 38–58.Berger, Peter Ludwig (1990 [1967]):The Sacred Canopy. Elements of a Sociolog-icalTheory of Religion, New York: Anchor Books.Bielo, James S. (2009): Words Upon the Word. An Ethnography of EvangelicalGroup Bible Study, New York: New York University Press.Bielo, James (2011): Emerging Evangelicals. Faith, Modernity, and the Desirefor Authenticity, New York: New York University Press.Bourdieu, Pierre (1998): Practical Reason. 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Methodische Reflektio-nen zumwissenschaftlichen Arbeiten in der Pandemie.” In: Zeitschrift fürjunge Religionswissenschaft 16.Laughlin,Corrina (2022):RedeemAll.HowDigital Life IsChangingEvangelicalCulture, Oakland: University of California Press.Lindholm, Charles (2008): Culture and Authenticity, Malden: Blackwell Pub-lishing.Loveland, Anne/Wheeler, Otis (2003): From Meetinghouse to Megachurch. AMaterial and Cultural History, Columbia: University of Missouri Press.Luhrmann, Tanya Marie (2012): When God Talks Back. Understanding theAmerican Evangelical RelationshipWith God, New York: Vintage Books.Maddox, Marion (2012): “‘In the Goofy Parking Lot’: Growth Churches as aNovel Religious Form For Late Capitalism.” In: Social Compass 59/2, pp.146–158.Petzke, Martin/Tyrell, Hartmann (2012): “Religiöse Organisationen.” In: Ma-jaApelt/VeronikaTacke (eds.),HandbuchOrganisationstypen,Wiesbaden:Springer VS, pp. 275–306.180 Social Forms of ReligionRakow, Katja (2020): “The Light of the World. Mediating Divine PresenceThrough Light and Sound in a Contemporary Megachurch.” In: MaterialReligion 16, pp. 84–107.Ritzer, George (2005): Enchanting a DisenchantedWorld. Revolutionizing theMeans of Consumption,Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.Roof,Wade (1999): Spiritual Marketplace. Baby Boomers and the Remaking ofAmerican Religion, Princeton: Princeton University Press.Sanders, George (2016): “Religious Non-Places: Corporate Megachurches andTheir Contributions to Consumer Capitalism.” In: Critical Sociology 42/1,pp. 71–86.Scheer,Monique (2012): “Protestantisch fühlen lernen.Überlegungenzur emo-tionalen Praxis der Innerlichkeit.” In: Ute Frevert/Christoph Wulf (eds.),Die Bildung der Gefühle,Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp. 179–193.Scheer, Monique (2014): “Von Herzen glauben: Performanzen der Aufrichtig-keit in protestantischen Gemeinden.” In: Anja Schöne (ed.), Religiositätund Spiritualität. Fragen,Kompetenzen,Ergebnisse,Münster:Waxmann,pp. 111–130.Schlamelcher, Jens (2018): “ReligiöseOrganisation.” In:Detlef Pollack/VolkhardKrech/OlafMüller et al. (eds.),Handbuch Religionssoziologie,Wiesbaden,Heidelberg: Springer VS, pp. 489–506.Thumma,Scott/Travis,Dave (2007): BeyondMegachurchMyths.WhatWeCanLearn From America’s Largest Churches, San Francisco and Chichester:Jossey-Bass; Wiley.Wellman, James/Corcoran, Katie/Stockly, Kate (2020): High on God. HowMegachurches Won the Heart of America, New York: Oxford UniversityPress.Wuthnow, Robert (1989): The Restructuring of American Religion. Society andFaith SinceWorldWar II, Princeton: Princeton University Press.Wuthnow, Robert (2007): After the Baby Boomers. How Twenty- and Thirty-Somethings Are Shaping the Future of American Religion, Princeton:Princeton University Press.Primary SourcesInterview with Philipp, pastor, January 14, 2021.Interview with Sophia, long-distance member from Europe, October 15, 2021.Interview with Kevin, pastor and small group host, December 5, 2022.Interview with Rachel, small group host in Seattle, December 5, 2022.Ariane Kovac: God Is Not at Church 181Interviewwith Carmen, small group host and long-distancemember,Decem-ber 15, 2022.Interview with Natalia, small group host and long-distance member, Decem-ber 16, 2022.InterviewwithDiane, small group host and long-distancemember,December22, 2022.Web ReferencesChurchome. “Churchome Experiences.” AccessedNovember 8, 2023. https://www.churchome.org/monthly-experiences.Churchome. “Churchome Stories.” YouTube. Accessed October 13, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLicUMmdCSpPjuC4NFk-JRzSlOxks5Z-eJ.Hartford Institute for ReligionResearch. “DefinitionMegachurches.”AccessedOctober 4, 2023. http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/definition.html.Chelsea Smith.“AGift From Jesus.”YouTube.November 20,2022.AccessedOc-tober 4, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I6qLNlbFOZ8.Chelsea Smith. “Let Jesus Serve You.” YouTube. November 13, 2022. AccessedOctober 4, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ewoVnnVMh08.JudahSmith. “FruitOverWorks.”YouTube.October 16, 2022.AccessedOctober4, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ElrUXVabrz4.Judah Smith. “God Pursues You.” YouTube.November 17, 2022.AccessedOcto-ber 4, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UixDJthl7dU.Shapeshifting the Christian RightThe Moral Majority as a Faith-Based Organizationand the Immanent Turn of Evangelicalismin the Late 20th CenturySebastian SchülerAbstract Without organizations, religious movements would unlikely survive orachieve social and political influence. This article therefore looks at nonprofit organi-zations as a specific religious social form. It uses the Moral Majority as an example ofhow the Christian Right evolved from a loose network of church organizations into apolitically successful movement by adopting new forms of organization. These nonde-nominational faith-based organizations arose in part in response to tax regulationsimposed by the government. The Christian Right thus underwent an immanent turn,increasingly adapting its social forms and semantics to secular forms of organizationand legal discourse.Keywords Christian Right, faith-based organization, MoralMajority, nonprofit orga-nization1. IntroductionOn June 24, 2022, the US Supreme Court overturned the 1973 Roe v. Wade le-gal ruling that granted women the federal right to make a personal choice onabortion. Since then, it has been up to individual states to decide whether andhow to grant this right. Twenty-two states have already banned abortion orplaced more significant restrictions on it than before.What makes this rulingso unique is that for nearly half a century, conservativeChristians in theUSnotonly ceaselessly fought the 1973 decision but also managed to turn this privatematter into a public issue to morally charge and politicize it. Many Christian184 Social Forms of Religioncampaigns, rallies, and even physical assaults in front of abortion clinics havetaken place since then. Yet, all these local protest actions would not have hadsuch an impact on public discourse and politics had it not been for the emer-gence of larger organizations of conservative Christians that have since en-gaged in targeted political lobbying (Hertzke 1988). As a 2012 study by the PewResearch Center for Religion and Public Life showed, not only have religiousorganizations begun to open offices inWashington and engage in political lob-bying since the 1950s,but their numbers anddiversity have also grown tremen-dously in the 20 years preceding the study, and have nearly quadrupled sincethe 1970s.1 One reason for this increase, according to the study, is the “growingreach of the federal government in economic, environmental, and social pol-icy”,whichacts likeamagnet and“draw[s] religiousgroups to thenation’s capi-tal” (ibid.: 26).However, the rise of theChristianRight and its political lobbyingcannot be explained quite so simply. Historian Randall Balmer (2021), for in-stance,has evenargued that thebeginningof theChristianRight liesnot inRoev. Wade but in segregated schools, an argument I will discuss later. Scholarlyresearch on the beginnings of the Christian Right shows one thing above all:astonishment at its sudden success. How could isolated churches and preach-ers with few connections swiftly mobilize the broad masses and conquer thepolitical stage? Different answers have been given to this question.My purpose in this paper is not to add yet another answer to the questionaboutmotives that gave rise to the Christian Right. Instead, I want to shift thefocus away from motives and toward changing organizational forms. I thusendorse the theses ofMarkusHero (2010), who points towards the importanceof the “productivity ofmediation structures” for religious change and assumesan “inherent logic of institutional arrangements” (35). The turn toward Evan-gelical political activism in the late 1970s was spawned by several organiza-tions that had a lasting impact on public opinion and party politics. Among thebest-known of these were Focus on the Family (founded 1977), Christian Voice(founded 1978), The Religious Roundtable (founded 1979), and Moral Majority(founded 1979).By this time,Evangelical leaders such as Jerry Falwell,RobertG.Grant, Paul Weyrich, and James Dobson had established solid networks.Theyforged a plan for Evangelical Christians to exert more influence on Washing-ton politics.These organizations, most notably the Moral Majority, were theirfirst genuinely successful instruments for doing so.1 Cf. https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2011/11/21/lobbying-for-the-faithful-exec/.Sebastian Schüler: Shapeshifting the Christian Right 185Two aspects of these organizations are of particular interest: First, they arenot ecclesiastical or denominational organizations, aswas typical in theUS fora long time, but rather supra-denominational organizations whose religiouscharacter is only sometimes immediately apparent. Second, they often consistof several component organizationswith different tax statuses.Theywere usu-ally founded as tax-exempt religious nonprofit organizations but, at the sametime, established sub-organizations that are not tax-exempt but enable politi-cal lobbying. As I will argue in this contribution, the differentiation and diver-sificationof organizational forms in theUShasprovidednewopportunities forthe Christian Right, and these two organizational strategies helped the MoralMajority, in particular, to achieve its success and influence.For a long time,research into religious social formswasbasedon the classicdistinctionbetween churchand sect; itwasnotuntil the 1970s that other terms,such as movement, cult, or network, were added (see the introduction to thisvolume for a detailed discussion). More recently, religious organizations havebeen considered as well, but rarely in their function as a social form. In the last30–40 years, there has been an enormous increase in religious organizations,leading to a transformationof religious social forms.Religiousorganizations–be they so-called religious nongovernmental organizations (RNGOs), religiousnonprofit organizations (RNPOs), or faith-based organizations (FBOs)2 – areexerting significant influence on social andpolitical processes and, at the sametime, becoming more and more like secular organizations because they haveto translate their religious motives into secular language. I therefore speak ofan ‘immanent turn’ in US Evangelicalism based on this change in religious so-cial forms.However, I do not claim that religions or Evangelicalismhave trans-formed into mere organizations. Instead, I argue that several social forms ofreligion exist side by side and that religious organizations have changed theface of religion in the US significantly inmore recent decades.Therefore, I willtake a closer look at religious organizations as particular social forms of reli-gion to address the transformation of US Evangelicalism.2 These terms for religious organizations are sometimes used synonymously. While RN-GOs are oftenmore internationally active, RNPOs tend to operate at a local or nationallevel. The term FBO is more recent and often used in the context of social welfare ordevelopment discourses. There is no adequate typology (Jeavons 2004). I do not seeit as my task to solve this problem here, but rather to address the role of religious or-ganizations as religious social forms, regardless of the definitional problem. For thispurpose, I will use themore general term FBO and, in the context of US tax law, RNPO.186 Social Forms of ReligionFirst, I will review some of the central arguments for the success of theChristian Right to argue that so far,mainly substantivemotives have been dis-cussed and less attention has been paid to the social forms of the religious or-ganizations thatmake up theChristian Right. Secondly, after reviewing recentliterature on religious nonprofit organizations and explaining the differencesbetween the various 501(c) types of organizations based on the United StatesInternal Revenue Service, I argue that they, as particular social forms of re-ligion, play a crucial role in explaining religious change. Building on this, Iwill further argue that the rise of the Christian Right is closely intertwinedwith tensions between Evangelical organizations and the US’s Internal Rev-enue Service (IRS) about tax exemption. Finally, and against the backgroundof this tension, I will show that the social forms of Evangelicalism have shiftedfrom church-based to faith-based organizations, giving the Religious Rightits success and paved the way for the ‘immanent turn’ of US Evangelicalism.By this, I mean replacing its rhetoric of redemption with nationalist and le-gal rhetoric and establishing advocacy groups. I understand my contributionas a cautious sketch of some implications of this development while provid-ing references to relevant literature to acknowledge previouswork and furtherstimulate the debate.2. Out of the blue? Explaining the success of the Moral MajorityTheMoralMajority (1979–1989) is considered one of themost influential Chris-tian conservative organizations and lobby groups of the Christian Right inthe United States. It was founded in 1979 by Rev. Jerry Falwell (1933–2007), thewell-known best-selling author, televangelist, founder of a megachurch, andfounder of the Evangelical Liberty University. Falwell actually has a Baptistbackground, in which religion and politics are traditionally strictly separated(Allitt 2005: 152).By the 1970s at the latest,and in thewakeof the counterculturemovement as well as rising unemployment, the attitude of many conservativeChristians changed, and they now increasingly blamed the government forsocial and moral decay. In a series of rallies entitled “I love America”, Falwelltraveled the country intending to awaken patriotism, morality, and cohesionamong Christians andmake them aware of their opportunity to exert politicalinfluence and to get them out of their self-imposed bubble, which until thenhad resulted primarily inmissionary work to save souls. In his view, there wasa moral majority in the country that was not (yet) visible and needed to beSebastian Schüler: Shapeshifting the Christian Right 187mobilized to exert real political influence. The term “moral majority” in thiscontext goes back to Paul Weyrich, who co-founded the Heritage Foundationand Moral Majority, Inc. with Jerry Falwell. By 1980, the Moral Majority al-ready had state chapters in 18 states, and at its peak, it hadmore than 4millionmembers.The rapid success was astonishing to many contemporary observers. Forseveral decades, it seemed that the activities of Evangelical Christians werelimited exclusively to saving souls and planting new churches.After the ScopesTrial in the 1920s, Christian fundamentalists were particularly critizied, and itwas not until the 1950s that Bible-believing Christians were given a new socialstage on which to publicly express their devout faith, most notably throughthe famous preacher Billy Graham. In the following years, Evangelical train-ing and education centers, radio stations, and televangelists also increasinglyemerged. Still,most activities servedmissions. Politics inWashington was fartoo distant for many Evangelicals to be closely involved, and local campaignshad little reach because there was no organization to focus activities (Liebman1983b: 227).It came as all the more of a surprise – in the perception of the media pub-lic and among scholars – that an organization like the Moral Majority shouldachieve ameteoric rise seemingly out ofnowhere andbegin exerting enormouspolitical influence.Through themedia prominence of Jerry Falwell (he reachedsome 15 million viewers every week through his television program “Old TimeGospel Hour”), mass letters, and an ideological program, it succeeded in mo-bilizing Evangelicals and bundling their votes. This way, the Moral Majoritymanaged to cast itself as the conservative andmoral conscience of the nation.However, even in the years before the Moral Majority’s founding and in thewake of Jimmy Carter’s presidential candidacy, the power of Evangelicals asa constituency became clear. Carter, a representative of the Democratic Party,officially declared himself a “born-again Christian” and received the full sup-port of Jerry Falwell for his candidacy. On October 25, 1976, Newsweek maga-zine ran the headline “Born Again! The Evangelicals”, and Christianity Today,the largestChristianmagazine in theUS,programmatically proclaimed 1976 as“TheYear of theEvangelical” (Kucharsky 1976), followedby theTimeMagazine ti-tling “TheEvangelicals: NewEmpire of Faith” onDecember 26, 1977. It was onlywhen Carter did not come out firmly in support of conservative causes suchas school prayer or a ban on abortion that the mood tilted. Falwell turned hisback on Carter and in the next presidential campaign supported RepublicanRonald Reagan with the help of his newly formed Moral Majority. The Moral188 Social Forms of ReligionMajority was not the first Evangelical lobby group. Still, it was certainly oneof the most influential, and its unexpected success drew a lot of attention tothismovement,which led scholars to take up the phenomenonof theChristianRight. Over the years, much has been written about its sky-rocketing appear-ance andmuch research done to seek explanations for this surprising develop-ment. Initially, Moral Majority attracted the interest of political scientists, so-ciologists, and also communication scientists. Some contributions attemptedto explain the religious and political support for Moral Majority using demo-graphic evaluations and analyses of voter behavior. For example, ClydeWilcox(1989) points to such diverse factors as geography, religious values, social sta-tus, party identification, alienation, and symbols, and argues that support forthe Christian Right was primarily a reaction to political symbols rather than areaction to social problems. Sociologists Johnson and Tamney (1984; 1988), onthe other hand, examined the voting behavior of Christians in several quanti-tative studies and found that older, less educated people predominantly votedfor the Moral Majority, but also that Christian media possessed a great dealof influence (televangelism, radio stations, etc.) (Lienesch 1982; Roberts 1983;Shupe/Stacey 1983).Sincemany also attributed the success of theMoral Majority to the promi-nence of its leader Falwell, several publications initially focused on Falwell’srhetoric. Between 1983 and 1985 alone, at least five dissertations were writ-ten on this topic (Buckelew 1983; Brenner 1984; Jefferson 1984; Phipps 1985;Ray 1985). These works focus primarily on Jerry Falwell’s sermons and publicspeeches, analyzing in particular the argumentative strategies of the MoralMajority in light of their political opposition. In addition, Snowball (1991)attempted an analysis of Falwell’s use of war metaphors, which he consideredsignificant for Moral Majority rhetoric. But this explains more about howEvangelicals perceived social tensions than it does about the success of theMoral Majority as a politically influential organization.For many observers, especially sociologists, the success of the Moral Ma-jority was at odds with modern America. They believed in the secularizationof society and that Evangelical and fundamentalist Christians were a dyingbreed, to be found at most in the very rural areas of the United States. How-ever, the opposite was true.While liberal churches lost members, conservativecongregations experienced growth (Liebman 1983b: 234). The rural-urban di-vide played a role here, as did the establishment of Evangelical educational in-stitutions in the 1970s.SusanHarding (2009), for example, argues that only lib-eral intellectuals (like herself) believed for too long that religion in general andSebastian Schüler: Shapeshifting the Christian Right 189Christian fundamentalism in particular were on the wane as secularizationprogressed. In her view fundamental Christians never disappeared,which sheattempts to demonstrate through her historical review going back to the 19thcentury. In doing so, she emphasizes that the “period between World War IIand the birth of theMoral Majority hosted an unbroken series of politically ac-tive or politically inflected conservative Protestant mobilizations” (ibid.: 1281).Harding points out a historical thread of the Christian Right that has neverbeenbrokenandargues thatEvangelicalswere already trying tobringmoral is-sues into the public sphere before the 1970s to “legislate morality” (ibid.: 1282).There is no question that the Moral Majority did not simply emerge out ofthin air but built its success on various activities and diverse organizations.However, I argue that the success of the Moral Majority cannot be explainedsolely by the expression of its moral consciousness and social concerns. Beforethe 1970s, the issues were much more centered on anticommunism, a minorissue for the Moral Majority and only one of many it served.Moreover, the or-ganizations Harding listed were not as successful as the Moral Majority, bothin their expansion and reach or membership.Many Evangelical organizationsat that time were almost exclusively registered as religious, tax-exempt orga-nizations and, therefore, did not function much differently than church con-gregations.Their opportunity for political influence was limited if they did notwant to risk their status. Accordingly, I argue that a closer look at the organi-zational form of the Moral Majority promises to shed a different light on thequestion of its political success.Robert C. Liebman and Robert Wuthnow made an initial foray in thisdirection as early as 1983 in their anthologyTheNewChristianRight:Mobilizationand Legitimation. They also express their astonishment at the rapid successof the movement by opening the volume with the following words: “Scarcelyanyone expected it. For more than 50 years Evangelicals kept studiously alooffrom American politics” (Liebman/Wuthnow 1983b: 1). They also emphasizethat while there had been Evangelical activities before, against communism,for example, these had been exceptions and for many conservative Christianspolitics was “an evil of the flesh, an exercise in futility” (ibid.: 1). To betterunderstand the Evangelicals’ sudden turnaround, they propose a movement-sociological perspective, first noting that social and political movements areoften short-lived and that it was therefore uncertain how long the ChristianRight movement would last. Today, 30 years later, it can be said that they wereright, as the Moral Majority lasted only about 10 years. On the other hand, the190 Social Forms of Religionauthors also emphasize that social and political movements can have a lastingeffect on society, which is also true for the Moral Majority.Themain concern in their volume is to show that common interpretationsof the sudden success of Evangelicals have too often been attributed solely tothe social discontent of Evangelicals and the popularity of pastors like JerryFalwell, with less consideration of the actual activities and strategies of themovement.3Moral protest and burgeoning ideological visions alonemight ex-plain amovement’s beginnings andmotivation, but not necessarily its societaltriumph. Every movement consists of various protagonists, lobbyists, and,most importantly, organizations that provide an infrastructure to make theprotest permanent and gain political influence. In the new Christian Right,several organizations can be foundwith financial resources, technical capabil-ities (such as computerized direct mail solicitation), media publicity, targetedlobbying, and particular organizational forms (Liebman/Wuthnow 1983b: 4).Robert Liebman compared four of the most successful of these new ChristianRight movement-organizations and found that Moral Majority’s advantageover the others was its experience in fundamentalist political activity as wellas its access to a widespread fundamentalist network (1983a: 49). Although theanthology on the Christian Right focused on social and political movementsand their organizations, the aspect of particular social and organizationalforms, especially regarding the Moral Majority, was not pursued more deeply.The fact that the Moral Majority consisted of various organizational formssheds a different light on its success, a point to which I return in the nextsection.Inmore recent years,however,historianRandall Balmer (2021) has broughta very different reading of the success of the Christian Right into the debate.Balmer argues that its success was not (solely) due to the abortion issue, butthat the real motive was to be found in a dispute over segregated schools (seealsoMarti 2020). Balmer even claims that the narrative of theChristianRight’ssuccess triggered by Roe v. Wade is a fiction served by scholars as much as byEvangelicals themselves. The historical facts would prove that Falwell did notprominently feature the abortion issue in his speeches until the late 1970s.Moreover, he emphasizes that the real key figure was not Jerry Falwell, but3 The editors emphasize that the contributions in the anthology argue quite differently.While some emphasize the role of ideology in the rise of the new Christian Right, oth-ers do not see it as a central factor. The volume deliberately unites different positions(Liebman/Wuthnow 1983b: 6).Sebastian Schüler: Shapeshifting the Christian Right 191Paul Weyrich, who tried out various themes to mobilize the Christian Right.Balmer’s reading goes like this: In 1970, public schools in seven federal stateswere still racially segregated, which had been illegal since the US SupremeCourt’s 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision. In response to that deci-sion, white students left public schools to enroll in private, racially segregatedschools, so-called segregation academies.These schools not only were fundedby churches, but also enjoyed tax-exempt status. In a legal trial in 1971 (Coitv. Green), the Supreme Court ruled that nonprofit segregation academiescould not be eligible for tax exemption based on the IRC 501(c)(3) definitionof public charities. In reaction, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) withdrewthe tax-exempt status of segregation academies, sparking an outcry amongwhite conservative Christians. According to Balmer, Paul Weyrich found thisa common ground for Evangelical leaders and approached Jerry Falwell withthis issue, which both now turned into a conversation about governmentinterference. It took until 1976 for the United States Supreme Court to rule,in Runyon v. McCrary, that private schools implementing racial segregationviolated federal law. Another famous case from the late 1970s was Bob JonesUniversity v. United States (1983), in which Bob Jones University lost its taxexemption on the grounds of racial discrimination.Balmer’s discovery is very intriguing, even though I don’t share his ratherone-sided account of the Christian Right mobilizing solely on the grounds ofsegregated schools. Nevertheless, his studies highlight a central point in theemergence of the Christian Right, which I believe was also important for thestrategic orientation of its organizational forms. Following Balmer’s findings,I argue that it was not only abortion (nor was it only segregation) that gaverise to the Christian Right, and that the influence of PaulWeyrich on Jerry Fal-well has probably been underestimated in most historical explanations. GivenWeyrich’s process of trial and error, it is convincing that abortion, even thoughit was already an important topic for some Evangelicals, was made a centralissue not immediately after Roe v. Wade in 1973, but was publicly politicizedonly when theMoralMajority was in place.The success of theMoralMajority –in my opinion – therefore cannot be reduced to a single reason or contentiousissue.The advantage of the Moral Majority over many other Evangelical orga-nizations was that it served several issues simultaneously. In addition, I arguethat past experiences of Evangelicals with the IRS prepared them to developnew ideas on how to build an organization per se. Evangelicals felt that theyhad long enough been castigated by the political arm from Washington withthe IRS as its sharpest tool. The tax-exempt status of religious organizations192 Social Forms of Religionsuch as churches or Christian schools has always been an important pillar fororganized religion in the United States. It guarantees tax-free income via do-nations and donors’ tax claims on their donations. In addition, tax exemptionalso means freedom from the state. However, the tax law for religious chari-ties and their relationship with the US government has a checkered history.I will argue, therefore, that the trigger for Evangelicals’ mobilization lay pri-marily in the perceived threat to their religious liberty from the governmentand the IRS. The mobilization of the Christian Right cannot be explained bymotives alone but must consider the infrastructure and strategies involved inestablishing new forms of organization. In the following, I will discuss theseparticular forms of religious organization in more detail.3. Religious social forms: From nonprofit organizationsto faith-based organizationsThe Christian Right in general, as well as the Moral Majority in specific, areoften casually classified as religious movements.The termmovement seems apopular label formany religious social forms.However, religionhas rarely beenresearched in its social form as a movement (Snow/Beyerlein 2019). Researchon New Religious Movements (NRMs) from the 1960s onward has scarcely en-gagedwith social sciencemovement research. In contrast,older distinctions ofreligious social forms such as church, sect, and mysticism have been taken uprepeatedly and supplemented by further terms such as cult, consciousness, orcharisma (Ashcraft 2018).This has not helped to sharpen the concept of move-ment in the field of religion. On the contrary, it seems to be applied to any ‘re-ligious movement’ that is not a church, denomination, or cultic community.While most NRMs are groups with a concrete and manageable following thatturns to a charismatic leader, the termmovement is more appropriate for col-lectivemobilizations such as religious reform and protest.TheChristian Rightalso rises from a position of protest against the state and the perceived moraldecay of society and seeks divine reform of society and politics.Therefore, themovement concept often forms the overarching classification of such a socialform,which consists of diverse groups, informal networks, and organizations(Diani 1992: 13).To better understand the dynamics and structure of such movements asthe Christian Right, it is necessary to distinguish between the substantivemotives of collective dynamics and mobilizations on the one hand, and theSebastian Schüler: Shapeshifting the Christian Right 193formal strategies and organizational structures on the other that togetherform amovement. As such,movements like the Christian Right also consist of(movement-)organizations. While much has been written about the motivesof the Christian Right, less is found about its organizational structures. How-ever, without organizations the dynamics of the newly emerging collectiveconsciousness would fizzle out shortly. Moreover, organizations must trans-late the (religious) ideological demands of the mobilized masses into secularpolicies and political action.To become politically active, the Moral Majority had to adopt a differentorganizational form than most religious organizations in the US. All formallyorganized religions in theUSare run as private nonprofit organizations (Ham-mack 1998). A religious nonprofit organization operates within legal parame-tersdefinedby the InternalRevenueService (IRS) that allow it to receive tax-ex-empt status and engage in activities related to itsmission.4 Formany decades,religions in the US were organized primarily as churches and congregations,legally registered as charitable nonprofit organizations and thus tax-exempt.However, this was to change from the 1970s at the latest. I argue that it wasthe Christian Right that initiated this change and became the forerunner of anew type of religious nonprofit organization, which on the one hand consistsof a more complex organizational form to be able to become politically active,and on the other hand identifies itself less as a religious organization. Fromthis perspective, theMoral Majority is one of the first so-called faith-based or-ganizations (FBO).This transition from a denominational church-based loosenetwork to a politically right-wing movement is grounded on creating faith-based organizations. It has allowed the Christian Right to take advantage ofthe benefits of this legal structure, such as fundraising, legal recognition, andtargeted advocacy efforts, while continuing to address its core religious andmoral concerns. To better understand this change in social form, the presentsection will provide an overview of different variants of nonprofit organiza-tions and past research on religious nonprofit organizations to determine thespecific character and appearance of FBOs.For centuries, religions have seen charity and care for the poor as one oftheirmost important tasks. In theUS, it is primarily local churches andcongre-gations that provide such social services.Legally, all organizationswhose activ-ities serve the general and public good are classified as charitable nonprofit or-4 Cf. IRS Tax Guide for Churches & Religious Organizations: https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf (last accessed January 18, 2024).194 Social Forms of Religionganizations.5 In fact, the definition of a “charity” is determined by the require-ments of state laws and the federal tax laws represented by the IRS. The IRSalso distinguishes between several variants of charitable organizations, all ofwhich are coded according to the internal IRS coding system. In total, there are29 different 501(c) types, such as for Social and Recreational Clubs (501(c)(7)) orVeterans Organizations (501(c)(23)). Religious organizations such as churchesare usually listed as 501(c)(3) organizations. All 501(c) corporations are exemptfrom corporate income tax, but donations to (c)(3)s are the only ones that aretax deductible.This makes it especially valuable for religious groups to be runas 501(c)(3) organizations. The label “nonprofit” also means that these organi-zations may take in more than they spend, but the income may not enrich in-dividuals.Most religious organizations fall under section 501(c)(3). Since at least the1970s, there has been a shift of some religious organizations to establish oneormore sub-organizations that have 501(c)(4) status. According to the IRS def-inition, a 501(c)(4) is a “social welfare” organization that is primarily engagedin promoting the common good and general welfare. This rather vague defi-nition makes it difficult for the IRS to understand the exact intentions of anorganization and classify it accordingly, thus allowing religious organizationsto expand their activities. Social welfare organizations are also granted tax-ex-empt status, but one important difference is that donations to 501(c)(4) orga-nizations are not tax-deductible for donors, unlike donations to 501(c)(3) char-itable organizations.This is a consideration for both the organization and po-tential donors. What makes the status of a 501(c)(4) organization interestingfor religions is that they havemore flexibility in engaging in political activitiesandadvocacy.Thismeans they canactively influence legislation andpublic pol-icy debates by supporting partisan campaigns and candidates. It’s importantto note that while 501(c)(4) organizations are allowed to engage in political ac-tivities, there are limitations on the extent of their political involvement.Theyare still required to primarily focus on social welfare rather than solely engagein partisan political activities. Unlike (c)(3) organizations, (c)(4) organizationsdo not have to disclose their donors, and a change from (c)(3) to (c)(4) is not al-ways easy because various aspects are taken into account here. It is therefore5 Nonprofit organizations and not-for-profit organizations are different legal forms. ANFPO must be distinguished from a nonprofit organization (NPO) because it neednot be established expressly for the public good. In addition, NFPOs are consideredrecreational organizations, which do not generate revenue.Sebastian Schüler: Shapeshifting the Christian Right 195also noticeable that religious organizations do not usually switch to (c)(4), butestablish further sub-organizations with (c)(4) status.This alsomeans that theactivities andfinances of each sub-organizationmust be kept separate. In gen-eral, the vague boundaries and requirements of nonprofits have led to litiga-tion, and there are now special nonprofit associations that provide legal adviceto individual nonprofits on tax issues.6The relevance of the 501(c)(3) status for religious organizations in theUnited States has evolved over the past 100 years, particularly as the legaland regulatory landscape surrounding nonprofit organizations and theiractivities has developed. The significance of the 501(c)(4) status for religiousorganizations became particularly pronounced during the latter half of the20th century and into the 21st century. For instance, in the early 20th century,tax-exempt status was primarily associated with charitable organizationsand there was less differentiation for social welfare activities. However, overtime, amendments to the tax code allowed for recognizing other tax-exemptorganizations, including 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations. The distinc-tion between the two types of organizations began to take shape duringthis period. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s promptedincreased advocacy and activism from various groups, including religiousorganizations. While religious groups had previously engaged in social andpolitical issues, the civil rights movement highlighted the potential impact oforganized advocacy. This period marked a growing interest among religiousorganizations in participating in political and social advocacy efforts. Duringthe latter half of the 20th century and into the 21st century, issues such asabortion, LGBTQI+ rights, family values, and other moral and social concernsgained prominence in public discourse. Many religious organizations soughtto influence the outcomes of debates surrounding these issues. The 501(c)(4)status provided a legal framework for organizations to engage more directlyin advocacy, lobbying, and political activities related to these issues. The riseof the Christian Right marked a significant period of political activism amongconservative religious groups. Some of its organizations operated as 501(c)(4)entities to maximize their ability to engage in political activities.6 As an example, see the California Association of Nonprofits, which lists the ad-vantages of being a nonprofit organization and creating another 501(c)(4) sub-organization to exert political influence. Cf. https://calnonprofits.org/publications/article-archive/616-what-should-nonprofits-know-about-501-c-4-organizations-especially-in-an-election-year.196 Social Forms of ReligionThese developments have further underscored the relevance of the 501(c)(4)status for religious organizations. Accordingly, the IRS has published a TaxGuide for Churches & Religious Organizations, which at least attempts to distin-guish between churches and other welfare organizations. Nevertheless, theoverall situation remains rather confused. It poses practical challenges toreligious organizations and the government in dealing with the tax conditionsfor religious and other welfare organizations (Scheitle 2010: 137).Research on religious nonprofit organizations has been very limited, al-though the religious nonprofit sector has grown significantly in the US andglobally in recent decades. One of the earliest explorations of the topic waswritten by Jeff E. Biddle (1992), who describes who benefits from the religiousand social activities of religious NPOs. It is noteworthy, however, that Biddlefocusesmostly on local congregations rather than larger parachurch organiza-tions or faith-based organizations such as theMoral Majority.This shows thatuntil the 1990s, religiousNPOswere perceived primarily in their social form aschurches.In thefirst edition of the handbookTheNonprofitSector, initiated by sociolo-gistWalterW.Powell,whichhas alreadybeenpublished in threegreatly revisedand expanded editions, there is no entry on religion (Powell 1987). Only in thesecond edition is there an entry entitled “Religion and the Nonprofit Sector”,in which the authors make clear: “Whereas religious organizations generallyfit the profile of voluntary associations that involve membership and supportfrommembers, they do not so easily fit definitions of nonprofit organizationsbasedon registrationwith tax authorities” (Cadge/Wuthnow2006: 485).There-fore, to obtain tax-exempt status, religious organizations must demonstratethat a substantial portion of their activities are for charitable and benevolentpurposes. In addition, they highlight that “the law and policies governing re-ligious organizations in the United States are subject to differing interpreta-tions and frequently contested” (ibid.: 489).The complexity of religious nonprofit organizations has also increasedsince the 1980s. Brad R. Fulton’s article “ReligiousOrganizations: Crosscuttingthe Nonprofit Sector” notes that religious organizations have rarely beenconsidered from an organizational sociology perspective and emphasizes:“Religious organizations are also the most prevalent type of organization inthe nonprofit sector, encompassing not only congregations but also a widevariety of other faith-based organizations that provide a vast array of prod-ucts and services” (2020: 579). In addition, some religious organizations haverecently become active in non-religious areas of the nonprofit sector and tendSebastian Schüler: Shapeshifting the Christian Right 197to downplay their religious roots and intentions (ibid: 580). Ultimately, thismakes the transition between religious and secular nonprofits increasinglyfluid and difficult to define for administrative authorities. Fulton also notesthe changing nature of religious organizations: While many scholars under-stand religious organizations to mean primarily churches and congregations,and even other religious traditions such as Buddhists and Hindus in the USorganize themselves into congregations, it is also clear that not every religiousorganization is a congregation. He therefore makes an analytical distinctionbetween congregations and faith-based organizations, which I adapt here.The term faith-based organization (FBO) is not a legal term and is under-stood more broadly than the category of a religious organization.Thus, FBOsdo not necessarily have to be of or affiliated with a particular religion or de-nomination.Most FBOsare social service organizations that run soupkitchensand care for the poor. The term emerged in the late 1990s, after President BillClinton initiated thewelfare reformof 1996 that took control overwelfare awayfromthe federal governmentandgave it to the states.Asa result, theywerenowto decide whether to allow religious organizations funding for their charitablework (this state degree is therefore also known as charitable choice program,cf. Nagel 2006).This was pushed even further when President GeorgeW.Bushlaunched the so-called Faith Based Initiative in 2001 that provided more in-frastructure for the welfare reform and allowed FBOs to partake in federallydirected social service programs to the same extent as any other group as longas they used the money only for their welfare activities and not for religiousactivities (Scheitle 2010: 155).This development has resulted in muchmore re-search literature on FBOs than on religiousNPOs since the 1990s (cf. Bielefeld/Cleveland 2013). Usually, it addresses only the state’s financial support of re-ligious organizations and not attempts on part of religious organizations toinfluence the state through lobbying.Although the term FBO refers principally to developments in the nonprofitsector since the 1990s, I think it is also fruitful for describing the transforma-tion of religious social forms particularly within the Christian Right since the1980s. Similarly, sociologist Christopher Scheitle has shown that parachurchorganizations have been growing since the 1980s (2010).The term parachurchorganization is used here synonymously with faith-based organizations thatwork across or outside of denominations. In an additional study of Evangelicalmobilization in the nonprofit sector, Scheitle andMcCarthy (2018) have shownthat countieswithmoreEvangelicals in thepopulation aremore likely to estab-lish parachurch organizations than counties with more Catholics or Mainline198 Social Forms of ReligionProtestants. Unfortunately, their analysis only covers the period from 1998 on-wards.Nevertheless, this study highlights an important point inmyargument:I suggest that since the late 1970s,Evangelicals inparticular havebegun to formFBOs that have changed the organizational landscape of Evangelicalism.Theseare characterized above all by the fact that, unlike other religious NPOs, theycannot be assigned to any particular church or denomination and are often –at least in terms of their name and appearance – hardly recognizable as reli-gious NPOs.TheMoral Majority fits that description. It was also open to otherdenominations, but was composed of and addressed primarily to EvangelicalChristians, without the name Evangelical in its title.Summing this up, traditional religious social forms such as church, sect,or cult have often been the subject of academic inquiry. In contrast, religiousmovement organizations such as religious parachurch organizations, non-profits, and faith-based organizations received less attantion as distinct socialforms of religion. Nevertheless, they can help to explain the transformationof religious social forms in late modernity. The emergence of faith-basedorganizations from the 1980s onwards can therefore be understood both asa reaction to the demands and possibilities of the rule of law (like the IRS)and as a way of manipulating the rule of law (as in federal politics). In thecase of the Christian Right, faith-based organizations like the Moral Majoritynot only gave opportunity for political activism, but also gave the ChristianRight a whole new image and an integrative, mobilizing force beyond churchorganizations and denominations, as I will exemplify further in the nextsection.4. From mobilization to lobbying and advocacy:The immanent turn of EvangelicalismSince the founding of theUnitedStates, the religious nonprofit sector has beencharacterized by “an ethos of voluntarism or self-help and the developmentof a strong civic sphere that was only loosely associated with government”(Cadge/Wuthnow 2006: 488). During the 20th century, however, tensionsbetween the state and religious service providers increased: “As the role of fed-eral government has expanded, church-state rulings have also governed theextent to which tax, employment, and nondiscrimination policies that applyto other nonprofit organizations would apply to religious ones” (ibid: 488).These tensions culminated in the 1970s and repeatedly led to legal disputes.Sebastian Schüler: Shapeshifting the Christian Right 199The first mobilizations took place at the local and regional level, and interestin political activism arose around abortion laws, pornography, and gay rightslegislation, most of which were fought in local courts or led to protest cam-paigns. Accordingly, from the 1970s onward, Evangelicals became increasinglypolitically aware. Local and regional networks and organizations became animportant infrastructure for the later success of the Moral Majority. It quicklyutilized its infrastructure to engage in advocacy, education, and mobilizationefforts while remaining aligned with its religious foundations. In additionto all the motives that contributed to the mobilization, a general awarenessdeveloped among Evangelicals that religious liberty was threatened by stateimpositions and an overly liberal government (Marti 2020).The IRS became asymbol of governmental evil and suppression of religious liberty.At the National Affairs Briefing Conference in Dallas on August 21, 1980,just a few weeks before presidential election day, Ronald Reagan held a well-known speech in front of thousands of Evangelicals. Some say this is whenEvangelicals finally embraced the Republican Party. In his speech, Reaganmakes direct reference to religious freedom under threat by the state (whichhe himself soon intended to represent): “If we have come to a time in theUnited States when the attempt to see traditional moral values reflected inpublic policy leaves one open to irresponsible charges, then the structure ofour free society is under attack and the foundation of our freedom is threat-ened” (American Rhetoric Online Speech Bank). Of particular interest here isthat for Evangelicals, political activism is part of their religious freedom, butpolitical decisions should not limit their religious freedom: “When I hear theFirst Amendment used as a reason to keep traditional moral values away frompolicy making, I’m shocked.The First Amendment was written not to protectthe people and their laws from religious values, but to protect those valuesfrom government tyranny” (ibid.). This tyranny he also sees in the IRS whenhe speaks against plans to “force all tax-exempt schools – including churchschools – to abide by affirmative action orders drawn up by – who else? – IRSbureaucrats”.7 Evangelicals saw America in jeopardy of losing its identity as aChristian nation, and the Christian Right continuously spread the narrativethat America was founded as a Christian nation, a myth that prevails untiltoday.The nameMoral Majority was therefore also programmatic and had an in-clusive rather thanadenominational character.To target advertisingandreach7 Cf. https://millercenter.org/rivalry-and-reform/building-movement-party.200 Social Forms of Religionadditional groups of people, the Moral Majority distributed a leaflet with theinscription Your Invitation to Join The Moral Majority.8 The leaflet was intendedto address pastors in particular, who were seen as multipliers for the organi-zation’s concerns: “Bible-believing churches of America constitute the largestsingle minority bloc of America. However, this bloc is, for the most part, un-informed and disorganized, to the point that politicians ignore them.The onlypersonswho can lead thismammothbloc are thepastors”.9This top-downpro-cess also shows that theMoralMajoritywas less of a grassrootsmovement thanit is sometimes portrayed. The movement was much more thought throughstructurally by a small circle of actors, and its organizational form is modeledonmodern FBOs.On the back of this tri-fold leaflet one finds a quite revealingorganizational chart of the Moral Majority. According to this chart, the MoralMajority is divided into four organizational units: theMoral Majority Founda-tion, the Moral Majority, Inc., the Moral Majority Political Action Committee,and the Moral Majority Legal Defense Foundation. All four suborganizationshad their legal status.According to the leaflet, the Moral Majority Foundation is a 501(c)(3) or-ganization whose central mission is to educate “pro-moral citizens”. Confer-ences, rallies,and seminars are tobeoffered for this purpose.The leaflet specif-ically points out that donations can be deducted from one’s taxes. The readeralso learns that Moral Majority, Inc. is a 501(c)(4) organization whose primarymission is to influence national, state, and local legislation.The organizationalstructure here is the most extensive and includes the production of print me-dia, targeted seminars, and assistance for political candidates and their staffto win elections. It also mentions a network of 435 congressional coordina-tors who can recruit and train “pro-moral” candidates for all public offices.TheMoralMajority Political ActionCommittee is listed as a separate sub-organiza-tion,butwithout specifying its legal status (regarding the IRS).This committeeaims to coordinatemoral activism between theMoralMajority and other “pro-moral” organizations and promote voter registration among church agencies.It also specifically states that donations to the committee are taxdeductible.Fi-nally, theMoral Majority Legal Defense Foundation is listed as a 501(c)(3) orga-nization and described as a “pro-moral” counterpart to the “humanist” Amer-ican Civil Liberties Union. The ACLU, founded in 1920, is an NGO advocat-ing for civil rights such as freedom of speech and liberal positions such as the8 Cf. https://cdm17184.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p17184coll1/id/22/rec/2.9 Cf. ibid.Sebastian Schüler: Shapeshifting the Christian Right 201right to abortion and the separation of church and state. The so-called “pro-moral” counterpart of the Moral Majority therefore wants to help individu-als and families with adequate legal defense “who are attacked by the godless,amoral forces of humanism”. It also states as oneof its goals to “legally establishHumanism as a religion and have it expelled from the public schools”. Here,once again, the Moral Majority’s perception as a group of citizens oppressedby the liberal state and the attempt to legally translate its concerns into secularlanguage (humanism as a religion) becomes clear.Thisway, theMoralMajorityalso established another trend: the use of legal action in addition to politicallobbying. For example, Evangelical law firms proliferated after the end of theMoral Majority, with the American Center for Law and Justice, founded by PatRobertson in 1990, as one of the leading firms.10TheMoral Majority can generally be seen as an FBOwith clear hierarchicalstructures to organize a centralized decision-making process, allowing forswift and coordinated responses to emerging issues. This hierarchical struc-ture aligned with the organization’s objectives of influencing public policy,particularly on issues like abortion, homosexuality, and school prayer. TheMoral Majority effectively utilized media platforms and personal networksto communicate its message, showcasing the significance of organizationalcommunication in promoting its cause andgarnering support.Unlike classicalchurches and denominations, FBOs often operate within a complex networkof stakeholders, including members, donors, and other advocacy groups.These interconnections influence the organization’s activities, strategies,and effectiveness in achieving its goals. The Moral Majority’s collaborationwith other conservative groups such as Robert Grant’s “Christian Voice” orthe “Roundtable” demonstrated the broader social forms that emerged fromshared values and objectives. The Moral Majority is thus not a typical (de-nominational) religious organization but can be considered one of the firstfaith-based organizations to use the creation of sub-organizations to obtainvarious legal and tax benefits and to operate at various levels. In this way,Evangelicalism has taken an immanent turn on its organizational side. Byimmanent turn, I do not mean the Moral Majority’s attempt to be politicallyactive, but to position itself as a secular organization that is no longer set uplike a church-based nonprofit and is even barely recognizable as a religiousorganization.Moreover, this organizational shift also implies a semantic shift:10 Cf. https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/41063.202 Social Forms of Religionreligious concerns are translated into secular, partly legal, language. The sal-vation of souls through faith and repentance, as preached by Billy Graham, isbeing transformed into the salvation of the nation through morally educatedcitizens whose rights must be secured by the courts. In this process, therehave been many areas where Evangelicals have identified moral lapses. Thesemay have been triggers for mobilization. But as I have shown, it was also theorganizational choice that made the actual success of the Moral Majority andthe Christian Right possible.5. ConclusionIn conclusion, the paper argues that understanding the success of the Chris-tian Right requires examining not just ideological motives but also the chang-ingorganizational forms that allowed these groups to exert significantpoliticalinfluence.The interplaybetween religiousorganizations, their legal status,andpolitical strategies is seen as crucial in shaping the trajectory of the ChristianRight and its transformational impact on US Evangelicalism. Therefore, I fo-cused on the organizational forms of theChristianRight, emphasizing the im-portance ofmovement organizations like Focus on the Family,ChristianVoice,The Religious Roundtable, and Moral Majority. These organizations, foundedin the late 1970s, significantlymobilized Evangelical Christians for political ac-tivism. Notably, they were supra-denominational and utilized tax-exempt re-ligious nonprofit status while establishing sub-organizations that allowed forpolitical lobbying.This legal transformation began as a response to tax regula-tions imposed by the IRS and led to the adoption of new organizational forms.The rise of Evangelical political activism is thus attributed to the differentia-tion and diversification of organizational structures. I further argued that thisshift from church-based to faith-based organizations and the strategic use oflegal statuses like 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations with varied tax classesprovided new opportunities for the Christian Right and contributed to its suc-cess. To explain this process, I have introduced the concept of an ‘immanentturn’ in US Evangelicalism, through which religious concerns are translatedinto secular language and used to address legal and political challenges. 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AccessedDecember 18, 2023. https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/41063.Social Forms in Neo-PentecostalProsperity ContextsFrom Network to Market ExchangeMaren FreudenbergAbstract This chapter discusses the various social forms that play a role in prosperitycontexts, a diverse yet distinct strain within neo-Pentecostalismwhose adherents believethat God will reward them with health and wealth in return for generous gifts to theirchurches and other financial investments. The contribution focuses on group, event,organization, network, movement, and market exchange as the social forms throughwhich individuals and groups coordinate their religious interaction and practice, andhighlights market exchange as a particularly salient form due to its congruence withprosperity semantics. Prosperity theologies teach that investment not only in one’spersonal faith and one’s congregation, but also, and importantly, on the secular market,will be rewarded by God, and these semantics are mirrored on a structural level bythe market exchange as a form of transaction between two parties. Given the fact thatfinancial risk-taking and success on the secular market are coded religiously as signs ofdepth of faith and divine grace, the market exchange complements these core tenets bytranslating semantics into structure, as it were.Keywords group, market exchange, neo-Pentecostalism, network, organization, pros-perity ethic, prosperity gospel, prosperity theologies1. IntroductionThis chapter focuses on what has been called the prosperity gospel, prosperitytheologies, or, more recently, the prosperity ethic, a diverse yet distinct strainwithin neo-Pentecostalismwhose adherents believe thatGodwill reward themwith health andwealth in return for generous gifts to their churches and other208 Social Forms of Religionfinancial investments (Attanasi 2016). Prosperity teachings have spread at anastounding pace in recent years, particularly in theGlobal South,where Pente-costalism continues to gain adherents in large numbers (Attanasi/Yong 2016).While a host of literature exists on the popularity and rapid dissemination ofprosperity theologies (cf. below), little attention has been paid to how the con-tent of these theologiesmight affect theways inwhich believers come togetherto practice their faith – how they structure and coordinate religious interac-tion. It is the aim of this chapter to shed light on various social forms that playa role in neo-Pentecostal prosperity contexts; it is thus primarily a theoreti-cal contribution, less an empirical one. To this end, it will draw from existingliterature and use selected empirical examples to illustrate its theoretical ar-guments.The chapter consists of four sections: The remainder of this introduction(1) will locate neo-Pentecostal prosperity teachings within the broader Pente-costal-Charismatic landscape as a general orientation for readers unfamiliarwith this Christian tradition. Following a brief summary of the history andmain tenets of prosperity teachings in section 2, which serves to sketch themost important religious semantics in the field, section 3 shifts the focus toreligious structure and discusses a variety of social forms that are evident inprosperity contexts. It focuses on group, event, organization, network, move-ment, andmarket exchange as themain forms byway ofwhich individuals andgroups coordinate their religious interaction andpractice, andhighlightsmar-ket exchange as a particularly salient social form due to its congruence withprosperity semantics.The chapter closes with some concluding reflections.Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity, an experiential strain that empha-sizes the “gifts” of the Holy Spirit, such as speaking in tongues, prophecy, andhealing, is the fastest-growingChristian currentworldwide (Miller et al. 2013).With its ability to adapt to local contexts, absorbing instead of disregardingexisting religious worldviews and ‘translating’ its core tenets to meet a rangeof cultural expectations, it has successfully spread around the globe and par-ticularly taken root in the Global South (Afolayan et al. 2018; Robbins 2004).Observers generally distinguish three phases in the history of Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity: (1.) ‘Classical’ Pentecostalism, which emerged at thebeginning of the 20th century in different parts of the world, including inthe United States in the context of the Asuza Street Revival (1906–1915) in LosAngeles; (2.) Charismatic Renewalmovements, especially but not exclusively inthe Roman Catholic Church, which gainedmomentum through contacts withPentecostalism since the 1960s; and (3.) neo-Pentecostalism (or neo-Charis-Maren Freudenberg: Social Forms in Neo-Pentecostal Prosperity Contexts 209matic Christianity), a ‘softer’ reinterpretation of classical Pentecostalism thatemerged starting in the 1980s and emphasizes healing and self-empowerment(Bowler 2013; Hunt 2002).There are a number of different statistics and reports on howmany peopleidentify as Pentecostal-Charismatic Christians; a rough consensus seems tobe that at least 500million people worldwide exhibit some degree of self-iden-tification with this broad tradition. The World Christian Encyclopedia’s thirdedition counts 644 million members globally: 230 million in Africa, 195 millionin Latin America, 125 million in Asia, 68 million in North America, 21 millionin Europe, and 4.5 million in Australia and Oceania (Johnson/Zurlo 2020);other general sources count e.g. 450 million Pentecostals and Charismaticsworldwide plus an additional 200 million Christians strongly influenced byPentecostal-Charismatic Christianity, including Evangelicals with a focus ontheHoly Spirit (Jacobsen 2021). In her extensive study on the Prosperity Gospelin the United States, Kate Bowler reports that 17% of all US Christians identifywith prosperity teachings, while 31% believe that God increases the wealth ofthose who give (2013, 6).Clearly, thus, Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity is an influential tra-dition in the Americas and, to a lesser extent, in Europe, and prosperityteachings play an increasingly large role in Asia, Africa, the Americas, andbeyond. Because the prosperity gospel originated in the United States and hasbecome similarly popular in Latin America in recent decades, the empiricalexamples this chapter draws from are largely located in the Americas, also tomatch the present volume’s geographical focus. The following section offersa brief overview of the history and main tenets of prosperity theologies be-fore we turn to our discussion of social forms in neo-Pentecostal prosperitycontexts in the remainder of the chapter.2. Neo-Pentecostal prosperity teachingsAt the heart of prosperity teachings lies the conviction that God will rewardbelievers with health and wealth for generous gifts to their churches and fora variety of other monetary and spiritual investments. Adherents are taughtto expect multiple returns on what they give: material wealth, physical andemotional health, and a generally prosperous, “abundant” life. For this reason,prosperity theologies are often called the “health and wealth gospel”, althoughobservers have long since emphasized the heterogeneous nature of prosper-210 Social Forms of Religionity teachings around the globe (Coleman 2017; Hunt 2002). Coleman suggeststhinking of “Prosperity discourse as manifested less in a single Gospel per se,andmore in a set of ethical practices that canbe combined and reconstituted inverydifferent cultural contexts, andwhichmay in factwork throughambiguityandplayasmuchas through theexpressionof apparentlyfirmandexclusive re-ligious convictions” (2016, 276–277). Very generally, he argues, “prosperity ori-entation is constituted by ritual activity that establishes links between formsof giving and the creation of value” (Coleman 2017, 62–63). In the prosperityframework, the believer becomes an investor with the goal not only of spiri-tual salvation but of access to the secular market as a sign of this-worldly di-vine election. As elaborated below, economic risk-taking is increasingly codedas conviction of God’s power to change adherents’ lives for the better, whilesuccess in themarketplace translates into an indicator of divine grace.The fol-lowing overview of the origins and development of global prosperity theolo-gies takes these assumptions as a point of departure to emphasize their widevariety at the same time as stressing core commonalities in order to focus, inthe following section, on the various social forms, particularly the market ex-change, that emerge in neo-Pentecostal prosperity contexts.Prosperity theologies also run under the heading of “Word of Faith”, thename of a Pentecostal current that was coined by American evangelist Ken-neth Hagin (Coleman 2016, 279). According to Harrison, Word of Faith con-sists of three core elements: Believers must (1) learn “who they are in Christ”and (2) practice “positive confession” to (3) be rewarded with prosperity, divinehealth, andmaterialwealth (2005,8–12).They are taught that because theBiblepromises a life of “abundance” for the faithful – “God loves a cheerful giver”(2 Corinthians 9:7); “Give and it will be given unto you” (Luke 6:38); “My Godwill supply every need of yours according to his riches of glory in Christ Je-sus” (Philippians 4:19); etc. (cf. Yong 2016) –, they must fully accept this factas a kind of contract between themselves and God, never calling it into doubtand thus not accepting poverty and suffering as their lot in life. Instead, theyare to cultivate an optimistic mindset which focuses on how “blessed” they areand to affirm this attitude out loud wherever possible.The belief in the trans-formational power of words lies at the heart of positive confession: “Membersare encouraged to always be vigilant concerning the power their words carry inshaping their thinking and their subsequent lives or realities. […] Mental dis-cipline, mental ‘hygiene,’ or self-censorship, should be an ongoing practice asdemonstrationof one’s faith” (Harrison2005, 10–11).Through thesemeans,ad-herents argue, health, wealth, and prosperity can be attained by anyone. ThisMaren Freudenberg: Social Forms in Neo-Pentecostal Prosperity Contexts 211line of reasoning can be seen as the smallest commondenominator of prosper-ity theologies, their broad variety notwithstanding.Prosperity theologies began emerging in neo-Pentecostal congregationsin the United States during the 1980s and 1990s, but their roots lie in certainways of thinking about spiritual power and the power of the mind at theturn of the 19th to the 20th century. In particular, New Thought (an 1870soffshoot of Christian Science emphasizing the power of thought and speech),classical Pentecostalism of the early 20th century, and the pragmatism, in-dividualism, and “mythology of uplift” that American society is known for,including African American spiritualism, shaped prosperity theologies asthey exist today (Bowler 2013, 11). Norman Vincent Peale’s 1952 bookThe Powerof Positive Thinking is considered as influential a source as televangelist OralRobert’s “seed faith” concept, which laid the groundwork for more recententrepreneurial, risk-taking varieties of prosperity discourse. Bowler arguesthat, in contrast to the biblically prescribed tithe of 10 per cent of one’s income,which can be seen as a secure investment as it constitutes part of a largeramount one has already received, seed faith money presents an additionaldonation that adds risk in the hopes of increasing returns (Bowler 2013: 67;cf. also Coleman 2017: 56–57). This idea has led to increasingly risky financialinvestment on part of prosperity adherents in the last decades with the aimof overcoming material poverty, physical suffering, and spiritual self-doubt,including in the Global South (Hunt 2002; Coleman 2016; Chesnut 2016).While the growing popularity of prosperity churches around theworld– incountries such as Brazil,Guatemala,Colombia, and other Latin American con-texts, but also in Sub-SaharanAfrica,East Asia, Southeast Asia, and, to a lesserextent, Eastern Europe – can be interpreted against the backdrop of the globaldissemination of American religious and secular (i.e. capitalist) values (e.g.Brouwer et al. 1997), it is crucial to realize that prosperity churches in theGlobalSouth have long become religious actors in their own right that shape not onlytheir own local and regional contexts in distinct ways but also strongly influ-ence the international neo-Pentecostal scene throughworldwidemissionizing(e.g. Afolayan et al. 2018; Hunt 2000). For instance, the Brazilian Igreja Uni-versal do Reino deDeus, the Universal Church of the Kingdomof God (UCKG),Latin America’s largest neo-Pentecostal denomination, has meanwhile estab-lished a visible presence in southern Africa (Freston 2005).What is the worldwide appeal of prosperity churches? The promise ofhealth, wealth, and “abundance” is obviously compelling to many, particularlybut not exclusively the lower strata of global society (Attanasi/Yong 2016). It212 Social Forms of Religionseems to resonate in contexts of both material (absolute) deprivation, suchas in the Global South, and of relative (perceived) deprivation, such as in themore affluent societies of the Global North (Hunt 2002), promising access to“the secular market not only as an enabler of open commerce but also as asomewhat exclusive space to which access is restricted but desired” (Coleman2017: 52). In fact, prosperity theologies are attracting an increasing number ofmiddle-class adherents with their promise of upward social mobility, includ-ing better jobs, better pay, no more loans and debt, and so forth (Marti 2008;Harrison 2005). Itsmessages are aimed at individuals (not at families, congre-gations, or communities) andmay also encompass typical middle-class issuessuch as ameliorating circumstances in the workplace as well as improvingone’s social or romantic life. Chesnut notes that prosperity theologies’ focuson health and healing is especially welcomed in contexts where themajority ofadherents perform hard labor and do not have access to basicmedical benefitssuch as sick leave and health care, while neo-Pentecostal exorcisms to driveout sickness are increasingly popular in the Global South as they dovetail withindigenous beliefs (2016: 221).Whether the context is one of absolute or relative deprivation, it is impor-tant to note that the individualist ethos of prosperity theologies is at completeodds with more communally oriented interpretations of Christianity, such asCatholic Liberation Theology with its focus on communal justice and funda-mental systemic change. In contrast, prosperity theologies emphasize indi-vidual “empowerment” by offering believers, who are usually the receivers ofcharity and assistance, the opportunity to “become active investors often in thesame institution that facilitated a miracle in their lives or even helped themturn their lives around” (Chesnut 2016: 219).They are clearly stronglymaterial-ist in orientation, promotingwhat has been called “a kind of consumer ‘instan-tism’ […] that prosperity and health is the automatic divine right of all bible-believing [sic] Christians” (Hunt 2002: 16).While prosperity teachings certainlyperpetuate the global capitalist order, they are at the same timemore complexthan simply a ‘neoliberalization of religion’; for better or worse, the prosperityframework arguably grantsmoral agency to believers towork towards alleviat-ing their own poverty through themarket. Adherents believe that they are em-powered by God to change their own circumstances by way of vocalizing theirconvictions of the better life that is in store for them and demonstrating thedepth of their faith by spending money with the firm expectation of a multi-tudeofdivine rewards.Although there is no statistical evidenceof overall socialMaren Freudenberg: Social Forms in Neo-Pentecostal Prosperity Contexts 213benefits fromprosperity teachings and practices, their popularity continues toremain high on a global scale (Ukah 2020; Soboyejo 2016; Chesnut 2016).While early prosperity theologies were more miracle-based and other-worldly in orientation, observers are noting subtle shifts in current prosperitydiscourses around the globe that increasingly emphasize this-worldly salva-tion. Cornelio and Media argue that giving and positive confession are, to acertain extent, a thing of the past; now, adherents are expected to developinvestment and financialmanagement skills with the goal of increasing finan-cial revenue and freedom from debt. This new “prosperity ethic”, accordingto them, “promotes an individualized work ethic, backed by a religious con-viction that promises financial returns” and is characterized by two mainfeatures: “sacralizing self-help and celebrating consumption” (Cornelio/Medina2021, 65; italics in original). The first includes achieving individual prosperitythrough one’s own means instead of waiting for God to intervene, while thesecond refers not only to financial prosperity but, quite explicitly, to spendingand consuming as a marker of a happy, fulfilled life. They argue that the newprosperity ethic “has three dimensions: the morality of the market (believingright), the prescribed mindset (thinking right), and the practical skills toaccumulate wealth (doing it right)” (ibid.: 72). Joel Osteen, senior pastor ofAmerica’s largest megachurch, is a forerunner of the prosperity ethic in thissense (Freudenberg 2024; Freudenberg et al. 2020), which has meanwhilespread around the globe.Bartel (2021) has shownhow spending and consump-tion – to the point ofmaximizing one’s credit card and running high debts – isconsidered a sign of absolute faith and trust in God in Columbia, while Ijaolanotes “a shift from the ‘claim it and have it’ prosperity formula to ‘work it andhave it’ by faith” in Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years (2018: 153).Analytical investigations of the development of prosperity theologies havefocused, on the one hand, on themarketization of religion and society, and, onthe other, on convictions regarding capacity for change on part of individuals(Medina/Cornelio 2021).This contribution understands itself as located in theformer line of investigation, given its focus on social forms as an expressionof religious structure and the market exchange as a particularly salient formof social interaction in prosperity contexts.The following section beginswith abrief overviewof the concept of social form, referring to the volume’s introduc-tion for amore detailed discussion, before presenting the various social formsthat are evident in neo-Pentecostal prosperity contexts.214 Social Forms of Religion3. Social forms of religion in neo-Pentecostal prosperity contextsThe introduction to this volume defines social forms very generally as ways inwhich individuals coordinate social interaction, and social forms of religionsubsequently as ways of coordinating interaction in the religious field.This in-cludes not only religious interaction per se, as in during a worship service orgroup prayer, but also the ‘background coordination’ that makes religious in-teraction possible, such asmaintaining a congregation or organizing an event.Social forms of religion are thus located at the meso level of society, betweenthe macro andmicro levels, where mediation between individuals and societyat large occurs and the dynamics of communitization, of deepening interper-sonal connections in the process of coordinating religious practice, come to thefore (Ludwig/Heiser 2014).The introduction offers an overviewof various typologies of religious socialforms, includingMaxWeber’s ideal types of church and sect (Weber 2011 [1905]);Ernst Troeltsch’s (1960 [1912]) expansion of Weber’s work and his addition ofmysticism as a third type; H. Richard Niebuhr’s (1929 [2005]) addition of de-nomination as an attempt to apply Troeltsch’s typology to the American context;Howard Becker’s (1940) alternative expansion of Troeltsch’s work that includesecclesia, sect, denomination, and cult; Bryan Wilson’s (1970) sevenfold sub-typol-ogy of sects; Roy Wallis’s (2019) distinction between world-affirming, world-rejecting, and world-accommodating cults; and Stark and Bainbridge’s (1985)distinction between church, sect and cult. Instead of drawing on the typolo-gies proposed byWeber andTroeltsch and subsequently expandedby other au-thors, however, this chapter draws from newer perspectives on social forms inthe sociology of religion which also look toward organizational sociology forinspiration.One of these is Beyer’s distinction between organized religion, politicizedreligion, social movement religion, and communitarian/individualistic re-ligion (Beyer 2003), which draws on organization, movement, and group asthree types of social forms of religion. Following a slightly different approach,Krech et al. (2013) view group (or community), organization, and marketexchange as the three main social forms of religion and add movement andevent as two further sub-types. Similarly, Heiser and Ludwig (2014) presentfive social forms of religion: organizations, networks (including movements),communitization (or group dynamics), marketization, and eventization (theincreasing importance of religious events) .The following discussion on differ-ent social forms that are evident in neo-Pentecostal prosperity contexts drawsMaren Freudenberg: Social Forms in Neo-Pentecostal Prosperity Contexts 215from this and other literature to show that a range of social forms shape neo-Pentecostal religion and are in turn influenced by prosperity ideologies.In neo-Pentecostalism, congregations and small groups (such as Biblestudies, prayer groups, and a range of other groups) are crucial: It is here thatpeople come together to affirm and celebrate their beliefs, strengthen theirsocial relationships, provide mutual support, and findmeans of accessing thedivine in community. While these characteristics apply to religious congre-gations in general, the group is inevitably an important social form in neo-Pentecostalism. Here, prosperity teachings are disseminated among mem-bers and legitimated by way of shared practices, such as worship as a central,formalized ritual with its elements of preaching, prayer, and testimony, onthe one hand, as well as through informal personal ties and close emotionalbonds, on the other. In addition, weekly worship as a communitizing and le-gitimizing ritual can be conceived of as an event as a spatially, temporally, andsocially condensed form of communal religious experience which transportsparticipants out of the realm of the everyday and offers an extra-ordinary,cathartic experience (Hitzler 2011; Gebhardt 2018). Again, this social form isnot exclusive to neo-Pentecostalism, being characteristic of other emotional,ecstatic traditions in andbeyondChristianity. In prosperity contexts, however,the worship service and especially the sermon have the important functionof elaborating the prosperity message and driving it home through specificperformative and rhetoric strategies (cf. Freudenberg 2024 for an example).At the same time, neo-Pentecostal congregations are usually embeddedin an organizational context that provides the necessary personnel, struc-tures, and resources to offer worship services and other forms of service tothe community as well as to maintain staff, a building, and so on. This so-cial form of organization may take the shape of a denomination, such as theAssemblies of God in the United States or the Igreja Universal do Reino deDeus (‘Universal Church of the Kingdom of God’) in Brazil. But there are alsoa multitude of non-denominational neo-Pentecostal congregations, manyof them megachurches with an attendance of thousands of participants perweekend (cf. Thumma/Travis 2007), that are small organizations in them-selves. Besides providing structures and resources for congregations, thesedenominations or non-denominational church organizations also facilitateaccess to (or are themselves nodes in) larger networks as channels for the fur-ther dissemination of prosperity theologies worldwide. As Coleman observeson organizational features of neo-Pentecostalism the United States,216 Social Forms of Religiona loosely knit organization called the International Convention of FaithChurches and Ministries (ICFCM) has provided some ideological unity inmore recent years, alongside powerful educational establishments suchas Oral Roberts University and Kenneth Hagin’s Bible School, both basedin Tulsa, Oklahoma. And yet, no single church form or organization hasheld definitive sway. For instance, the suburban, middle-class, post-de-nominational megachurch phenomenon of the late twentieth and earlytwenty-first centuries has provided an important venue for dimensions ofprosperity teaching (2017: 57).Ina similar vein,Harrisoncalls theneo-PentecostalWordofFaithmovement“acontemporaryAmerican religious subculturemadeupof denominationally in-dependent churches,ministries, Bible training colleges and other educationalinstitutions, voluntary organizations and fellowships, information and enter-tainment production facilities, andmassmedia broadcast networks” (2005: 5).So while organizational structures are clearly evident in neo-Pentecostal-ism as a broader field, it also exhibits the characteristics of a network, withflatter hierarchies, decentralized power structures, and a global range. TheBrazilian denomination Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus (‘Universal Churchof the Kingdom of God’) again serves as a good example: It is based in SãoPaulo but has spawned subsidiaries not only throughout the country andregion, but overseas, including in the United States, the United Kingdom,India, and, most importantly, southern Africa (Freston 2005). These ‘sisterchurches’ around the world are connected with each other through variouschannels, including through international conferences to share the latestdevelopments and best practice examples, by way of guest preachers to exposecongregations to different styles of preaching and interpreting the prosperitymessage, but most importantly through the internet and social media. Inthis way, the UCKG is able to integrate a range of different social actors androles on this basis of a common identity, all the while maintaining distinctyet porous boundaries to ensure flexibility in the many different contexts ithas (and continues to) spread to. Other prominent examples of global neo-Pentecostal prosperity networks that operate similarly include the Nigeria-based Redeemed Christian Church of God (Adogame 2004) and the originallyAustralian Hillsong Church (Rocha et al. 2021).As mentioned in the introduction, the social forms of network and move-ment are often understood as somehow related, albeit in different ways, in theliterature (e.g.Ludwig/Heiser2014;Williams2003).Social (including religious)Maren Freudenberg: Social Forms in Neo-Pentecostal Prosperity Contexts 217movements have been defined as networks consisting of group and organiza-tion elements assembled around a collective identity, common goals, and re-source mobilization and aimed at bringing about social (or religious, or po-litical) change (Kern/Pruisken 2018). Neo-Pentecostal prosperity settings havebeen described as taking the social form of “meeting combined with move-ment: coming together while never quite wishing to accept stasis and institu-tionalization” (Coleman 2016: 281). At the same time, observers argue that thedesignation of movement misses the mark, as the term implies more coher-ence than is actually apparent in the field (e.g. Coleman 2017). The breadth ofvariety found in global neo-Pentecostalism – also considering that many neo-Pentecostal congregations are non-denominational instead of being part of alarger denomination (Walton 2016) – should not be underestimated, particu-larly in terms of how it affects the development of its social forms. Hunt em-phasizes that “the designation of this relatively new religious phenomenon asa ‘movement’ is a misnomer, since the distinctive Faith gospel is representedby hundreds of independent ministries which might depart, to one degree oranother, in both practice and doctrine, from the core teachings. What cannotbe doubted, however, is the global significance of theseministries.” (2002: 2). Iagreewith this assessment; although neo-Pentecostalism is often described asa ‘movement’ even in academic literature, the term is not used in a sociologicalbut more in a popular sense, implying development and innovation instead ofstasis.While neo-Pentecostalism is certainly a dynamic field, it lacks the unity– shared identity, goals, and resource mobilization – that would render it acoherent movement from a sociological perspective.In the context of prosperity theologies, the market exchange is a salientsocial form that deserves special attention considering the fact that believersare encouraged to actively invest in their faith, their congregations, and thesecular market as a sign of their conviction that God will reward them with“abundance”. The market exchange involves exchange partners – individualsor groups – that come together for a limited amount of time to negotiateand conduct a transaction. Krech et al. (2013: 55–56) argue that because theexchange is a rational form of interaction, the exchange partners are includedin this social form based on their formal roles and functions, not on theirpersonalities. In slight contrast, Ludwig and Heiser (2014: 6) point out thatboth rational cost/benefit analyses as well as communally negotiated normsand values establish the basis for market exchanges . From the perspective ofmicroeconomics, negotiating norms and values in the process of the markettransaction falls under the individual’s cost/benefit analysis, whichmeans, for218 Social Forms of Religiona discussion of social forms, that the exchange partners are in fact includedbased on their formal roles in the exchange (cf. Freudenberg/Rezania 2023:85–125 for an overview of basic assumptions in microeconomics).In prosperity churches, then, who are the exchange partners?Theymay beconceived of as the believer, on the one hand, and the divine, on the other:The believer invests time and effort to learn “who they are in Christ” and at-tain the skill of positive confession (Harrison 2005: 8–11), and investsmoney inand beyond their congregation to ultimately sow the seeds of health, wealth,and prosperity. This is an inevitably tricky analytical construct from a socialscientific perspective as the divine is of course not a concrete empirical socialagent; but considering that it is the task of the sociology of religion to investi-gate the social consequences of individual and collective religious beliefs,pros-perity theology adherents’ conviction that God responds to and rewards theirinvestments must be taken seriously, also from an analytical vantage point.This means conceptualizing the divine as one ‘partner’ involved in prosperitytransactions. Another way of understanding the partners included in themar-ket exchange in prosperity contexts is the believer, on the one hand, and theircongregation, on the other. In return for the believer’s spiritual and monetaryinvestment, the congregation grants affirmation and legitimacy to the individ-ual’s conviction that God will reward them with a healthy, wealthy, and pros-perous life.The same framework could be applied to the believer and the con-gregation’s pastor:Thepastor as preacher and spiritual guidebut also as amainbeneficiary of donations to the congregation encourages individual believers’investments in return for the promise that God will reward them abundantly.In this case, the pastor represents the rewards promised by the divine in theform of his (or, more seldomly, her) own prosperity.However, prosperity teachings have consequences that extend beyond therealm of the congregation. As adherents are encouraged to “celebrat[e] con-sumption” (Cornelio/Medina2021: 65) by spendingmoneyas a signof ablessed,fulfilled life, by conducting risky financial investments, and even by taking ondebt to show their absolute faith in divine rewards, the social form of markettransaction in prosperity contexts also includes transactions between believ-ers and agents in the secular market.The latter may or may not hold prosper-ity convictions of their own, but secular market transactions become part of alarger set of religious practices from an analytical perspective as soon as be-lievers frame spending money in the secular realm as an act of faith. Whena prosperity adherent is encouraged by their pastor as spiritual guide to in-vest in something as seemingly mundane as, say, new living room furnitureMaren Freudenberg: Social Forms in Neo-Pentecostal Prosperity Contexts 219to demonstrate their conviction that God will abundantly reward their posi-tive, optimistic mindset with health and wealth, the seemingly ‘secular’ act ofbuying furniture is coded religiously, i.e. as a divine investment that will reapmultiple returns (cf. Freudenberg 2024 and Freudenberg et al. 2020 for exam-ples). It is in this sense that prosperity teachings create a kind of ‘double value’through investment: On one level, the believer invests in new furniture, in-creasing the value of their home; on the other, they invest in their religious con-victions, increasing their expectation of manifold returns (cf. Coleman 2017:62–63).We arguably see here the extent to which prosperity semantics correspondto the social forms prosperity practices take. The main tenets of prosperityteachings have come to include not only investments in one’s personal faithand one’s congregation, but also increasingly risky and debt-prone transac-tions on the secular market. The market exchange – conceived of as takingplace between the believer and God, or the congregation, or the pastor, or,importantly, agents in the secular market as exchange partners – is evidentlythe social form of religion best suited to ‘translate’ the central prosperitytenets into concrete social practices, as it allows individuals to interact andcoordinate with one another in a way that gives expression to those religiousideas they, for better or worse, hold most valuable.4. ConclusionThis chapter has focused on neo-Pentecostal prosperity theologies as a distinctyet diverse tradition within Pentecostalism to show the range of social formsthat are evident in the ways that adherents come together to coordinate theirfaith: group, event, organization, network, and market exchange. It has sug-gested that the social form of market exchange is particularly salient in thiscontext due to its correspondence with prosperity semantics: Prosperity the-ologies teach that investment not only in one’s personal faith and one’s con-gregation, but also and importantly in the secular market, will be rewarded byGod in multiple ways – especially with physical and emotional health as wellasmaterial wealth –, and these semantics aremirrored on a structural level bythe market exchange as a form of transaction between two parties. Given thefact that financial risk-taking and success on the secular market are coded re-ligiously as signs of depth of faith and divine grace, themarket exchange com-plements these core tenets by translating semantics into structure, as it were.220 Social Forms of ReligionThis is not to render any of the other social forms discussed above less im-portant; for other dimensions of neo-Pentecostalism, such as community co-hesion or globally organized structures, they remain central. As analytical cat-egories, all of them could (and should) be investigated in more depth againstthe backdrop of the congruence between form and semantics. It is necessaryto keep inmind that religions always exhibit amix of social forms,with impor-tant effects onhowreligions–especially their core ideas–developover time.Inthis sense, a closer investigation of the tension between community and indi-vidualism in neo-Pentecostalism would further our understanding regardingthe importance of the social form of group and the dynamics of communitiza-tion just asmuch as an investigation of the logistical structures that undergirdneo-Pentecostal denominations and megachurches would further our under-standing of the centrality of organization andnetwork as social forms.The cor-respondence between semantics and structure is thus not limited to a singlesocial form; this chapter has highlighted the market exchange in the effort ofmaking an indent in the larger work on social forms to be done in and beyondthe neo-Pentecostal field.BibliographyAdogame, Afe (2004): “Contesting the Ambivalences of Modernity in a GlobalContext: The Redeemed Christian Church of God, North America.” In:Studies inWorld Christianity 10/1, pp. 25–48.Afolayan, Adeshina/Yacob-Haliso, Olajumoke/Falola, Toyin (eds.) 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(1970): ReligiousSects: ASociological Study,London:Weiden-feld & Nicolson.Yong, Amos (2016): “A Typology of Prosperity Theology: A Religious Econ-omy of Global Renewal or a Renewal Economics?” In: Katherine Attanasi/Amos Yong (eds.), Pentecostalism and Prosperity:The Socio-Economics ofthe Global Charismatic Movement, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.15–33.Pentecostal Social Engagementin Contemporary GuatemalaVirginia GarrardAbstract This essay explores emerging social forms in the context of Pentecostal socialengagement in the Central American nation of Guatemala. It explores why in this spe-cific context, evangélicos and Pentecostals in particular have begun to develop new socialforms and hermeneutics of social transformation. Guatemala has undergone a tectonicepistemological shift from a post-temporal, apocalyptic orientation to one that is presen-tist and instrumentalist in its outlook. Pentecostals in recent decades have transitionedfrom an eschatological hermeneutics of separation from the world to one that embracessocial and political participation, cohering, in the process, into social forms that empha-size collectivemobilizationandparticipation.This evolution of religious social forms cor-responds to a shifting emphasis in religious ideals and theologies that become self-rein-forcing logics within the vertical and horizontal networks of the church. Pastors buildstrong vertical patriarchal relations with their congregants, and they purposefully en-courage strong lateral networks within “small groups,” formed around different affini-ties, such as geography, interest, age,marital status, or demographic, that strengthen thegroup cohesion of the church as both a community and as an institution As these socialrelationships evolve, they transform the role of the church as an organization to one ofincreased, outward-facing social action. This chapter posits that this transition evincesan evolution of evangélico social forms.These differ in fundamental ways from classicalPentecostalism, which reified insularity, to modern social forms that adhere to religiousvalues that they believe compel them to action.Keywords Guatemala, hermeneutics, Latin America, Pentecostalism, social forms, so-cial groups, social mobilization, theology226 Social Forms of Religion1. IntroductionIn 1990, theUSanthropologistDavidStoll publishedanearly studyon the rapidexpansion of Protestantism, and specifically Pentecostalism, in Latin Amer-ica entitled Is Latin America Turning Protestant? The Politics of Evangelical Growth(1990).The book’s subtitle exposed an expectation as to the implications of re-ligious conversion that pervadesmuchof the literature to the present day.Bothscholars and popular observers of Pentecostalism in Latin America have oftendefined the religion’s function as one that is or should be, fundamentally polit-ical and socially engaged.This work will explore how and why in the specific context of the CentralAmerican nation of Guatemala, evangélicos (used here in the Spanish sense todescribe all Protestants, not only ‘Evangelicals,’ as the termmeans in English),and Pentecostals in particular, have begun to shift their individual and groupreligious understandings, as well as their own and institutional expectations,from staunch apoliticism to a new hermeneutics of social engagement. Dur-ingwhat the noted British-Brazilian sociologist Paul Freston (1994) designatedas the ‘first wave’ of wholesale conversions in Guatemala – roughly, the 1970sand 1980s, during the nation’s civil war – these ‘Classical’ Pentecostals wereperhaps the least likely of any sector to get involved in politics or political ac-tion of any kind. In sharp contrast, many of today’s Pentecostals believe thattheir beliefs compel them to action (cf. Garrard-Burnett 2012). Pentecostals inrecent decades have transitioned from an eschatological hermeneutics of sep-aration from the world to one that embraces social and political participation,cohering, in the process, into social forms that emphasize collective mobiliza-tion and participation.This evolution of religious social forms corresponds toa shifting emphasis in religious ideals and theologies. As these social relation-ships evolve, they transform the role of the church as an organization –whichpreviously prioritized insularity – to one of increased, outward-facing socialaction.I posit that this transition evinces an evolution of evangélico social forms.These differ in fundamental ways from Classical Pentecostalism. Concepts ofpersonhood and theological concerns throughout Latin America, even as re-cently as the 1980s, were fixated upon end times prophecies and the centralityof the salvationnarrativeswithin a social universe that they called “the church,”but in practice, consisted of many disaggregated denominations and individ-ual congregations.These religious groupswere connected only by a shared em-brace of key charismatic theological beliefs and somatic practices, specifically,Virginia Garrard: Pentecostal Social Engagement in Contemporary Guatemala 227an emphasis on “baptism in the Holy Spirit”, manifest by “gifts”, such as faithhealing and speaking in tongues.Classical Pentecostalism was extraordinarily atomized and highly indi-vidualized, as believers established their bona fides not by joining a specificchurch, but in their individual abilities to performatively manifest Charis-matic virtues such as offering individual conversion stories and engaging inecstatic behavior during worship services. A third characteristic of Classi-cal Pentecostalism was its centrifugal tendency, as any individual memberwho had a unique Charismatic vision or heterodox theological perspective,regardless of his or (less commonly her) training or experience as a pastor,could and often did break off to start their own church, taking sectors of theirhome congregation with them. These factors all conspired to make ClassicalPentecostalism in Latin America dynamic, but also very fragile in terms ofsocial cohesion, and the churches weak in their collective efficacy as socialorganizations.All this has changed over the past three or four decades, as the dynamismof Pentecostalismhas generated new theologies that are presentist rather thaneschatological in orientation, and which emphasize new technologies of self(self-improvement,capacity-building,education,wealth acquisition,andcon-sumerism, leadership training) instead of focusing on the imminent SecondComingofChrist, theprophetic vaticination that animated their predecessors.The scholarly literature refers to this orientation as ‘neo-Pentecostalism’, anetic designation that few believers or pastors would utilize or even recognize;nevertheless, it is thedominant religious strain inGuatemalanPentecostalism,as it is in most of Latin America.Neo-Pentecostalism encourages and flourishes in large mega-churches.These types of churches typically gravitate around the Charismatic leader-ship of a single pastor, who often presides with his wife or other close familymembers as leadership affiliates. Pastors build strong vertical patriarchalrelations with their congregants, and they purposefully encourage stronglateral networks within “small groups” (a term of art used in the churches);some congregations call these grupos celulares, or cellular groups, reflecting theaspiration that the groups reproduce themselves like cells undergoingmitosisin a living organism. Small groups form around different affinities, such asgeography, interest, age, marital status, or demographic, that strengthen thegroup cohesion of the church as both a community and as an institution.Thegroups function as a social formation designed to encourage strong horizontalinterpersonal relationships among group members. At the same time, they228 Social Forms of Religionreinforce horizontal, patriarchal relations between the groups and the churchas an institution as embodied by the pastor; these horizontal and verticalrelations stabilize the structure of the church and the authority of its leader.This is especially crucial in a very large church such as Guatemala’s Frater-nidad Cristiana, for example, which boasts an average Sunday attendance of12.000 at services (cf. Célulares Fráter 2023).In a congregation that is the size of a small town,manymembersmayneverotherwise have an opportunity to have a personal relationship with or even ex-perience a one-on-one conversationwith their pastor. But the small groups, asper Simmel, help to establish a relationship of super- and subordination thatmakes the believer predisposed to be bound by their pastor’s mandates andteachings (1909: 289–322).Horizontal groups encourage interpersonal relationships between friendsand families, and small groups form close and coherent social groups; theseconnect and overlapwith one another, thus reinforcing the church’s hegemonyacross the totality of amember’s life.These connections, at least in theory, pro-vide for the believer and their family on every level of human need: friendship,career connections, financial education, leadership training, education,moraledification, support in life’s sufferings, and, lest we forget, salvific assurancesthrough involvement in the church. Churches, as organizations, typically al-low members to come and go at will, but even deeply disillusioned membersare socialized to such an extent that they often find it difficult to challenge theleadership or to leave the comprehensiveworld that the church provides, alongwith the social groups within it (Schmidt 2019; Alexander 2012: 1049–1078).Neo-Pentecostal pastors typically have a higher degree of religious train-ing than their Classical Pentecostal counterparts (although this is by nomeansa sine qua non to be a pastor, as charism and the ability to rally a congrega-tion are the key qualifications for the job).They are usually connected to otherpastors through regional, national, and even international Pentecostal nodesand networks. Through these, they are aware of and responsive to new cur-rents and trends in their field. In this respect, Pentecostalism, displays ele-ments that mark it as a religio-social movement, even as expressions withina belief and practice within a given congregation are locally derived and con-textualized (Powe 1994).Virginia Garrard: Pentecostal Social Engagement in Contemporary Guatemala 2292. Setting the political contextGuatemala has one of the largest evangélico populations, percentagewise, ofany nation in Latin America. Just over 40 per cent of the population is Protes-tant and the vastmajority of these –upwards of 80 per cent – are Pentecostals,the vigorous legacy of the conversion “boom” of the early 1970s.1The boomwasconcurrent with and in some respects a response to the 36-year-long armedconflict during which Guatemala’s ferociously anti-communist military con-ducted deadly counterinsurgency campaigns against a small but tenaciousleftist armedmovement.The violent nadir of the armed conflict took place in the early 1980s, whenan idiosyncratic neo-Pentecostal general, Efraín Ríos Montt (1982–1983),headed up a full-throttle military campaign to defeat the leftist guerrillas andtheir indigenous supporters. A new convert to Pentecostalism, the generalpublicly advocatedwhat he touted as Christianmoral teachings on corruptionand family values at the same time that he commanded a scorched-earthcampaign in the rural countryside,which also killed, displaced, and terrorizedmany tens of thousands of Maya indigenous peoples (cf. Garrard-Burnett1998). Although many urban elites, non-Mayas, and evangélicos admired RíosMontt, subsequent revelations about the brutality of his regime did much tosully his name and his Pentecostal associations along with it for a time, andfor good reason. The general was convicted of genocide and crimes againsthumanity in 2013. In the words of one Guatemalan pastor, “Like many of mygeneration, I was convinced that if the head of government were healthy (sana)[meaning evangélico], the social-political body would also become healthy. Buthistory has shownus the irrationality of such ideas” (Cajas 2009: unpaginated).Democracy returned to Guatemala in 1986, and the armed conflict con-cluded in 1996. However, Guatemala remains a country where what politicalscientists Guillermo Trejo and Camilo Nieto-Matiz term “criminal wars –armed conflicts by which states fight organized criminal groups and fightamong themselves for control over illicit economies and territories – haveemerged as one of themost lethal types of conflict in the world today, surpass-ing the death toll of the typical civil war of the second half of the twentiethcentury” (2022: 1328). Today, despite small signs of improvement, the nation1 https://www.statista.com/statistics/1067082/guatemala-religion-affiliation-share-type/230 Social Forms of Religioncontinues to struggle with many of the very same social and economic in-equalities that militants in the 1970s and 1980s had sought to bring an end toin the first place.Guatemala’s earlier unresolved social, political, and economic problems inrecent years have been augmented by an intractable array of new challenges,including endemic violent crime (the nation suffers some of the highest ratesof homicide in the world), rampant narcotrafficking, corrupt and ineffec-tive government, deeply engrained racism against the indigenous majority,widespread gang violence, the drain of productive human capital through em-igration, and new inequities resulting from neoliberal economics (cf. Lessing2017; Trejo 2020). The unexpected election of Bernardo Arévalo, a reformistand progressive, to the presidency in August 2023 – if Guatemalan’s politicalelites actually allow him to assume power – promises what Guatemalanscall a nueva primavera, or new spring, for the nation, but genuine progress,even under optimal circumstances, will remain a serious challenge for anygovernment.23. From quiescence to mobilization:Shifts in the Pentecostal worldviewNotwithstanding the extremity of this context, Guatemala’s evangélicos, untilrelatively recently, have kept themselves at a remove from social or politicalaction, both for strategic and theological reasons. Subscribing to a fugamundioutlook (literally, ‘flee the world’), they framed their moral constructs arounda strict binary dividing “the church” and “the world” the former a safe haven ofsalvation, the latter dangerous and sinful. InClassical Pentecostalism, the onlycontact between these two spheres should be through prayer and evangeliza-tion.By contrast, neo-Pentecostals, whose churches started to come of age inGuatemala in the late 1980s, embrace the notion of the manifestation of theHoly Spirit through temporal transformation: theirs is an instrumentalist the-ology that is very much of the here-and-now. Neo-Pentecostalism focuses notonly on healing – a traditional Pentecostal preoccupation – but also promisesfaithful believers wealth and temporal success, a belief known as prosperity2 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-66569014.Virginia Garrard: Pentecostal Social Engagement in Contemporary Guatemala 231theology.Not only in Guatemala but across the Global South, prosperity theol-ogy enjoys enormous appeal in places where urbanization, late-stage capital-ism, and neo-liberalism in the late 20th and 21st centuries have eroded alreadyfragile rural lifeways. In these settings, where traditional saberes (knowledgeand ways of being) gave way, prosperity theology seemed to open up accessto modernity’s enchantments: consumer goods, lucrative employment, socialstability, and respect (cf. Bowler 2018).Neo-Pentecostals believe that God wishes them to have “life abundant”(John 10:10) in ways that are material and quantifiable: to ask God for lessis not merely unwise, but unfaithful. They focus on the improvement of theindividual through prayer and ascetic practices such as fasting; most impor-tantly, they trust in God’s power, which they believe flows to the individual,to his or her family, and then, almost by osmosis, permeates the church, thecommunity, and beyond. God, in the neo-Pentecostal imaginaire, is a directand negotiable agent in every matter of daily life, no matter how mundane oracquisitive.For the proponents of this highly instrumentalist theology, as DanielMíguez has noted, prosperity theology “inverts the moral value of acquisitionand capitalism”: money is no longer “the root of all evil,” (1 Timothy 6:10) buttangible proof of God’s sovereignty and grace (2001: 4). Pastors urge believersto give money and give again to the limits of their abilities and beyond, as asign of their faith that Godwill provide, and do so abundantly, in the exchange.As a form of market exchange, prosperity theology reifies capitalist acquisi-tion and serves as a heuristic through which religious ‘consumers’ enter into asymbolicmarketplace where they are able to purchase, through their faith andtithing, both credence goods (as per Gill) as well as greater access to consumermaterialism (cf. Gill 1998).Thus is resolved the apparent paradox of Pentecostal pastors who displayostentatious wealth –well-tailored suits, expensive cars, fine homes, even pri-vate planes – purchased with believers’ tithes and ‘widow’s mites.’ Prosperitytheology’s devotees see these things not as signs of decadence, but rather aspositive affirmation of blessing: it is a powerful signifier of the potential good-ness available to every believer who seeks it. Within the world of prosperitytheology, awell-coiffed pastor with an elegantwife clothed in designer apparelanda secondhome inMiami is a living testament to thegood life abundant thatawaits poor and aspiring Central American congregates, for whom economicand social access to capitalism’s enchantments seem otherwise closed off. Be-lievers understand prosperity theology to be a rational market interaction in232 Social Forms of Religionwhich they exchange their time (via church attendance), talent (participation),and above all their treasure (donations), with every expectation that they willbe able to maximize personal gain in return.Within this matrix of understanding, there has not been any real theo-logical space for social justice considerations, because prosperity theology etin se posits a market exchange that promises to bring those who suffer frompoverty and inequality into the shining world of modernity and capitalism (cf.Freudenberg’s chapter in this volume). However, it is important to rememberthat prosperity theology is also an actual theology –that is to say, it is a sys-tematic method of relating to the divine. Because of this, access to the modal-ity is, understandably, religious, through evangelization: spreading the mes-sage of the church and bringing others into the congregation. Evangelizationis paramount to church growth, which is a trope within Guatemalan Pente-costalism, as for Pentecostals, church growth (iglecrecimiento, a neologism thatcombines the Spanish words for ‘church’ [iglesia] and ‘growth’ [crecimiento]) isa quantifiable measure of a church’s vigor, prosperity, and favor in the eyes ofGod. It is, therefore, the critical obligation of all believers to bring individualsin from the cold of the soulless secular world to the warm and sanctified em-brace of the church.And the arms of the church are indeed expansive. Scholars such as Brusco,Mariz, Smilde, and Santos have demonstrated that there are many varietiesof collateral social goods that can accrue from belonging to an Evangelicalchurch – problems with alcohol diminish,machismo is tamed, family violencedecreases, educational levels often increase. This said, after adopting thesevalue-rational (wertrational) behaviors, evangélicos do not distinguish them-selves from others in this regard to the degree that Max Weber, writing fromhis observations on the rise of capitalism in Western Europe, predicted in hiswork the Protestant ethic and on society and economy. Be that as it may, allthese transformations continue to take placewithin the church and the churchfamily, not outside of it (cf.Mariz 1994; Burdick 1993; Brusco 1995; Smilde 2007;Santos 2012).A key aspect of this discourse is that neo-Pentecostal churches encourageself-improvement on all fronts, for which they mandate new technologies ofthe self (Garrard 2020: 191–236).These typically range from dictating mode ofdress to personal comportment, to issues of health (often dealt with by spiri-tual rather thanmedical interventions), to the nature of daily interactionswithfriends and family, hobbies, and pastimes (members may attend church ev-ery single day and devote nearly all their free time to church-related activi-Virginia Garrard: Pentecostal Social Engagement in Contemporary Guatemala 233ties). Danish sociologistMartin Lindhardt underscores the centrality of a Pen-tecostal identity to a believer’s own personhood: “[T]he faith-drenched life ofPentecostals/charismatics and theways inwhich notions of sacred agency andinterference in human affairs pervades their life worlds shape their everydayexperiences and interpretations of events, and enable them to cultivate a cer-tain sense of agency,” he writes. “[A]dherents live their religiosity on an every-day basis” (Lindhardt 2012: 7).The church thus becomes an encompassing universe for a member, colo-nizingmind,body, and spirit for Christ.Churches encouragemembers to con-stantly read devotional and edifying texts and improve their spiritual educa-tion, and they provide training (often in the small groups) for leadership, eco-nomic stewardship, and general capatación (training and empowerment).Neo-Pentecostal churches demonstrably generate substantial amounts of humancapital for theirmembers, as evinced, for example, in the leadership skills theylearn through the church. In the words of Lindhardt, “they create new prac-tical skills and new ways of relating to oneself and the social world,” (2011: 5)although that social world may, in fact, be only as large as the church itself.The church produces a social universe in which interpersonal relations,personal networks, horizontal, and low-hierarchy relations built on a sharedfaith vision and confianza (trust and confidence: a coveted commodity of rareand inestimable value in Guatemala). This function is especially cohesive atthe small group level, although the vertical linkages that membership pro-vides farther up the hierarchy of the church can also be beneficial, not unlikethe practice of compadrazgo (godparent relations) that bound patrons withreciprocal obligations to peasant families in earlier eras. Daniel Levine is oneof several sociologists who have demonstrated that this is particularly truein leadership training and the teaching of executive function skills that menand especially women would likely not learn elsewhere (Levine/Stoll 1997:63–103). But they can alsomake great demands on human capital, as the churchcan become a self-referential loop of meetings, services, small groups, andpeople that absorbs almost all the time, talents, emotions, and attention of itsmembers.In dealing with an outside “world” that they still largely regard as hostileand dangerous, Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal churches have been morewary, even regarding charitable work. Even neo-Pentecostal churches, broadlyspeaking, do not share a common vision with Mainline Christians as to themeaning of Jesus’ teachings about charity or the need to contribute to aworldlysummum bonum, nor do they reify extending a helping hand to the poor and234 Social Forms of Religionneedy outside of their own communities. As Samuel Berberian, a leadingGuatemalan Pentecostal educator, explained tome in a personal conversation:“We have simply not had the theology for that.”34. Toward a Pentecostal hermeneutics of social engagement?4.1 The Seven Mountains of Iglesia El ShaddaiThere is a particular sector of neo-Pentecostalism, however, that claims thisview reflects a limited view of God’s potential to transform: for them, it is ashort conceptual leap from believing that God wishes to upgrade the faithfulbeliever’s economic status to believing that He desires to improve the insti-tutions, economic and social conditions, and governance in which one lives.The argument in favor of the church taking on these challenges is compellingin a place like Guatemala, where corrupt government, a nearly absent rule oflaw, a frail justice system, and the outsize roles played by illegal actors – nar-cotraffickers, gangs, and a venal political-economic elite – have all eroded civilsociety’s ability to uphold its responsibilities to maintain the nation’s publicinstitutions and its people.Guatemala’s example par excellence of activist Pentecostalism is aGuatemala City-based pastor, Dr. Harold Caballeros, who has been willing toventure into this void. In the early post-war years, Caballeros envisioned amuch larger role for himself and his church in transforming Guatemala, withthe larger objective of bringing the entire nation into the Pentecostal fold.Caballeros was founder and pastor of a El Shaddai, a wealthy Guatemala Citymegachurch with a significant presence in other areas of the country. In theearly 1990s, he launched his first large-scale crusade for national reformation,a campaign of prayer and revival called Jesus es Señor de Guatemala. In this na-tional-wide public effort, Caballeros called upon evangélicos – even those whodid not belong to El Shaddai – to pray and fast for the welfare of the nation,calling for the redemption of the nation and call to abundant life, by the graceof God.The Jesus is Lord of Guatemala campaign was an aspirational social move-ment, built on Caballeros’ initiative, but the ideas behind it grew out of an3 Personal conversation, July 28, 2006.Virginia Garrard: Pentecostal Social Engagement in Contemporary Guatemala 235emergent new current within global Pentecostalism known as the New Apos-tolic Reformation (NAR), of which Caballeros was an early proponent and laterknownas a “prophet.”TheNAR is an international Pentecostal/Evangelical net-work that promotes the notion that divine revelation is still unfolding in thecontemporaryworld, and thatGod speaksdirectly tomoderndayprophets andapostles. These men, although there are a few women in the movement, be-lieve they are specifically anointed to help bring their own nations, and indeedthe whole world, under Christ’s authority and governance. This they refer toas bringing “dominion”: leading their nations into a new era where Christianleadership and values will rebuild fallen and sinful societies.Dominion theology digresses from Classical Pentecostalism or even stan-dard neo-Pentecostalism in its willingness – indeed its eagerness – to engagewith the secular world and to flood it with a Christian message that advancesvery conservative and literally-defined “biblical values” (cf. Cowen 2021; Stew-art 2020; Ingersoll 2015; Goldberg 2006; Hedges 2006; Diamond 1995). Whilethe main arena for engagement is in politics, dominionism calls for Evan-gelical domination across seven key areas of influence that they believe formthe bedrock of secular modernity. These are the so-called “Seven Mountains”(7M): 1) faith and religion, 2) politics and government, 3) family, 4) media andcommunications, 5) arts and entertainment, 6) education,and 7) business/eco-nomics. Dominionism calls upon Christians to “invade” and dominate eachof these spheres in order to restore “godly” and “biblical” values to the world(Wallnau/Johnson 2013). By way of example, Paula White, a well-known NorthAmerican pastor, advocate of 7M, and Christian nationalist, rationalized hersupport for Donald Trump’ tendentious January 6, 2021 insurrection in theUnited States by framing it in the language of providential dominion. “Wehave God-given authority,” she stated plainly, “to take over the world”.4The NAR also promotes the tenets of “spiritual warfare”, a wide-spreadpractice in which Pentecostals pray and (literally) exorcise malign beings suchas fallen angels, demonswhich have held people and places in their thrall, thusshutting them off from God’s presence and goodness (O’Neill 2012). This is aPentecostal practice that began in the 1980s and has spread rapidly throughPentecostal networks as a concrete ritual modality, although non-Pentecostalsmight consider it as a metaphoric resistance to social and moral changes that4 Cf. https://www.cbc.ca/radio/day6/mrna-after-covid-19-blowing-up-trump-plaza-crokicurl-history-of-swear-words-and-more-1.5874120/how-a-conservative-christian-movement-became-an-important-part-of-trump-s-political-strategy-1.5874143.236 Social Forms of Religionchallenge traditional cultural and biblical values (such as abortion and same-sex marriage). In parts of Latin America, it is also strongly associated withPentecostal enmity to indigenous- and African-spiritual beliefs and prac-tices that remain active features on the religious landscape of the region. Forexample, spiritual warfare in Brazil is largely directed toward the exorcismof exús and pomba giras and other African spirits (cf. Reuter’s chapter in thisvolume), while in places such as Guatemala, Peru, or Bolivia, where there arelarge indigenous populations, it highlights the targeting of native saints andgods. By contrast, in Argentina, which has the highest rate of psychologistsper capita in the world, spiritual warfare combats mental illness as a spiritualdisease.5For believers themselves, however, these celestial struggles with evil areanything but symbolic: rather, they are physical and concrete. In 1990, for ex-ample,Guatemala’sCaballeros claimed thatworkers on theEl Shaddai church’snew property unearthed an enormous pre-Columbian earthwork of a serpent,which he associated Mesoamerican god Quetzalcoatl. To Pastor Harold, thisdiscovery provided both a soteriological explanation for Guatemala’s troubledhistory and the opportunity for Caballeros to champion his theology, espe-cially since the graven image’s excavation happened to coincide neatly with thelaunch of the Jesus es Señor crusade (cf. Caballeros 2001). Declaring that “ourentire country was dedicated [in 300 BC] to Satan,” Caballeros used the Jesuses Señor platform to call upon all Guatemala to pray fervently for their coun-try to deliver it at last from the power of malevolent Mesoamerican false godsand fallen spirits that had controlled its destiny since even before the arrival ofEuropeans (Stoll 1994: 99).By the turn of the new century, Caballeros expanded his vision of directengagement by neo-Pentecostals in prayer and politics toward the “redemp-tion” of their nation. Here, he moved away from the standard Pentecostalrepertoire of prayer, fasting, and deliverance toward practical interventions inthe lives of church members, intended to build their social and human capitalin a variety of ways, including training in extensive capacitación (capacity-building), self-improvement, and furthering education. All of this took placein small groups connected to the church andwas the lynchpin of the formationof what Caballeros calls “Christian citizenship.” A key aspect of this citizenshipis preparing ordinary people for leadership, whether that be as modest asrunning a small business or as lofty as being summoned to the highest level5 Cf. https://qz.com/734450/almost-everyone-in-buenos-aires-is-in-therapy.Virginia Garrard: Pentecostal Social Engagement in Contemporary Guatemala 237of servanthood, even to the godless world of government or business. AsKevin Lewis O’Neill has shown in his work, City of God: Christian Citizenship inGuatemala (2010a),while Caballeros’ tipping point for national transformationhas remained elusive, the principles of “Christian citizenship,” largely by wayof small prayer and study groups affiliatedwithEl Shaddai,have becomeactivein networks for capacity-building and shared confianza among GuatemalanPentecostals, catapulting members into prominent leadership positions inbusiness and education within the country.Capacitación has benefits not least of all for Pastor Harold himself, whoran for President of Guatemala in two elections. Though unsuccessful bothtimes, his campaign for the presidency in 2011 resulted in his being namedforeign minister in the administration of President Otto Pérez Molina. Afterhis government service, Caballeros continued to expand his influence acrossalmost every sphere of the Seven Mountain Mandate. While his wife, Cecilia,continued as the head pastor of the 12.000member El Shaddai church that hefounded (which remains the spiritual home ofmany government and businessleaders), Caballeros actively expanded his portfolio. He served as founder andrector of Universidad San Pablo, Guatemala’s largest Evangelical university,the mission of which is to train professionals in Christian moral values andprinciples in order to become “agents of transformation in the society they livein;” he became president and founder of Radio Visión Corporation, a networkof twenty five Evangelical radio stations; he is founder and former directorof FUEDES (Fundación Educative El Shaddai), a system of Christian schoolsin rural areas of the country “designed to inculcate a worldview of values andprinciples that affect the nation,” and, along with his wife, headed “Manos deAmor,” a church-affiliated development program that works in rural areas (ElShaddai 2010: unpaginated).On top of all this, Caballeros is also the founder of a political party calledVision con Valores (VIVA), which in 2015 ran Zury Ríos, an Evangelical Chris-tian and daughter of the genocidal general of the early 1980s, at the head ofits ticket.6 Caballeros also served as facilitator for Guatemala’s ‘Vision Plan’(Plan Visión de País), a UNESCO-sponsored initiative which consolidated therole of political parties as interlocutors between society and state during the2020 presidential regime (Caballeros 2001).6 Cf. https://www.as-coa.org/articles/six-numbers-understand-guatemalas-surprising-2023-general-election-results.238 Social Forms of ReligionFor a longmoment, Caballeros’ successful summiting of all the Dominion-ism’s Seven Mountains seemed to have made him a bellwether of Pentecostalsocial mobilization and political ascendency. His star continued to rise untiltwo events – the disclosure of offshore bank accounts and commercial realestate holdings in Miami he had purchased with church monies in 2016, fol-lowed by his injury in a near-fatal traffic accident while traveling in Germanyin September 2022 – tumbled him from the summits of success.7And yet, the rise and fall of Harold Caballeros serves as a rich case study,perhaps even an archetype, for a new type of leader in Latin America: thatof a well-connected and influential religious leader who successfully uses hisnetworks, suasion, and connections to articulate and implement a social andpolitical program that advances Pentecostal religious values and ambitions.We can see Caballeros’ successes mirrored elsewhere across the continentin the influence of highly visible, well-connected religious actors in Brazil,Bolivia, Mexico, and elsewhere in the region. We need only look toward thestrong support that Brazil’s former president Jair Bolsonaro received frompowerful megachurch pastors such as Edir Macedo and Silas Malafaia; or tothe influence that Mexico’s evangélicos wielded in demanding that Mexico’sleftist president Andres López Obrador’s administration issue a nationalcartilla moral (moral primer) in return for their support; or to the prominentrole that evangélicos played in Bolivia in the ouster of Evo Morales during hisattempt to remain in the presidency in 2019 to see that the days of quiescentPentecostal leadership is long past (cf. Cowen 2021).4.2 Centro EsdrasNotwithstanding decades of prayer and fasting, Guatemala remains a deeplytroubled nation, as far from the tipping point of redemption as ever, and evenfor evangélicos, this is a paradox that is impossible to ignore.With this inmind,in July 2009,Centro Esdras, an evangélico non-profit organization founded by apastor named Israel Ortiz, convened a meeting of Evangelical and Pentecostalpastors in Guatemala City. The conference theme, Rostros del Protestantismo enGuatemala (Faces of Protestantism in Guatemala) did not hint at the event’s7 Cf. https://www.evangelicodigital.com/sociedad/24339/harold-caballeros-sufrio-un-accidente-en-alemania; https://cmiguate.org/iglesias-politica-y-millones-de-dolares-harold-caballeros-y-los-panamapapers/; https://www.businessobserverfl.com/news/2016/may/27/stay-classy/.Virginia Garrard: Pentecostal Social Engagement in Contemporary Guatemala 239subtle but urgent agenda, which was to establish a framework for developinga theology for Evangelical social engagement en su propia manera (in their ownway). In contrast toCaballeros’ Jesus esSeñor initiative andChristian citizenshipprojects, which were driven by Caballeros’ charisma and his 7M aspirations,Ortiz drew his inspiration from the issue that Berberian (above) articulated:the lack of a Pentecostal theology of social consciousness.At the time,Ortiz’swas aunique vision to redirect andmobilizePentecostalsocial potential by channeling evangelicos’ value-driven rational behaviors tohelp address secular society’s most dire problems. Ortiz’s proposal hoped tobuild on conventional Pentecostal beliefs and priorities, but it also embraced amuchmore capacious viewofwhat constituted the body andboundaries of ‘thechurch’. Specifically, Ortiz envisaged, per Turner, the building of communitasby creating a more porous membrane between the church and secular world8(Turner 1969: 96).This task was doubly complicated not only in that it requireda radical re-reading of Guatemalan evangélico theology, but it also demandeda high degree of coordinated organizational decision making that seems al-most impossible, given the highly disaggregatednature ofGuatemalanProtes-tantism and Pentecostalism in particular (cf. Starkloff 1997).Despite these known challenges, Ortiz threw down the conceptual gaunt-let in very specific terms: “Are we feeling we are the salt and light of the world?Are we conscious of the moral and ethical role that the Gospel demands of usin society?”, he asked the group. “Why have we not hadmore of an impact on acountry that is plagued by violence, corruption, poverty, and inequality, etc.?”Ortiz challenged his colleagues to ask themselves to entertain the question ofwhy fervent prayer alone had not saved the nation. “We continue to grabblewith theories and practices of mission,” he argued, “that reduce the Gospel toa spiritual force and leave aside the challenge to affect all dimensions of life”(Ortiz 2009: unpaginated). The conference attracted a wide variety of churchleaders, representing some 400 different denominations. As one rural pastorplaintively calledout fromtheaudience,succinctly summarizingupCentroEs-dras’ challenge, “How many churches have we built? How many Bible studies,how many small groups? And yet this country still continues to get worse andworse. Isn’t it time for us to ask if God wants us to domore?”98 Turner uses this word to describe, “society as an unstructured or rudimentarily struc-tured undifferentiated comitatus [Latin: “retinue”] or even communion of equal indi-viduals who submit together to the authority of ritual authority.”9 Quote taken from fieldnotes at conference on July 29, 2009.240 Social Forms of ReligionMarco Tulio Cajas, a well-known Guatemalan pastor, spoke to this ques-tion directly, explicitly critiquing the churches’ “anti-society” discourse as bothimpeding the advance of the faith and as patently disingenuous. “We pray forthe authorities in power, and yet we are contemptuous of public life and thosewho take part in it,” he noted. “We need solid argumentation [for social en-gagement] and innovative ideas that will permit us to be more audacious andcreative in the transformation of society.” Cajas, too, called for what he termeda “theology of public life,” wherein “the churches as community of faith, mo-tivate, equip, and support their members to reinterpret public life and to actwithin it as agents of social and political transformation” (Cajas 2009: unpagi-nated).Even as the conference generated enthusiasm among its participants, itdid not transform Guatemalan Pentecostalism overnight. But it did help tocoalesce social groups of like-minded pastors and other religious actors (suchas faculty at the Guatemala City-based Seminario Teológico Centroamericano)by opening venues for communication that allowed them to safely explorenew hermeneutics of social engagement and to consider new social formsthat might pave the path to change. This process is of yet incomplete, butin the years since the conference took place, we can see a more expansivesocial hermeneutics has emerged inGuatemalan Pentecostalism in several keyareas. Church efforts are most visible in those areas of need where the feebleGuatemalan state has failed to provide even basic services for its people andsome, perhaps, have grown weary of waiting for the soteriological unfoldingof the redemption.4.3 Hermeneutics in action: Pentecostal social forms against violenceBy way of example, Guatemalan sociologist Claudia Dary (2016) writes aboutthe community campaigns against domestic violence conducted by the Iglesiade Dios Evangélio Completo (IDEC) (a “classical” Pentecostal denomination),demonstrating ways that the church has been particularly adept at developingnew biblically based strategies by which women and men learn to cope withviolence in the home. The IDEC’s Baja la Voz (literally: “lower your voice”) pro-gram both empowers women (and some men)who belong to the church to speakup against abuse, and for abusers to learn newways to control their anger andincrease respect for their partners, providing templates for what the churchcalls “biblical alternatives tomachismo” (Dary 2016: 100).Virginia Garrard: Pentecostal Social Engagement in Contemporary Guatemala 241Sociologist Robert Brenneman (2012) is among themost prominent schol-ars who has written about other Pentecostal social interventions that havemetwith success;Brenneman’s research focuseson religiouswithprogramsamonggang members. Although it is patently dangerous work, this type of ministryappeals to Pentecostals and evangélicos because they view gang violence as a“spiritual problem” best tackled by the church, rather than as a social or crim-inal problem that the state should address (but does not). As a social group,evangélicos are one of only a handful of social actors who are willing to take onthegangs,oneofCentral America’smosturgent social problems.Churchwork-ers are usually respected mediators, to the extent that the gangs themselvestake their efforts seriously.Brenneman’s work on Pentecostal ministries to gang members notes thatgenuine religious conversion is one of the onlymeans by which youngmen areable to leave la vida loca; the only other exit from the gang is through death. Inpractical terms, this means a gang member must fully abandon his criminalpast, eschew all contact with his former clique and homies, begin the processof removing tattoos, and adhere to standard evangélico behaviors such as notdrinking alcohol and attending church services with regularity, often severaltimes per week. As sociologist José Miguel Cruz observes: “The pious lifestylethat churches encourage lets gang members easily monitor their formermembers” and gangs expect formermembers to fully live up to the Evangelicallifestyle to which they have converted. When gangs determine that a formermember is not sincerely committed to their new life, they promptly eliminatehim, notifying the victim’s pastor with the message: “This one didn’t walkright” (quoted in Miller 2023: unpaginated).Likewise, Pentecostal ministries have improved conditions for some inGuatemala’s carceral hellscape – a dangerous and lawless system of prisonsthat criminologist Mark Fleischer has termed “warehouses of violence” (1989;O’Neill 2010a). By using strategies such as prayer, helping break addiction andbad habits, and teaching basic literacy and other life skills, prison ministerswork to improve self-esteem and teach new technologies of self to prison-ers, who become less violent while still incarcerated and are less prone torecidivism when they are released (cf. Johnson 2017). As one prison ministerdescribed his work: “My objective has always been to spread the word of God,but also to teach gang members good customs and habits, how to be goodpeople, good sons and fathers, how to be good citizens.”This approach simul-taneously speaks to theChristian quest to findGod through inspection of one’sinterior life, at the same time that it provides new and practical technologies242 Social Forms of Religionof self – soft skills – to help prisoners cope both in and outside the walls ofprison (O’Neill 2010b).As they learnanalternative towhat is called inEnglish“the thug life,”Chris-tian prisoners become part of new social forms that cohere and support thembothwhile still in prison and once they are released. So committed are some ofthese groups that they police themselves while still in confinement, providingsomemodicum of security and order in Central America’s notorious and func-tionally unregulated penal system, includingGuatemala’s El Pavón prison, oneof the most lawless and dangerous such places in the world. As such, Chris-tian prison groups – organically united by their shared conversion and some-times united under the authority of a self-appointed incarcerated “pastor” –provide an alternative to the hierarchies of international gang and drug cartelmembers, extortionists, and “prison kings” that otherwise control virtually allaspects of men’s lives in confinement.10In short, “empowered”neo-Pentecostals have been increasingly effective increating functional systems for improving education, security, and problemsof everyday violence in places where other types of public authority, includingthe state, are precarious or even entirely absent.But even these successes carrywith them some serious caveats. As evinced in O’Neill’s work on Evangelical-run Guatemalan addiction centers, the state’s abjuration of its own respon-sibility to provide proper care for addicts and the mentally ill opens the doorwide for intentional or unintentional mistreatment when it hands them overto untrained church people, turning rehabilitation over to unregulated, un-monitored institutions,where care can range from clinically lax (again, relyingmainly on prayer and tropes of redemption) to unscrupulous and dangerous(where, for example, patients are locked up and mistreated and hunted downif they leave the premises) (2019). It would also be possible, and probably fruit-ful, to discuss some very negative effects of Pentecostal social mobilization,for example, cases of vigilantism in parts of the country where the rule of lawis largely absent that have resulted in the deaths of purported criminals with-out benefit of trail, or of rumors of financial ties between prominent nationaltelevangelists and the drug cartels, but these disturbing cases donot reflect theoverall larger trajectory of Pentecostal life in contemporary Guatemala.10 Cf. https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/the-prison-kings-of-guatemala/.Virginia Garrard: Pentecostal Social Engagement in Contemporary Guatemala 2435. ConclusionAs we have seen, Evangelical religion, especially in its majority form of Pente-costalism in the Central American nation of Guatemala, has undergone a tec-tonic epistemological shift from a post-temporal, apocalyptic orientation toone that is profoundly presentist and instrumentalist in its outlook. In specificterms,Pentecostals in recent decades have transitioned froman eschatologicalhermeneutics of separation from the world to one that embraces full-on socialand political participation, cohering, in the process, into social forms that em-phasize collectivemobilization.This reflects a change in religious social formsand values that correspond to a shifting corpus of religious ideals and theolo-gies. As these social relationships evolve, they change the role of the church –which previously prioritized insularity – to one of increased, outward-facingsocial engagement. As this evolution progresses, pastors retain charisma andsway, but the capacity building, self-realization, and leadership training thatsmall groups nurture in congregants has made them into a social force that,over time, is beginning to chip away at the patterns of patriarchy and even au-thoritarianism that characterized earlier Pentecostalism.In this milieu, we see that at least certain sectors of Pentecostalism havesacralized social values and aspirations that they heretofore perceived as sec-ular, but which they now map onto a religious framework of understanding.It is not the allure of secular society that encourages Pentecostals to engagewith the world, but rather its absence – the failure of secular modernity’s ‘en-chantments’ in modern Guatemala to provide sustenance for body or soul. Irefer here to such things as basic public services, the rule of law, remediationprograms to address poverty, violence; Pentecostals also identify as problem-atic the anomie that pushes youngpeople towardsdrugs or gangs, for example.And yet, Pentecostal social engagement is very much on Pentecostalism’s ownterms, as secular social, tropes, and formulas for advancing the public goodmust be re-signified within a Pentecostal idiom to be acceptable, even legible,to them.Pentecostal social mobilization holds great promise, but also certain dan-gers, as evinced by the role that evangélicos openly played in the nation’s 2023presidential campaign. In an attempt to marshal Evangelical votes, one ofthe leading candidates, Sandra Torres, chose an Evangelical pastor as hervice presidential running mate and adopted a morally conservative platform244 Social Forms of Religionthat she that hoped would appeal to that constituency.11 On the other, severalGuatemalan Pentecostal televangelists produced a steady flow of negativesocial media against Arévalo, the progressive-moderate winning candidate,denouncing him as a “communist,” and even an agent of Satan. The fact thatthis beleaguered candidate roundlywon the election offers tells us that despitethese efforts, evangélicos,whomakeupover forty percent ofGuatemala’s overallpopulation, voted for him despite efforts by their institutional leadership tosway them otherwise.12 This suggests that, while Evangelical organizations’organizational logic remains inchoate, the power of social forms – notably,the small groups that exist within the large churches and among which Aré-valo enjoyed much larger support – were instrumental in determining theoutcome.Many scholars have argued that Pentecostalism’s attraction to converts ageneration ago was its ability to offer an “alternative imaginary” to a corruptand violent world, a symbolic resistance that demanded to keep the world atarm’s length and offer believers an orderly,meaningful life framed by a partic-ular understanding of the nature of the Holy Spirit’s presence and mandates.Yet as Pentecostalism in Central Americamatures, there is a small but growingnumber of cradle and second-generation evangélicoswho are beginning to testthe boundaries of old binaries. Even today, the social spaces that Pentecostalsarewilling to enter remain limited,and thenewhermeneutics struggle to com-pete with the old: Pentecostalism remains divided into those who still wish toflee the world versus those whowish to scale the SevenMountains. As recentlyas September 2022, for example, evangélicos gathered to pray to ask God to “fillin” a massive sinkhole that had formed in one of Guatemala’s major highways,but they did not propose or support any material remedy to this basic infras-tructural problem.13 It remains to be seen just how much the human capitalthat Pentecostal churches cultivate in theirmembers will translate into amorefungible social capital within society at large. If so, a new hermeneutics of so-cial engagement will require a broad expansion on the Pentecostal prerogativeto bring the world to the church, en sumanera.11 Cf. https://apnews.com/article/guatemala-election-sandra-torres-74ce43addf2ec3f36f356fd034546cc0.12 Cf. https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/guatemala/.13 Cf. https://progressive.org/latest/other-americans-guatemala-religious-narco-state-abbott-091422/.Virginia Garrard: Pentecostal Social Engagement in Contemporary Guatemala 245BibliographyAlexander, JeffreyC. 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Accessed October 30, 2023. https://qz.com/734450/almost-everyone-in-buenos-aires-is-in-therapy.Mark Gordon. “Stay Classy.” Business Observer, May 27, 2016. Accessed Octo-ber 30, 2023. https://www.businessobserverfl.com/news/2016/may/27/stay-classy/.Elle Hardy. “How a Conservative Christian Movement Became an ImportantPart of Trump’s Strategy.” Canadian Broadcast Company, January 15, 2021.Accessed October 30, 2023. https://www.cbc.ca/radio/day6/mrna-after-covid-19-blowing-up-trump-plaza-crokicurl-history-of-swear-words-and-more-1.5874120/how-a-conservative-christian-movement-became-an-important-part-of-trump-s-political-strategy-1.5874143.Chase Harrison. “Six Numbers to Understand Guatemala’s Surprising 2023General Election Results.” Americas Society/Council of the Americas, June26, 2023. Accessed October 30, 2023. https://www.as-coa.org/articles/six-numbers-understand-guatemalas-surprising-2023-general-election-results.Office of International Religious Freedom. “2019 Report on Freedom of Reli-gion: Guatemala.” United States Department of State. Accessed October30, 2023. https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/guatemala/.Alex Papadovassilakis. “The Prison Kings of Guatemala.” InSight Crime, April16, 2019. Accessed October 30, 2023. https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/the-prison-kings-of-guatemala/.Sonia D. Pérez. “Guatemalan Presidential Candidate Sandra Torres Leans onConservative Values, Opposing GayMarriage.” APWorld News, August 12,2023. AccessedOctober 30, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/guatemala-election-sandra-torres-74ce43addf2ec3f36f356fd034546cc0.Solano. “Iglesias, política y millones de dólares: Harold Caballeros y los#Panama Papers, Centro de Medios Independiente.” Centro de MediosIndependiente,May 9, 2016. Accessed October 30, 2023. https://cmiguate.org/iglesias-politica-y-millones-de-dolares-harold-caballeros-y-los-panamapapers/.Statista Research Department. “Religious Affiliation in Guatemala as of 2020,By Type.” September 5, 2023. Accessed October 30, 2023. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1067082/guatemala-religion-affiliation-share-type/.Social Forms in Orthodox Christian ConvertCommunities in North AmericaSebastian Rimestad and Katherine KelaidisAbstract The Orthodox Church is considered a rather conservative body – akin to theRoman Catholic Church. Nevertheless – or precisely for that reason – it has attractedconverts from the other mainstream denominations who seek an ecclesiastical homegrounded on a traditional theological basis. For many Orthodox converts in the UnitedStates, the Orthodox Church is seen as a refuge from rampant liberalism and socialrelativism expressed in fluid gender identities and the waning of traditional values. Assuch, the Orthodox Church offers them a ‘counter-structure’ to the secular and main-stream world ‘out there’. In this contribution, we analyze the way Orthodox Christianconvert communities in the US use various social forms in order to create this image ofthe Orthodox Church as a divinely inspired counterculture. These social forms in theconvert milieus pose a challenge to existing Orthodox Christian communities, who areoften more concerned with ethnic and cultural affiliation and wish to integrate intoWestern culture.Keywords diaspora, migrant religion, migration, Orthodox Church, reactive onlineOrthodoxy, religious conversion1. IntroductionThe origins of the Orthodox Church lie in the eastern basin of the Mediter-ranean Sea, where Christianity first grew as a movement within the RomanEmpire in the first centuries CE and from the 4th century as the state religionof the empire.The separationbetweenEasternOrthodox andWesternCatholicChristianity is conventionally dated to the year 1054, although the actual alien-ation between the two parts occurred much earlier in a rather subtle fashion(Chadwick 2003). Numerous theological, liturgical, and political differences252 Social Forms of Religionbetween the two halves of Christendom ensured that a reconciliation had be-come impossible by the 16th century.Oneof thesedifferenceswas the assertionthat the church did not represent a counterpart to secular society or state pol-itics but was an integral part of it (Höpken/Rimestad forthcoming). This em-phasismight not have been unique to the Eastern Orthodox Church, but it hassince the early 20th century been at the center of Orthodox theology’s identityvis-à-vis Western Christianity.As such, from the emic perspective of Orthodox theology, the OrthodoxChurch cannot be analyzed from the vantage point of social forms. In its self-understanding, just as that of the Roman Catholic Church, the church doesnot have a social form, it encompasses the social in its entirety. Formost of the2000-year history of the Orthodox Church and its antecedents, it was enoughto consider every baptized individual a part of the Church, which would existwherever there was a church and parish. Ironically, this globalized narrativecould only exist because Orthodoxy functioned as a “cultural church”; that isto say, a religious community embedded in a particular homogeneous cultural(and frequently geographic and political) context in which it acted as societalglue asmuch as ideological community. Baptism,which normatively occurredin infancy, was the only requirement for membership, as it encompassed thevast majority of members of the community without further inquiry whichmight produce dissension and conflict. Even today, and even in far less ho-mogenous contexts, Orthodox theologians still actively resist looking at thechurch as a separate part of society at large. There is no concept of member-ship beyond baptism, unlike inWestern churches, wheremembership is oftenconnected with following rules, participating in ceremonies, or paying mem-bership fees. Even when one looks at the Orthodox Church from a social sci-entific perspective, it is difficult to frame it in terms of social forms. In thecore region of the Orthodox Church, it is seldom an organization with definedmembership and clear goals, but rather an all-encompassing institution witha clear hierarchy, which anybody can seek out to satisfy their religious needs.However, in those regions where the Orthodox Church has traditionallynot been dominant, such as inWestern Europe andNorth America, the Chris-tianOrthodox presence is relatively young and does not represent themajorityfaith. It is therefore subject to the three processes outlined in the introductionto this volume, both within the church and in its relations to the surround-ing socialworld: (1) the societalization of communitization implies that hierar-chical structures are less important,while community elements gain in preva-lence; (2) the empowering of the individual is a process that is more obvious inS. Rimestad and K. Kelaidis: Social Forms in Orthodox Christian Convert Communities 253this part of the world than in more traditionally Orthodox regions; and (3) thecompetition among religions is a core feature of the North American religiouslandscape.These three processes, which are usually perceived by Orthodox Christiansas external influences, alien to the Orthodox faith, do play a peculiar role inthe development of Orthodox Christianity in Western Europe and, especially,North America. Unlike the Western Christian denominations, which devel-oped somewhat organically together with modernity, the Orthodox Churchhas developed a narrative of being at odds with modern developments. Itsencounter with such developments began with the Enlightenment and secu-larization from the 18th century onwards, which first introduced the idea ofnon-religious social coherence (Roudometof 1998). However, a real encounterwith Western modernity only occurred when a significant migration of Or-thodox faithful, especially in the 20th century, diversified and dispersed theglobal Orthodox presence (Rimestad 2021).This contributionanalyzes theparticularway these twoprocesses impactedthe social forms that ChristianOrthodox communities have taken in theNorthAmerican diaspora. They include the individual parish as a close-knit groupand the auxiliary organizations that structure parish outreach. At the sametime, the Orthodox Church in North America is not a single structure but con-sists of several parallel, ethnically connoted jurisdictional organizations. Fi-nally, in an era the two sociologists Lee Rainie and Barry Wellman have diag-nosed as “networked individualism” with its own “operating system” (Rainie/Wellman 2012: 6–7), the social form of a network is also making inroads intothe Orthodox Church.Rainie and Wellman argued that networked individualism relies on in-ternet communication, enabled by the “Triple Revolution” of social networksbeyond the tight and homogeneous group, of communication technologiesinvolving the internet, and of mobility induced through ever-smaller cellphones (ibid.: 11–12). The two sociologists focused on the positive aspects ofnetworked individualism,which are undeniable.However, there is an increas-ing awareness of the detrimental effects of the Triple Revolution, which hasbecome rather visible among US-American converts to the Orthodox Church.These developments do not only appear in the Orthodox Church in NorthAmerica fromwithin but are often introduced by zealous converts fromWest-erndenominations. In somecases,one canevenobserve thatnovel social formsfunction in opposition tomore traditional Orthodoxways of community. Also,the culture wars of the 20th and 21st centuries in the US (Hartman 2019) are254 Social Forms of Religionheavily influencing the way Orthodox Christians in North America live theirfaith and coalesce into the social form of networks, often displaying the samepolarization of American society as can be observed in other arenas.The remainder of this paper is divided into three parts.The following part(2.) analyzes the historical development of the Orthodox Church outside of theareas that have traditionally beenEasternOrthodox, especiallyNorthAmerica.This is important to understand the three levels ofOrthodoxChristianity in theUSA and their corresponding social forms. Then we turn to the phenomenonof conversion toOrthodoxy (3.).Whereas converts have nevermade up thema-jority in the North American Orthodox Church, they are arguably its most vo-cal representatives, who have often introduced elements into the church thatthe traditional Orthodox consider alien and unsuitable, including ‘Protestant’social forms.The final part (4.) elaborates on the more recent development ofAmerican internet Orthodoxy, that inscribes itself into an era which has wit-nessed the globalization of the culturewars (Goldberg 2014).This phenomenonintroduces anewsocial dimension into theOrthodoxChurch inNorthAmericathat may have detrimental effects on it in the long term.2. The globalization of the Orthodox Church –the Orthodox diasporaThespread of OrthodoxChristianity beyond its core regions in theMiddle Eastand Eastern Europe since the end of the 19th century is primarily the result ofgeopolitical upheavals and migration waves, rather than missionary endeav-ors. While Christianity is per se a missionary religion, the Eastern OrthodoxChurch has always been less aggressive in its mission and therefore also lesssuccessful in terms of expansion. Instead of pro-actively traveling to the cor-ners of the earth in order to turn people into Christians, Orthodox missionshave been less visible, even though theywere also quite successful, for examplein the Eastern regions of the Russian Empire, as well as in Japan and Alaska(cf. Rimestad forthcoming). In the case of Alaska, which was a Russian colonybefore it was sold to theUS in 1867, historians agree that the RussianOrthodoxmission among the indigenous populationwas farmore effective than the sub-sequent US Protestant attempts to evangelize the population (Kan 1999; Kan2001). For many inhabitants, the Orthodox were perceived as peers, whereasthe Protestantswere foreign intruderswhodid not value their original culture.S. Rimestad and K. Kelaidis: Social Forms in Orthodox Christian Convert Communities 255Besides this arrival of Orthodox Christianity to America from the Westvia formerly Russian Alaska, it also, from the end of the 19th century, arrivedfrom the East in the form of Balkan and Eastern European immigrants fleeingeconomic and political hardships. While most of these migrants identified asGreeks and came from either the newly formed Greek state or the OttomanEmpire, they were joined by a substantial number of Serbs, Romanians, andarrivals of various ethnicities from the Russian Empire (Durante 2015). Thesemigrants brought with them a profoundly different kind of faith than thatwhich had developed among the Alaskan indigenous population. In terms ofsocial forms, though, both communities can be characterized as groups, heldtogether by close-knit parish and family ties and often linked to a commonancestry of origin. However, the migrants were eager to integrate into themulticultural American society. They found themselves in a novel context inwhich the state did not involve itself in religious affairs, neither dictating thereligious observance of its citizens nor (importantly) providing state support.Moreover, ecclesiastical authorities in the regions from which they origi-nally came were often at best uninterested in these émigré communities, forc-ing themtoorganize themselves independently of ecclesiastical oversight.Thiswas further complicated in theGreek case,where the immigrants arrived fromtwo distinct (and at times antagonistic) church jurisdictions, the Church ofindependent Greece and the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the OttomanEmpire. As a result, earlymigrant parishes were established independently, asprivate associations (often connected to a school in addition to a church) alongthe Protestant model (Kitroeff 2020). This engendered the social form of or-ganization, but bottom-up and on a voluntary basis. Moreover, these organi-zations were not the main social form of the parishes, which functioned fur-ther as groups. They were necessary for the formal and legal existence of theparishes, which were the owners of the church (and school) buildings.Meanwhile, the ‘Russian’ Orthodox in Alaska tried to uphold a traditionaltop-down episcopal church structure (dioceses), with bishops appointed bythe church administration in Saint Petersburg. The diocese of Alaska wasexpanded to include all of the US soon after the Alaska Purchase (1867) and thebishop resided in San Francisco from 1872. His diocese was also an organiza-tion, but not congruent with the individual parishes, which remained groupsand seldom had explicit organizational structures themselves. The buildingsand legal obligations all lay in the hands of the diocese, which was a whollydifferent level from the lay faithful. It is therefore somewhat misleading tocharacterize the diocese as a social form. This element of Russian Orthodoxy256 Social Forms of Religionin the USA was greatly affected by the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917,as it opened up the way for legal disputes regarding such ownership (Sarkisian2019). Russian Orthodoxy in North America split into several antagonisticjurisdictions (organizations) as a result, one of which eventually became theOrthodox Church in America (OCA) in 1970.TheRussians, thus, tried touphold adiocesan structure andadminister thechurch top-down, while the Greeks established parishes from the bottom up,starting with an association and then contacting a bishop to appoint them apriest.These twomodi operandihave remained prevalent in theNorth AmericanOrthodox Church to this day. Whereas the bishops try to run the church as acorporation with a top-down structure, independent Orthodox communitiesand individuals periodically appear, looking for a bishop that may legitimizethem in terms of church law.Moreover, there are auxiliary organizations in allOrthodox communities in theUS that provide support for the poor,healthcare,or other issues of social welfare. While these tended to be located at the indi-vidual parish level in Greek parishes, the Russians often founded regional ordiocesan organizations1, but this difference is no longer constitutive.The ethnically connoted jurisdictional plurality of the Orthodox Church inNorth America is considered an anomaly in the Orthodox world. In the tra-ditionally Orthodox regions of the world, every bishop’s jurisdiction is clearlydelimited in geographical terms (Rimestad 2021: 87–91), but this is not the caseoutside of these regions. Because there is no universally recognized OrthodoxChurch responsible for North America, almost all nationally connoted churchstructures try to lay claims on “their” co-nationals on the continent. After theGreeks, numerousmigrants from all traditionally Orthodox countries enteredthe US over the 20th century. Such migration happened especially followingthe great geopolitical catastrophes of the century, such as the Russian Revo-lution and the Greek-Turkish War in the wake of World War I as well as therecalibration of Europe following World War II. But the fall of the Iron Cur-tain 1989–1993 as well as the Yugoslav Wars and persecutions of Arab Chris-tians have also increased the number of potential Orthodox Christian Ameri-cans, which is currently estimated between three and six million, or between0.5 and 2 per cent of the population.The US Religion Census 2020 found that the number of actual adherentsto the Orthodox parishes had dropped from almost 800.000 in 2010 to about1 Cf. https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.northwestern.edu/dist/c/1549/files/2019/08/Sarkisian-Analysis.pdf.S. Rimestad and K. Kelaidis: Social Forms in Orthodox Christian Convert Communities 257675.000 in 2020.2 The vast majority of these are migrants from Orthodox cul-tures and their descendants. The absolutely largest Orthodox structure in theUS is the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North America (GOA) with 375.000adherents, followed by theOrthodox Church in America (OCA), the AntiochianOrthodox Christian Archdiocese (AOCA), and the Serbian Orthodox Church(SOC), each numbering between 60.000 and 75.000 adherents.The OCA is a structure that was founded in 1970 as a church independentof any of the national Orthodox Churches (Tarasar 1975: 261–280). However, itwas to a large extent a political project of the RussianOrthodox Church (ROC),meaning that it is still considered ‘Russian’ by many, even though it countsamong the more ‘American’ jurisdictions. The traditional center of world Or-thodoxy, the Patriarch of Constantinople, has not recognized it as an indepen-dent church so far, probably because it considers the GOA the most legitimatestructure in North America. The AOCA was originally responsible for ArabicOrthodox Christians but has accepted a number of convert communities sincethe 1980s,making it too a multicultural entity.There are elevenother church structures in theUS that share the remaining100.000 Orthodox adherents, including the Russian Orthodox Church Out-side Russia (ROCOR)with 24.000 adherents.This is a structure thatwas estab-lished in Serbia in the 1920s as an alternative to the compromised ROC in theSoviet Union (Rimestad 2015). It comprised most of the Russian bishops whofled fromtheBolshevik regimeand remaineda staunchlymonarchist and reac-tionary structure throughout the ColdWar, considering itself the true RussianOrthodox Church. Its administrative center was relocated to Munich in 1945and to New York in 1948. In 2007, through the mediation of Russian PresidentVladimir Putin, it reunited with its archenemy, the ROC of the Moscow Patri-archate (Collins 2023, 50–57). It still exists as a separate entity with a ratherconservative outlook but has acknowledged the legitimacy of the Moscow Pa-triarchate as the center of Russian Orthodoxy.This is a rather confusing plethora of separate structures, each of whichmay be seen as an organization in its own right.However, as was the case with2 Cf. https://orthodoxreality.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2020CensusGeneralReport1.pdf. There are additionally almost 500.000 Oriental Orthodox adherents in theUS. This community has, despite being frequently conflated with the Eastern Ortho-dox, its own unique historical and sociological realities and so is beyond the scope ofthis paper.258 Social Forms of Religionthe Russian diocese in the 19th century, these organizations are not primar-ily social forms in the sense of being arenas for social interaction, but ratherproviders of identity and umbrella organizations for the individual parishesthat see themselves as communities for their members. The latter still corre-spond largely to the social form of ‘group’, where membership is informal anddiffuse, but often tied to ethnic affiliation. At the same time, more formal-ized ‘organizations’ do exist, especially when it comes to the relationship withsecular American society. There are church-linked social and cultural organi-zations, where there is formal membership and a hierarchical structure withclear division of labor.These organizations in most cases do not claim to rep-resent ‘the Church’, however, but are auxiliary associations.In other words, the social forms of the Eastern Orthodox Church in the USshould be viewed at three different levels: the national level of dioceses andchurch structures (organization) is not really concerned with membershipand social interaction, but mostly with church law and upholding geopoliticalboundaries. The individual parishes (group), on the other hand, generally tryto be inclusive but tend to become rather closed communities for people ofa specific ethnic affiliation. The third level is outside of the church as such(organization/network) and includes church-affiliated organizations thatlabor for inclusive parishes, inter-jurisdictional cooperation, or social welfareprograms. All three levels form part of the Orthodox Church in North Americaand make up its outward appearance. It would be a fallacy to see only onelevel, which would skew the image and misrepresent the complexity of USOrthodoxy.3. Conversion to Orthodox Christianity in the United Statesof AmericaOne of the factors resulting in such a skewed perception is that of Americanconverts to the Orthodox Church. Even though the vast majority of OrthodoxChristians in the US have family ties to traditionally Orthodox countries andsee themselves as Orthodox faithful “in the diaspora”, the most vocal views oftheOrthodoxChurch in the English language come from converts.Whilemostconverts have personal reasons for joining the Orthodox Church, such as Or-thodox spouses or formative holiday encounters with Orthodox spirituality,there is a sizeable and very vocal type of convert who approaches the OrthodoxChurch from readings and profound theological or spiritual search (RimestadS. Rimestad and K. Kelaidis: Social Forms in Orthodox Christian Convert Communities 259forthcoming; Medvedeva, forthcoming). Interestingly, such converts becomevery visible in the American religious field, since they are muchmore inclinedtomissionary activity than theOrthodoxChurch has traditionally been and of-ten try to convince their peers of theOrthodox “truth” they havediscovered.Thesocial form thus championed is that of a group, but not in terms of social, lin-guistic, or ethnic proximity. Rather, the converts seek to idealize the religiousaspects of Orthodoxy, downplaying its social aspects (Gallaher 2022).One of the earliest examples of this type of convert was Seraphim Rose(1934–1982), a Californian academic who rejected Christianity as a youth andstudiedEastAsian languages andculturebeforebeingaccepted into theOrtho-dox Church (ROCOR) in 1962 (Christensen 1993). Six years after joining the Or-thodox Church, Seraphim founded amonastery where he became amonk.Hetranslated Orthodox theological writings into English and wrote his own the-ological texts, often in a rather polemical style, besides running an Orthodoxpublishing house and bookstore with a bi-monthlymagazine. One of hismaintopics was the perceived depravity of Western society that could only be over-come through a rigorous adherence to Orthodox theological doctrine (ibid.).For Seraphim, secluded monasticism was the only social form that was fullycompatible with Orthodox Christianity. He took an example from the Russianmonastic saints of the 16th through 19th centuries, who also chose a life at themargins of civilization.A different conversion story that also conforms to this type is that of PeterGillquist (1938–2012), a leading member of the Evangelical Campus Crusadesfor Christ in the 1960s. Together with some of his fellow ‘Crusaders’, Gillquistbecame disillusionedwithwhat he perceived as the superficiality of Protestantworship and church life and looked for the “One, Holy, Catholic, and ApostolicChristianChurch” (1992: 57).He came across EasternOrthodoxy,which he con-sidered to embody this ideal community. Gillquist and his associates wishedto retain the social form they had grown into during their search for religioustruth – that of a close-knit “community of fate” – but the wish to be acceptedinto theOrthodoxChurch as a groupwas initially not granted by anyOrthodoxbishop in the US. The bishops feared that the balance between the three lev-els of social forms described in the previous section would suffer from such agroup conversion of theologically literate and, perhapsmore importantly, cul-turally Protestant Americans. If these Protestant Americans entered into theirjurisdictions, their cultural (and one could say, ethnic) character would suffer.Considering the churches had functioned not just as centers of worship but ofcommunity life, this was a reasonable fear.260 Social Forms of ReligionNevertheless, the Gillquist group was finally accepted by AOCA bishop(Metropolitan) Philip in 1987, who saw these conversions as a way to provideadditional visibility to his fledgling church of Arabic migrants (Herbel 2014:103–129). The group was known as the Evangelical Orthodox Mission, an or-ganization modeled on Protestant missionary outreach, and it grew rapidly,from 17 to 32 parishes within six years (Gillquist 1992: 175–177). Moreover, theMission established a publishing house (Ancient Faith Publishing), which haspublished numerous volumes and other texts praising the AOCA as a generoushaven for American converts, even though these publications have been criti-cized as being a “strange hybrid of evangelical Protestantism and Orthodoxy”(Gallaher 2022: 115).For Gillquist, as well as for innumerable others, the Orthodox Churchoffered a place for unadulterated spirituality, a refuge from rampant secular-ization and liberalism (cf. Makrides 2022). At the same time, their Western,Protestant mindset made it difficult for them to imagine a religious faithwhere the social form of organization does not take a prime place. Instead ofblending into the existing social forms of jurisdictions (organizations) andparishes (groups), the converts tend to establish parish organizations andevade obedience to traditional authority structures (cf. Gallaher 2022). Thiscan also be seen in the rising popularity of published conversion accounts toOrthodox Christianity on the American book market in the last years (suchas Gillquist 1995; Huneycutt 2018; cf. also Medvedeva forthcoming), not tomention the establishments of other media outlets, such as the radio station“Ancient Faith Radio”3 or interactive websites, like “journeytoorthodoxy.com”and others. Common to them all is the attempt to portray Orthodox Chris-tianity as original Christianity, and thus the solution to many of the problemsof the modern world.KseniaMedvedeva (forthcoming) argues that American converts to theOr-thodox Church either convert “to the Ancient Church” or they convert “againstWesternvalues”.Weargue that there isno substantial differencebetween thesetwomotives,but rather betweenwhatmaybe called theological and cultural con-verts.Cultural converts are thosewho convert because of personal reasons or af-3 Rebranded as “Ancient Faith Ministries” in the digital era. Ancient Faith Ministriesdemonstrates the particular nature of these “theological converts” and the extent towhich they retain their (white) American Protestant cultural perspective, seeking tocreate “Orthodox” alternatives to the cultural components of American EvangelicalProtestantism.S. Rimestad and K. Kelaidis: Social Forms in Orthodox Christian Convert Communities 261ter a profound spiritual experience involving the Orthodox Church. They aregenerally happy to try to integrate into existing parishes, even if these retainan ethnic character. The theological converts, on the other hand, who see in Or-thodoxy “the true church”, feel distracted by the ethnic character. These lat-ter, like Peter Gillquist and his community,may then try to establish their ownOrthodox parishes, where ethnicity is not a significant marker (Gillquist 1992:182–184; Slagle 2011: 124–142). Asmentioned above, this ismost easily achievedin the OCA and the AOCA, church structures that try to leave their ethnic con-notations behind.That is why these two structures are the ones that tend to bemost open to receiving converts and integrating fully into American culture. Interms of social forms, this means that their parishes conceive of themselves as“movements”, rather than groups, in the sense that their membership is evenmore diffuse and informal with a high degree of symbolic integration and aclearly stated goal: to make society more Orthodox.However, this goal is a two-pronged sword, for it can mean either of twothings. For one, some converts long for a return to the “golden age” of Ortho-dox Christianity, which is variably situated in the time of the Church Fathersin the first Millennium CE or in the Tsarist Russian Empire, as we elaboratein the next section. The other option is more benign, a diffusion of Orthodoxspirituality andChristian love into all aspects of societal life, by leading thewayas positive examples. For some proponents of the first idea, the converts argu-ing for the second option have already lost contactwith the trueOrthodox faithand have succumbed to liberalism and secularization. For those in the secondgroup, it is the other way around: the converts that long for an ‘orthodoxiza-tion’of society conflate theabstractOrthodoxethoswith rigorouspractices andrules (Gallaher 2022).The proponents of an ‘orthodoxization’ of American society want the Or-thodox Church to take on the social form of a movement, which would con-sciously and radically counter what they perceive as harmful secularizing andliberal developments. Analytically, it is difficult to describe them as a move-ment, but they are rather part of a network of political and social ideas thatare shared across communities and religions. They often refer to the polemicworks of Seraphim Rose, which would champion ‘traditional Orthodox anti-Westernism’.However,according toRobert Saler (2024),Seraphim’s actual the-ology was not so much anti-Western as it provided a template on which anti-Westernism can easily be crafted (cf. also Riccardi-Swartz 2022: 191).The radi-cal anti-Westernism of Orthodox Christianity is a recent phenomenon, even ifit has precursors in earlier centuries (Makrides/Uffelmann 2003).262 Social Forms of ReligionAt the same time, immigrant American Orthodoxy has not been entirelyimmune from the effects of this mentality, absorbing it both from the con-verts entering Orthodoxy and from the wider culture, a culture in which reli-gionhas increasinglybecomeamarkerofpolitical identity (Hartman2019).Themost visible exampleof thisphenomenon is the riseof the so-calledEphraimitemonasteries in the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America (Kostarelos 2020;Kostarelos 2022). The charismatic Elder Ephraim (1928–2019), born in Volos,Greece,and trainedasanAthonitemonkunder the influential Joseph theHesy-chast, visited North America in the late 1970s.Here, he found a Greek commu-nity in its second and third-generation post-migration that was increasinglyaffluent and highly assimilated.4 Ephraim understood this as a lack of spiri-tual vigor on the part of the Greeks and thus resolved to come to the UnitedStates as amissionary to this Orthodox Christian community.Thus, likemanyAmerican converts to Orthodoxy, Ephraim understood Orthodoxy in a muchmoremission-focusedway than it had previously understood itself.Thediffer-ence, however, is that Ephraim understood his mission primarily to the Greekdiaspora, which had fallen away from their traditional Orthodox faith, not tothose from other ethnic backgrounds. Despite this original focus of his mis-sion on the Greek American community, themonasteries founded by Ephraimand his followers have also attracted a considerable number of converts, ea-ger for the experience of ‘authentic’ Athonitemonasticism inAmerica (Kelaidisforthcoming).The existence of Ephraimitemonasteries demonstrates the wayin which Western Christian social forms have influenced Orthodox Christianunderstandings in the diaspora leading to the generation of para-ecclesiasticalbodies under the guise of religious organizations.4. Orthodox catechization and the internetSarah Riccardi-Swartz (2022) conducted fieldwork over an extended periodamong Orthodox Christians in a small town in the Appalachian mountains.Her findings corroborate the change occurring since 2010 and especially sincethe ascent of Donald Trump to the American presidency in 2016.Whereas theOrthodox community she studied initially grew out of the vision of a discipleof Seraphim Rose in 2000, it has increasingly become a home for convertswho are disillusioned with current American politics and look for alternative4 Cf. https://ergon.scienzine.com/article/articles/liturgical-language-crisis-of-1970.S. Rimestad and K. Kelaidis: Social Forms in Orthodox Christian Convert Communities 263concepts of community.This way, the Orthodox faith becomes reimagined in away that is deeply tied to the political.This imaginedworld “marshals theolog-ical and political structures far removed from ancient Christian monasticismand American religion and politics, yet continually in tensionwith both” (ibid.:192).Besides this political radicalization of Orthodox communities in ruralAmerica, there is a much more dangerous radicalization that is happeningonline.The proliferation of internet resources and digital communication hasprofoundly changed the social forms of Orthodox Christianity in America.Coupled with an increasingly polarized and dichotomized political atmo-sphere in the US, this gave rise to the phenomenon of reactive internetOrthodoxy. Digital Orthodox celebrities, such as Josiah Trenham, Rod Dreher,Peter Heers, and Frederica Mathewes-Green, “were all players in the socialdrama of Reactive Orthodoxy” (ibid.: 21).These actors not only are all convertsfrom Evangelical Protestant Churches to Orthodox Christianity, but they useinternet technologies to very vocally lay the claim of representing ‘true’ Ortho-dox spirituality. At the same time, they have retained a Protestant mindsetthat hinders them in fully accepting universally held Orthodox truths, such asthe subordination to one’s bishop or the importance of community (Gallaher2022). Although there are various parallel Orthodox ecclesiastical structuresin North America that have a partially strained relationship with each other,they all agree that it is usurpation when a priest like Peter Heers is unable todisclose which bishop is blessing his work as a priest.5Nevertheless, this does not diminish Heers’ appeal to disillusioned Amer-icans who find these online offerings of Orthodox faith so appealing that theydecide to convert and become avid followers. Even those who are rooted in anOrthodoxparish community tend toutilize online resources.Formanyof theseconverts, according toRiccardi-Swartz, “digital networks allowed them to con-nect, share, andbe apart of the broaderOrthodox community across the globe”(Riccardi-Swartz 2022: 188; cf. also Medvedeva forthcoming).While the actualdiscussions in Orthodox communities and the printed literature retain somelevel of theological nuance anddifferentiation, online communications tend tobe more polarized and full of inflammatory rhetoric.In terms of social forms, the actual parishes and living Orthodox commu-nities, be they predominantly ethnic or converts, retain the characteristics of agroup, focusing on the individuals as part of the community (Bringerud 2019).5 Cf. https://www.assemblyofbishops.org/news/2023/communique-04202023.264 Social Forms of ReligionThe online communities, on the other hand, perceive themselves as a move-ment that aims at preventing further social change in the liberal direction.However, they are more concisely conceptualized as networks, since they donot rely on locations or physical interaction but only serve as echo chambersmutually reinforcingmostly far-right political opinions through specific theo-logical interpretations that are often not condoned by the official religious ex-perts of the Orthodox Church.6A significant number of the recent converts to online reactiveOrthodoxy inNorth America have little contact with an actual Orthodox parish since there isnone in their vicinity. Furthermore, many of these converts are already partof social groups particularly prone to engagement with online radicalism –namely young men who have at least some higher education and experiencesome degree of alienation from society and/or peer groups (Odag et al. 2019).In keepingwith their broader alienation, their exposure to everyday parish lifein the Orthodox Church isminimal, to such an extent that the social form theyare living in the Orthodox Church resembles a dyad,where the individual con-vert interacts with the church through a few self-styled internet gurus.7 Thatmany of these converts embrace the label “incel” (originally denoting involun-tary celibate youngmales) further exacerbates their radicalization, as they are“outraged by the shifting social norms in theUnited States, fearful of potentialpolitical and religious persecution of American conservative Christians, andconcerned by threats to white hegemony” (Riccardi-Swartz 2022: 188). It be-comes increasingly clear that there is a growing subculture within the Ortho-dox Church in North America that politically leans to the right fringes whileit increasingly disconnects with traditional authorities and social forms in theOrthodox Church, the bishops and the parishes as moderating communities(Gallaher 2022). This subculture thrives in the era of “networked individual-ism”, as identified by Rainie and Wellman (2012). The more detrimental ef-fects of the “Triple Revolution” they hold high have arguably become plainlyvisible only since the mid-2010s, in the “Putin-Trump era” that saw the riseof White Nationalism in the US, the eruption of inter-racial violence and theBlack LivesMatter-Movement, and also the COVID-19 pandemic and rampantTrumpism (Riccardi-Swartz 2022: 187).That there is a direct link between far-right rhetoric and conversion to Orthodox Christianity is undeniable, both interms of white nationalism (Leonova 2019) and anti-vaccinationism (Issaris et6 Cf. e.g. https://theopenark.substack.com/p/from-orthobro-to-orthodox-and-the.7 Cf. https://theopenark.substack.com/p/from-orthobro-to-orthodox-and-the.S. Rimestad and K. Kelaidis: Social Forms in Orthodox Christian Convert Communities 265al.2023).When thedisputeover thepresidential electionsof 2020provoked the“Stormon theCapitol” on January 6, 2021, therewerenumerousOrthodox con-verts among the rioters, including at least one priest,whowas later sanctionedby his bishop for his actions.8This radicalization is undoubtedly a result of thetriple revolution, with the additional revolution in AI and algorithms, whichhelp solidify the feeling of being part of a moral majority, even if this feelinghas little basis in reality.The fact that physical interaction as a diverse community is not necessaryto spread some of these political and social views becomes a problem for theOrthodox parishes in North America. There is a tension between the tradi-tional emphasis among the Orthodox church structures in the USA and thisnew English-language Orthodox discourse on the internet.The former has fo-cused on finding away tomakeOrthodox Christianity American and universalby overcoming ethnic divisions, a topic that has remained an important partof the rhetoric of converts like Gillquist and is still held high by the OrthodoxChurches in the US.The other discourse, which Riccardi-Swartz terms “Reac-tiveOrthodoxy”, is adiscoursehappeningprimarily online since themid-2010sthat is seeping into convertOrthodox communities. It is a “worldbuilding formof the faith that finds its roots in an imagined nostalgia for ancient Rus’, Amer-ican Christian nationalism, and an apocalyptic disenchantment with democ-racy” (Riccardi-Swartz 2022: 173).Instead of readily accepting the social form of the Orthodox parishes thatcan be conceptualized as a local group and focuses on the individualmembers,reactive Orthodoxy sees itself as a movement with a clear goal – to overthrowthe liberal bias of contemporary American society, be it gender ideologies, in-fringements upon civil liberties, or race relations. At the same time, it is ana-lytically more correct to describe reactive Orthodoxy as a network in the senseof Rainie and Wellman, as a community held together through digital links,often centering on a few controversial but media-savvy experts. Some of theseexperts, moreover, are more interested in followers and internet fame than inconsistent theological arguments.98 Cf. https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2023/08/22/orthodox-priest-jan-6-participant-supports-russian-government-scheme-enticing-conservatives.9 Cf. https://theopenark.substack.com/p/from-orthobro-to-orthodox-and-the; https://www.euronews.com/2023/07/31/democracy-is-a-tool-of-satan-the-murky-world-of-orthodox-influencers.266 Social Forms of Religion5. ConclusionWhat all this means for the social forms of Orthodox Christianity in NorthAmerica is that there is a rising tension between the communitizing elementsthat have dominated American Orthodox discourse until recently and the soci-etalizing tendencies of reactionary onlineOrthodoxy.Communitization for theOrthodox communities in the USmeans growing together to be a harmoniouscommunity of believers, which would overcome traditional and existing eth-nic and cultural divisions, including with regard to mainstream society. Thesocietalizing tendencies, on the other hand, refer to abstract and functionallinks between like-minded individuals who are more interested in construct-ing an alternative to themainstream thangrowing as a community.TheOrtho-dox Church has never been fond of the idea of the church as an organization,even though the various jurisdictions operating inNorth America have organi-zational structures.These aremuchmore concernedwith authority structuresand church law than with their actual members, though. Although Orthodoxparishes in theUShad to register as organizations for legal reasons,most earlyparisheswere relatively homogeneous groups of individual faithful that recog-nized each other as equal without any formalmembership requirements.Thatbeing said, not infrequently throughout the twentieth century, Greek Ortho-dox parishes, for example, developed along regional lines or split from one an-other as political tensions inGreece found theirway to thediaspora (Diamanti-Karanou 2015).10Nevertheless, the conceptualization of the Orthodox Church as a move-mentof like-mindedpeopleof the same faith, thoughdispersedamongvariouscontesting ethnic structures, was prevalent, including the attempts to estab-lish a non-ethnic American Orthodoxy – be they through inter-jurisdictionalcooperationor convert communities (Bringerud2019).This is clearly a commu-nitizing impetus, looking to integrate diverse individuals into a united faithcommunity. Orthodox religious organizations below the level of the jurisdic-tion do exist, but they are not coterminous with the parish.They help organizespecificparts of itsOrthodoxoutreach,suchas support for theneedy (Riccardi-Swartz2022: 152–153) or inter-Orthodoxcooperation (Kishkovsky2004).More-over, this work is usually perceived as the fulfillment of Christian obligationsrather than as a function within an organization. For the individual parish,10 The tensions in America’s growing Ethiopian Orthodox community seem to repeatthis kind of development in the 21st century (Kelaidis, forthcoming).S. Rimestad and K. Kelaidis: Social Forms in Orthodox Christian Convert Communities 267the social form of a group is more apt, since it has a fluid, diffuse member-ship, where all those present are integrated into the community as individualfaithful.Reactive online Orthodoxy, on the other hand, while also perceiving itselfas a movement with a moral impetus, is best described with the social formof a network. More precisely, it is a digital network, one that in some casesborders on the dyadic, meaning the relationship between a central actor andtheir individual followers. As such, it does not display the same communityelements, but can rather be viewed as a political entity.The community is vir-tual and only occasionally becomes visible, most often in the term of events.Brandon Gallaher mentions several events at various North American Ortho-dox clergy seminaries over the last few years that have included speakers whoare celebritieswithin reactive onlineOrthodoxy (Gallaher 2022: 112–113; cf. alsoRiccardi-Swartz 2022: 21). He laments a general trend for all these seminariesto succumb to ultra-conservative agenda-setting and fundamentalist rhetoricin their public events.Most Orthodox believers in the US still congregate in communities, but itis increasingly difficult to avoid the discourse of reactive online Orthodoxy be-cause it is omnipresent on the internet. Moreover, it is a self-reinforcing spi-ral in that evenwell-meaning reposts of seemingly harmlessOrthodox contentvery easily attract comments from the reactive Orthodoxmilieu.This is the re-sult of both the veil of anonymity that is offered by the internet and themissionimpetus of reactive Orthodoxy. Seeing themselves as saviors of a fallen world,these actors,who aremostly converts fromProtestantism,display online com-munication that is lecturing and polemical.Thus, the ideas circulating amongreactive onlineOrthodox do take hold also in the parishes, especially those thathave a large percentage of converts.This implies that these parishes might be-comemore closed and dismissive of diversity of opinion.The dream of diverseand all-encompassing Orthodoxy that is harbored amongmany liberal Ortho-dox in North America is hampered by this development.However, this development is not specific to North America, though reac-tive onlineOrthodoxy still is a predominantlyAmericanphenomenon.Becauseit is conducted mainly in English, however, it has a global following. At thesame time, it is fueled also by the deliberate use of Russian propaganda, es-pecially following the attack on Ukraine in February 2022. 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Accessed November 23, 2023. https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.northwestern.edu/dist/c/1549/files/2019/08/Sarkisian-Analysis.pdf.Forever Into EternitySocial Forms of Religion in the Temple Weddingof The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day SaintsMarie-Therese MäderAbstract Thewedding in the temple, knownas the “sealing” ceremony, constitutes a piv-otal moment in the life of a Latter-day Saint. Beyond the eternal nature of themarriage,the exclusive sacred space of the temple holds profound significance for the couple andtheir community, accessible only to members ofThe Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-daySaints.The temple wedding establishes clear distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’, delin-eating boundaries to the outsideworld and creating social units that embody the cellularprinciple of social forms of religions. In this particular case, these units manifest as themarital dyad of the couple, fortified during the “sealing” ceremony in the temple. Mar-riagebetweenamanandawomanrepresents themost esteemed formof living, providingaccess to the highest place in heaven.During thewedding, norms and values are not onlyactively shared but also collectively experienced. Even years later, the event is recalledin intricate detail, with certain experiences akin to the sealing ceremony in the temple.Therefore, the wedding plays a vital role in communitization. Lastly, the wedding recep-tion fosters emotional connections among guests who actively and enthusiastically par-ticipate in the event, thereby bringing the social form of eventization into play.Keywords boundarymaking, communitization, eventization, Latter-day Saints, mar-ital dyad, temple, ceremony, video conversations, wedding1. Introduction: Drawing boundaries within temple ceremoniesIn 2008, while journeying through the Western United States, I had my inau-gural visit to the Latter-day Saints Temple Square. Back then, my knowledgeof Mormonism andThe Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints was rather274 Social Forms of Religionlimited. My initial impression of the place was vivid: the remarkable cleanli-ness lingered in my memory; a feature particularly noteworthy from a Swissperspective.Moreover, the noticeable gap, the physical separation between thetourists participating in guided tours and the members of the church, left astrong impression onme (Mäder 2020).Most of the men were dressed in white shirts with ties and jackets. It ap-peared that the temple square was segregated into two distinct sections: onedesignated for the church members and another for the visitors. Initially, Iwas puzzled by this division, but I later learned that access to the temple is re-stricted to churchmembers only. It was not until later that I noticed thewall atthe bottomof the picture and the deliberate landscaping that created a separa-tion betweenmyself and the guests.This setting clearly delineated a boundarybetween us, the visitors, and them, the insiders. It became evident to me thatwithin Temple Square, there existed an exclusive group: individuals who stoodapart from the broader world, even though the dividing line was adorned withcarefully tended plants.Latter-day Saints,who consider themselves Christians but are not fully ac-cepted as such by all Christian communities, visit the temple to conduct vari-ous rites of passage (Van Gennep 2019: 1–14), such as baptism for the dead orcouple sealings for eternity. Another important ritual practice is the “sealingceremony”. Latter-day Saint families who join the church after their childrenarebornwill, as they call it, “seal” their family in a temple ceremony for eternity,meaning that the family will continue to be bound together in the afterworld.The same ritual is conducted by couples to be sealed for eternity,meaning thatthe couple will still be married even after their death.1 Due to its eternal du-ration, the Latter-day Saint temple wedding is called the “celestial marriage”(Daynes 2015). The ceremonies, such as the regular temple visit where mem-bers perform the “endowment ceremony” in various temple rooms, serve notonly as a way to confirm and establish identity among themembers but also asa way to create a social distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’.The present paper centers on one specific rite of passage within the Lat-ter-day Saint community: the temple marriage, specifically the “sealing” cere-mony. It addresses three questions: First, what does the temple wedding, the“sealing” of the couple, mean within the Latter-day Saints’ worldview (Fritz etal. 2018: 56–57)? Second, how is the representation of inclusion and exclusion1 For more about the Latter-day Saint practices of “sealing” and “eternal marriage” cf.Hammarberg 2013: 171–196; Daynes 2015)Marie-Therese Mäder: Forever Into Eternity 275symbolically and practically communicated in the temple wedding and othermoments, like the civilmarriage ceremony and the reception?Third,which so-cial forms of religion follow from these boundaries of inclusion and exclusionand how are social forms of religion expressed in the temple wedding and itsfestivities?The second question claims that the ritual of templeweddings signifies theestablishment of boundaries where participants create a distinction between‘them’ and ‘us’. This approach draws on the ethnographer and sociologist An-dreas Wimmer’s understanding of the boundary concept that consists of “ev-eryday networks of relationships that result from individual acts of connect-ing and distancing” and the social classifications as ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Wimmer2008: 113). This classification allows the experience of belonging that, accord-ing toHeinrich Popitz, is a basic form of social experience.The resulting socialunits represent the cellular principle of social forms of religion that define thedistinctions between ‘us and the others’ by drawing certain boundaries to theoutside world (Popitz 1992: 140–143).In the context of Latter-day Saints, this distinction from others is prac-ticed in the sealing ceremony in the temple.2 The latter is specifically drasticbecause the couples are sealed forever beyond death. The collective represen-tation of this shared worldview is expressed, among other ways, in the templebuildings, which are only accessible to members of the church with a templerecommendation by church authorities.3 Moreover, the various temple ritualscan be viewed as identity markers used to establish boundaries between theLatter-day Saints and those outside the faith, echoingWimmer’s analysis:One divides the social world into social groups – into ‘us’ and ‘them’ – andthe other offers scripts of action – how to relate to individuals classifiedas ‘us’ and ‘them’ under given circumstances. Only when the two schemescoincide, when ways of seeing the world correspond to ways of acting inthe world, shall I speak of a social boundary. (Wimmer 2008: 113)“[S]eeing the world” and “acting in the world” are intertwined and rooted ina particular worldview and distinct practices, among which a wedding can be2 The temple marriage is an important step in the “Mormon Quest for Glory,” as the titleof Melvyn Hammarberg’s monograph reads. Cf. Hammarberg 2013, 253–267.3 A detailed account of the religious practices in a Latter-day Saint temple can be foundin Mäder 2023, 201–202.276 Social Forms of Religionincluded as a specific religious social practice on several levels. Yet, the tem-ple wedding holds significant importance in the worldview of the Latter-daySaints. The couple forms an eternal dyad between husband and wife by mak-ing eternally valid promises to each other in the sealing ceremony in the tem-ple to enter the highest degree of heaven (out of three) in the afterlife (Daynes2015: 334).This eternal dyad can be seen as the smallest social form, accordingto Popitz (1992: 152–156), in which each individual recognizes the other indi-vidual and by doing so creates a social relationship.Additionally, the wedding also encompasses the community and the wed-ding guests. They partake in the ritual, listening to the couple’s vows and the“sealer’s” (the master of ceremony in the temple) words. During weddings col-lective and often emotional experiences, a strong sense of unity, and personalinclusion are communicated. These experiences contribute to the social formof religious communitization. A wedding transforms “individual experiencesinto collective experiences and thus makes a constitutive contribution to so-cial forms of religion”4 (Heiser/Ludwig 2014: 8). In processes of communitiza-tion common norms and values are shared, and the social boundary betweenus and them is strengthened, and a collective identity is generated (Krech etal. 2013: 54).5 And finally, the support by other churchmembers before, duringand after the wedding reinforces a collective practice. It highlights the experi-ence of something extraordinary, emotional bonding and active participation,that belongs to another religious social form, namely the eventization. “Actingand feeling together connects the participants, takes them out of their every-day lives and gives rise to the assumption that they are connected to somethingbigger”, as sociologists Patrick Heiser and Christian Ludwig describe the reli-gious social of eventization (Heiser/Ludwig 2014:10).This collective experienceis exemplified, for instance, in group photographs taken in front of the temple.Following the temple wedding, the group congregates on the temple steps forimmediatephotographs.Thismomentholdsparticular significanceasphotog-raphy and videography are prohibited within the temple.The chapter’s questions are considered on the basis of three interviewsthat form part of a comprehensive interdisciplinary research project. Thisstudy employs a multi-methodological approach encompassing 27 narrative-biographical interviews involving both religious and non-religious couples4 Translation from German by the author.5 A detailed account of the religious social form of communitization can be found inthe introduction of this volume.Marie-Therese Mäder: Forever Into Eternity 277across Italy, Germany, and Switzerland. These video-recorded conversationsare shaped by themethodological principles of visual anthropology (Pink 2021:81–170).They involve couples viewing and commenting on their wedding pho-tos to reconstruct the events of their wedding day.The current chapter centerson three video interviews featuring couples affiliated withTheChurch of JesusChrist of Latter-day Saints from Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. It serves asa case study within a broader research sample, where the contextual informa-tion becomes pertinent for analyzing the three interviews (Baur/Lamnek 2017;Hering/Schmid 2014).The contribution is structured in four parts. In this introduction, I haveconsidered the boundary concept and how it is connected to the question ofsocial forms of religion in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (1.).The main part discusses the role of Latter-day Saint temples not only in thewedding ceremony but also as spaces of collective experiences andprocesses ofidentity building (2.). Additionally, three conversations with Latter-day Saintcouples showhow thewedding contributes to the social formsof religion of themarital dyad, communitization, and eventization (3.). Finally, the conclusion(4.) summarises the boundary-making processes taking place during Latter-day Saint weddings andmatches themwith corresponding social forms of re-ligion.2. Latter-day Saint wedding in the temple2.1 The boundary of the temple areaAs previously mentioned, the temple is an exclusive space reserved solely forLatter-day Saintswho are baptized, have reached the age of eight, and have ac-quired a temple recommendation issued by the temple authority (Mäder 2023,201).This recommendation is followed by an interview with either a bishop ora representative of the church. Within the Mormon worldview, the temple ishistorically linked to the Tabernacle of the Israelites (Ex 25–31) in the desertand King Solomon’s temple in Jerusalem.66 There are 179 dedicated temples worldwide. 51 temples are under construction, 98temples are announced, and six temples are currently being renovated. Cf. https://churchofjesuschristtemples.org/temples/.278 Social Forms of ReligionFig. 1: The Google Earth screenshot of the SanDiego templeshows the symmetrically arranged area.The two strikingtowers are recognizable as shadows.(https://www.google.com/maps/place/San+Diego+California+Temple/@32.8662322,-117.2291438,484m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m6!3m5!1s0x80dc06d32da29aff:0x3681ef10f8a92fa4!8m2!3d32.8665341!4d-117.228771!16zL20vMGQybDNi?entry=ttu)The exclusivity of the temple is also reflected in its architecture and thesurrounding grounds, which are deliberately set apart from the adjacent ar-eas. Often, the temple area is arranged within a block, enclosed by streets andhedges.The layout of the buildings and pathways emphasizes a preference fordistinctive symmetrical and square architecture, exemplifiedby the aerial viewof the San Diego temple (cf. fig. 1). The spatial configuration of these templeMarie-Therese Mäder: Forever Into Eternity 279complexes becomes a distinguishing characteristic (see fig. 2) (Mäder 2023:202–208).Fig. 2: SanDiego Latter-day Saints temple.(Photo M.-T.Mäder, November 2015)The temples’ predominantly white, square-shaped exteriors establish a vi-sual connection between the individual temple buildings and represent TheChurch of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as a global institution.The distinc-tive temple architecture collectively embodies the church, in alignment withWimmer’s concept, and exudes an air of exclusivity.This architectural expres-sion is further underscored by the surrounding garden areas,which contributeto a somewhat segregating aesthetic.Whenmembers visit the temple, they en-ter into an exclusive realm to which they maintain an emotional and personalrelationship that is based on shared norms and values. Temple visits not onlyreinforce the relationships among the members but also provide a collectiveidentity. These experiences are attributed to the religious social form of com-munitization. Only the visitor center serves as an inclusive space, although itspristine appearance often creates an atmosphere that seems somewhat iso-lated from the external world.280 Social Forms of Religion2.2 Communitization, societalization, and the eternal dyadin the “sealing” ceremonyIn addition to the wedding for eternity, other significant rituals occur withinthe temple.They allow further experiences that support processes of commu-nitization as well as societalization. The latter comes into play because thechurch strictly regulates these rituals, and assigned temple workers observethe procedures to be carried out correctly. These include sealings of familiesfor eternity, particularly for those families who joined the community at alater stage. Parents and their children are eternally linked in a manner similarto the wedding ceremony. Furthermore, baptisms and confirmations for thedead are conducted within the temple, taking place in the baptismal fonttypically situated in the temple’s basement. The baptismal font is upheld bytwelve oxen, symbolizing the twelve tribes of Israel.This (presumably) imitatesthe architectural design of the bronze basin in the courtyard of the Templeof Solomon.7 Members conduct rituals to baptize and confirm deceasedindividuals, inducting them as posthumous members of the church.The temple itself serves as a representation of the cosmology ofTheChurchof Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, featuring the so-called “telestial”, “terres-trial”, and “celestial” rooms.8 These rooms symbolize the stages of existence:the telestial represents the world of creation, the terrestrial signifies Earthwith the Garden of Eden, and the celestial denotes eternity. During a visitto the temple, Latter-day Saints move through these rooms consecutively. Inthe telestial and terrestrial rooms, visitors engage with spoken or recordedtexts, with the telestial room even presenting a film depicting creation. In thecelestial room,members are invited to experience the presence of Godwithoutany further instructions.In the Rome temple, these three rooms are arranged horizontally from leftto right on the middle level, with the telestial room on the left, the terrestrialin the middle, and the celestial room on the right, following the order of theircosmological significance (fig. 3).7 Cf. https://www.esv.org/resources/esv-global-study-bible/illustration-11-solomons-temple.8 The graphic depicting the telestial kingdom appears more akin to an infernal realm,contradicting the Latter-day Saints’ belief in the absence of a traditional hell.Marie-Therese Mäder: Forever Into Eternity 281Fig. 3: Model of the Latter-day Saint temple in Rome.(photo M.-T.Mäder, February 2023)At the center of the upper level lies the sealing room, the site for weddingsand family sealings.This room is distinctive due to the altar positioned in thecenter where the couple kneels during the ceremony. Adjacent to the wall par-allel to the altar, mirrors are suspended, reflecting each other endlessly. Thisperpetual reflection serves as a symbol of eternity.Members informed me in various conversations that temples are repletewith symbols consistent across all temple locations worldwide. Latter-daySaints are welcome to visit any temple and will encounter a similar internalbuilding structure and comparable interior design.Additionally, the similaritybetween the temples allows members to share an emotional and sensationalexperience that, in turn, fosters global communitization. As access to templesis restricted, non-Mormons (unable to attend a Latter-day Saint temple wed-ding) are guided towait in a roomadjacent to the temple reception,where on alarge screen the wedding ceremony is explained by amember of the governingbody of the church (Quorum of the Twelve).It is notable that all three couples with whom I spoke about their templewedding vividly recalled the profound significance of the endlessmirroring ef-fect during the ceremony.The social form of the dyad represents the cell of re-282 Social Forms of Religionligious communitization and at the same time becomes collective on the levelof experience andmemory of the wedding.92.3 The temple wedding as reinforcing collective identityThe temple marriage is an integral aspect of processes of communitizationwithinThe Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. It is exclusive not onlyspatially but also emotionally, as – in their self-imagination – only Mormonscan comprehend the significance of being sealed for eternity. Gettingmarriedin the temple holds distinctive importance in aiming for thehighest position inthe celestial kingdom,as illustrated in a graphic from 1950 (seefig. 4)where thecouple will live together in eternity by attaining godhood and proceeding withtheir procreation forever and ever (Hammarberg 2013: 267).Only these coupleswill be given access to the highest of the three heavens Latter-day Saints believein.The telestial kingdom stands as the lowest, reserved for those who havecompletely disregarded the moral guidelines outlined by the Mormon faith.The terrestrial kingdom is the second heaven, designated for “The good& hon-orable but blinded by the craftiness of men,” as described in the image. Ulti-mately, marriage is essential for the third heaven, “the highest of which is ex-altation” (Daynes 2015: 334) as highlighted by the celebratory banner displayedin front of the Salt LakeCity temple in the image, but there are other paths intoit as well. While several other responsibilities are essential, such as baptism,repentance, adhering to moral standards, paying tithes, and fulfilling duties,marriage holds a preeminent role in attaining the kingdomof heaven and ulti-mately achieving godhood as a reward.This positive appreciation of the tem-ple wedding draws another boundary inside the Latter-day Saint community.It highlights the dyad between the couple as the smallest religious social formwhich is the most recognized in the afterlife.Conversations with three Latter-day Saint couples delve deeper into socialformsof religion through the sealingexperienceandwedding festivities.High-lighting their significance within the context of the dyad, communitization,and eventization.9 Interviews with N.N., couples, September 16, 2022 near Frankfurt/M./GE (https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8181413), February 1, 2023 near Zurich/CH (https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8248443), and February 10, 2023 in Rome/IT (https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8248549).Marie-Therese Mäder: Forever Into Eternity 283Fig. 4: Depiction of the Latter-day Saint worldview.(Leonidas DeVonMechan, Salt Lake City/US, 1950)3. Three conversations with Latter-day Saint couplesThe conversations with three Latter-day Saint couples about their weddingreveal not only the significance of the temple wedding but also express similarvalues connected to this experience. The couples stressed not only the socialform of the dyad during the temple wedding but also reported on the personalinclusion of their guests during the sealing rite.The Latter-day Saint weddingenhances not only communitization but also provides eventization during thefestivities. The conversations are recorded, and the video protocols are tran-scribed verbatim (Halcomb/Davidson 2006: 40) and evaluated by combininggrounded theory and sociological hermeneutics of knowledge (Kurt/Herbrik2014; Boehm 1994; Strübing 2014).The analysis focuses on the way the couplesconstruct their wedding narrative in the temple and how they report differentsocial forms.The video interviews are part of a larger research project with themain question of how contemporary media representations like photos and284 Social Forms of Religionvideos of religious and secular weddings in Europe communicate norms andvalues. In the current paper, this question is discussed in the context of socialforms of religion, where the sharing of common norms and values stabilizesreligious communication and plays an important role in communitizationprocesses (Heiser/Ludwig 2014: 9).The interdisciplinary study applies amulti-methodological approach that includes, among others, the analysis of wed-ding shows and 27 narrative-biographical interviews (Hopf 2016) with couplesfrom Italy, Germany, and Switzerland who married between 1968 and 2022.Within the research project’s framework, the discussions with Latter-daySaint couples hold significance because these couples lack any photographs oftheir temple wedding.Remembering the ceremonywithout visual references forges aunique con-nection among coupleswhile creating adistance fromotherswhodohavepho-tographs of the event. Despite this, their memories of the ceremony remaindistinct and vivid.The subsequent analysis of these three conversations delvesinto how the boundary-making processes of inclusion and exclusion manifestwithin the memories of the temple wedding.The three couplesweremarried at different times:The Italian couplewed inthe Bern temple in Switzerland in 1977, just two days after their civil marriageat the civil registry in Campidoglio, Rome. The wife was 25 years old, and thehusbandwas 26. Both had converted toMormonism at a young age after beingraised Catholic. They are parents to two children and are now grandparents.TheGerman couplemarried in the Frankfurt temple in 1989, holding both theirtemple and civil ceremonies on the sameday.Thewifewas 20 years old, and thehusband was 23 at the time of their marriage. Both were born into the churchand are parents to four adult children.The Swiss couple exchanged vows in theBern temple in 2022, following their civil wedding the day before.Thewife was24 years old, and the husband was 25. Both were born intoThe Church of JesusChrist of Latter-day Saints.3.1 The Italian couple (temple wedding in 1977)10The couple – it wasmainly the wife who was speaking while the husband reas-sured her, repeatedly distanced themselves from the civil wedding during the10 The conversation took place on 10 February 2023 at The Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-ter-day Saints visitor center in Rome/IT.Marie-Therese Mäder: Forever Into Eternity 285conversation.Both agreed that the civil weddingdidnotmean anything. Itwasnothing more than a tedious event, as the wife mentions:Nothing. Just a deadly effort. The real marriage for us would have been inthe temple. We only did the civil marriage because, from a legal point ofview, our marriage was valid. Otherwise, there would have been no need.It was nice because it was exciting because we shared all this with ourrelatives, our friends, and our parents. But while they were congratulatingus, we were thinking that the best is yet to come. We are here wishingeach other well, but we are married, yes, we are married by law, but ourhearts are yet to be married. The chain of love, of which I spoke before,has not yet been bound. And so, the real wedding, for us, was the oneup in the temple. The wedding day here in Rome was a terrible effort.11The couple explicitly expressed that their civil ceremony did not feel like the“real wedding”, a sentiment they reiterated multiple times during the conver-sation.They conveyed that they arranged it primarily for their parents and rel-atives. Moreover, the post-wedding lunch created an uncomfortable situationas they were expected to toast with the guests, which they refrained from do-ing, given the Latter-day Saint prohibition of alcohol. This act of abstainingfrom the toast symbolized their divergence from the group or non-membersof The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and highlighted their senseof not fully belonging to their wedding guests.This deliberate choice served asameans to reinforce their dyad, i.e. their identity as a couple while simultane-ously creating a noticeable boundary to the attendees.Primarily, the wife portrays the civil wedding and subsequent reception ashectic and draining. In stark contrast, the temple wedding the following day isdepicted as a quiet and calm occasion. However, the wife emphasizes that thespiritual experience during the temple wedding was indeed exhaustive:And we just went up [to Switzerland]. Nothing happened there, though,in the sense that the wedding in Zollikofen, like all weddings that takeplace in the temple, are extremely meaningful. In this specific case, bothhe and I had never done the path, so on the same day we did the spiri-tual path, which we talked about earlier, and immediately afterwards wewent upstairs and had the wedding. So, it was a really full day for us. Also11 Video conversation with NN, spouse, Rome/IT February, 10, 2023.Transcript translatedfrom the Italian by the author.286 Social Forms of Religionbecause, besides the excitement of getting married, there was the com-ing to know and making covenants and commitments, which were reallyimpactful from a spiritual point of view. And so we were exhausted.12In the wife’s representation, the two weddings compete against each otherwith regard to representation andmeaning.The civil marriage proved sociallyexhausting due to the presence of numerous guests, family, and friends whowanted to celebrate something the couple was not entirely invested in. Thegreat significance of the temple wedding proved to be draining also becauseit was additionally combined with a customary temple visit that they had notexperienced before. This visit had a profound impact on them, as describedby the wife: “[…] there was the coming to know and making covenants andcommitments, which were really impactful from a spiritual point of view”.13In 1977, the sealing ceremony was also logistically demanding, because therewas no temple in Italy at the time.The Latter-day Saints from Italy and manyother countries in mainland Europe had to travel to Switzerland to conductthe diverse temple ceremonies andmake covenants with God.The couple’s firm boundary with non-Latter-day Saints, even many yearsafter their wedding, is likely due to their conversion to the church, which setsthem apart from the rest of their family and most of their friends who didn’tshare their worldview. On the one hand, the dyadic relationship between thecouple is strengthened through this experience.On theother, they experience astrong feelingof belonging to theLatter-daySaint community evenmanyyearsafter thewedding.The templewedding becomes part of their identity that theyshare with the other members and therefore contributes to communitization.3.2 The German couple (temple wedding in 1989)14TheGerman couple acknowledges that the civilwedding serves as the legal pre-requisite for the templewedding,but they alsodonotfind it particularlymean-ingful.They arranged the civil ceremony simultaneously with the temple wed-ding and the evening reception.Managing these three significant events in one12 Video conversation with NN, spouse, Rome/IT, February, 10, 2023. Transcript trans-lated from the Italian by the author.13 Video conversation with NN, spouse, Rome/IT, February, 10, 2023. Transcript trans-lated from the Italian by the author.14 The conversation took place 16 September 2022 in a private home near Frankfurt/M./GEMarie-Therese Mäder: Forever Into Eternity 287day was stressful, as they recall, and they express a desire to do it differently ifgiven the chance. It is not surprising that the temple ceremony held the focalpoint amidst this packed day.The husband even remarks that this moment isthe only one he vividly recalls from the wedding:So, the sealing is the only thing I can still remember. […] It was just –because it’s just the ambiance, it’s so beautiful. You’re there in the temple.You kneel in front of an altar and there are just so many of them, thereare opposing mirrors. That means you can see the others into infinity.And that’s what a circle does. It's simple. It’s just incredibly beautiful.15It is notable that the husband becomes emotional while recalling the cere-mony. Another instance of emotional depth in their conversation occurs whenthey discuss the certainty they had in choosing each other during their datingphase. The husband emphasizes that this decision holds a different signifi-cance within their church because it involves choosing for eternity, which, initself, can be quite intimidating. However, surpassing this fear is rewardingand ultimately brings a sense of happiness. The husband’s memories of thesealing ceremony point out again how the Latter-day Saint eternal maritaldyad distinguishes itself from other weddings.Within this conversation, the temple ceremony is revealed not only as ashared collective representation among all Latter-day Saints but also as a col-lective experience. Both aspects foster connections among its members whilecreatinga senseofdistance fromnon-Latter-daySaints andcontribute to com-munitization. The husband classifies those who do not belong to the churchwhen comparing the temple with the civil ceremony:It's just more personal than the registrar reading out his text. We thoughtit was unspeakable, but that's just the way it is. It is what it is. It was anofficial who just did his job and that was it. It wasn’t very personal.16Similar to the Roman couple the ceremony by the registrar is less valued by theGerman couple. The husband laughs when he describes the anonymous andalmost mechanical civil procedure. It seems that he does not take it seriously15 Video conversation with NN, husband, near Frankfurt/M./GE, September, 16, 2022.Transcript translated from the German by the author.16 Video conversation with NN, husband, near Frankfurt/M./GE, September, 16, 2022.Transcript translated from the German by the author.288 Social Forms of Religionand judges the work of the official as someone who “just did his job” while thesealer in the templewho is anofficial chosenby the church authorities gives theceremonymeaning. In contrast, the couple positively remembers details of thesealing ceremony like when “the sun’s rays shine in through the stained-glasswindows”,17 as the wife describes the moment. It is also noticeable that theyagree on this very detailedmemory which strengthens their marital dyad.Thehusband says that after this moment the wedding could have been over. Thereception was obligatory, but obviously not relevant to them.It is noteworthy that although non-Latter-day Saints are usually invited tothe reception, it is nonetheless exactly this part of the wedding which is lessvalued by the couple. It shows that the community is prioritized over the “oth-ers”, the non-Latter-day Saint members, against which a boundary is drawn.Here not only communitization but also eventization take place by the inclu-sion of non-members. This also coincides with the experience of the Germancouple. The wedding reception took place in the church’s community center.Many church members helped with organizing the reception, preparing foodand decoration, taking photos, and tidying up again at the end.The Swiss cou-ple, the youngest of the three, could also count on thehelp of themembers.Thisalso turns the wedding as an event into a shared experience during which theLatter-day Saints additionally connect.3.3 The Swiss couple (temple wedding in 2022)18In the case of the Swiss couple the shared experience of the wedding, withothermembers of the church,was highlighted evenmore during the conversa-tion. The whole wedding was supported by church members at different mo-ments and revealed the social forms of religious eventization and communi-tization. The hairdresser who also did the make-up was from the church, thewedding cake was created by the bride’s father who is a professional confec-tioner. Church members decorated the wedding location of the reception andhelped cleanupafterward.Thephotographerwas aLatter-daySaint.Addition-ally, the couple celebrated an extra blessing ceremony at the garden house of amember, a former bishop of the church.The husband describes their relation-ship as being father-son-like.17 Video conversation with NN, spouse, near Frankfurt/M./GE, September, 16, 2022. Tran-script translated from Swiss German by the author.18 The conversation took place in the couple’s apartment near Zurich/CH.Marie-Therese Mäder: Forever Into Eternity 289Thewedding consisted of four different ceremonies or receptions and tookplace in central Switzerland in 2022.The first wedding was the civil at the reg-istry with 50 guests.The secondwas the alreadymentioned blessing ceremonywith a reception afterward in the garden of a member with 80 guests. In theevening the newlyweds celebrated with 100 guests, friends, and family mem-bers.The following day the couple was sealed in the Bern temple in Zollikofenaccompanied by 25 close family members. Some of the guests, only membersof the church, participated in all four weddings.The couple sent different invi-tations to individually assign the guests to oneormore of the four celebrations.Themanagement of the different invitations was according to the couple quitecomplex. Among other things, it was a way to draw boundaries betweenmem-bers and non-members that in turn contributes to communitization.During the conversation, the couple shared their intricately crafted wed-ding album encapsulating the entire day, along with a video documenting theevening reception. They explained that the absence of photos from the tem-ple wedding did not bother them, as it felt that they compensated for the lackof temple images with those from the blessing ceremony. Furthermore, nu-merous photos were taken in front of the temple, featuring the couple, familymembers, and friends in group shots. The wife expressed a sentiment of re-gret at not being able to record the words spoken by the sealer, with a slightdisagreement between the couple on thismatter. She believes thewordingwasindividually tailored for them.However, thehusbandholdsadifferentperspec-tive, disagreeing with her. To his understanding, the sealer’s words during thewedding are consistently the same in every temple wedding. It was noticeablethat both of them made a swift attempt to resolve this disagreement duringthe conversation, almost as if it were inappropriate to hold differing views onthematter.Theirmarital dyad does not allow differentmemories in this issue.When reflecting on the most significant moment of their wedding, theemotional and personal experience of the temple ceremony once again stoodout as pivotal:Husband: I had several moments like that. One of them was when I sawher for the first time. Now it’s getting real. But the other one was also onSaturday itself then, inside in the temple. And in that room, it has liketwo mirrors, opposite each other, representing eternity. From this place,where you are, you can look into the mirror non-stop. When I was therewith [my wife], I already-.290 Social Forms of ReligionWife: At the end when we were still two?Husband: Yes, yes, exactly.Wife: Everyone left the room at the end. It was really just the two of ussitting there.mtm19: Is that part of the ceremony?Husband: That you’re alone? No, we just wanted it that way.mtm: To have a moment alone.Husband: Yes.mtm: And did you talk to each other or just soak up the moment-?Husband: More soak up the moment. Maybe one word.Wife: No, not spoken much, just absorbed.Husband: For me, I once worked in the temple for three weeks. That wasbefore the mission. That was 2018. And I often went into that room wherethe sealings take place, and I used to imagine what that might be likewhen I was in there. That always gave me a calmness. Just such a nicefeeling. You can’t compare that with what happened during the day. Be-cause it was even better then. When I think of it like that, I always lookedforward to that moment. When I can be in there with my wife, and I canseal myself to her for eternity.20Again, the opposing mirrors in the sealing room are mentioned as an experi-ence of eternity by the husband. Additionally, the religious social form of theintimate dyad shared exclusively by the couple resonates with the experiencesof the other couples during the temple ceremony. In this instance, the coupledeliberately carved out time for themselves immediately after the ceremony.Despite having four celebrations in total, the temple ceremony stands as the19 Interviewer and author of present chapter.20 Video conversation with NN, husband, near Zurich/CH, February, 1, 2023. Transcripttranslated from Swiss German by the author.Marie-Therese Mäder: Forever Into Eternity 291pivotal event for both, holding significance beyond the other festivities. Thesealing for eternity serves as a profoundly unique and deeply personal emo-tional experience for the couple. Simultaneously, it acts as a source of self-assurance and connection for the community, creating a distinction betweenthem and others.These characteristics solidify as a robust boundary, delineat-ing a clear divide between the Swiss couple and non-Latter-day Saints.The de-lineation aligns with the concept of boundaries in this scenario and confirmsitself as the social-religious form of communitization.The couple’smemory oftheir templewedding represents an exclusive andhighly symbolic practice thatcanbe categorized as a collective experience that is sharedwith othermembersof the church.4. Conclusion: Boundaries and social forms of religionin temple weddingsIn the Latter-day Saints worldview, temple weddings serve as a means of es-tablishing boundaries in the social form of an exclusive religious community,enabling members to distinguish themselves from others. These boundariesmanifest in various aspects, including the architecture of the Latter-day Saintstemple, its surroundings, and the couples’ recollections of their weddings.Thedynamics of connection and separation unfold at distinct junctures within thewedding, delineated into the civil ceremony and the temple wedding.This de-marcation provides “scripts of action that aid in the identification of ‘us’ versus‘them’ (Wimmer 2008: 113), contributing to a nuanced process of inclusion andexclusion that in turn results in social forms of religion of the bridal couple’sdyad, communitization, and eventization. The concluding remarks will con-centrate on three pivotal moments identified in the analysis. They answer theunderlying question of how boundary-making processes and social forms ofreligion are expressed in Latter-day Saint weddings.The initial moment pertains to the perception of the temple building andthe collective emotions experienced by itsmembers.The temple holds a centralsignificance as weddings are exclusively conducted in the sealing roomwithinits premises.The temple visit is perceived as a privilege, distinguishing Latter-day Saints from others. Members share a profound connection to this sacredspace, fostering a sense of unity among them. The communal emotional at-tachment to the temple amplifies its impact as a collective representation andidentity, which again refers to communitization reinforcing the social classi-292 Social Forms of Religionfication of ‘them’ and ‘us‘. This boundary contradicts their self-perception asChristians and their desire for a Christian affiliation that should include thewhole of Christianity and not just The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-daySaints. The exclusivity of the temples frequently faces criticism. A commonresponse to this critique is the assertion that the temples are “sacred, not se-cret”.21The significance of the temple ceremony for couples is the secondmomentin which the social forms of the dyad on one hand and communitization onthe other play a role. They are expressed in collective representations, socialclassifications as ‘us’ and ‘them’, and the interaction with the community. Allthree couples treasured their experiences in the sealing room, each in a uniqueway. The shared ‘mirror experience’ emerged as a common thread, serving asa defining aspect of the temple wedding. Emotional moments were describedby all three couples, with the Italian couple expressing feeling “exhausted”due to the intense spiritual experience. Furthermore, it was the first time theItalian couple had entered the temple, experiencing the endowment cere-mony for the first time. This dual encounter likely heightened the emotionalintensity. Similarly, the German couple vividly recalled their temple wedding.For instance, they intricately described the sunlight streaming through thestained-glass windows of the sealing room. Both emphasized the profoundshared emotional moment, noting that everything thereafter felt more like aduty toward their guests.The Swiss couple deliberately approached the templeceremony, carving out amoment to savor the atmosphere in the sealing room.They scarcely spoke, opting to “soak up the moment”, as they recollect.Despite these three independent experiences, commonalities emerge. Allthree couples articulate a perception of something extraordinary during thetemple ceremony, rooted in the spatial and sensory elements.This exceptionalexperience thus becomes an exclusive boundary between the couple and atten-dees of the sealing ceremony.The couple is drawing an inner boundary – nowtransformed into an eternal dyad by the sealing/mirroring – separated fromeveryone else, even other Latter-day Saints present in that room.The thirdmo-ment of communitization pertains to the wedding reception held outside thetemple during which the religious social form of eventization comes into playas well. Once again, the receptions varied, yet shared certain similarities as acollective endeavor.The Italian couple, compelled to celebrate for their parents,21 Cf. https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/study/eng/new-era/2006/01/how-to-talk-about-the-temple.Marie-Therese Mäder: Forever Into Eternity 293repeatedly underscored that the civil wedding and the ensuing reception werebothersome and held no personal significance for them. They felt estrangedfrom the entire event and explicitly distanced themselves. Similarly, the Ger-man couple conveyed that the temple wedding was the highlight of the entireday, echoing the sentiment of the Swiss couple. Unlike the Italian couple, boththe German and Swiss couples celebrated with numerous church members,creating amore comfortable atmosphere compared to the Italian couple.Addi-tionally, theGermanandSwiss couples celebrated in the churchmeetinghousewith assistance from fellowmembers. According to the couples, the membersexpect and are accustomed to supporting couples in preparing and celebratingtheir weddings, as humorously noted by the Swiss couple. In this way, not onlythe temple ceremony but also the reception become a practice of inclusion andboundary-setting for the community in a collective endeavor. Therefore, thewedding reception includes both social forms, namely communitization andeventization.To summarise, it can be stated that the multiple boundary-making pro-cesses within the context of temples and Latter-day Saint weddings unveilsocial forms of religion at different moments. First, the overarching boundarybetween outsiders and insiders (us/them) is revealed in relation to the spaceof the temple building which excludes outsiders. It creates a profound senseof belonging in the temple sealing ceremony and plays a constituting part inthe Latter-day Saints’ communitization process. From an emic perspective, itmakes all the other elements, such as the civil ceremony or various receptions,pale into insignificance for the couples. Second, the ceremony also createsinner boundaries within this “sacred space” within the sealing room, formedaround the couple’s dyad as the smallest social form,mirrored in eternity.Thecouples see themselves as a unity for all eternity, distinct even from other LDSmembers within the sealing room.The third boundary is the common space ofthe wedding reception – in which LDS members and non-members share thespace. In this setting, Latter-day Saints, notably the married couple, seek toexpress their religious identity (e.g. by not drinking alcohol) in a worldly spaceby applying the religious social form of eventization. The clearest example ofthese multiple boundary rings is indicated by the various invitations sent todifferent ceremonies and receptions, to members and non-members, distin-294 Social Forms of Religionguishing between the four ceremonies of the Swiss couple.22 It shows thatcommunitization may also include non-members for a certain time framewho participate in the event. At the same time, these guests are aware thatthey are only partly included, which in turn lets both sides experience theboundary during the celebration of the wedding.Clear and robust boundaries, even multiple boundaries, impact not onlyinsiders but also outsiders of a community. LDS weddings allow intense col-lective experiences that serve the social forms of religious communitization,the eternal dyad of the couple, and in some moments the eventization of reli-gion.The boundaries established in a Latter-day Saint weddingmay thereforealso evoke anequal sense of exclusion for thosenot permitted to enter the innerboundary rings of the temple space.DisclaimerThis project has received funding from the EuropeanUnion’s Horizon 2020 re-search and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grantagreement No 101024115. The present document reflects only the author’sview and the European Commission Research Executive Agency (REA) is notresponsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.22 The model draws on the religious space of the Jerusalem Temple with its gradationsof “holiness” increasing the closer to the center one gets of the Holy of Holies. 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Accessed Novem-Marie-Therese Mäder: Forever Into Eternity 297ber 16, 2023. https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/study/eng/new-era/2006/01/how-to-talk-about-the-temple.Temples of theChurch of JesusChrist of Latter-day Saints. “Temples.”AccessedJanuary 3, 2024. https://churchofjesuschristtemples.org/temples/.The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. “Style Guide:The Name of theChurch.”Newsroom.Accessed April 9, 2010. http://newsroom.churchofjesuschrist.org/style-guide.TheChurch of JesusChrist of Latter-day Saints. “Temple List.”Accessed July 22,2021. https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/temples/list?lang=eng.Organizing “Private Religion”Types of Governance in US ProtestantismInsa PruiskenAbstract According to Luckmann, the new social form of religion inmodern societies isthe private form,which is characterized by the rise of a consumermentality.However, re-ligious consumers can only emerge when religious organizations provide the options forconsumer choices. Consumer religion is associated with a particular pattern of churchorganization, which is best represented by the megachurch model and is similar to pro-cesses in the field of higher education. To identify this pattern, I introduce the “gover-nance equalizer”, an instrument thatwas developed for the field of higher education.Theanalysis of governance patterns proceeds in three steps. First, I discuss three types of el-ementary mechanisms of governance forms: mutual observation, influence, and negoti-ation. Second, I differentiate types of actors in US Protestantism: individual believers,communities, congregations, denominations, and special purpose groups. Third, build-ing on constellations of mutual negotiation, I distinguish six types of governance formsin US Protestantism: (1) denominational regulation, (2) democratic self-governance, (3)hierarchical self-governance, (4) stakeholder guidance, (5) competition, and (6) networkgovernance. Finally, I discuss the role of organizations in the formation of private reli-gion.Keywords governance, legitimation, megachurch model, privatized religion, socialform of religion, United States1. IntroductionHow does religion show itself in modern societies? This was the leading ques-tion for Thomas Luckmann, who considered a social form of religion broadlyas a “social arrangement between collective religious representations and thesocial structure” (Luckmann2003: 279).FollowingÉmileDurkheim,Luckmann300 Social Forms of Religionstudies religious change from a functionalist perspective and states that reli-gion is “not a passing phase in the evolution ofmankind but a universal aspectof the conditio humana” (ibid.: 276).The social form of religion describes howthe religious core of a worldview is related to the social and normative order ofsociety.1Therefore, Luckmann’s concept of the social form of religion not onlyrefers to organizational types, such as markets, networks, and events but alsoconsiders the relationship between institutional forms and religious ideas (seethe introduction to this volume). How are religious ideas and worldviews in-stitutionalized in modern societies?With the spread of secularization and the progressing functional differen-tiation of spheres – politics, economy, science, education, art, etc. – the socialform of “privatized religion” emerged, which resulted from the “demonopo-lization” of the production and distribution of worldviews and the despecial-ization of religion. In this social form, the sacred cosmos depends on the pri-vate sphere and on secondary institutions2 Knoblauch (2010) later described as“popular religion”. This means that religious socialization is not necessarily apart of primary socialization, in which individuals encounter an objective so-cial structure that is mediated by significant others (such as parents, siblings,and teachers). No general obligatory model exists anymore that relates reli-gious values to the social and normative order of society. Instead, a plurality ofworldviewsand institutional formsdevelop that (inprinciple) becomeavailableto everyone. Multiple “sacred cosmoses” represent religious and nonreligiousworldviews and compete with each other. Luckmann (2003) and Berger (1963)use the concept of the “market” as a metaphor to describe this new form of1 Luckmann does that by distinguishing analytically between personality, structure, andculture. Personality refers to the individual’s unique pattern of thoughts, feelings, andbehaviors and serves as the mediating mechanism between the individual and soci-ety. Social structure describes the organized patterns of social relationships and insti-tutions that make up society including norms and values, roles, institutions, and pat-terns of social interaction. Culture provides a framework for understanding the world,shaping individual behavior, and maintaining social order (Parsons/Platt 1973).2 This term refers to Berger and Luckmann’s distinction between “primary” and “sec-ondary” socialization. “Secondary socialization is the internalization of institutionalor institution-based ‘subworlds’. (…) [It] requires the acquisition of role-specific vocab-ularies, which means, for one thing, the internalization of semantic fields structuringroutine interpretations and conduct within an institutional area” (Berger/Luckmann1967: 138).Insa Pruisken: Organizing “Private Religion” 301religion; others talk of “event-structured”, “hyper-mediatized”, and “spiritual”forms of religion (Gauthier 2014).With the rise of the private form of religion, religious communities areincreasingly operating in competitive environments.3 Unlike the fields of art,science, health, and sports, religions receive less or no financial support fromthe government to carry out their activities. Althoughmany European nation-states still maintain a cooperative relationship with religion and churches en-joy special privileges, these special rights are often more historical remnants.In particular, in the United States, religious organizations must grow on theirown merit. Therefore, in the discourse on the “governance of religion”, thedominant question is not how to enhance the effectiveness of religion (as inthe case of education and science) but rather how tomanage religious diversityand restrain or contain the power of religious communities (Schuppert 2012;2017). The state’s role in this context is primarily to institutionally safeguardpluralism and nonviolence (Kern/Pruisken 2018).In the competitive environment of private religion, religious organizationsneed to draw in members with their offerings.The social form of private reli-gion necessarily builds not only on religious consumers but also on religiousproviders. Consequently, culturally pluralized religion also faces a pluraliza-tion of religious organizational forms. Although the rational-choice approachto religion has repeatedly emphasized the market-like nature of religion, ithas neglected the pluralization of religious organizational forms. This is ac-companied by the fact that established organizational sociology has only beensporadically integrated into the sociology of religion (and vice versa) (Petzke/Tyrell 2012; Tracey/Phillips/Lounsbury 2014). The development of types of so-cial forms in religion has not been incorporated into current debates in orga-nizational sociology.However, despite differences from other societal fields, there is no reasonto assume that established instruments of governance and organizational re-search should not be applicable to religious organizations as well. Religiousactors in modern societies copy and enact organizational models from other3 By using the concept of “competitive environments,” I draw on Meyer and Rowan’s(1977) distinction between competitive and institutional environments. Meyer andRowan focus on the degree of legitimacy of organizations. While organizations incompetitive environments must struggle for their survival, organizations in institu-tional environments can survive even if they are not successful, yet still perceived aslegitimate by the environment.302 Social Forms of Religionsocietal fields, such as economy, science, and education, and from the non-profit sector.This isparticularly true for the“megachurches”,whichhave trans-formed US Protestantism in the last decades. In addition, similar to religionin the United States, the state has withdrawn from direct control over manysocietal sectors in modern societies. Since the 1970s, management conceptshave diffused to noneconomic fields and have promoted an arrangement inwhich the state stops regulating universities, schools, and other public orga-nizations directly (as part of the implementation of New Public Management)(De Boer/Enders/Schimank 2007; OECD 2010). In this setting, organizationsare increasingly expected to define their goals and evaluate their outcomes(Krücken/Meier 2006; Brunsson/Sahlin-Andersson 2000).Scholars studying the governance of universities and research organiza-tions have emphasized the need to examine the elementary mechanisms thatconstitute forms, such as market, state, and event. For example, markets inmodern capitalism are by no means solely based on exchange under competi-tive conditions. Instead,markets are shapedbyother elementarymechanisms,such as hierarchy and networks, as well as mutual and reciprocal adjustment(Schimank 2007b: 34). However, a systematic analysis of various governanceforms, as has been conducted in higher-education research, is lacking for thefield of religion so far. Although many individual studies and theoretical ap-proacheshavebeenconducted, they tend to lacka commonanalytical basis thatcan be built on (see for example Krech et al. 2013).In the first part of the paper, I briefly present the state of research on thegovernance of religion. In the second part, I develop an analytical tool for ana-lyzingorganizational structuresof religion in three steps.First, followingSchi-mank, I discuss three types of elementary mechanisms of governance forms:mutual observation, influence, and negotiation. Second, I differentiate typesof actors in religious fields. Third, building on this, I distinguish six types ofgovernance forms in religion that build on constellations of mutual negotia-tion. In the third part, I discuss the role of organizations for the private formof religion.2. The governance of religionResearch on governance originated in the economic discussion on theories ofthemarket and the role of firms onmarkets (Coase 1937;Williamson 1973, 1993)and in the political science discussion on the changing role of the state and theInsa Pruisken: Organizing “Private Religion” 303rise of nonhierarchical forms of action coordination (Mayntz 2004). Accord-ing to Mayntz, governance describes “the sum of all kinds of existing forms ofthe collective regulation of societal circumstances, including institutionalizedforms of self-regulation of civil society, different joint activities of public andprivate actors as well as sovereign actions of governmental actors.” (ibid.: 66,own translation).Mayntz suggests a continuumof governmental regulationonthe one hand and civil self-regulation on the other. Against this background,Mayntz, Scharpf, and others define state-related sectors as those that do notfulfil core governmental functions4 but that nevertheless bear a degree of re-sponsibility for important social causes. Examples are science, education, andhealth (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995: 13–14).Religion has not been included in these analyses of Mayntz, Scharpf,Schimank, and others. Religion can be characterized by its particular role: Itis not a state-related sector that is deemed so important in a plural, secularsociety that it would be supported by the state. Rather, religion is considereda private matter. The public claim of religion is shifting from the state to civilsociety (Casanova 1994). Sociological studies on religion that use the conceptof governance do so especially when examining how the state influences orregulates religious diversity. In the sociology of religion, the discussion onthe governance of religion revolves around the question of how the regulatorypotential of religion canbe dealtwith (Schuppert 2017; Burchardt 2020; Koenig2009). From a legal perspective, many researchers have examined nationaldifferences in national constitutions, jurisprudence, and church financing (cf.Martikainen 2013). Additionally, researchers have explored how Islam is dealtwith in Europe (Koenig 2007). Depending on the national context, the statecan assume different roles and act as a regulator and promoter of religion,especially concerning religious peace or ecumenism (Körs/Nagel 2018).Especially in the US sociology of religion, the rational-choice approach toreligion has become established, focusing on the regulatory role of the state(Stark/Finke 2000; Finke/Stark 1992; Iannaccone et al. 1997).Themore the stateregulates religion and therefore favors certain religious communities, the lesscompetition is possible, the argument goes. Consequently, this hinders reli-gious participation. This approach has been criticized from methodologicaland theoretical perspectives (Kern/Pruisken 2018; Voas et al. 2002). Religiousmarkets do not form “spontaneously”, as claimed by the economics of reli-4 As, for example, the police.304 Social Forms of Religiongion, but are the result of demanding processes of institutionalization (Kern/Pruisken 2018).In this article, I take a different approach. I use a well-established conceptin the fields of science and higher-education research and apply it to the caseof US Protestantism. Initially, both fields, that of European universities andresearch organizations and that of US religion, differ significantly: The regu-lation and financing of universities and research organizations in Europe arethe responsibility of the statewhereas in theUS, religion and the state are com-paratively strictly separated. Nevertheless, the method of governance analysiscan be applied to theUSProtestant field because it operates at such a high levelof abstraction that it can be employed across fields.3. Governance analysis of US ProtestantismA detailed analysis of governance forms in a focal field includes three steps.First, elementarymechanismsmust be distinguished. Second, the question ofwho the relevant actorswho interactwith eachother areneeds tobe addressed.Based on these two steps, relevant governance forms in the religious field canbe described.3.1 Elementary MechanismsWhat are the elementarymechanisms that constitute joint actions and the in-tentional design of governance forms? Schimank distinguishes between threetypes of elementarymechanisms: (1)mutual observation, (2)mutual influence,and (3) mutual negotiation.These three elementarymechanisms are producedin actor constellations in which actors have to deal with the interdependen-cies that emerge among them.Themechanisms ensure that twoormore actorscan reliably coordinate their actions relative to each other, making them pre-dictable for both parties. In this process, they establish a relatively enduringsocial order for this constellation (Schimank 2016: chapter 8–10; 2007b).Constellations of mutual observation are themost elementary of the threetypes of constellations. In thismode, the coordinationof actionoccurs throughmutual adjustment to the perceived actions of others, including anticipatedactions. In the case of one-sided adjustment, the actions of the others are con-sidered unaffected by one’s own actions. In the case of mutual adjustment,Insa Pruisken: Organizing “Private Religion” 305one takes into account that the other person is also adjusting to oneself – asa sequence of actions and reactions, where the initiative can come from ei-ther side at different times, or as simultaneous mutual actions that respondto each other’s anticipated actions.Themanagement of interdependencies be-tween actors in constellations of mutual observation can occur occasionally orcan solidify in recurring episodes.For example, the worship service in any given congregation is a recurringevent in which actors coordinate their behavior by observing what the othercongregants are doing. A new visitor will intuitively observe how themembersof the congregation dress as well as whether they stand up or sit and sing or donot sing.The new visitor can adjust her actions one-sidedly, but the membersof the congregations may notice that there is a new visitor and adjust theiractions to her as well, for example by way of a friendly greeting or, quite theopposite, by ignoring the newcomer. Mutual observations are the key mecha-nisms for the constitution of communities and markets. In constellations ofmutual influence, influence potentials, such as money, knowledge, emotions,and power, are deliberately employed (Schimank 2016). Situations in whichone actor possesses enough influence potential to completely impose their willon another actor are, however, relatively rare. Therefore, interdependenciesbetween actors are managed through a balance of influence potentials. Lesssignificant are sporadic forms of coordination; continuous influence relation-ships take precedence. The concept of “influence potentials” builds on TalcottParsons’s concept of “generalized media”. Parsons conceptualizes power, in-fluence, and value commitments in the spheres of community, politics, andculture as functional equivalents for money in the economic system (Parsons1963a, 1963b, 1968). Whereas money and power directly influence an actor’ssituation, value commitments and influence can only be used to change actors’intentions (Habermas 1980).5 Money and power can directly alter an actor’s5 Habermas employs his renowned distinction between instrumental action and com-municative action to elucidate the differences in potentials for influence. Communica-tive action is aimed at fostering understanding or establishing social bonds. This ap-proach relies on the mutual exchange of arguments, seeking to cultivate a consensuson specific truths, norms, or values. Conversely, instrumental action is focused on at-taining particular outcomes or objectives by manipulating an actor’s physical or so-cial surroundings. In this context, power and money serve as tools, directly impactingan actor’s situation. However, the influence exerted through value commitments andpersuasion is more subtle, indirectly shaping actors’ intentions by engaging with theirconvictions and beliefs.306 Social Forms of Religioncircumstances by providing or withholding resources (in the case ofmoney) orby exerting control or authority (in the case of power). For example, offeringa financial incentive can compel someone to act in a certain way, and usingauthority can force compliance.Value commitments and persuasion representa more indirect form of influence.These rely on aligning with or appealing toan actor’s internal beliefs, values, or principles. Instead of compelling changethrough external pressure, they aim to shift an actor’s intentions by convinc-ing them to see situations differently, reevaluate their beliefs, or adopt newvalues. This process is more nuanced and requires a deeper engagement withthe actor’s perspectives andmotivations.Generalized symbolic media govern social relations. How can ego – an in-dividual actor, an organization, or a nation-state – impel alter to do somethingthey do not want to do? For example, a congregation can deal with new visi-tors attending the service in various ways. First, they can simply ignore newvisitors and thereby use no influence potentials to convince them to join theirchurch. Second, they can try influencing new visitors to get them to return thenext week or to donate money.The congregation could simply force the visitorphysically to return. Christian churches used this influence potential to evan-gelize the non-Christian population in the colonies. However, in the mode ofthe private form of religion, violence is not an appropriate influence poten-tial to bind individuals to a congregation. Rather, the congregationwill have topersuade the new visitor to come back by being kind and friendly, producing awelcoming atmosphere, presenting a stimulating worship service, or wieldingone’s moral authority. Religious promises such as the promise of eternal life inheaven are examples of influence potentials and can be used by the congrega-tion as well.Religious pluralism is another typical example of a constellation of in-fluence without a dominant actor (Schimank 2016: 298). Religious groupsdo not solely observe each other but may use various influence potentialsto win over the unaffiliated or to exert influence over the followers of otherreligious groups.The opposite is a constellation in which one dominant actorstructures the constellation of mutual influence. An example is the “religiousmonopoly” (Diotallevi 2002): countries in which one religious community(e.g., Catholicism) is dominant.Actors in constellations of mutual influence often start to negotiate “bind-ing agreements”. When formal hierarchies, legal, or other binding (especiallycodified) rules are present and when actors start to act on them, we refer tosituations of mutual negotiation. Negotiations’ outcomes are documented inInsa Pruisken: Organizing “Private Religion” 307laws, statutes, contracts, or organizational charts, managing interdependen-cies among actors without the need for influence potentials to be constantlypresent. In the caseof the congregationmentionedabove, thenewvisitor couldformally apply formembership andfill out amembership application.Constel-lations of mutual negotiation can be purely episodic in nature, representingopportunities for one-time exchanges. For example, markets involve constel-lations of mutual observation among providers and consumers. Providers ob-serve the offers, prices, and followers of other market actors. The cooperativeinteraction between the two parties typically results in prices inmarkets usingthe medium of money. In this context, providers and interested parties whowish to engage in business negotiate until they reach a binding agreement,typically in the form of a purchase contract, or they recognize the futility offurther negotiations. In this sense, even one-time attendance of a church ser-vice can be considered a binding agreement:Theworshipper participates in anevent and contributes time and money, and in return, the congregation pro-vides a compelling event.Three abstract modes of negotiation are distinguished, forming the ba-sis for the examination of concrete governance forms: networks, polyarchy,and hierarchy (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995; Lange/Schimank 2004: 22). In networks,collective agency relies on actors’ voluntary agreement. Typical examples in-clude political networks and corporate collaborations.The cooperation of ma-jor churches with the German state is also based on this mode of negotiation.Polyarchy is characterized by majority decisions. This pattern is often foundin democratic governance forms, which are also partially present in churches.In hierarchies, decision-making authority lies with a superior governing bodyand is based on directives. I will come back to these threemodes of negotiationin section 3.3.3.2 Types of actors in religionFor the further identification of governance forms, it is now necessary to iden-tify the actors who mutually observe, influence, or negotiate with each other.Various types of actors are considered in this context. On the one hand, thesecan be individual actors (e.g., individual believers, pastors, andministers).Theconcept of an actor encompasses “entities that actmeaningfully and intention-ally, and to which action can be attributed by other actors” (Schimank 2016:44–45). The choice of an action is always embedded in and shaped by a social308 Social Forms of Religioncontext that can bring about this action. Actors can also be organizations, so-cial groups, or social movements. These are “supra-individual actors” (Schi-mank 2016: 327). Each supraindividual actor is a constellation of individualactors, and their actions are therefore the collaborative actions of constella-tions of individual actors. What is crucial is the extent to which the actionsof individual actors in the constellation form an organized whole.This meansthat they systematically build on each other to pursue an overarching objective(Schimank 2016: 329). In this regard, binding agreements can be used to buildan organized whole oriented toward a specific goal. For example, individualbelievers can join forces and found a congregation together with the intentionto make it a megachurch in the future.Collective actors, however, do not only emerge based on binding agree-ments. Through the mechanism of mutual observation, collectively sharedevaluative and cognitive interpretations can also contribute to the coordina-tion of actions. Therefore, Schimank distinguishes between collective actorswho do not require binding agreements and corporate actors who rely onbinding agreements (Schimank 2016: 329). An example of collective actorsthat form based on mutual perception of commonalities (and not on bindingagreements) is the religious community (Durkheim 1995). Membership in thecommunity is formed through perceived commonalities (Gläser 2007: 87). Inthe religious community, perceived commonalities are mostly the religiouscreeds thatmembers of the community sharewith each other.These creeds areoften represented by religious symbols or codes, which help the members of acommunity identify each other. In thisway, perceived commonalities, throughmutual observation, constitute the collective self-image of a community andcontribute to the shaping of an identity (Kern 2008: 119). Symbolic bound-aries exist in the community and toward nonmembers of the community. Inthe community, common values are identified as positive whereas negativejudgments are attributed to the world outside the community (Alexander2006).Inmany communities, themechanismofmutual influence is atwork, suchas the emergence of charisma and power as influence potentials.The commu-nication networks in communities often revolve around eliteswho have a largefanbase and many followers on social media (Gläser 2007: 87). In US Evan-gelicalism, these famous personalities, such as Billy Graham, Joel Osteen, andSarah Young, are revered like celebrities and shape the community members’collective beliefs, practices, and actions.Insa Pruisken: Organizing “Private Religion” 309However, communities often exhibit limited collective agency. Mutualobservation of perceived commonalities and identity-driven actions aloneare usually insufficient for formulating collective goals and deciding on theallocation of common resources.There is a lack of an entity capable of makingdecisions for the community. Even if such a decision were to be reached, itwould be challenging to compel the members of a community to implementit due to membership based on perception and the autonomy of its members.This weakness in endogenous governance is characteristic of spontaneoussocial orders that arise without actions being deliberately coordinated (Gläser2007: 89). Whereas informal systems of rules may indeed emerge in thecommunity, the formulation and implementation of common political or or-ganizational goals require networks or organizations that compensate for thecommunity’s endogenous governance deficit (Gläser 2007: 89). For example,the organization of events is not possible solely through spontaneous andidentity-driven actions or on the basis of mutual observation.The realmof religion is segmented into various faith communities –Chris-tianity, Judaism, Islam,Hinduism, etc. – each with its own interpretative andexpectation structures in the form of dogma, behavioral guidelines, and rit-uals. Especially in modern Christianity, formal organizations have developedin which participation is constituted by membership (Luhmann 1964: 39). USProtestantism, which is of particular interest to this article, has primarily twoorganizational levels: the local church and the associational organizationof thedenomination.There is a functional division of labor between these two orga-nizational levels: Whereas the congregation organizes the interaction ritualsof local worship, the denomination organizes the overarching community ofall believers (Kern et al. 2022). Ammerman defines congregations as “locally-situated, multi-generational, voluntary organizations of people who identifythemselves as a distinct religious group and engage in a broad range of reli-gious activities together.” (Ammerman 2009: 562).In contrast, denominations are “more and less bureaucratically organized,usually at the national level, and chargedwith supporting (and sometimes reg-ulating) the groups and traditions that share a religious identity” (Ammerman2016: 143).The denominational pluralism specific to the United States is oftendescribed as “competition”.Unlike theEuropean state churchmodel,member-ship in denominations is historically voluntary. However, the various denom-inations often do not compete with each other at the local level of the congre-gations because the denominations are regionally unevenly distributed. For310 Social Forms of Religionexample, whereas the Southern Baptist Convention dominates in Texas, theEvangelical Lutheran Association is strong in Minnesota.A third type of collective organizational actors in the United States (nextto congregations and denominations) is special-purpose groups (Ammerman2016: 146). These are religious nonprofit organizations that provide socialservices and engage in missionary work, broadcasting, publishing, and muchmore (Scheitle 2010; Kern/Pruisken 2020). Unlike congregations or denomi-nations, they are specialized in a specific goal or task.3.3 Competing Governance FormsIn the US literature on church sociology, three fundamental “church struc-tures” are described (Moberg 1962: 61–62): The Episcopal church structure isbased on a hierarchical church order in which, for example, the bishop holdsthe highest authority over a local congregation. For instance, every Catholicparish worldwide is geographically defined (according to the parochial princi-ple) and is affiliated with a diocese. The authority over the diocese rests witha local bishop, who in turn is under the authority of a higher unit, the Pope inthe Catholic Church. Members are typically assigned to individual congrega-tions near their place of residence according to the parochial principle. Whenmoving to a new location, church members are required to register in a newparish.In the Presbyterian church structure, an elected group of individualsknown as “Presbyters” (from the Greek “presbyteros”, meaning “elder”) holdsauthority in a local congregation. The Presbyters of each congregation are, inturn,members of a broader assembly called the Synod.Because the Presbyteryserves as an intermediary body between the congregation and the Synod, it canbe “subject to pressure from above and below” (Moberg 1962: 94). Therefore,the Presbyterian church structure represents a hybrid form of the hierarchicalEpiscopal and polyarchic Congregationalist church structures.TheCongregationalist church structureadvocates for theautonomyof localcongregations.The responsibility for their respective ecclesiastical polity restssolely in their hands. Congregationalists may establish committees or officesfor specific tasks, but the ultimate authority remains with the congregationmembers.TheCongregationalist church structure is also referred to as “Baptistpolity” because it is the prevalent church structure among Baptist churches.Membership in the congregation is based on personal choice and is exclusivelyInsa Pruisken: Organizing “Private Religion” 311related to the local congregation. The dominant mode of negotiation is “pol-yarchy”.The three types of church organization describe the relationship betweencongregations and denominations in US denominationalism. However, theyare not suitable for reflecting the profound transformation that the religiousfield in theUnited States has undergone in recent decades:Thedenomination’srelevance as the predominant form of Protestant organization has consider-ably declined (Roozen/Hadaway 1993; Chaves 2017; Wuthnow 1988), Evangeli-calismhas become amainstreamProtestantmovement, and –as a central fea-ture of this development – the megachurch, as a new type of religious orga-nization, is always spreading (Von der Ruhr 2020; Wollschleger/Porter 2011).Consequently, the diffusion of megachurches in the United States has led toa growing concentration of more and more believers in fewer congregations:“The biggest 1 percent of Protestant churches … contain approximately 20 per-cent of all the people, money, and staff” (Chaves 2017: 70). Beside their size –most studies label a congregation as a megachurch if it attracts 2000 atten-dees or more on Sundays – megachurches are characterized by two definingfeatures: a relatively high degree of organizational autonomy and a strong ori-entation toward a religious market logic. “Organizational autonomy” meansthat their leadership exerts a high degree of control over the definition and at-tainment of the congregation’s goals. The term “market logic” refers to a setof (more or less) latent background assumptions and beliefs that increasinglyshape religious suppliers’ and customers’ behavioral expectations (Pruisken etal. 2022).These developments are not unique to the religious field in the UnitedStates but are embedded in a global process in which patterns of marketi-zation, economization, and commodification of noneconomic sectors arebecoming prevalent worldwide (Martikainen/Gauthier 2013). Since the late1980s, the New Public Management has become predominant in state-relatedsectors, such as science, education, and healthcare. With the model of the“governance equalizer”, de Boer, Enders, and Schimank (2007) developedan analytical instrument with five dimensions that can be used to comparenational higher education systems but has been used for the analysis of schoolsystems as well. The instrument is designed to capture multiple governanceforms at the same time: governmental regulation, democratic self-regulation,hierarchical self-regulation, stakeholder guidance and competition. All fivedimensions can be more or less pronounced.312 Social Forms of ReligionBased on the instrument of the governance equalizer, I distinguish sixforms of governance that are prevalent in the field of religion in the UnitedStates: (1) denominational regulation, (2) democratic self-governance, (3)hierarchical self-governance, (4) stakeholder guidance, (5) competition, and(6) network governance. All three forms build more or less (but not solely) onbinding agreements that result frommutual negotiations.(1) The regulation of the congregation by the denomination can be com-pared to the regulation of universities through the state. In linewith themodelof the Episcopal church structure, the denomination regulates local congrega-tions concerning finances, personnel, organization, programs, and doctrine.Regulation, as defined by Schimank (2007a: 241), means controlling behaviorthrough conditional programs (Luhmann 1964).Therefore, the relationship be-tween the denomination and the congregation is characterized by clear if-thenrules governing various matters. Megachurches often adopt this governanceform in the framework of the multisite model. The overarching main church,similar to the denomination, sets the rules, processes, and standards that thesubordinate campus congregations must adhere to (Reed 2019).(2) The democratic self-governance of congregations can be compared tothe form of academic self-governance, which is characterized by profession-als’ involvement in decision-making processes in universities. The self-orga-nization of Baptist congregations relies on the principle of the priesthood ofall believers, which is often associated with Protestant Christianity. It empha-sizes that all believers have direct access to God and are capable of interpretingand understanding the teachings of the faith. It suggests that individuals donot require an intermediary, such as a priest or clergymember, to connectwithGodor tomediate their relationshipwithhim.TheCongregationalist andPres-byterian church structures are marked by strong democratic self-governance.Members are involved in decision-making processes.Decisions are democrat-ically voted on in elected committees or at a member meeting and are not de-cided hierarchically.(3) Hierarchical self-governance refers to the management of single orga-nizations (e.g., universities, schools, and congregations) that are controlled bystrong leadership figures. Important decisions regarding personnel, finances,and programs as well as central religious beliefs are therefore in the hands ofan individual pastor or a team of pastors. In manymegachurches, democraticself-governance has been replaced by hierarchical self-governance (Pruisken/Coronel 2014; Kern/Pruisken/Schimank 2022). The relationship between be-Insa Pruisken: Organizing “Private Religion” 313lievers and the senior pastor is often characterized by “charisma”6 attributedto the senior pastor. However, hierarchical self-governance typically relies notonly on charisma but also on anunderstanding of the pastor as a “leader” of thechurch similar to that position in the business world.(4)Thegovernance formof external control,often referred toas stakeholderguidance, is described by Schimank (2007a: 241) as a form of control throughgoal programs rather than conditional programs.Unlike denominational con-trol, hierarchical instructions are not enforced from the top (the denomina-tion) down to the local congregation but are negotiated in the form of agree-ments or recommendations.The interest of intermediate actors, that is, stake-holders, lies in enhancing the performance of the subordinate actor (such asthe university or congregation). Here, certain special purpose organizationscome into play, specifically religious counseling organizations. An example ischurch networks such as Acts 297 and Exponential.8 These organizations ad-vise congregations in achieving their goals. They focus on growth strategiesand church planting and develop scientifically legitimated strategies for betterleadership and community building. In addition, denominations increasinglyuse the stakeholder guidancemode. An example is the Baptist General Confer-ence, which changed its name to “Converge” in 2015. It no longer sees itself asa denomination (as a regulating body) but as a movement that helps to startand strengthen churches.9 Finally, megachurches that have institutionalizedthe multisite model can also use stakeholder guidance instead of direct formsof regulation.(5) Competitive pressure as a form of coordination refers to the market,which consists of exchange as negotiation based on mutual observation andthe use of potentials of influence, particularly time and money (Schimank2007b: 242). Congregations (and denominations) exchange their “religiousproducts” for resources. In this context, not only the amount of membershipcontributions counts as a resource; the number of worshipers can becomean intrinsic value confirming the correctness of one’s doctrine. Although thepressure for market formation in state-related sectors comes from the state,congregations in the United States often face real competitive pressure due to6 In the sense of the concept of “charisma” in Weber’s sociology of religion (Riesebrodt1999).7 Cf. https://www.acts29.com/about-us/.8 Cf. https://exponential.org/.9 Cf. https://www.converge.org/about.314 Social Forms of Religionactual scarcity of potential “customers” or a high density of churches (Homan2024). A market consists of (a) a set of religious producers who observe eachother mutually, (b) a set of consumers who compare these producers’ offers,(c) a set of relations between these components, and (d) a comparative orderthat allows for categorization and evaluation of these offers (White 1981; Leifer1985; Jansen 2013; Aspers/Beckert 2017).(6) Unlike the higher education and science sectors, the religious sphereis additionally shaped by the mode of horizontal coordination as a sixth gov-ernance form (“network governance”) (Martikainen 2013). Congregations joinforces with other congregations, for example, by pooling resources to achievecollective goals. This leads to the formation of network or umbrella organi-zations that develop their own organizational structures. An example is thevarious interfaith activities that have emerged in the religious field in the pastdecades and that are specifically designed to build trust through networks(Körs/Nagel 2018).With this categorization of governance forms in US Protestantism, noth-ing can yet be said about how common each form is and which ones might belosing influence.Thequestionnowarises of how these governance forms inter-act. New Public Management, and similarly the megachurch model, are char-acterized by a combination of hierarchical self-governance, stakeholder guid-ance, and competitive pressure (De Boer et al. 2007; Pruisken/Coronel 2014).The hierarchical regulation therefore shifts more strongly into the organiza-tions. In this way, megachurches create an organizational power that enablesthe private social form of religion.4. Discussion and outlookFromThomas Luckmann’s perspective, the concept of the social form encom-passes the relationship among personality, social structure, and culture in asociety. However, an analysis of the transformation of religion is only possibleif all three levels are taken into account. In modern societies, the social formof private religion is the formative social structure of religion. Luckmann sug-gests that in the context of private religion, individuals in modern society ex-perience a distinctive level of freedom in shaping their personal identity.Thisfreedom, according to Luckmann, is akin to a consumer mindset, which ex-tends beyondmere economic goods and encompasses the individual’s engage-ment with the broader worldview. Luckmann’s assumption was that religionInsa Pruisken: Organizing “Private Religion” 315loses its obligatory hierarchical character. However, this only succeeds in anorganizational society where organizations or other forms exist that providethese consumer choices. In the social form of private religion, religious orga-nizations are increasingly only considered legitimate if they provide individualbelieverswith choices (Kern et al. 2022; Pruisken et al. 2022).However, in Luck-mann’s framework, the meso level of organizations and interorganizationalrelations (the social structure) remains underdeveloped. As Freudenberg andReuter demonstrate in the introduction to this volume, awide variety of formsof institutionalization of religion has developed on the meso level of religiousfields.I developed my argument that the private social form of religion mustbe understood in the context of the emergence of the organizational societyagainst the background of my research on megachurches and Protestantcongregations in the United States (Pruisken/Coronel 2014; Pruisken et al.2022; Kern et al. 2022). The focus was on governance forms that are basedon mutual negotiations: denominational regulation, democratic self-gover-nance, hierarchical self-governance, stakeholder guidance, competition, andnetwork governance.The analysis shows that hierarchical forms of governancedo not disappear. Therefore, the model of the megachurch is characterizedby the fact that the organization is becoming more hierarchical internally.The leadership of megachurches increasingly aligns with standards issued byexternal organizations and consulting firms. At the same time, there is com-petition at the local level, especially when multiple megachurches compete ina city. This competition allows individual believers to choose between variouscongregations’ offers.For future researchonsocial formsof religion, the elementarymechanismsofmutual observation andmutual influence are equally important. In particu-lar, the increasing digitization of religion cannot be understood without thesemechanisms. On digital platforms, such as YouTube and Instagram, pastors,congregations, and other religious content providers can observe and adjusttheir actions to each other.The organized environment of these platforms alsooffers various opportunities for the emergence of influence potentials, suchas the number of followers or violent outbreaks. Religious influencers can sig-nificantly increase the scope of their influence and thereby compete with es-tablished organized providers.The consequences of this development can onlybe understood if one understands religion, like other fields, as an “organizedfield” in whichmechanisms ofmutual observation, influence, and negotiationcoexist and interact.316 Social Forms of ReligionBibliographyAlexander, Jeffrey C. (2006):The Civil Sphere,Oxford: Oxford University Press.Ammerman,Nancy T. 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From 2005 to 2011, she conducted research on Charismatic-Pentecostalmovements in Réunion Island, published under the title Christianismes charis-matiques à LaRéunion (Karthala 2014).Herwork then focused on the evangelicalinfluencewithin FrenchCatholicism.This resulted in her studyRéveil catholique(Labor et Fides 2020).Samuel Dolbeau holds a Ph.D. in Religious Studies from the UCLouvain (Bel-gium) and in Sociology from the EHESS (France). His doctoral research in-vestigated the process of institutionalization of the Emmanuel Community inFrench-speaking Europe. In a broader sense, his work examines New Eccle-sial Movements and the transformations of contemporary Catholicism from asocio-historical perspective.Maren Freudenberg is Senior Lecturer of the Sociology of Religion and theComparative Study of Religion at Ruhr University Bochum, Germany. Herresearch interests include the intersections of religion and the economy, the-ories of charisma and authority, global Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity,as well as conservative Evangelicalism in the United States and Germany/Switzerland.Virginia Garrard is Professor Emerita of History at the University of Texas atAustin andpastDirector of LLILASBensonLatinAmericanStudies andCollec-tions. She is currently the Greenleaf Distinguished Scholar in Latin AmericanStudies at Tulane University and is currently researching a new book on revo-lutionary Catholic priests in Central America during the 1970s and 1980s.324 Social Forms of ReligionHannah Grünenthal studied Religious Studies, Modern Indology, and Psy-chology at the University of Heidelberg. In 2021, she completed her doctoratein Bremen on the construction of authority and positioning processes ofthe Catholic Charismatic Renewal in Germany. Her areas of specializationare Catholicism in Germany, religion during the Covid-19 pandemic, andqualitative research methods.Hillary Kaell is Associate Professor of Anthropology and Religion at McGillUniversity, where she holds a William Dawson Chair. Her most recent bookis Christian Globalism at Home: Child Sponsorship in the United States(Princeton, 2020), winner of the 2021 Schaff Prize from the American Societyof Church History. Currently, she is co-researcher on MuREL, a long-termstudy of municipalities, religion, and secularism in Quebec, from which theresearch in this article derives.Katherine Kelaidis is Director of Research and Content at the National Hel-lenicMuseum in Chicago and a Research Associate of the Centre for OrthodoxChristian Studies, Cambridge. She studied Classical Languages at the Univer-sity of California, Berkeley and the University of London.Ariane Kovac is a Ph.D. candidate in religious studies at Leipzig Universityand a research associate at the Center for Religious Studies at Ruhr Univer-sity Bochum.Her research interests include contemporary Christianity in theUS and Germany, emotions and therapeutization, and digital religion.Marie-ThereseMäder is a scholar of religion,media, and philosophywith par-ticular expertise in the field of media and religion. Since 2020 she is a SeniorLecturer at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich (DE) and teachesMedia Ethics at the Universities of Applied Sciences of the Grisons (FHGR)and Bern (HKB) in Switzerland. In 2021 she won a two-yearMarie SklodowskaCurie Fellowship for her research about themediatization of weddings (www.promising-images.eu) at the university in Macerata/IT.InsaPruisken is an Assistant Professor in SociologicalTheory at theUniversityof Bremen, Germany. Her research interests are the sociology of religion, thesociology of organization, social network analysis, and sociological theory.Authors 325Astrid Reuter is Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Münster.Her main research areas are the history and theory of the study of religion,Charismatic Catholicism, and religions in Brazil.Sebastian Rimestad studied Political Science and Religious Studies in Ab-erdeen, Tartu, and Erfurt, with a focus on Orthodox Christianity. He holds aresearch position at Leipzig University, working on religious conversion andcurrent developments in the Orthodox Church.Sebastian Schüler is Professor of Religious Studies at the University ofLeipzig. His research interests include Evangelical Christianity and New Agemovements in Europe and the United States. He has done extensive fieldworkon the Emerging Church Movement and has recently begun research on theHuman Potential Movement in California from 1960 to the present. |
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