| Original Full Text | 1.30.7The Regulation of Religion throughNational Normative Frameworks: AComparative Analysis between Italyand ArgentinaLuca Bossi and María Pilar García BossioSpecial IssueManagement of Religious Diversity: Comparing and Contrasting Experiences across the WorldEdited byDr. Roberta Ricucci and Prof. Dr. Juan Cruz EsquivelArticlehttps://doi.org/10.3390/rel15070799Citation: Bossi, Luca, and María PilarGarcía Bossio. 2024. The Regulation ofReligion through National NormativeFrameworks: A ComparativeAnalysis between Italy and Argentina.Religions 15: 799. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15070799Academic Editor: Susanne OlssonReceived: 2 May 2024Revised: 21 June 2024Accepted: 25 June 2024Published: 29 June 2024Copyright: © 2024 by the authors.Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.This article is an open access articledistributed under the terms andconditions of the Creative CommonsAttribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).religionsArticleThe Regulation of Religion through National NormativeFrameworks: A Comparative Analysis between Italyand ArgentinaLuca Bossi 1 and María Pilar García Bossio 2,3,*1 Department of Cultures, Politics and Society, University of Turin, 10100 Turin, Italy; luca.bossi@unito.it2 Institute of Social Sciences Research (IICS), Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina,Buenos Aires C1107AFF, Argentina3 Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), Buenos Aires C1033AAJ, Argentina* Correspondence: mariabossio@uca.edu.arAbstract: The normative framework is one of the constitutive edges of state regulation of religion.It contributes to the configuration of different forms of relations between state and religions. This canbe observed in at least three areas. First, in the way the state defines religion. Second, in the way itrecognises and legislates its relationship with different religions. Finally, in the rules it establishes forconfessional institutions and actors at different levels of social life (education, health, prisons, etc.).In this article, we propose to comparatively analyse the national legal systems that regulate religionin Italy and Argentina, with special emphasis on the equal or differentiated treatment of differentreligions. The policies of recognition and integration of religious minorities find in the normativeframework an empowering or limiting factor, depending on the national context. Although bothcountries share a dominant Catholic matrix, their historical developments and legal formats presentcontrasts that project different scenarios of religious governance, which we will try to elucidate.Keywords: religion; normative frameworks; state; regulation; Argentina; Italy1. IntroductionThe national state and its legal system have long been emphasised by social sciences asa crucial factor in the study of secular–religious interactions. In fact, the national normativeframework is one of the constitutive elements of state regulation of religion, influencing theconfiguration of different forms of relations between the state and religions. However, theanalysis of the national legal framework in itself—namely, what is prescribed by law—is notalways sufficient to define the more nuanced configurations of concrete relations betweenthe state and religions, nor to assess the tangible conditions of religious pluralism in a givensociety—as saying, what results from the law. Over time, scholars have highlighted thelimitations of relying solely on state-centric approaches1.Following the proposals of the spatial turn2, the local dimension of urban governancehas acquired a new relevance in the study of social phenomena of global scope and localrecurrence (Sassen 2005), with significant implications for the empirical study of secular–religious relations in contemporary societies3. As research increasingly shows, beyond thegeneral—de jure—framework, it is also important to examine the concrete—de facto—impacton matters closer to the daily lives of believers and their organisations. In the Italiancase, for example, as Ferrari and Ferrari (2015), among others, have pointed out, “if theofficial doctrine of the Constitutional Court seems quite clear and coherent, the situationis more complex when we move from the highest principles to the jurisprudence of thelower courts and, above all, to the legislative and political sphere. At this level, the Italianmonoconfessional tradition significantly limits the pluralism associated with secularism asa juridical principle”. In Argentina, while legislation at the national level has not changedReligions 2024, 15, 799. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15070799 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/religionsReligions 2024, 15, 799 2 of 25significantly in past decades (directly and indirectly benefiting Catholicism), at sub-nationallevels of government partial changes are taking place, in a “bottom-up” logic that seeks tobroaden the representation of religious diversity (García Bossio 2018).In this article, we propose to comparatively analyse the concrete consequences arisingfrom the application of the national legal systems that regulate religion in Argentinaand Italy, with special emphasis on the equal or differentiated treatment of differentreligions. In order to achieve this objective, three areas of investigation have been selected,corresponding to the three main fields of practical application of the rules that protect,promote, or hinder the status and agency of different religious organisations. First is theway the state defines religion. Second, the way it recognises and legislates its relationshipwith different religions. Finally, the rules it establishes for confessional institutions andactors at different levels of social life (education, health, prisons, places of worship, etc.).As we shall see, the policies of recognition and integration of religious minoritiesfind in the legal framework an empowering or limiting factor, depending on the nationalcontext and the positioning of each confessional organisation in relation to the state and thewider religious field. Although both countries—Argentina and Italy—share a dominantCatholic matrix, their historical developments and legal formats present contrasts thatproject different scenarios of religious governance, which we will attempt to elucidate. Aftera historical and demographic framing of the Argentine and Italian religious landscapes, thefollowing three paragraphs will develop each of the aforementioned dimensions: definition,recognition, and regulation.Methodologically, this work is based on the case study as a research design (Yin 2003),with a strategy of multiple cases (Stake 2006), instrumentally selecting them. The compari-son between the two countries is part of a larger project that aims to analyse state policiesof integration of religious minorities at the national level in Argentina and Italy, and at thelocal level in the metropolitan areas of Buenos Aires and Turin. As we will see in this article,both countries have similarities and differences in the way religious issues are handled bythe state. There is some background research on both countries (Oyarzo 2018; Mariotti andMarradi 2021), but none of it focuses on the regulatory and institutional framework in theway that will be addressed here.From there, we conducted a comparative study taking into account the followingmaterial: literature review, analysis of national legal frameworks (national constitution,codes, and other laws), use of secondary sources (surveys on religious affiliation and othercase studies) and original fieldwork. In the latter, we conducted participant observation andsemi-structured interviews with ministers of worship, public administrators, and experts.For the Italian case, fieldwork was conducted between 2017 and 2023 in the cities ofTurin, Rome, and Catania, including interviews with state agents at the national level ofgovernment. For the Argentine case, material was collected between 2016 and 2023 in thecity of Buenos Aires and municipalities in the province of Buenos Aires (especially JoséC. Paz, La Plata, Quilmes, Florencio Varela, and Lanús), also including interviews withnational state agents.2. Theoretical BackgroundThe secularisation paradigm represents the dominant theoretical and analytical frame-work through which the social sciences have traditionally observed the relationship be-tween religion and secular modernity. The framework is not unitary; rather, it consistsof a variety of theories corresponding to distinct approaches, theoretical dimensions, andempirical factors. These theories usually observe the phenomenon as a configuration of thepresence or absence of three key elements: (i) the distinction between secular spheres, insti-tutions, and religious norms; (ii) the decline of religious beliefs and practices; and (iii) themarginalisation of religion in the private sphere. Theories on the process of secularisationof European societies have been, from various quarters and on several occasions, reducedto the secularisation of institutional spaces.Religions 2024, 15, 799 3 of 25In other cases, the process has been entirely criticised in favour of new interpretativeparadigms that are still competing—such as the post-secular society, multiple modernitiesand secularities, desecularisation, secular transition, or competition. Davie (1990), Iannac-cone (1991), Finke and Stark (1992), Casanova (1994), Berger (1999), Hervieu-Léger (1999),Stark (1999), Eisenstadt (2000), Habermas (2006), Grim and Finke (2006), Semán (2007),Mallimaci (2008), Voas (2008), Molendijk et al. (2010), Rosati and Stoeckl (2012), Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2012), and many others have all contributed to this boundless field ofstudy. While a great deal of ongoing quantitative and qualitative research is producing newempirical evidence on the various dimensions of religiosity and secularity, and a new focushas arisen on intergenerational religious transmission as a factor in the growth or decline ofreligiosity among populations, recently Stolz (2020) has been busy reordering a good dealof this immense body of scientific literature, and Voas (2020) has continued the debate4.Other authors have instead focused on the political dimension of the secular state,its interactions with monopolistic or pluralistic configurations of the national religiousfield, and its close relation to the conditions of religious freedom as an indicator of thehealth of democracy in specific countries. Jurists and politologists from comparativepolitics often refer to three kind of ecclesiastical law, or secular–religious models (Robbers2005): state–Church, separation, and hybrid—or concordatarian/cooperationist—systems;or, alternatively, to “formal establishment combined with pluralism (as in Great Britain),a cooperation model (as in Germany), and strict separation (as in the case of Frenchlaïcité)”, as Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2017, p. 9) remember citing Matthias Koenig(2007). To describe regimes of separation or state–religion relations, Rajeev Bhargava (2009)introduced his idea of “political secularism”, while Alfred Stepan (2000, 2011), applying theconcept of multiple secularisms, proposed his model of “twin tolerations” and a casuistryof four democratic patterns of state–religion–society relations (separatism, establishedreligion, positive accommodation, and principled distance). Kuru (2009) introduced thedistinction between “assertive” and “passive” secularism and Modood (2010) introducedthe opposing categories of “moderate” and “radical” secularism, while Wohlrab-Sahr andBurchardt (2017) suggested the term “secularity for the sake of . . .” to denote the differentconfigurations of the concept and its guiding ideas.Thus, the debate has been going on for a long time, and scholars are still far fromtaking a common position. Within this frame, this contribution differs from other, equallyuseful works (such as Moniz 2023) in that the validation of one theory and the refutationof others is not its aim. Rather than focusing on the relative merits of competing theories,this contribution aims to illustrate a more nuanced reality than can be discerned from acursory examination of normative systems. It also seeks to contribute to the analysis ofdiscrepancies between legal systems, declared ideologies, political models and orientations,and actual practices of governing religious diversity, in order to avoid the risk of reifyingan ideal, purely theoretical configuration of the degree of secularisation or confessionalityof a country.Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2017, p. 25) recall how “the ways in which secularity islegally identified and anchored in constitutional laws often prove to be relatively stableand independent from such political shifts [. . .] secularism and secularity move in differenthistorical rhythms”. Sharing their contribution and starting from this, the comparison ofthe Argentine and Italian case suggests that no particular political shifts may be necessaryto motivate divergences between constitutional dictates and political approaches. Adminis-trative practices and bureaucratic repercussions may be sufficient to shape the religiousfield of a country—and for several decades, regardless of political fluctuations—in a waythat is even diametrically opposed to what would otherwise be inferred from the purelyideological orientations represented, for example, in the legal, political, or media debate.Italy is currently experiencing a decline in religious transmission and collective reli-giosity, as well as a culturalisation of religion, an individualisation of forms and practices ofreligiosity, and religious diversification. Although the Italian legal system was establishedat a time when collective religiosity was still high and religious plurality was less prevalent,Religions 2024, 15, 799 4 of 25it sets up a secularised and egalitarian state. It explicitly endorses the secularity of the state,religious freedom for all denominations, and the right to exercise it in public or private,autonomously or in an organised manner. The Constitution imposes a specific obligationon the state to eliminate obstacles to the full enjoyment of rights, including freedom ofworship, and to intervene to mitigate inequalities. The Constitutional court has consistentlyupheld the principle of a laicità that is understood as state’s equidistance with regard to allreligious beliefs, upholding a regime of pluralism that encourages religious initiative andautonomy rather than hindering it. Nevertheless, an analysis of the day-to-day practicesof religious and secular actors who interact in the public sphere reveals a clear disparityin treatment. In Italy, the equity and pluralism formally guaranteed by the secular sideof the state contrasts with the system of privileges typical of religiously oriented publicinstitutions, in a way that is independent of mere political orientation.Argentina, with a different legal system, also shows a decrease in religious identifi-cations, greater individualisation, and diversification. Although practices of sacralisationpersist (Martín 2009) and we can observe dynamics typical of lived religion (Morello et al.2019), institutional identifications are decreasing. Legally, the country presents an inequal-ity of origin between the Catholic Church and other religions, in what Grim and Finke(2006) call state favouritism. This does not prevent the existence of religious freedom, butit is more regulated by the state. Beyond these legal differences, two phenomena occursimultaneously. “Top-down” laws have been passed in recent decades which are contraryto many religious principles (Catholic and other religions), such as same-sex marriage andthe legalisation of abortion. “Bottom-up”, there are systems of cooperation between thestate and different religions that change the dynamics of state favouritism and allow evenvery minority religions to maintain a fluid dialogue with local governments, especially inareas such as social action. In this way, pluralism is produced in daily governance, even ifthe main legal frameworks do not change.The subsequent sections will analyse the interrelations between religious affiliations,legal frameworks, and governance in Italy and Argentina.3. A Country (No Longer) with Catholic HegemonyWith differences in the presence and composition of its religious diversity, both inItaly and in Argentina, Roman Catholicism has long exercised a cultural hegemony in thereligious field. Thus, beyond the beliefs and practices of its citizens, the religion that wastaken for granted (Beckford 2003) was Roman Catholicism, impacting the way religionis perceived in each country. In turn, this allowed the Catholic Church to have—andstill has today in some specific areas—relevance and interference in the economy andpolitics of each country. In more recent times, social secularisation and the weakening ofintergenerational religious transmission have led to a marked reduction in the number ofpractising Catholics, and an increase in the number of nones.Below we will present statistical data on the religious composition of both countries.It should be noted that in neither case do we have census data on this topic, so we will useother statistical sources. In this sense, the data presented are based on estimates that takeinto account data reported by religious organisations, data from national multi-purposesurveys, and surveys and projections related to intervening factors, such as incoming andoutgoing migration flows. In the Argentine case we will take the survey conducted by theCEIL-CONICET’s Society, Culture and Religion program, which was applied in 2008 and2019 (Mallimaci 2013; Mallimaci et al. 2019), allowing us to establish certain trends.Catholics in Italy are generally estimated at around 75% of the population5 (44,138,250out of a total of some 58,851,000). However, this includes both a minority of practisingCatholics—assiduous, regular, or irregular—and the majority of non-practising Catholicswho identify only culturally with that denomination—the so-called “cultural Catholics”.The National Institute of Statistics’ multi-purpose survey, “Aspects of daily life”6, showsa decline in the number of regular practising Catholics over the last twenty years. Thepercentage of Catholics attending religious rites at least once a week has decreased fromReligions 2024, 15, 799 5 of 2536% to 19% of the population, while the percentage of non-practising Catholics has doubledfrom 16% to 31%. The decline in religious practice has affected all age groups, but it is mostprominent among younger generations, especially those aged 14 to 24. In 2022, only 8% ofyoung people aged 18 to 19 reported being regular practitioners. Over time, the proportionof individuals attending a place of worship at least once a week has declined across all agegroups. Women continue to be the largest group among regular worshippers, with 22% ofthe female population attending regularly compared to 15% of the male population in 2022.According to data from Fondazione ISMU (2022, 2024) and Cesnur7, minority religionsconstitute approximately 12.5% of the population, which amounts to around 7,328,000 peo-ple with Italian and foreign citizenship. Muslims (around 2,281,175 people, or 3.9%) andOrthodox (2,131,300 people, or 3.6%) are the two largest religious groups after Catholics.Italy is the third European country in terms of Islamic presence, following France andGermany. This makes it a relevant case for studying the integration of Muslims in Europe.Among Italian citizens, in addition to Roman Catholics (whether they are regularpractising or “cultural Catholics”), an estimated 2,297,000 belong to other denomina-tions, according to Cesnur. The population included 566,000 Muslims, 445,000 Orthodox,414,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses, 366,000 Protestants and Evangelicals, 218,000 Buddhists,57,000 Hindus, 36,000 Jews, 29,000 members of Human Potential movements, 28,500 Mor-mons, 26,000 other Catholics, and 25,000 Sikhs, as well as smaller numbers of Baha’i, newreligious movements, esoteric groups or groups of Oriental origin, and other Christians.Starting in the 1970s and 1980s, and with greater intensity in the 1990s and 2000s,immigration and conversions have contributed to a new pluralisation of the Italian religiouslandscape. According to data compiled by the ISMU Foundation, as of 1 January 2023,foreign citizens in Italy numbered about 5,775,000, which accounts for 9.8% of the totalpopulation. Legally resident foreign citizens numbered 5,050,000, which accounts for 8.6%of the total population. Of the foreigners legally present in Italy, approximately 75% werecitizens of non-EU countries. Among them, the majority (40%) came from four countries:Ukraine (with a sharp increase following the war with Russia), Morocco, Albania, andChina. The remaining non-EU citizens mostly came from India, Bangladesh, Egypt, thePhilippines, Pakistan, Moldova, Sri Lanka, Senegal, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Peru, with valuesbetween 5% and 2% of the non-EU foreign population.As of 1 July 2023, the majority of foreign-born residents in Italy were affiliated with aChristian denomination (53.1%). Among them, 29.2% were Orthodox (with a significantincrease linked to Ukrainian immigration), 17% were Catholic, 2.7% were Evangelical,1.6% were Coptic, and 2.6% belonged to other Christian denominations. Muslims wereestimated to be 29.7%, followed mainly by Buddhists (3.3%), Hindus (2.1%), and Sikhs(1.7%). As of 1 July 2023, the ISMU Foundation estimated that 9.7% of the population withforeign citizenship identified as atheists or agnostics. The estimated number of individualswith foreign citizenship who identified as Muslim was 1,521,000, while those who identifiedas Orthodox was 1,499,000, and those who identified as Catholic was 870,000.In Argentina, we can observe a majority identifying as Catholic but falling, from76.5% in 2008 to 62.9% in 2019 (from around 30,689,578 to 25,233,653 out of a total of some40,117,096); while there is growth in two specific groups: nones and evangelicals. Whilethe evangelical growth is considerable, from 9% (3,610,538) to 15.3% (6,017,564) (whichreaches higher values in low-income sectors), the growth of those who do not identify witha religion is even more significant, from 11.3% (4,533,231) to 18.9% (7,582,131) in ten years.If we take into account that the number of people who frequently attend a temple or placeof worship decreased—from 35.2% in 2008 to 27% in 2019 (Mallimaci et al. 2020, p. 13)—wecan account for a country in which practices linked to the most institutionalised religionare decreasing. At the same time, in recent decades there has been a process in which thecost of identifying with religions other than Catholicism, or none at all, has decreased.Although this does not imply that people stop believing in God, it does mark a growingsecularisation of public life and allows us to understand—in part—the advance of certainpolicies that oppose Catholic doctrine, such as the legalisation of abortion.Religions 2024, 15, 799 6 of 25Evangelical growth (important but less accelerated than projected years ago) hadan impact on local disputes over religious representation, which had its climax in thedebate over the legalisation of abortion in 2018 and in the 2019 presidential elections.Outside these three presences, there were Jehovah’s Witnesses and Mormons, which alsodropped from 2.1% (842,459) to 1.4% (531,639), and then other religions, which remainedaround 1.2% (481,405). In this last group, statistically very small, we find a great variety ofreligions, ranging from Judaism and Islam to local religions (such as the Basilian ScientificSchool, spiritualist) and religions of the African matrix. This last group has a widespreadpresence in the territory of the province of Buenos Aires, especially in large urban areas,but with a low social identification of its followers in public spaces, largely due to years ofdiscrimination (Frigerio and Wynarczyk 2004). This is why researchers and state agentsspecialised in the subject and the religious communities themselves consider that they areunderrepresented.Unlike the Italian case, immigration in Argentina today is not associated with a changein the religious landscape of the country. Most immigrants come from Christian religions.Although there is a community of Muslims from countries such as Senegal, their presence isvery small and has not generated a need for specific policies on the part of the national state.4. State Definition of ReligionAs we mentioned, Italy’s religious landscape has historically been a plural one. Thoughthe Catholic faith is designated as “the only religion of the state” in its Statute, sincethe unification of the country in 1861, the Kingdom of Italy has included regulations torecognise and protect Jewish and Waldensian minorities. However, for centuries, therelationship between the state and minority confessions in Italy has been troubled.After the Inquisition was established in Spain in 1478 and the Alhambra decree of1492, which led to the persecution of Jews, Muslims, and heretical Christians, the Republicof Venice established the first known ghetto in 1516. This was followed by the State ofthe Church in 1555, which imposed social, residential, cultural, and economic segregationon the Jews of the kingdom through the papal bull Cum nimis absurdo. This measure waslater adopted by other Italian monarchies. Following the Protestant Reformation, theCongregazione del Sant’Offizio was established in 1542, which led to the persecution andmassacre of heretical Christians in the Italian peninsula. The Waldensians of Calabria werethe first to be targeted in 1561, followed by those of Savoy during the “Piedmontese Pasque”of 1655.The recognition of civil and political rights of minorities in the Italian Risorgimentowas influenced by the French Revolution, the Enlightenment, and the People’s Spring. TheStatuto albertino, enacted in 1848 by the Kingdom of Sardinia, is the only constitutionaldictate that granted new rights to subjects, including those belonging to minority religiousgroups, to survive without substantial modifications: it later became the Statute of theKingdom of Italy in 1861. The Siccardi Laws of 1850 sanctioned the secularisation of thestate; in 1870, the annexation of Church territories caused a historic fracture between theItalian state and Roman Catholicism. This wound was healed in 1929 with the signing ofthe Lateran Pacts between the Holy See and the fascist government. Although Law 1159of 1929 established the category of “non-Catholic cults admitted in the state”, in 1938, thegovernment issued racial laws against Italian Jews. After the Liberation in 1945, the 1948Constitution of the Italian Republic established the secular nature of the state and the rightsof all religious denominations.Until the mid-nineteenth century, the history of European states was founded on theperception of religious diversity as a threat to public and political order, and a sourceof instability, conflict, and violence. This perception changed with the affirmation ofliberal principles and the enactment of constitutional charters—and then again duringthe twentieth century (Lagi 2021). Those were times of personalistic and authoritariangovernance of territories, resources, populations, and public space itself. The despotsunderstood public space as their private property and based their privilege, authority, andReligions 2024, 15, 799 7 of 25the loyalty of their subjects on religion. A vision of religious diversity as closely, if notexclusively, connected to the presence of foreigners has become prominent. Furthermore, inaddition to denying the religious plurality that is intrinsic to the European—and so Italian—population, this overlay also denies the native character of the second (and subsequent)generations who were born or raised in the country of their parents’ immigration, forcinga representation of diversity as an external threat to national homogeneity. It is not acoincidence that state–religion relations in Italy were entrusted first to the Ministry of Justiceand, from 1932, to the Ministry of the Interior, contributing to “accentuate a mentality andpractice of a police-like nature towards non-Catholics” (Madonna 2011; see also Rochat1990; Long 1991).Currently, in Italy, the relationship between the state and religions is governed by a setof laws from the 20th century. These laws were enacted during both the monarchical periodof fascist dictatorial government and the democratic republican period. The coexistence ofnorms established in different historical–political periods is anything but peaceful. Along-side the principles of secularism and religious pluralism, a system of legal privilege for theCatholic Church and explicit references to questionable categories (such as “state religion”,“acatholic confessions”, and “admitted cults”) survive. Religious freedom is protected bythe 1948 Constitution through a set of norms that guarantee rights directly (Articles 3, 7, 8,19, and 20) and indirectly (Articles 2, 17, 18, and 21), which are essentially dedicated to theprotection of human rights, freedom of assembly, association, and expression of thought.Article 3All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, withoutdistinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinions and personal andsocial conditions;Article 7The State and the Catholic Church are, each within its own order, independentand sovereign. Their relations are regulated by the Lateran Pacts. Amendmentsto the Pacts, accepted by both parties, do not require a constitutional revisionprocedure;Article 8All religious confessions are equally free before the law. Religious confessionsother than the Catholic Church have the right to organise themselves according totheir own statutes, insofar as these are not contrary to Italian law. Their relationswith the State are regulated by law on the basis of agreements with the competentrepresentations;Article 19Everyone has the right to freely profess their religious faith in any form, indi-vidually or in association, to propagate it and to worship in private or in public,provided it is not contrary to morality;Article 20The ecclesiastical character and the religious or cult-related purpose of an asso-ciation or institution may not give rise to special legislative limitations, nor tospecial tax burdens on its constitution, legal capacity and any form of activity.In Argentina, there is a legal inequality of origin, which places the Catholic Churchin a preferential position, although respectful of religious freedom. Configured around acomplex relationship between the State and the Church at the origin of the country’s history,this is crystallised in the National Constitution, which, sanctioned in 1853, maintainedthree key positions in dispute: the Gallican, the intransigent, and the liberal (Di Stefano2011). The Gallican position promoted a “national” Church where the diocesan structuredepended fundamentally on the State; the intransigent position, which demanded a clearseparation between Church (as societas perfecta) and State, being very restrictive withReligions 2024, 15, 799 8 of 25religious diversity; and the liberal position, which promoted the unrestricted recognition offreedom of conscience, abandoning the patronage and promoting the concept of toleranceto diversity. Finally, the Gallican and liberal positions prevailed, with a concession to theintransigent position by allowing provincial constitutions to declare the Catholic religion asthe state religion. It is important to point out that during a good part of the country’s history,Argentina—as it happened with other Latin American countries—maintained the figureof the “Patronato regio”, a concession of the Catholic Church to the kings of Spain duringthe conquest that allowed them to appoint bishops in American lands. The three modelspresented maintained the figure of Patronage in their link between state and Church.If we analyse the central points of the religious presence in the Constitution, we cansee that God is mentioned as “source of all reason and justice” in the Preamble, whileArticle 19, referring to the private actions of men, indicates that “they are reserved onlyto God” (Secretaría de Culto 2001, p. 69). Specifically regarding religions, two basicparameters are established: on the one hand, Article 2 states that the federal government“sustains the catholic, apostolic and Roman cult”. On the other hand, Article 14 assuresthat every inhabitant of the Nation has the right to worship freely, extending this guaranteeto foreigners in Article 20 (in these two articles we can see the influence of the liberal side).The regular ecclesiastics cannot be members of the Congress (article 73).Article 2The Federal Government upholds the Roman Catholic Apostolic worship;Article 14All the inhabitants of the Nation enjoy the following rights in accordance withthe laws regulating their exercise, namely: to work and to exercise all lawfulindustries; to navigate and trade; to petition the authorities; to enter, remain,transit and leave the Argentine territory; to publish their ideas in the presswithout prior censorship; to use and dispose of their property; to associate foruseful purposes; to worship freely; to teach and learn;Article 20Foreigners enjoy in the territory of the Nation all the civil rights of citizens;they may exercise their industry, commerce and profession; own real estate, buyand dispose of it; navigate the rivers and coasts; freely exercise their worship;testament and marry in accordance with the laws. (. . .);Article 73Regular ecclesiastics cannot be members of Congress, nor can governors ofprovinces for the province of their command.Although in 1966, with the signing of the Concordat between Argentina and the HolySee, the Patronage ended, it was not until 1994 that a series of articles of the Constitutionthat strongly linked the state structure with the ecclesiastical structure were modified. Thus,until 1994, according to article 67, it was up to the Congress of the Nation to “preserve thepeaceful treatment of the Indians and promote their conversion to Catholicism” (item 15),to approve or reject the concordats with the “Apostolic Chair”, to maintain the patronage(item 19) and to admit in the territory of the Nation other religious orders in addition to theexisting ones (item 20) (Secretaría de Culto 2001, p. 71). More complex was the requirementthat the president of the republic be a Catholic (article 76) and that he should swear bythe Holy Gospels (article 80), with a series of specific attributions regarding patronage(article 86).Beyond the transformations that took place in the different versions of the NationalConstitution—all of which were agreed upon with the Catholic Church—we can establisha first-state parameter. In Argentina, there is acceptance of religious diversity, but grantingthe Catholic Church a “special status” (Frigerio and Wynarczyk 2004) often equates it withthe identity of the nation. This can be seen in the survival of article 2 of the Constitution,which establishes the “support” of the Catholic cult (without delimiting whether it is anReligions 2024, 15, 799 9 of 25economic or symbolic support) and in other legal forms that regulate religion, as we willsee in the next section.5. State Recognition of ReligionsIn addition to the rules concerning the exercise of religious freedom, the Constitutiontherefore provides for specific legal provisions concerning the regulation of relations be-tween the state and confessional organisations and their recognition as entities endowedwith legal personality, through reference to dedicated rules and their implementing regula-tions. The Italian legal system does not provide for the possibility of founding associationswith a religious purpose, nor does it have a national register of religious organisations.These can be established as free associations with a cultural or social purpose, and subse-quently apply for legal recognition through political approval.Relations between the Italian State and the Holy See are regulated through the LateranPacts of 1929, subsequently amended and renewed in 1984 with the Agreement of VillaMadama. On the other hand, those with “religious denominations other than the CatholicChurch” are regulated through the system of intese (Article 8 of the Constitution), whichcan only be accessed after obtaining legal recognition as an “admitted cult” (Law 1159–1929and implementing regulation Royal Decree 289-1930).These intese, among other things, provide access to public funds through “8xmille”(Giorda and Vanolo 2021) and impose legal duties on the parties involved. Both the intesaand the “admitted cult” require a long bureaucratic, administrative, and political processinvolving numerous state agencies and departments. The entities involved in this matterinclude the Ministry of the Interior, the Council of State, the Council of Ministers, andParliament. There are at least thirteen formal steps in the process:(1) Proposals made by religious organisations already recognised and endowed withlegal personality;(2) With the favourable opinion of the State Council;(3) Are subject to prior examination by the Ministry of the Interior, General Directoratefor Religious Affairs;(4) The Government has the power to enter into negotiations with the representatives ofthe organisation;(5) The organisation has to submit a request to the Prime Minister who, with a specialmandate;(6) Entrusts the negotiations to the Undersecretary or Secretary of the Council of Min-istries;(7) The undersecretary or secretary asks the “Inter-ministerial Commission for Agree-ments with Religious Denominations” to draw up a draft agreement;(8) The “Advisory Commission on Religious Freedom” gives its verdict.Once the formalities foreseen in the negotiation of the draft agreement have beencompleted the following steps ensue:(9) The draft is signed by the Undersecretary or Secretary and the representative of thereligious organisation;(10) The agreement is sent to the Council of Ministers for review.If the Council approves it, the following steps ensue:(11) The Prime Minister and the President of the religious organisation can sign the finaldraft, which stipulates the intesa;(12) And which is sent to the Parliament for discussion and, if successful;(13) The enactment of a specific law.The institution of the intesa, which should have been the main form of regulation ofrelations with non-Catholic confessions since 1948, has, in fact, only been implementedsince 1984, as saying the same year of the revision of the Concordat between State andChurch, as noted by Simone Martino (2014) among others. Seventy-six years after itsinstitution and forty years after the first intesa, this formula concerns only a minority ofReligions 2024, 15, 799 10 of 25the confessional organisations present in Italy today. Thus, the religious field in Italyresembles a pyramid, with Roman Catholicism at the top and only thirteen confessionalorganisations with intesa, comprising two Buddhist, one Hindu, one Jewish, and nineChristian groups. The application process is undoubtedly cumbersome, involving multiplesteps, from submitting the application to negotiating, signing, and transforming it into lawvia parliamentary approval.Considering the interval between the ratification of a draft (point 9 on the above list)and the date of parliamentary approval (point 13), the Waldensian Table had to wait forsix months in 1984, while it took a year and eleven months for Pentecostal Evangelicalsof the Assemblies of God in Italy and the Union of Seventh-day Adventist ChristianChurches (1988). It took two years and one month for the ratification of the Intesa withboth the Union of Jewish Communities in Italy (1989) and the Evangelical Baptist ChristianUnion of Italy (1995). It took two years and seven months for the Evangelical LutheranChurch in Italy (1995); five years and three months for Greek Orthodox, Mormons, andPentecostal Evangelicals of the Apostolic Church in Italy (2012); five years and eight monthsfor Buddhists and Hindus of their respective Unions (2012 and 2013); one year for theBuddhist association Soka Gakkai Buddhists (2016); and two years and five months for theAssociation of the Church of England (2021).However, the wait is significantly longer if we take into account the full iter. Forinstance, the Italian Buddhist Union had to wait more than a decade. In 2012, AlessandroAlbisetti referred to the delayed parliamentary approval of ratified intesa as “phantomagreements” (Albisetti 2012a, 2012b). Some organisations are still waiting on feedback,though, as Jehovah’s Witnesses, who, to date, have been waiting nineteen years for aparliamentary response.To date, only one Islamic organisation has been allocated the designation of “admittedcult” thus far, and that was fifty years ago: that is the Islamic Cultural Centre of Italy,founded in 1966 and recognised by the state through presidential decree in 1974, in view ofthe construction of the Great Mosque of Rome. This occurred during a period of pro-Islamicpolicies, which reached their peak in the 1970s and 1980s following the oil crisis and Italy’sstrategic relations with Arabian Peninsula countries. Nevertheless, none of the significantMuslim organisations who submitted applications were able to get the Intesa. 1992 saw thesubmission of an application by the Ucoii, or Union of Islamic Communities in Italy; in1993, the Islamic Cultural Centre of Italy; in 1994, the Ami, or Italian Muslim Association;and in 1996, the Coreis, or Italian Islamic religious community.The process of reaching an agreement involves very high costs in terms of professionalsand economics, but also reputational, social, and political capital. Together with theorganisational characteristics, governmental criteria, and sets of demands on both sides tobe included as clauses in the specific contracts, these sets of capitals can constitute elementsof structural and political discrimination that greatly affect the timeframe and thus thepracticability of legal recognition. Of course, the political nature of the final decision, whichrequires a parliamentary vote, can further delay—if not jeopardise—the translation of analready signed agreement into law. Parliament can approve or reject the treaty (by a doublevote of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate), but it can also simply fail to schedule orpostpone discussion of the bill, making the length of the process almost incalculable.It is important to note that intesa and “admitted cult” are not mandatory: religiousorganisations are free to apply for recognition or not, accepting the limits of simple recog-nition as a legal person under private law. Constituting oneself as an association with acultural or social purpose differs fundamentally from recognition as a cult organisation.The economic dimension has the greatest impact, as the agreement allows access to publicfunds collected through tax returns (8 × 1000). Among symbolic limitations, the failureto obtain agreement or at least an “admitted cult” entails difficulties in obtaining social orpolitical recognition in the public and political sphere. Legal recognition, in fact, acts as astate “license” of “official” religion.Religions 2024, 15, 799 11 of 25In addition, there are practical limitations on the recognition of ministers of religion,the services they may provide in public spaces such as schools, hospitals, and prisons, thecivil recognition of religious marriages, the organisation of cemetery spaces, and accessto public land or funds for the construction or renovation of places of worship. Althoughthe Constitutional Court has ruled that the enjoyment of benefits envisaged for bodies ofworship does not require legal recognition, in practise, the discipline remains complexand its management by local public administrations often results in forms of deliberatediscrimination.Having established the distinction in the National Constitution between the CatholicChurch and other religions, Argentina has two other important forms of differential recog-nition. On the one hand, in the Civil and Commercial Code of the Nation—whose lastreform is from 2015—an old distinction is maintained between the Catholic Church as apublic legal person, that is, comparable to any state organisation; and the other religions asa private legal person, on par with other organisations of the civil society (Mallimaci 2015).Although the Code makes an advance by contemplating the figure of private religiouslegal entity (previously it did not exist, and religions had to be registered as civil societyorganisations), its lack of regulation continues to generate tensions.On the other hand, non-Catholic religions require registration in the National Registryof Cults8, which, with previous antecedents (Secretaría de Culto 2001), has been in forcesince 1978, through the de facto law 21.745 (Catoggio 2008). This registry is part of theNational Secretariat of Cult, which belongs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, InternationalTrade, and Cult. This Secretariat, the highest authority in matters related to religions atthe national level, is in charge of establishing international links in matters of religiousfreedom, with the Vatican and with the Sovereign Military Order of Malta towards theexterior, and towards the interior it centralises at the national level the steps that both theCatholic Church and the other religions carry out before the State. It also has the functionof advising government officials in all matters related to religion. Within this dependencyis the Registry of Institutes of Consecrated Life in which the religious orders of the CatholicChurch are registered (the secular clergy must not register because it is a public juridicalperson) and the aforementioned National Registry of Cults. Both registries are national andapply to the entire Argentine territory.In its historical origin, the National Registry of Cults has at least two clear antecedentsin 1833 and 1948. The first, the Registry of Ministers of Worship in the different religiousbeliefs existing in the Province of Buenos Aires, was created by Governor Viamonte, whosemain objective was to keep a list of ministers authorised to celebrate marriages betweenpeople of religions other than Catholicism, which was necessary given the promotionof immigration from Anglo-Saxon countries, but it was soon absorbed by the nationaldynamics (Navarro Floria 2000). The second, the “Fichero de Cultos”, was sanctionedduring the first Peronism in a context of tension with the Catholic Church (Catoggio 2008),being a tool for the recognition of diversity for its legitimate link with the State. The“Fichero” subverts the previous intention of Farrell’s de facto government to establish aRegistry with police regulation functions, which would control the “dangers” that Judaismand evangelical churches supposedly implied for the national identity. This in a contextwhere the State was aligned with institutional Catholicism, and therefore imagined theArgentine citizen as Catholic (Catoggio 2008). However, this idea of the state regulatingnegatively those religions that move away from the Catholic imaginary, or that supposesome kind of “competition” for the Catholic Church, remains to some extent in the currentRegistry. This began to take shape during the government of Estela Martínez de Perón andmaterialised in the decree of the last civil–military dictatorship mentioned above. Duringthese years of de facto government is when the Registry will have a clearer police regulationfunction, controlling any religion that might seem “dangerous” (Catoggio 2008), closingplaces of worship and prohibiting public demonstrations (even religions, such as the caseof the Jehovah’s Witnesses).Religions 2024, 15, 799 12 of 25Catoggio (2008) provides an account of how at least three tendencies of the Argentinepublic policy on religion materialise and juxtapose in the National Registry of Cults: aprocess of bureaucratic–institutional centralisation of the survey of religions already existingin the territory; the knowledge and standardisation of religious diversity based on statisticaldata; and a police imperative of control of minorities that could be presented as dangerousto “national security” for not responding to the imaginary of the white, Catholic, andmodern nation (Frigerio 2012). This has been changing progressively so that the element ofpolice control has been reducing, the other two growing and assuming a new edge: that ofthe recognition of religions other than the Catholic Church as part of the subsidiarity ofthe relations between religions and State in Argentina (Esquivel 2014), also fulfilling thatfunction of “relief wheel” (Carbonelli 2015) in a territory that has more needs and at thesame time is recognised as more diverse in its beliefs.However, even in the face of this openness, registration presents tensions for religionson at least two levels: on the one hand, the processes of adaptation to an imaginary of whatis understood by religious for the state (Ceriani Cernadas 2013) has forced the adaptationof the practices themselves to be translatable to the requirements of the Registry. On theother hand, the hierarchisation of beliefs still prevents certain religious practices from beingregistered, especially those more associated with popular sectors, such as the Gauchito Giland San La Muerte (López Fidanza and Galera 2014).The inscription in the National Registry of Cults is of a legal nature, it does not havea restrictive function but a registration function (as is the ID for individuals), and it is avoluntary inscription. This means that if a religion is not registered it is not illegal, but itdoes not have its place of worship recognised by the state, and therefore cannot establishagreements or tax benefits.The registration includes six forms and a series of theological and sociological dataon the place of worship. The process begins by registering a place of worship, for whichthe characteristics of the religion are evaluated. Once accepted, an identification numberis assigned to that religion. If that religion opens a new place of worship, it must registerit separately, but it is assigned the same ID as the original registration. For example, theEvangelical Methodist Church of Argentina is registered with ID 320, from the registrationof its temple in Cabildo Street in the City of Buenos Aires. Today it has 124 Methodisttemples registered with ID 320 throughout the country. This explains why the NationalRegistry of Cults currently has more than thirty thousand registrations (which refer tothirty thousand places of worship, not thirty thousand religions), and has granted 7848 IDs.This number should also be taken into consideration, because each Evangelical Pentecostalchurch usually processes its own ID, increasing the number of IDs. In addition, not allplaces of worship are active, but data updating processes are usually slow, and a numberthat has already been issued is not reused.If we disaggregate the registration requirements, they are composed of six forms andcomplementary information. The forms include:1. The application for registration;2. The general characteristics of the worship;3. The relationship with religious entities abroad, and its establishment in Argentina(in the case of being a local religion, its foundational act);4. The description of the personnel with religious hierarchy;5. The authorities;6. The central place of worship.To this must be added the act of composition of the directive commission, the historyof the religious organisation (in general and in Argentina), the legal status (today as asimple association), the statutory norms, the characteristics of the doctrine, the permanentand regular activities of worship (with days and schedules, and an explanation in caseanimal sacrifices are performed), the training of the ministers of worship, the sociologicaldimension of the entity (understood as number of members), the translation of foreigndocuments, and the number of branches.Religions 2024, 15, 799 13 of 25The point that usually generates more complications is associated with Form 6 andhas to do with demonstrating the legitimacy of the use of the place where the worship isheld and its certification. This may be owned by the religious organisation, have a lease orgratuitous bailment contract, or have state authorisation in the case of public lands. In turn,it must be demonstrated that the registered property is the main place of worship, eitherwith a certification from a notary public, the municipality, or the police.As we have mentioned, registration is not mandatory, so sometimes some religiouscommunities desist from registering when part of the process is complex. At the same time,it is the responsibility of the organisations already registered to update their data and toreport possible changes. When they fail to do so, they do not lose their registration, but thedata remains outdated, and important information on the spatial composition of religiousdiversity is lost.With the administration of Andrea de Vita (2009–2019), the first non-Catholic andnon-lawyer director of the Registry, a process of decentralisation of part of the registrationprocess began, although the final acceptance (or not) remains in the hands of the centraloffice in the city of Buenos Aires. This decentralisation was propitiated by the signing ofagreements with provinces and municipalities (the latter mainly in the province of BuenosAires), in order to speed up a process that is free and simple, but that many times found inspeculators intermediation that did not facilitate the registration and swindled the religiouscommunities (García Bossio 2018).6. State Regulation of Religious ActivitiesReligious diversity and its relationship to public, social, and political space can beanalysed using a variety of territorial markers (and, conversely, to investigate the publicpolicies undertaken in the field of local regulation of religious diversity). One can, ofcourse, think of the forms of religious expression in urban life, through which religionsare sometimes made visible (e.g., through the symbolic use of the body and clothing),sometimes audible (through language, sounds, music, songs, calls to prayer, and otherforms of sonic expression). Food, and the locations where it is produced, exchanged, andeaten are among them, such as the religious activities in healthcare system (hospitals,hospices, cemeteries, etc.) and education services (public schools displaying religioussymbols, offering religious education classes, coexisting with private denominationalschools, etc.).Regarding religious education, in Italy there are no special legal issues with denom-inations having the ability to create schools and other educational facilities of any kindor size. Article 33 of the Constitution actually grants this right to private individuals,and the terms of the Villa Madama agreement and some intese with other denominationssimply reiterate and apply this principle. There is a noticeable distinction between the lawsgoverning religious instruction in state schools that apply to the Catholic Church and theother organisations. The Villa Madama Agreement mandates that Catholicism be taughtin public schools at all levels; religious instruction is not offered at the university level.The state bears the entire financial burden of Catholic religious education; the selection ofteachers is the responsibility of the diocesan bishop; and the curricula for Catholic religiouseducation are determined by agreement between the Minister of Public Education and thePresident of the Italian Episcopal Conference. In the case of denominations with an intesa,an “admitted cult” or non-recognised denominations, the parents of the pupils may requestthe school authorities to provide specific religious instruction on the school premises; thecost of this instruction is the sole responsibility of the religious organisation. Pupils or theirparents must declare each year whether or not they wish to take part in Catholic religiouseducation. If they refuse, they can concentrate on other subjects—with or without the helpof a teacher—or leave the school. The legitimacy of public funding of private (includingreligious) schools has long been debated. In any case, families who send their children tostate-recognised private schools are entitled to partial reimbursement of school fees.Religions 2024, 15, 799 14 of 25Italian law makes it easier to wear religious symbols in public places, including schools,hospitals, and public offices, and allows a similar degree of freedom for civil servants. Theonly restriction would be in relation to symbols that require the face to be covered, as thiswould make it difficult to recognise the person and establish relationships with others. Inrecent years, this has been discussed again in relation to the use of health masks during theCOVID-19 pandemic crisis, but there are no public conflicts on this issue. The presence ofcrucifixes in public buildings, such as schools, hospitals, and courts, has been the subject ofdebate and confrontation, but has never been denied.With regard to prisons9, article 26 of Law 354/1975 on Prison Regulations recognisesthe freedom of prisoners and internees to profess their faith, receive religious instruction,and practise their religion. Legislative Decree No. 123 of 2 October 2018 amended article 9of the Prison Order to provide that inmates who request it are guaranteed, as far as possible,a diet that respects their religious beliefs. In prison establishments, religious assistance isguaranteed for all religions and, for the Catholic religion, the presence of a chaplain in eachestablishment is provided for. For denominations other than the Catholic religion, chaplainsmay enter the prisons in two different ways: in the case of religious denominations thathave signed an agreement with the Italian State, ministers may enter the establishmentswithout special authorisation; a nulla osta issued ad personam by the Religious Affairs Officeof the Ministry of the Interior is required for all non-recognised organisations.In the case of hospitals, article 38 of law no. 833 of 23 December 1978 “Establishmentof the National Health Service” states that “religious assistance is guaranteed in the in-patient institutions of the National Health Service, respecting the will and freedom ofconscience of the citizen”. With regard to the Catholic Church, many Italian regions havesigned agreements with the Presidents of the regional Episcopal Conferences on religiousassistance in public hospitals. Non-recognised religious organisations can sign specificagreements with health care institutions to allow spiritual assistance to be provided onhospital premises by religious chaplains who have obtained a nulla osta from the Ministryof the Interior.From this point of view, the city of Turin is a relevant case for its experience inthe field of public services (Bossi and Ricucci 2023): this is the case, for example, of thepublic–private management of cemeteries, or of the agreements on religious and spiritualassistance in prisons and hospitals, guaranteed also to members of denominations withoutde jure recognition, through the de facto recognition of their clergy, mediated by theInterreligious Committee, the Catholic diocese, and the Department for Integration. Wheremany local and regional governments seem to be retreating, abandoning the definitionof non-recognised interlocutors—a passive tactic that often translates into exclusionarypolicies—, other non-political institutions are intervening pragmatically to respond to thefailures of a terrain long unprepared for religious diversity.Throughout the fieldwork, the importance of each administration’s practical endeav-our kept coming up, and it was validated in every interview setting. It is important tohighlight the entire statement made by a minister of a Greek Orthodox parish (interview#5/22-5-17):“Common sense ensured that even before the intesa, we were received in hospitalswithout problems. Catholic chaplains themselves searched to open jails to admitOrthodox ministers. Common sense always won out in this situation”.Among the spatial markers of religious presence, places of worship in particular are a clearexample of the difficulties that can arise in the exercise of the right to freedom of religionand non-discrimination in Italy. At the national level, legal confusion arises from theoverlapping of a democratic and secular order—which establishes equality before the law—and a dictatorial and confessional one—which privileges certain religious organisationsand hinders others. The result is a highly politicised system of legal recognition that,instead of regulating certain strategic partnerships between the state and the organisations,acts as an instrument of regulation and control (Becci 2021). Through the pyramid ofrecognition—and with a long, expensive and uncertain iter over which political discretionReligions 2024, 15, 799 15 of 25prevails—the Italian state acts as a gatekeeper of the religious field, determining whichgroups can organise as religious organisations and which others must transform themselvesinto cultural or social associations instead.As we have seen, this distinction is not without consequences and creates a viciouscircle that can even lead to administrative censorship of religious activities. At the locallevel, religious groups that are not recognised by the State are forced to organise themselvesas civil associations. Their statutes reflect this form of organisation, declaring the predomi-nance of cultural or social activities and minimising or omitting the worship activities forwhich they were created. Their premises are not registered as places of worship but asplaces for cultural or social purposes. It is therefore possible for the public authorities toconfiscate the seat of a religious group constituted as a cultural or social association if theyfind that it is carrying out worship activities that are not compatible with the purpose ofuse established by the local building and urban planning regulations. Or, with an evenmore paradoxical distortion, the public authority may compare the Islamic sermon to atheatrical performance, the imam to an actor, the prayer room to a cabaret stage, and theassembled faithful to an audience. In Rome, for example, in 2019, the municipal policesealed off one of the prayer rooms most frequented by the Bangla population because theassociation had not applied for a public performance permit (Pierucci 2017; Tieri 2019).From this point of view, Turin is a peculiar case. In the city that was the first capital ofunified Italy, a flexible administrative regime has allowed the establishment of religiousbodies as activities of public interest in all urban areas, recognising de facto the legitimacyof existing places of worship, without ever imposing de jure confiscation for incompati-bility with religious activities. Despite its open and inclusive orientation, this pragmaticapproach goes hand in hand with the survival of a regime of clear normative distinctionsin the organisational culture of local administrations. The limits imposed by a confusedlegal system became clear during the interview with the Directorate for Private Buildingand during the conversation with the Planning Service—Coordination of General UrbanPlanning and Historic Heritage of the Urban and Territorial Department of the Municipalityof Turin, of which an extract is provided below:“Compatibility is very elastic: in order to identify not a cultural centre, not anassociation, but a public service, I must be able to substantiate it. You cannot use astandard that certifies a profession for worship and then carry out other activities.In order to qualify, I must have a legal regulation and it must be recognised atthe concordat level, as with intesa. In a very specific cultural and historical realitysuch as that of Italy, where there has been a kind of state monopoly of the Catholicconfession, not by chance even with the presence of a concordat, from there ananalogy has opened up to a multitude of other confessions. Not all of them:there’s a list. Are only those on the list to be considered public? [Is the statute ofthe association enough?] I think they should be recognised, otherwise every sector association becomes a confession. [If you present as a cultural association forreligious purposes, with a coherent statute, and ask for funds or an area or a building inwhich to settle. . . If you present with that definition, but without Intesa, what happens?]I do not think it can be recognised, because religions have a defined legal regime.Otherwise, how can cultural activities be distinguished from those of publicinterest? It has to be established in an intesa with the state, and it seems to me thatthis is a non-competitive but exclusive matter for the state. If it is not possible toidentify it, if it does not have the nature of public interest, how does it judge thecases? You should have a list, like for hospitals: how do you distinguish a clinicof public interest from private activities?”. (Interview #31/8-1-19)The problem of identification—who should do it and according to what criteria—imposesa pragmatic limit on administrations accustomed to working with a technical approachto defined categories, making decisions based on the objective presence of circumstan-tial, measurable characteristics. However, the pragmatic obstacle is mainly due to legaluncertainty, which does not provide administrations with any tools:Religions 2024, 15, 799 16 of 25“[When stating that the agreement was not fundamental, the Court only indicated theneed for a statute, prior de facto public recognition, and common consideration] Well, thatmeans nothing: what does it mean? [For example, the fact that a sharing pact hasbeen signed with the municipality. . .could be a valid prior public recognition?]I can’t give you an answer, I have to be honest. Maybe it’s one, but do you needthem all? There is not only a technical answer, but also a legal-administrativeone. I can’t give you a direct answer. [The regional law, for example, provides foran organised, widespread and significant presence at the national level, a significantsettlement in the local community] And significant means that it represents, I don’tknow, 10,000 people? Or maybe 10% of a city of a million people? In my opinion,it is no coincidence that these rules give rise to appeals and interpretations in oneverse or another, depending on the objective that each person sets for himself.A technician accustomed to working in an accounting way, like a binary system,on the basis of what determines whether the condition exists? There’s a needfor certainty. A term like “significant” means nothing from a geometric point ofview. As an urbanist, I often go to the legal part, but if there are deliberately thesedefinitions, which are in themselves a vulnus, how do I say what is significant?10%? 5%? I don’t know”. (ivi)Thus, religions without legal recognition have conformed to the status quo, homologatingto the legislation, to its vulnus and its interpretations10, preferring, above all, a short-termtactic: that which allows the immediate satisfaction of organisational needs. Thus, insteadof mosques (or Buddhist temples, Sikh or Pentecostal churches, etc.) qualified as places ofworship, hundreds of sites of cultural associations are emerging in Italy: an escamotage byreligious groups and local public administrations to transcend legal recognition as a placeof worship through institutional recognition, thereby guaranteeing the application of theright to freedom of religion. Escamotage, however, is often denounced by Islamophobicparties as a strategy to hide the presence of mosques—and the illegal activities that theybelieve would be carried out there.11In addition to the material and normative constraints faced by all organisations withoutstate recognition, the establishment of Islamic places of worship is further hamperedby political opposition and social stigma, which, together with administrative practice,contribute to encouraging “mimetic” forms of adaptation. However, this is an exogenousmimetism induced by the context, in which the (lack of) legal recognition and, on top ofit, the normative system based on the pyramid of recognition play an important role, as itbecomes clear in the interviews with the referents of Islamic organisations:“[Why do some call them cultural centres?] Because in some regions or areas theydon’t want to hear about mosques. Even if the association is asking for renovationor building work, it is always called a cultural centre. There is no opposition.Unfortunately, these associations are forced to move. If you manage a place ofworship, you should be able to declare it. [. . .] It is not easy because we do nothave an agreement with the state and we are not recognised as religious bodies.This always causes problems because there is always something to do: It is noteasy to open a place of worship and ask for a proper building destination, we aregoing around laws that have been in place for too long [. . .] and the legal systemis still that of the 1929. We are looking for a way to the agreement, we haverecently had many consultations with lawyers and notaries [. . .] We still need aform of recognition that meets our needs and the requirements of the law that wehave to respect”. (representative of an Islamic association, interview #18/22-7-17)“They don’t give us permission to have a mosque, they only give us the culturalcentre, and sometimes not even that, because Islam is not recognised as a religion:That’s why we have cultural associations. [Why can’t you get recognition?] I don’tknow, we have to ask, we have to do something, we all Muslims together, not justone organisation. We have to try to at least get Islam recognised as a religion, likethe others”. (representative of an Islamic association, interview #23/23-11-17)Religions 2024, 15, 799 17 of 25In the silence of both religious and secular institutions, mosques have indeed become thetarget of aggressions and acts of vandalism, scourges of the holy books, pig walks, andother insults. On a more subtle level, some parties have launched political campaigns toban Islamic places of worship. It is precisely by taking advantage of this legal patchwork,to which unrecognised religious organisations are forced to adapt in order to exist, thatpolitical forces of the more or less radical and sovereign right have been able to promoteIslamophobic laws, commonly referred to as “anti-mosques”. Although they have beendeclared unconstitutional by the Court, they have allowed the confiscation or closure ofnumerous religious centres, between security decrees and administrative bribes. In manycases, the reason was precisely the lack of an authorisation for religious activities, whichwas rejected by the authorities themselves because it had been submitted by organisationswithout an intesa.Although constitutional jurisprudence has intervened to harmonise local regulationswith the principle of non-discrimination based on the legal status of religious organisations,since 2015 a new legislative season has begun in some regions, restricting the right tofree exercise of religion. Among other things, these “anti-mosques” laws have introducedelements that discriminate against religious organisations without legal recognition, amongwhich Islamic organisations are undoubtedly the most numerous and exposed.Thus, the law of the Lombardy region of 3 February 2015 n. 2 (by Lega Nord-ForzaItalia-Fratelli d’Italia-Popolari-Pensionati), the law of the Veneto region of 12 April 2016 n.12 (Lega Nord-Forza Italia-Fratelli d’Italia), and the law of the Liguria region of 14 December2016 n. 23 (Forza Italia-Lega nord-Fratelli d’Italia) provide the following:(a) Two differentiated disciplines for access to building and economic contributionsfor denominations with and without intesa, with more difficult paths and intrusivecontrols [. . .] reserved for the latter;(b) The presence of ad hoc political bodies used to decide on the existence of the require-ments foreseen only for denominations without intesa;(c) The need to obtain preliminary opinions from organisations, citizens’ committees,exponents, and representatives of the law enforcement agencies, as well as the provin-cial offices of the districts and prefectures, in order to assess possible public securityprofiles in relation to the preparation of the plan for religious services;(d) The possibility for municipalities to hold a referendum on the plan, without clearlyspecifying the aspects and issues on which the referendum could be held;(e) The right to include in the municipal urban plans the obligation to use the Italianlanguage for all activities carried out in the facilities of common interest for religiousservices that are not closely related to ritual practices of worship» (Marchei 2017, p. 5).After the Court’s interventions, the season of anti-mosque laws seemed to be over.Since 2018, the issue had largely disappeared from the front pages of newspapers, tomake room for other, more page-turning and profitable issues. However, a few monthsafter taking office on 22 October 2022, Fratelli d’Italia has proposed a new law to preventthe presence of mosques in Italy. The bill was presented to the 8th Environment andTerritory Commission by Tommaso Foti, already known to the chronicles for being underinvestigation since 2022 for corruption and trafficking in illicit influences precisely inrelation to change in destination of use in favour of entrepreneurs, from which he wouldhave received money (Trinchella and Tundo 2022).If enacted into law, it would prevent unrecognised religious communities from or-ganising as associations for cultural and social purposes (and therefore to organise inall respects), or make it extremely difficult to find land or buildings compatible with thepurpose of the place of worship, thus subjecting religious freedom to the discretionarypower of the competent municipal administrations in the area of construction and change inuse—and to possible political, criminal, and economic pressure. The Foti proposal explicitlyrefers to Islam and mosques, accusing associations of taking advantage of administrativeconfusion to circumvent urban norms and inaugurate religious places in areas intendedfor other services (Tieri 2023). According to the signatories, the current regulation is beingReligions 2024, 15, 799 18 of 25used as a “picklock” to set up hidden mosques, prayer rooms, and “madrasahs” withoutspecific authorisation.Designed to impede the right to worship, association, and prayer of Muslims, the rulewould in fact affect dozens of denominations without legal recognition by the State, includ-ing “ethnic” or non-Roman Catholic churches, Evangelical, and Orthodox and Pentecostalchurches, but also Adventist associations, Bahá’ís, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Taoists, Sikhs andShintoists, Buddhists, and Hindus not affiliated to organisations with Intesa, includingnew religious or spiritual movements, etc. (Fraschilla 2023). The opposition of the centreand left parties in the Eighth Committee objected, defending the legitimacy of the currentregulation and its applicability to the case of religious organisations. The supporters ofthe proposed law are divided between those who demand transparency and respect forthe norm and those who invoke the spectrum of international terrorism and the need toprevent the presence of “informal” mosques as places of “jihadist radicalisation” (Piccardo2023), which would include more than 1,200 Islamic places in Italy, that is, all but five or sixmosques misleadingly called “official”.In the regulation of daily religious activities, the Argentine state maintains the privilegefor the Catholic Church in chaplaincy in prisons and public hospitals, armed forces andother security forces, where the only official presence is that of a Catholic priest. Thisdoes not mean that the presence of other religious assistance is prohibited, but sinceit is not officially regulated, it depends on negotiations between religious leaders, thedirectors of the institutions, and the Catholic priests. In the case of evangelical churches,there is an important organisation that, despite the lack of a specific legal framework, hasallowed the creation of “evangelical wards” in prisons (quieter and cleaner than commonwards, and where prisoners who are at risk of being harmed by others, such as rapists,are generally held) (Brardinelli and Algranti 2013). In a less organised way, other spiritualpractices associated with the New Age have also entered prisons, such as the Art ofLiving Foundation in the province of Buenos Aires (Viotti 2021). The Catholic Churchalso maintains a privileged position in state support for social assistance activities, whileevangelical churches have gained ground in addiction care and prevention (Algranti andMosqueira 2018).In education, Argentina has a long tradition of secular state education. In this sense,and despite having had numerous conflicts throughout its history, free public educationdoes not include religious education in its curriculum and discourages the presence ofreligious symbols in schools. Where denominational education does exist is in the so-calledprivately managed public schools. In this case, these schools have different levels of statesupport, and are mostly Catholic denominational, although there are also schools managedby evangelical churches and the Jewish community. In the case of universities, somethingsimilar happens, with public universities being secular and several private denominationaluniversities generally being run by the Catholic church and evangelical churches.In territorial management and presence in the public space, some of this distinction isalso maintained; although, progressively at the local level, there may be a greater openness.There are no restrictions on the religious symbols a person may wear in public space. Interms of religious symbols in cities and state agencies, these are mostly Catholic, which hasgenerated different controversies, but without major conflicts (García Bossio 2017). Thelargest pilgrimages in the country are Catholic, and in general they have ample supportfrom the state for their development. Particularly noteworthy is the youth pilgrimage toLuján, a city in the province of Buenos Aires where the image of the Virgin Mary, patronsaint of Argentina, is located. On the first weekend of October, pilgrims from the City ofBuenos Aires, but also many other localities, travel almost 60 km in an average of ten hours,generating a continuous flow of people—ranging from one million to 2.5 million—from theearly hours of Saturday to the early hours of Sunday. Nine municipalities are crossed, sostate assistance from each locality and the provincial government is made available to theChurch (Flores 2015). This does not happen with any other religion in the country.Religions 2024, 15, 799 19 of 25Unlike what happens in Italy, in Argentina there is no clear restriction for the installa-tion of places of worship in the cities. Even many religions that have not yet been registeredin the National Registry of Cults establish their places of worship, often by renting existingpremises, without further control by the state. This, however, is not free of tensions. Thepresence of evangelical churches in what used to be theatres or movie theatres in downtownareas of the cities usually generates some discomfort among the local population (Frigerio2017). In the same way, many temples of African religions, even those registered in theNational Registry of Cults, do not have a sign or clear identification on public roads forfear of being discriminated against. In all these cases, the state usually mediates, but not toclose the place of worship, but many times to regularise its situation, and to maintain peaceamong neighbours.The question of the ownership of the land or the legal rental of the places of worshiponly becomes a problem when the process of registration in the National Registry of Cultsis initiated, because, in that case, it is necessary to have a legal certification. Faced with thisdifficulty, many municipalities have opted to generate a parallel registry to the nationalone, in which to contemplate these churches and temples that do not meet all the legalrequirements but maintain an active role in their communities (Carrone 2023).One problem with state regulation of religion in Argentine daily life is that there isno single criterion as to how this regulation should be. Outside the framework of theNational Registry of Cults, each province and municipality establish its criteria. In almostall provinces, and several municipalities, state agencies have been created whose mainfunction is the management of religious matters, while in other localities this task is carriedout by other offices, generally in public spaces or ceremonial offices.In those cases where there is an office of “cult”, the main tasks are usually the artic-ulation with the National Registry of Cults, the management of the use of public space,and the protocol presence in religious events. Outside of these activities, more proactiveagencies promote concrete actions to make the religious diversity of the locality visible andto create interreligious dialogue groups. However, each local initiative depends a lot on themanagement profile of state agents, so there is often no long-term public policy planning.7. ConclusionsIn this article, we attempt to show the form of state regulation of religion throughthe normative frameworks of Argentina and Italy. Both countries started from a longrelationship with Catholicism in the construction of their normative frameworks, in animaginary that associated the nation with Catholicism. In turn, both countries show adecline in the identification of their citizens with Catholicism, hand in hand with the growthof the nones and religious diversity.Each country, however, presents particularities in its legal framework that have animpact on how the governance of religion is conceived and, therefore, on how the manage-ment of diversity can be conceptualised (Table 1). First, there is a significant distance inthe framework of the relationship between the Catholic Church and the state. While Italyhas established the separation of Church and state, Argentina still maintains the “support”of Catholicism in its Constitution. Second, the regulation of religion is seen as a problemwhose competence lies with different state agencies: in Italy, the Ministry of the Interior;in Argentina, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is interesting to note that, despite thisdifference, in both cases, religious diversity is to a greater or lesser extent seen in relation toimmigration and internal security.Religions 2024, 15, 799 20 of 25Table 1. Summary table of the main points of comparison.Italy ArgentinaReligious compositionCatholic 75%; None 12.5%; Otherreligions 12.5% (2022)Catholic 62.9%; None 18.9%; Otherreligions 18.1% (2019)ConstitutionArt. 3 (non-discrimination); Art. 7(separation Catholic Church/Concordat);Art. 8 (equality before thelaw/Agreements); Art. 19 (religiousfreedom); Art. 20 (religious association);Art. 117 (legislate on religion)Preamble (God the source of all reasonand justice); Art. 2 (Catholic Churchsupport); Art. 14 (freedom of worship);Art. 20 (freedom of worship forforeigners); Art. 73 (ecclesiastics may nothold legislative office)Concordat with the Catholic Church1929: Catholicism as state religion,Vatican City, financial compensation;renewed in 1984: “Free Church in a FreeState”.1966 End of the Patronato RegioRegistration of non-Catholic ReligionsAgreement (Intesa) 13;“Admitted cults” 48;Associations;Unregistered, informal religious groupsRegistered in the National Registry ofCults; 7848 identifications (more thanthirty thousand places of worship);Unregistered, informal religious groupsGovernment registration area Ministry of Interior Ministry of Foreign Affairs and CultBenefits of enrolmentSymbolic recognition and access to the8 × 1000 (percentage of taxes, already defacto for the Catholic Church)Symbolic recognition and access to taxexemptions and other state benefits(already de facto for the Catholic Church)ChaplaincyEducationParticipation of religious diversity inprisons, hospitals, and cemeteries (whenlegally recognised); otherwise throughspecial, ad hoc permissions;Mostly public educationOfficial for the Catholic Church inhospitals and Armed Forces. In otherreligions, present but not regulated;Mostly public educationPublic space managementFrom the municipal government.Permission is required, but there areusually no problems if they do not have itFrom the municipal government.Permission is required, but there areusually no problems if they do not have itPlaces of worshipRegulated according to urban planning,without considering religious criteria andsustaining a certain status quo; majorimpediments to IslamThere is no specific urban regulation,although certain permits are required toensure registration in the NationalRegistry of CultsSource: Prepared by the authors.Third, there is a change in the way religious diversity is recognised at the legal level.While in Italy there is a pyramidal structure with the Catholic Church at the top, thirteendenominations recognised by agreements, other as “admitted cults”, and a majority ofnon-recognised organisations, in Argentina, this hierarchy is composed of three groups:the Catholic Church on top, as part of the state, the other religions that must be registeredin the National Register of Cults, and finally beliefs that cannot or do not want to beregistered. It is also interesting to note the criterion of registration: in the Italian case, it isthe recognition of religions as institutions, while in the Argentinian case, it is the registrationof places of worship, and in the same act they are recognised as part of a religion.Fourth, there is an important difference in the management of public space and thepossibility of creating new places of worship in the urban fabric. In this sense, the Italiansystem is much more restrictive than the Argentinean one, where limits depend more onregulation by society than by the state and its local agencies. This also has an impact on thespecific weight that local authorities have in the management of religious affairs, so that inArgentina the lack of a clear management task in the local space, and in Italy the lack of clearcriteria to be applied by administrations, leaves room for a variety of activities that dependon both the political opportunity structure and the profile of the people in charge of this task.In both cases, these gaps leave the governance of religions through public management toReligions 2024, 15, 799 21 of 25individual competences—often insufficient—and to personal initiative—which can resultin bureaucratic or political arbitrariness.Beyond the differences, some similarities allow us to see challenges for the future.In both cases, there is an overlap of rules, laws, and agreements between different levels ofgovernment and different religions that often allow for political discretion. In turn, legalrecognition is understood and used as a control device that, even in the Argentine case,which seems less restrictive, ends up giving the state the power to define what is and whatis not a religion in its territory.In both cases, therefore, the question arises as to the need for an organic law onreligious freedom and what form it should take. This raises the following questions: shouldthe state regulate the religious practices of its inhabitants? What should be the scope ofthis regulation? Is it possible for the state to generate a form of management that promotesreligious pluralism instead of the hierarchisation of legitimate religions?Alongside fluctuations in religiosity among the population, or in the legal systemthat ground social living and regulate relations between public space and confessions, anddespite the formal type of state–religion system, the comparison between the Argentineanand Italian cases suggests that both countries are better described as limited, adaptive,hybrid secularities, with their foundations resting on arbitrary mechanisms of allianceor control, rather than on equity and pluralism; and this confirms that secularity andconfessionality can de facto coexist in the same environment: which is that of everydayadministrations of power relations.Author Contributions: Conceptualization, L.B. and M.P.G.B.; methodology, L.B. and M.P.G.B.; re-search and field work, L.B. and M.P.G.B. Writing-preparation of the original draft, L.B. and M.P.G.B.:L.B. did most of the literature review and theoretical approach; M.P.G.B. did most of the systemati-zation of the methodology, visualization of the comparative table and first draft of the conclusions.Writing-revising and editing, L.B. and M.P.G.B. All authors have read and agreed to the publishedversion of the manuscript.Funding: This research was funded by the Bilateral Cooperation Program CONICET (Consejo Na-cional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Argentina)-CUIA (Consorzio Universitario Italianoper l’Argentina), as part of the project “Differences and similarities in the state management of reli-gious diversity in Argentina and Italy. Comparative study of the policies of recognition of religiousminorities”, 2020–2023.Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.Informed Consent Statement: Informed consent was obtained from all subjects involved in this study.Data Availability Statement: The data presented in this study are available on request from thecorresponding author.Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.Notes1 For an overview, please see (Borraz and John 2004; Bowen 2007; Bertossi 2012; Schmidtke 2014; Scholten 2015; Martikainen 2016among others).2 For a first orientation, we refer to the texts by (Soja 1989; Hervieu-Léger 2002; Knott 2005; Warf and Arias 2009; Davie 2012;Hopkins et al. 2013; Marramao 2013; Grüning and Tuma 2017; Mezzetti and Ricucci 2019; Breskaya et al. 2023).3 To cite but a few of the relevant studies conducted in this perspective: (Griera 2012; Griera and Nagel 2018; Becci et al. 2013;Giorgi and Itçaina 2016; Esquivel and Pérez 2016; Körs and Nagel 2018; Martínez-Ariño 2019).4 If you have missed the latest episodes in a saga as long and exciting as Sociology itself, we recommend that you start with at leastthese last two fundamental contributions.5 Data available at: https://it.usembassy.gov/it/rapporto-sulla-liberta-di-religione-nel-mondo-2022-italia/#:~:text=Secondo%20le%20stime%20di%20uno,3,7%20per%20cento%20musulmano (last accessed on 24 April 2024).6 Data available at: https://www.istat.it/en/archivio/129959 (last accessed on 24 April 2024).7 Data available at: https://cesnur.com/dimensioni-del-pluralismo-religioso-in-italia/ (last accessed on 24 April 2024).Religions 2024, 15, 799 22 of 258 In Argentina, state agencies and legislation use the term “cult” to refer to the different religious institutions and their places ofworship.9 For further information please see: https://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_2_3_0_5.page (last accessed on 24 April 2024).10 As also found by Martucci (2018).11 To cite but one recent example, taken from a news article entitled “The Lega Nord: It’s not a cultural centre, it’s a mosque”,published by the local online newspaper Cuneo Dice: “The Lega Nord deputy then went on to add: ‘Islam is not compatible witha rule of law’, he said, and then made an appeal: ‘Inside the mosque disguised as a cultural centre, Italian should be spoken, toensure transparency. The cases in which radicalised elements have emerged are due to situations in which people have tried toevade the control of the police by speaking Arabic [. . .] Senator Giorgio Bergesio: ‘We are not racist, but we are against mosquesbeing opened under the banner of a cultural club’. [. . .] Simone Mauro, city secretary of the Lega Nord: [. . .] ‘We will go aheadwith other complaints to stop this nonsense’” (Simone 2018).ReferencesAlbisetti, Alessandro. 2012a. Le intese fantasma. Stato, Chiese e Pluralismo Confessionale, March 5, Rivista telematica.Albisetti, Alessandro. 2012b. Le intese fantasma (a metà). Stato, Chiese e Pluralismo Confessionale, September 24, Rivista telematica.Algranti, Joaquín, and Mariela Mosqueira. 2018. Sociogénesis de los dispositivos evangélicos de “rehabilitación” de usuarios de drogasen Argentina. Salud Colectiva 14: 305–22. [CrossRef] [PubMed]Becci, Irene. 2021. 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