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Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe Manuscript 2534 The Structure of the Anti-Religious Unit of the Soviet Secret Service (1953 – 1956) Oleksandr Korotaiev Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree  Part of the History of Religion Commons, and the Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Commons THE STRUCTURE OF THE ANTI-RELIGIOUS UNIT OF THE SOVIET SECRET SERVICE (1953 – 1956) By Oleksandr Korotaiev Oleksandr Korotaiev, PhD in history. Department of History Kryvyi Rih State Pedagogical University, Dnipropetrovsk region, Ukraine. Academic interests: History of Religions in Ukraine (20th century), History of Soviet Security Services. E-mail: korotaiev.oleksandr@kdpu.edu.ua                           ORCiD: 0000-0002-4460-0118. Abstract The article is devoted to the issue of reforming the Soviet Security Services and their network of agents during the period of de-Stalinization (1953-1956). The directions of this reform were studied, and how these reforms affected changes in their activities in the religious sphere was traced. Based on a study of the KGB reporting documentation, as well as the personal files of KGB employees, the structure of the anti-religious division of the KGB and its peripheral offices was revealed for the first time, the main directions of its activities were indicated, the pseudonyms of secret agents working in these areas in the religious sphere were declassified. For the first time, photographs of employees of the anti-religious unit (6th Office of the 4th Secret Political Department, 1954-1956) of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR and agents from the Protestant environment, which were assigned to them, are being published. Key words: MGB-KGB, Pentecostals, Evangelical Christians, Baptists, intelligence and undercover work, agents, recruitment. Introduction The work of the Soviet Security Services in the religious environment (especially among Protestants) is a little-studied aspect of modern historiography. The issue of the structure of the Soviet state security bodies in general and their anti-religious units in particular, as well as the direction of their work in the religious sphere, remains particularly poorly researched. Among the numerous works devoted to this issue, we can mention the works of Nikita Petrov, Alexander Pozharov,1 Oleh Bazhan,2 and Dmytro Viedienieiev.3 The presence of such a small number of works on this topic is explained by the long-term closure of the 1 Александр Пожаров “КГБ и партия (1954–1964 гг.)” Отечественная история. Вып. 4. (1999): 169-174. [Aleksandr Pozharov, “KGB and the Party (1954-1964),” National History, No. 4 (1999): 169–74]. 2 Олег Бажан “Реформування органів держбезпеки УРСР у 1950 – першій половині 1960-х рр. Радянські органи державної безпеки в Україні (1918–1991 рр.): історія, структура, функції.” Матеріали круглого столу, 19 грудня 2013 р., м. Київ / Упоряд.: О. Бажан, Р. Подкур. Київ: Інститут історії України НАН України (2014): 312-33. [Oleg Bazhan “Reform of the state security bodies of the Ukrainian SSR in 1950 – the first half of the 1960s. Soviet state security bodies in Ukraine (1918–1991): history, structure, functions.” Materials of the round table, December 19, 2013, Kyiv / Edited by: O. Bazhan, R. Podkur. Kyiv: Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (2014): 312-33]. 3 Дмитрий Веденеев. Атеисты в мундирах: Советские спецслужбы и религиозная сфера Украины. (Москва: Алгоритм, 2016): 496. [Dmytro Viedienieiev, Atheists in uniform: Soviet intelligence services and the religious sphere of Ukraine. (Moscow: Algorithm, 2016): 496]. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 1archives of the Soviet intelligence services, which made the work of researchers impossible. However, with the declassification of the KGB archives that began in 2015, historians can study this issue in more detail. This article is the result of such research.  The Main Material and Results The death of Joseph Stalin and the July Plenum (July 02–07, 1953) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) marked the beginning of serious changes in the attitude of the Communist elite regarding the punitive system of the Ministry of State Security (MGB).4 The purpose of the plenum was the desire of the Communist Party to establish its own control over the activity of the “powerful punitive department, which, according to the Ukrainian historian Oleh Bazhan, for decades ensured the smooth functioning of the Soviet empire.”5 In support of this opinion, one can cite an excerpt from the plenum resolution, which states that “the Communist Party shall carry out systematic and continuous monitoring of the activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs bodies at the central and local levels.”6  Consequently, Joseph Stalin’s successors resorted to downgrading the status of the Soviet Security Services. The consequence of their collective activity was the resolution of the CC CPSU dated March 12, 1954: “On the main tasks of the State Security Agencies of the USSR,” which presented an analysis of the situation in the Soviet Security Services, identified serious shortcomings in their work, identified the main tasks of the Soviet intelligence services and determined their reorganization. According to the decision of the Communist Party resolution, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council, by decree of March 13, 1954, separated the MGB apparatus from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and reorganized it 4 MGB (МГБ) – Министерство государственной безопасности (Ministry of State Security) – the name of the Soviet state security bodies in February–July 1941 and in 1943-1953. 5 Олег Бажан “Реформування органів держбезпеки УРСР у 1950 – першій половині 1960-х рр. Радянські органи державної безпеки в Україні (1918–1991 рр.): історія, структура, функції.” Матеріали круглого столу, 19 грудня 2013 р., м. Київ / Упоряд.: О. Бажан, Р. Подкур. Київ: Інститут історії України НАН України (2014): 313. [Oleg Bazhan “Reform of the state security bodies of the Ukrainian SSR in 1950 – the first half of the 1960s. Soviet state security bodies in Ukraine (1918–1991): history, structure, functions.” Materials of the round table, December 19, 2013, Kyiv / Edited by: O. Bazhan, R. Podkur. Kyiv: Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (2014): 313] 6 Лаврентий Берия. 1953. Стенограмма июльского пленума ЦК КПСС и другие документы / Под ред. акад. А. Яковлева; сост. В. Наумов, Ю. Сигачев. (Россия. XX век. Документы). (Москва: МФД, 2003): 371. [Lavrentiy Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents / Ed. acad. A. Yakovleva; comp. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. (Russia. XX century. Documents). (Moscow: MFD, 2003): 371.] OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 2into the KGB7 under the Council of Ministers of USSR.8 The text of the resolution of the CC CPSU stated that the main task of reforming the Soviet Special Services was the following: “to eliminate the consequences of Beria’s hostile activities in state security agencies as soon as possible and to achieve the transformation of state security bodies into sharp weapons of our Party, directed against the true enemies of our socialist state, and not against honest people.”9 From then on, the main line of work of the newly created KGB apparatus, as Lazar Kaganovich aptly noticed, was to be directed “to identify real enemies and protect honest people,” naturally with “the superiority of Party bodies over the KGB.”10 Researcher Nikita Petrov noted that the “honest people” of the “new” government primarily considered themselves, then their relatives, and only then other Soviet citizens. This statement by Nikita Petrov argued that Lavrenty Beria had in his hands a so-called “collection” of agent files, forms, and documents of compromising content “for almost the entire Kremlin elite,” such as Vladimir Molotov and his wife Polina Zhemchuzhina (agent file “Aspen Nest”), Georgy Malenkov, Nikita Khrushchev, Mikhail Kalinin, Klima Voroshilov, Nikolay Bulganin, Mikhail Suslov, Alexander Shcherbakov, Mikhail Kaganovich, and their family members.11 The removal of Lavrenty Beria and the establishment of Communist Party control over the activities of state security bodies made it possible to exempt the highest communist nomenclature from their sphere of influence. The subsequent reform of the Soviet special services, aimed at liberalizing the forms and methods of their work, became a kind of guarantee that their future leaders would no longer be able to concentrate in their hands the power that would threaten the sole rule of the apparatus of the CC CPSU in the USSR. Due to these circumstances, according to Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSS) officer Alexander Pozharov, the functions of the KGB “revised in the direction of shifting the focus on the actual intelligence and counter-intelligence activities with 7 KGB (КГБ) – Комитет государственной безопасности (The Committee for State Security) – the name of the Soviet state security bodies from 13 March 1954 until 3 December 1991.  8 Service Security of Ukraine Branch-Wise State Archive (hereafter, SSU BSA) Found 13. File 666. Page 497 (“Found” hereinafter – “F”; “Page” hereinafter – “P”). 9 Реабилитация: как это было. Документы Президиума ЦК КПСС и другие материалы. В 3-х томах. Том 1. Март 1953 – февраль 1956. / сост. А. Артизов и др. (Москва: МФД, 2003): 116–117. [Rehabilitation: how it happened. Documents of the Presidium of the CC CPSU and other materials. In 3 volumes. Volume 1. March 1953 – February 1956 / comp. A. Artyzov et al. (Moscow: MFD, 2003): 116–17]. 10 Никита Петров. “КГБ и ХХ съезд КПСС (1954–1960 гг.)”. Россия и современный мир, Вып. 2. (2016): 136-154. [Nikita Petrov. “The KGB and the XX congress of the CPSU (1954–1960).” Russia and the modern world, Vol. 2. (2016): 137]. 11 Никита Петров. Первый председатель КГБ Иван Серов. (Москва: Материк, 2005): 156–58.  [Nikita Petrov. The first chairman of the KGB, Ivan Serov. (Moscow: Materik, 2005): 156–58]. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 3a significant reduction in the functions of internal political control and search.”12 In the sphere of intelligence work, the CC CPSU gave the KGB the task of a comprehensive reinforcement of intelligence activities directed against the USA and England as the main opponents of the USSR in the “Cold War.” In the field of counterintelligence the task was “detection and exposing of spies, saboteurs and terrorists sent to the USSR by imperialist intelligence.” In the realm of domestic political control the task was the elimination of the remnants of the “bourgeois-nationalist” and “church-sectarian” underground, which amounted to collusion with foreign intelligence and helping them undermine the power of the state from within.13 We note that in the future the KGB had to carry out work in all these areas, especially the latter, in coordination with the CC CPSU and under the close supervision of the prosecutor’s office. To familiarize the KGB staff with the decisions of the Communist leadership of the CC CPSU, a meeting was held in June 1954 in Moscow for 650 heads of various subdivisions of the Soviet security agencies. Nikita Khrushchev delivered a two-hour speech to the participants of the meeting. He sought to explain to the KGB officers the main provisions of the decision of the CC CPSU on the directions of the KGB reform. The cornerstone of the reform was the subordination of the state security agencies to the CC CPSU. The content-analysis of Nikita Khrushchev’s speech, pronounced at the plenum, found that the phrase “control over the KGB” by the CC CPSU, was repeated 21 times.14 According to Nikita Khrushchev, the introduction of accountability of the KGB apparatus of the CC CPSU meant a return to the Leninist model of leadership of the Soviet special services, since they were created at the very beginning as a “branch of the Communist Party.”15 The decision of the CC CPSU included not only the reorganization of Soviet special services, but also new forms and methods of their work, which greatly interested Nikita Khrushchev. He noted the need to improve the undercover, intelligence, and investigative work of the KGB, as well as the strict compliance of security officers with the requirements of “socialist legality” during the performance of their duties. Regarding the observance of the law, Nikita Khrushchev demanded that the KGB officers, in the new political conditions, not violate the criminal and procedural codes during their activities and that they coordinate their actions 12 Александр Пожаров “КГБ и партия (1954–1964 гг.)” Отечественная история. Вып. 4. (1999): 169. [Aleksandr Pozharov, “KGB and the Party (1954-1964),” National History, No. 4 (1999): 169]. 13 SSU BSA. F. 13. File 666. P. 511. 14 Никита Сергеевич Хрущев. Два цвета времени. Документы из личного фонда Н.С. Хрущева. В 2 томах / гл. ред. Н. Томилина (Т. 1. 2009): 507-23. [Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. Two colors of time. Documents from the personal fund of N.S. Khrushchev. In 2 volumes / chapter. ed. N. Tomilina (Vol. 1. 2009): 507-23.]. 15 Ibid, P. 508. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 4with the prosecutor’s office, especially regarding obtaining arrest warrants for criminals.16 At the same time,  Khrushchev gave carte blanche to the security officers in the case that they have 40% confidence that the subject of interest is a criminal. In such a case, they did not need to obtain approval by the prosecutor, but could act on their own, without fear of “responsibility for making appropriate decisions on their own.”17 It is significant that in the fight against the “anti-Soviet element,” the First Secretary of the CC CPSU allowed the KGB to use even preventive arrests for preventive purposes, with only the caveat that, in the absence of investigative evidence against the arrested person, he/she must be released from custody.18  It should be noted that Khrushchev permitting KGB officers to carry out preventive arrests (without evidence of the suspect’s guilt and without the prosecutor’s sanction) contradicted the fundamental principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948. Since Khrushchev encouraged the Chekists to violate the most important of them– the principle of the presumption of innocence19 --this once again demonstrates that the political “thaw” in the USSR was not a radical change in the principles of the regime from prosecution and punishment to democratically fair ones. Nikita Khrushchev drew the attention of the KGB officers toward the need to change their approach to intelligence work. To this end, he recommended that the Security Police improve their own educational and professional levels. Now, according to the regulation of the CC CPSU “On the main tasks of the state security agencies of the USSR,” the basis of intelligence activity should be not large-scale undercover operations (namely mass repression) but that careful spot-based intelligence work should aim at identifying and eliminating only “real” enemies of the Soviet state. Khrushchev proposed to implement this change not by force, as it used to be, but by comprehensively well-designed agent-operative (intelligence) plans. “In your work,” Nikita Khrushchev said, appealing to the security forces, “the ingenuity is of great importance. To develop an operation, to discuss it well and comprehensively is to provide half of the case.”20 Providing the other half of the case, according to Khrushchev, meant selecting highly educated, skilled, and patriotic secret agents. “We must now scout out our enemies,” Khrushchev continued, “only through agents who are smart, subtle, cultured, and understand their work. So that the person you’re recruiting as a secret agent is more cultured than the one 16 Ibid.,  518-519. 17 Ibid.,  519. 18 Ibid,  511-512, 519.   19 The presumption of innocence is a legal principle that every person accused of any crime is considered innocent until proven guilty. Under the presumption of innocence, the legal burden of proof is thus on the prosecution, which must present compelling evidence to a judge or a jury. 20 Ibid,  523. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 5you want to exploit. One cannot secretly develop a more cultural person with little experience. He/she will be able to peek, to spy, but to secretly develop an agent, as needed, will not succeed.”21 According to Khrushchev, the KGB employees had to change the principles of recruitment work and their approach to the formation of the agency, not through a template (according to the so-called “gross”22 principle of recruitment) but individually (according to the so-called “qualitative”23 approach). In other words, the KGB employees were required to involve only such citizens through whom “real” work could be carried out. In fact, the recruitment process itself should have been conducted based on the principles of voluntariness and patriotism, excluding bribery and blackmail.  To implement such requirements, Khrushchev advised KGB officers to strengthen ties with the Soviet public to “recruit a good reliable agent <...>, work with it, <...> so that it would be an overwhelmingly honest agent, so that people would be ours (i.e. Soviet patriots – Auth.)”24. However, Khrushchev made several exceptions. Firstly, if the intelligence necessity required the development of “bandits” or “anti-Soviets,” the State security agencies could recruit “dirty people” (in other words “all kinds of criminals”–Auth.) by old methods if they (i.e. “dirty people” – Auth.) bring benefits” in agency and intelligence work;25 "Secondly, to prevent excessive reduction of the agent apparatus due to the application of a «qualitative» approach, Khrushchev immediately reminded the security officers that the USSR is surrounded by enemies (capitalist states), which systematically send spies to the USSR. Given this circumstance, the KGB should have enough of its agents who could identify and develop these spies.” Since the above-mentioned decision of CC CPSU referred to the improvement of the investigative work of the KGB, the First Secretary provided his comments, saying that the KGB officers should have once and for all eradicated inappropriate methods of investigation. Khrushchev said: “A fool who can beat a man can get a statement from an arrested man. But it will be a false statement. One must use one’s ability to force the opponent to disarm or to provide facts that cannot be refuted <...>. Only this method is true and undeniable.”26 But, insisting on the use of legal methods of investigation, Khrushchev did not say a word about 21 Ibid,  521-522. 22 The principle was to recruit as many agents as possible, regardless of their personal characteristics. 23 This approach was to focus on the personal qualities of the recruiter rather than on numbers. 24 Ibid,  522. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid.,  525. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 6changing or clarifying the provisions of some articles of the Criminal Code of the USSR (and other Union Republics), which the security officials interpreted very broadly and “legally” “customized” for qualification as “anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda” (art. 54-10 pp. 2 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR) or “counter-revolutionary” or “anti-Soviet” crimes (art. 54-11 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR) which covered almost any manifestations of dissent or a healthy civil position.27 Thus, in Khrushchev’s manuals, along with the constructive requirements set out in the decision of the CC CPSU “On the main tasks of the state security agencies of the USSR”, populism and duality of standards are clearly traced. By imposing control over the KGB apparatus and declaring its comprehensive reform, the Party leadership did not abandon the repressive and punitive nature of its activities. Proclaiming “new” political conditions, Soviet state officials tried to reduce only the repressive component in the work of the Soviet special services, without renouncing the further use of special agencies as a long-patented and effective means of combating the “anti-Soviet” and “hostile” element inside the country. This was confirmed in a speech by the new chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Ivan Serov, who was given the floor after Khrushchev. In his speech, Serov said: “At the reception in honor of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia, Nikita Sergeyevich (Khrushchev – Auth.) directly said that in some cases the state security agencies should quarrel with the prosecutor’s office on principled issues, and we (CC CPSU – Auth.) reconcile them. <...> If the state security agencies get in a fight somewhere, it’s nothing. We (the CC CPSU, not the prosecutor’s office – Auth.) will cool them.”28 Analyzing Serov’s speech, it is possible to conclude that the KGB employees clearly understood Khrushchev’s “transparent” hints and the “new” requirements for their work by the apparatus of the CC CPSU.  However, practical guidance on the need for KGB officers to use softer forms and methods to combat the anti-Soviet underground and sectarianism was still expressed at the meeting. Thus, Lieutenant General Fedor Kharitonov, commander of the 4th (secret-political) Department (hereinafter SPD), stated that it is “advisable to apply preventive measures to persons who make anti-Soviet statements due to their political incompetence and not because of hostility to the Soviet system, especially among young people and religious people.”29 27 In particular, the Pentecostals, who did not want to join the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists (AUCECB), were prosecuted under these articles of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR. 28 Никита Петров. “КГБ и ХХ съезд КПСС (1954–1960 гг.)”. Россия и современный мир, Вып. 2. (2016): 141. [Nikita Petrov. “The KGB and the XX congress of the CPSU (1954–1960).” Russia and the modern world, Vol. 2. (2016): 141]. 29 Ibid. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 7Kharitonov’s call for preventive measures (i.e. moral and psychological impact), rather than criminal prosecution of unconscious “anti-counsellors” and ordinary believers, testified to the awareness of the top leadership of the KGB of the need to mitigate the forms and methods of their work in these areas. The main provisions of the CC CPSU resolution on the reform of the KGB and the contents of the manuals issued at the June 1954 meeting are the basis for the by-laws of various Soviet and Party structures and the KGB. For example, the accountability of the KGB apparatus of the CC CPSU was legally prescribed by the order of KGB Chairman Ivan Serov “On tasks of State security services,” issued in June 1954. The final registration of the KGB as a branch of the CC CPSU took place only after March 2, 1959, when the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council approved the resolution of the CC CPSU entitled “Regulations on the State Security Committee and its local bodies.” This document stated that the KGB and its structures on the periphery were “political bodies” that were obliged to report systematically on their work to the Communist Party. It was also said that “on the most important issues of intelligence and investigative work, the head of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR issues orders after the approval of the CPSU Central Committee.”30 Thus, the KGB became legally established as political police in the service of the CC CPSU. Consequently, the reform of the KGB was reduced to direct control by the Communist leadership. According to Alexander Pozharov, the change of subordination of the state security agencies led to the fact that the “Party nomenclature <...> got favorable opportunities for committing various offences” which later led to its moral degeneration and decomposition of the Soviet state.31 Pursuant to the provisions of the CC CPSU “On the main tasks of the state security bodies of the USSR” in the matter of demilitarization of the Soviet special services, in 1953-1954 the extrajudicial organs of the MIA-MGB USSR were dissolved (Special Council of the MIA-MGB USSR, Transport Courts and Military Tribunals) who were authorized to pronounce sentences even in absentia.32 With the abolition of the non-judicial bodies by the CC CPSU, the renewal of the “principle of socialist legality” was declared, according to which no one can be considered guilty of a crime and subject to criminal punishment without a court verdict.33 Also, in accordance with the resolution of the CC CPSU dated January 19, 1955 “On 30 Александр Пожаров “КГБ и партия (1954–1964 гг.)” Отечественная история. Вып. 4. (1999): 171. [Aleksandr Pozharov, “KGB and the Party (1954-1964),” National History, No. 4 (1999): 171]. 31 Ibid, P. 170 32 SSU BSA. F. 13. File 666. P. 499. 33 The principle of “socialist legality” was a certain (although not identical) analogue of the pan-European principle of the presumption of innocence and was legally enshrined in Art. 160 of the Constitution of the USSR of October 7, 1977. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 8measures to further strengthen socialist legality and strengthen prosecutorial supervision”, the bodies of the internal prosecutor’s office operating under the MIA–MGB were dissolved, and the supervision of the Prosecutor General of the USSR over the activities of the apparatus of the Soviet special services was strengthened.34 By decree of the Presidium of the CC CPSU dated May 24, 1955, special departments were created at the Prosecutor’s Office of the USSR and at the prosecutor’s offices of other Union republics, which were entrusted with the responsibility of supervising investigations in the KGB system. 35  Simultaneously the so-called “special” departments of the MIA-MGB were abolished at enterprises, organizations, and institutions. The main function of such disbanded structures, in addition to reconnaissance service of the objects under their jurisdiction, was to monitor the political loyalty of Soviet citizens.36 At the same time, the district departments of the MIA-MGB were also eliminated, which, according to Oleh Bazhan, “eventually led to the preservation of the huge network of informants created in the 1920s-1940s.”37  During 1954-1957 in Ukraine, because of the restructuring of the MIA-MGB apparatus, 18,000 special services were dismissed from work, of which 2.300 were for violation of Soviet law.38 On the order of the CC CPSU, Communist Party employees were seconded to the senior positions of the KGB. For example, the former head of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR, Sergei Savchenko, was replaced by career Communist Party member Vitaliy Nikitchenko, head of the department of administrative and trade-financial bodies of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, candidate of technical sciences, associate professor at the Kharkov Institute of Railway Engineers..39 34 SSU BSA. F. 13. File 666. Pp. 499-500. 35 Ibid., 500. 36 Ibid 37 Олег Бажан “Реформування органів держбезпеки УРСР у 1950 – першій половині 1960-х рр. Радянські органи державної безпеки в Україні (1918–1991 рр.): історія, структура, функції.” Матеріали круглого столу, 19 грудня 2013 р., м. Київ / Упоряд.: О. Бажан, Р. Подкур. Київ: Інститут історії України НАН України (2014): 315. [Oleg Bazhan “Reform of the state security bodies of the Ukrainian SSR in 1950 – the first half of the 1960s. Soviet state security bodies in Ukraine (1918–1991): history, structure, functions.” Materials of the round table, December 19, 2013, Kyiv / Edited by: O. Bazhan, R. Podkur. Kyiv: Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (2014): 315]. 38 Олег Бажан “Реформування органів держбезпеки УРСР у 1950 – першій половині 1960-х рр. Радянські органи державної безпеки в Україні (1918–1991 рр.): історія, структура, функції.” Матеріали круглого столу, 19 грудня 2013 р., м. Київ / Упоряд.: О. Бажан, Р. Подкур. Київ: Інститут історії України НАН України (2014): 317. [Oleg Bazhan “Reform of the state security bodies of the Ukrainian SSR in 1950 – the first half of the 1960s. Soviet state security bodies in Ukraine (1918–1991): history, structure, functions.” Materials of the round table, December 19, 2013, Kyiv / Edited by: O. Bazhan, R. Podkur. Kyiv: Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (2014): 317]. 39 Юрій Лисюк, Володимир Чисніков. “Керівники органів держ. безпеки рад. України (1953—1991 рр.)”. З архівів ВУЧК-ГПУ-НКВС-КГБ. (2001. Вип. № 2): 3. [Yuriy Lysyuk, Volodymyr Chisnikov. “Heads of state bodies. Security Council of Ukraine (1953-1991)”. From the archives of the VUCHK-GPU-NKVS-KGB. (2001. Issue No. 2): 3.]. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 9According to Oleh Bazhan, as of April 1958, out of 26 heads of regional KGB USSR departments, 10 people had previously worked on the leading Communist Party work. Out of 41 deputy heads of KGB USSR departments, 23 were formerly Communist functionaries. A total of 34 persons who came from Communist, Komsomol or Soviet work, were appointed heads of operational departments of KGB USSR.40 In addition to the communists, young security officers were appointed to senior positions in the KGB of the USSR. In 1958, seven heads of regional departments, 15 of their deputies and 75 heads (almost 51%) of the main intelligence departments were young, newly appointed employees of the KGB USSR bodies.41 With such personnel changes, the Party leadership wanted to reduce the level of repression in the activities of the Soviet special services and, at the same time, achieve real control of the Communist Party over the State security service. The staff cuts also affected the employees of anti-religious units of the KGB USSR. Previously, the staff of the 6th (anti-religious) Office of the 4th SPD MGB USSR had 30 people, and its peripheral organs had between 4 to 6 employees of Special services in the Eastern regions of Ukraine and  6 to 8 in the Western regions of Ukraine.42 After personnel rotations, the staff of the 6th Office of the KGB of the USSR became 19 people (Head of Office – 1; Deputy Head of Office – 1; Secretary – 1; Heads of sections – 3; Deputy Heads of sections – 3; Senior operational Commissioner – 7; Operational Commissioner – 3, which meant a reduction by almost 36%. But during the staff reduction, neither the head of the 6th Office (Colonel Victor Sukhonin) nor his deputy (Colonel Vladimir Sekariev) were dismissed, even though these two persons carried out numerous top-secret operations (in fact – mass repression) among all religious communities of the Ukrainian SSR during 1944-1953. The downsizing of anti-religious units had been carried out mainly through the dismissal of ordinary operatives. Exact data on the number of staff reduction units of 6th regional offices of the regional departments of the KGB USSR could not be determined because of the lack of relevant documentation in the archives of the regional departments of the Security Service of Ukraine.43 40 Олег Бажан “Реформування органів держбезпеки УРСР у 1950 – першій половині 1960-х рр. Радянські органи державної безпеки в Україні (1918–1991 рр.): історія, структура, функції.” Матеріали круглого столу, 19 грудня 2013 р., м. Київ / Упоряд.: О. Бажан, Р. Подкур. Київ: Інститут історії України НАН України (2014): 320. [Oleg Bazhan “Reform of the state security bodies of the Ukrainian SSR in 1950 – the first half of the 1960s. Soviet state security bodies in Ukraine (1918–1991): history, structure, functions.” Materials of the round table, December 19, 2013, Kyiv / Edited by: O. Bazhan, R. Podkur. Kyiv: Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (2014): 320]. 41 Ibid. 42 Due to the difficult operational situation in the religious sphere (the presence of many Greek Catholics and Jehovah’s Witnesses) the exception was Lviv, Ternopil, Drohobych and Stanislav oblasts, where the operational staff had from 9 to 15 special employees (SSU BSA. Fond 3. Inv. 1. F. 330. P. 74, 86, 248). 43 SSU BSA. Fond 1. Inv. 1. F. 1102. P. 130. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 10It has been documented that after all personnel rotations (as of 1956), employees of the 6th Office and 6th regional offices of the regional departments of the KGB USSR provided operational support to44 1,496 legally functioning Protestant communities numbering 96,000 people and developed through their agents 1,664 Protestant communities with a total number of 24,000 people, which functioned “illegally” (i.e. without the sanction of the Council for Religious Affairs and the KGB).45  To effectively carry out the work of the KGB Deputy Chairman of the USSR Colonel Nikolai Moroz approved a new division of responsibilities among the employees of the 6th Office of the 4th SPD KGB Ukrainian SSR, distributing them into three sections. Each section was assigned a designated agent based on the section’s line of work. The First Section (5 people) of the 6th Office of the 4th SPD KGB Ukrainian SSR received the task of “operational support” of objects of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and its exarchate, as well as the identification of anti-Soviet elements among the clergy, monks, parishioners of the ROC and groups that broke away from it (True Orthodox Church, Ioannites, Mikhailovtsy, Podgornovtsy, etc.). The head of this section, Captain Vladimir Kalashnikov and his staff were assigned agents who worked in the exarchate of the ROC in Ukraine and were rectors of various cathedrals and monasteries of the ROC in Kiev and the Kiev region (“Omega,” “Ryazantsev,” “Fedulin,” “Korevich,” “Korkin,” “Natasha,” etc.).46    Behind the Second Section (5 persons, the head of this section Major Mikhail Kuptsov), who carried out undercover and intelligence work among the Roman Catholic Church (RCC), the liquidated Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), Jews, and Muslims, also reinforced the respective agents (“Fructovyi,” “Solomon,” “Isakovskiy,” “Skorobogatov,” “Brinin,” etc.).  The Third Section (6 persons), which was headed by Major Kuzma Saltykov, provided operational support to the legally active communities of AUCECB and All-Union Council of Seventh-day Adventist Church (AUCSAC), as well as developed “illegal” communities of Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Adventist-reformists, etc.47 Agents of the top leadership of AUCECB and AUCSAC of Ukraine were assigned to this section. Such persons were “Berezovskiy” (Dmitriy Ponomarchuk, Aleksei Andreiev’s Deputy in the matter of work with Pentecostals), young leaders of the Kiev communities of AUCECB (“Narton,” “Gorskiy,” 44 Operational support is a set of measures (undercover and intelligence) aimed at maintaining operational (undercover) control over the activities of the subordinate KGB bodies of the object with the aim of its further direction in the direction required by the state security bodies. 45 Ibid., 132. 46 Ibid., 241. 47 Ibid, P. 130-131, 239-243. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 11“Kluch,”48 etc.). There were agents working among “illegal” communities, namely, bishops of All-Ukrainian Council of Evangelical Christians /Pentecostals/ (AUCEC): “Goroshko” (Gavriil Ponurko), “Donetskiy” (Moisei Murza), “Dubovskiy,” and others.49 Deputy Head of the 6th Office Vladimir Sekariev had contact with the agents “Flint” and “Muratov” (heads of the Jewish and Muslim communities of Ukraine), and the head of the 6th Office Victor Sukhonin – “Ryazanskiy” (Republican Presbyter AUCECB in Ukraine), “Kosarev” (Artur Mitskevich, First Deputy Andreiev) and “Ptitsin” (Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, Exarch of the ROC of Ukraine John /Ivan Sokolov/).50 On a similar basis, the distribution of staff, duties, and agencies in 6th offices of the regional departments KGB of the Ukrainian SSR was carried out.  The reduction in the number of KGB personnel led to a reduction in the number of its agents. It should be noted that the reform of the secret network was started by Lavrentiy Beria in 1952 (order of MGB USSR No. 0015 of Jan.  01, 1952).51 As a result of the implementation of the order, the agency composition of the MGB USSR during 1952-1953 decreased by 33% (from 203,750 to 137,270 people).52 In the first reduction, the contingent of “informants” was liquidated (only special agents, agents and residents remained in the secret network).53 The next large-scale reduction occurred because of the fulfillment of the requirements of the CC CPSU of March 12,1954, which provided an in-depth analysis of the status of the secret network of the Soviet state security agencies of the day and indicated “the unreasonableness of having too many agents.”54 In fulfillment of the requirements of the Resolution, the leadership of the KGB USSR issued several orders (No. 00405 from June 20, 1954, No. 00420 from June 14, 1955, etc.), which concerned the reduction of the agent network and the improvement of the efficiency of intelligence and undercover activity.55  As a result of the execution of orders, the contingent of the agent network of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR decreased in 1954 to 57,430 (by 58%), and in 1955  to 27,895 people (by another 51%), which amounted to almost 14% of its total in 1952-1953 (203,750 people).56 48 According to the testimony of KGB Colonel Georgiy Sannikov, who recruited “Key,” this agent became “subsequently one of the best agents in this line of work in the entire security system Soviet Union.” (Георгий Санников. Большая охота. Разгром украинской повстанческой армии. (Москва, Олма Пресс, 2002): 85. [Georgy Sannikov. Big hunt. The defeat of the Ukrainian rebel army. (Moscow, Olma Press, 2002): 85].). 49 Ibid, P. 243. 50 Ibid, P. 239, 299. 51 SSU BSA. F. 9 (USSR). File. 240. P. 41. 52 SSU BSA. F. 42. File 17 Arch. No. 312. P. 54. 53 SSU BSA. F. 9 (USSR). File. 240. P. 45b. 54 SSU BSA. F. 13. File 666. P. 506. 55 SSU BSA. F. 9 (USSR). File. 252. P. 176-179. 56 SSU BSA. F. 42. File 17 Arch. No. 312. P. 54. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 12The reduction was due to the exclusion of agents from the secret network who “were not trustworthy and not able in their personal qualities and counterintelligence capabilities to assist the Chekist bodies, and who had previously resorted to lying, falsifying materials, double-dealing, and provocative actions.”57 For such large-scale reduction of the agent apparatus not to affect the quality of intelligence work, the provisions of order No. 00405 introduced a new category of secret agents called “proxies” (trusted persons).58 Proxies were supposed to combine the functions of informants and secret agents, but the KGB maintained operational (undercover) contact with them based on “trust relations” and did not formalize “any written obligations.”59 Therefore, they were not given secret pseudonyms, personal files were not brought to them, and they were not listed in centralized agent records.60 This made it impossible to find out the quantitative composition of proxies in the secret apparatus of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR and the intelligence and undercover work that they performed. According to the definition of the Chekists, a “trusted person” (proxy) was supposed to be an “honest Soviet person” who, “due to certain conditions of his work or personal data, can provide the KGB with more assistance than anyone else in providing us (the KGB – Auth.) with timely information about facts or persons of interest to the Soviet security agencies.”61 The KGB officer had the right to establish a trusting relationship with any Soviet citizen and persuade him based on patriotism to undercover cooperation with the KGB.62 In fact, the desire of KGB officers to make potential agents of conscious Soviet citizens (which is what Khrushchev called them to do at the June meeting of 1954), in our opinion, became the leitmotif of reforming the agent network of the KGB apparatus. In support of this opinion, one can cite an article from the newly appointed head of the 4th SPD of the KGB of the USSR, Lieutenant General Yevgeniy Pitovranov, which was published in the top-secret (at that time) service magazine of the KGB of the USSR (1959 Issue No. 2): “the relationship between an intelligence officer and a proxy <...> should be the relationship of Soviet people who are well acquainted with certain joint responsibilities to ensure state security. The trusted person (proxy) must see in the officer of the state security agencies a respected person to whom he considers it his duty to report data that, in his opinion, 57 SSU BSA. F. 13. File 666. P. 507. 58 Ibid, 509. 59 SSU BSA. F. 13. File 706. P. 53. 60 SSU BSA. F. 13. File 666. P. 509. 61 SSU BSA. F. 13. File 706. P. 53. 62 Ibid, 54. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 13are of interest for ensuring the state security of his homeland.”63 This approach to intelligence and undercover work in the professional language of the Chekists began to be called “expanding and strengthening the ties of state security agencies with the masses of workers.” His idea was to significantly expand the capabilities of the KGB and simultaneously free them from bureaucratic red tape in the design of undercover and intelligence relations. The reform of the KGB’s agent apparatus also led to the reduction of the secret network of anti-religious units of the Soviet special services of Ukraine. At the end of 1949 the intelligence apparatus in the Ukrainian SSR consisted of 6,997 people, of which 2,981 secret agents worked among Protestants, 2,745 among the ROC, another 1,271 among the RCC, the UGCC, Jews, etc.64 For 1953, because of the execution of the order of the MGB of the USSR No. 0015, the agent apparatus of anti-religious units for all lines of work was reduced by 60% (for Protestants by 43% and totaled 1,679 people).65 As stated in the reporting documentation of the Soviet special services: “When reducing the agent network, the specifics of work among the clergy, churchmen, and sectarians were taken into account, due to which the reduction of the agent apparatus was carried out only by excluding decrypted and disabled agents recruited without sufficient study in the first days of the liberation of Ukraine from the Nazi invaders.”66 As of Aug. 25, 1954, the agent contingent of the 4th SPD KGB of the Ukrainian SSR totaled 288 people (as of Jan. 01, 1954, there were 464 people), of which 235 people were agents, one person was a resident, and 52 people were owners of apartments for meetings with agents.67 Most of the remaining 131 people (that is, 55%) agents had higher education. Another 71 people (30%) had medium or unfinished higher education; while 33 people (15%) had primary education.68 It is also important to pay attention to the periods of recruitment of agents: 10 people were recruited from 1925 to 1930; 27 – during 1931-1940; 36 – in 1941-1945; 70-in 1946-1950; 91-from 1951-1954 (see Figure).69 63 Ibid  64 SSU BSA. F. 3. Inv. 1. File 330. P. 50. 65 SSU BSA. F. 1. Inv. 1. File 1102. P. 50, 52. 66 Ibid, P. 50. 67 SSU BSA. F. 2. Inv. 1. File 2448. P. 1. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid, P. 2 OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 14 Figure. Distribution of agent contingent 4th SPD KGB USSR in August 25, 1954  We see that the largest percentage of recruitment by officers of the 4th SPD occurred precisely in the period from 1951 to 1954, which can be associated with the execution of orders No. 0015 and No. 00405. But according to the conclusion of the inspection conducted in August 1954 by the central apparatus of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR, the state of intelligence and operational work of the 4th SPD of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR and its units was assessed as unsatisfactory. The inspectors noted the presence in the intelligence network of the 4th, 5th and 6th Departments of the 4th SPD of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR of disinformers, double-handers, and decrypted agents who “do not have any value, but only interfere with the affairs of the operational staff.”70 The audit revealed that “most of the decrypted agents who were not fired were from the 6th department.”71 These were mostly ordinary believers who were burdened by cooperation with the KGB and who disclosed their connections with the special services to their family members, subjects they developed, or leaders of the religious community in confession (who were often KGB agents and reported on these parishioners to their supervisors).72 The inspectors demanded that the head of the 6th Department, Colonel Viktor Sukhonin, get rid of such “ballast” as soon as possible and concentrate on working with “workable” agents who also did not do their responsibilities with complete integrity.” The commission found out that agents “Berezovskiy” (Dmitriy Ponomarchuk) and “Ryazanskiy” (Aleksei Andreiev) for a long time did not receive from their supervisors (Nikolay Shchelkunov and Viktor Sukhonin, respectively) any serious tasks, and therefore, instead of agent reports, they provided the KGB with “copies of monthly reports of [the] senior-pastor of the regions of the Ukrainian SSR on 70 SSU BSA. F. 9 (Ukr. SSR). File 218. P. 61. 71 SSU BSA. F. 2. Inv. 1. File 2448. P. 8. 72 Ibid, 8,9. 10273670910204060801001925-1930 1931-1940 1941-1945 1946-1950 1951-1954Number of agents recruitedOCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 15the state and sectarian activities of the communities of Evangelical Christians Baptists (ECB) and other official documents.”73 Agent “Kosarev” (Arthur Mitskevich), hiding behind his secret position, began work aimed at attracting young people to the ECB communities.74 Active preacher of the Kyiv community AUCECB agent “Narton” tried to evade the development of persons in whom the KGB was interested.75 Agent “Donetskiy” (Bishop AUCEC Moisei Murza), instead of disorganizing illegal Pentecostal communities and resorting to measures to unite them with the Baptists, began to strengthen them, familiarizing them with the basic principles of conspiracy.76 In the conclusion of the commission, we find an explanation of the identified shortcomings. The commissioners accused the heads of the 4th SPD of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR Seraphim Krikun and the 6th Department of the 4th SPD of the KGB Viktor Sukhonin, that they “daily and in depth do not immerse themselves in working with the agents of each officer, are rarely present at control appearances with agents, rarely read intelligence reports  and, in some cases, did not give any instructions on them, They have little control over the work of undercover agents and do not provide daily help in eliminating shortcomings and fundamental improvement of work with agents.”77  As a result, the commission recognized that the intelligence and operational work of the employees of the 6th Department for a long time was carried out not in the direction of implementing “acute” intelligence and undercover operations to lead and disorganize the religious “underground” of the Ukrainian SSR, but in the direction of “repressing the leading and most active element” among believers.78 As a result of this approach, the religious “underground” instead of the arrested “leaders” chose a new leadership and, under its control, preserved the lives of denominations. To eliminate the shortcomings of the activities of anti-religious units, the leadership of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR 1954 issued order No. 0061, according to which Serafim Krikun and Viktor Sukhonin were tasked with changing the direction of intelligence and undercover work. The new head of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR, Vitaly Nikitchenko, demanded that they develop a set of special “sharp” undercover operations aimed not only at repressing the leaders of the “underground” religious movement, but also at disorganizing the “sectarian and church-monarchical underground” at the same time. To these curators, the leadership of the 73 Ibid, P. 20. 74 Ibid, P. 16. 75 Ibid, P. 11. 76 Ibid, P. 16. 77 SSU BSA. F. 9 (Ukr. SSR). File. 218. P. 62. 78 SSU BSA. F. 2. Inv. 1. File 2448. P. 23. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 16service instructed to restore control over the activities of agents from among the leaders of “legal sects” (the AUCECB and AUCSAC) to prevent double-dealing and eliminate the negligent attitude of agents toward their duties.79 The reduction of the agent network and the change in the direction of intelligence and operational work included a revision and reduction of the operational accounting documentation of the MGB-KGB. According to Oleh Bazhan, carrying out orders of the KGB of the USSR No. 00405 and No. 00511 (“On the procedure for receiving, systematizing, storing, and auditing operational archives in the bodies of the KGB of the USSR and the list of main operational materials and KGB files, indicating the terms of archival storage”), KGB employees of the Ukrainian SSR carried out an extensive “cleaning” of archival and intelligence-operational documentation. As a result, 803,593 cases of agent development for 1,031,768 people were reviewed; 713,445 investigative cases for 1,172,558 people; 1,838,491 filtration cases of repatriates for 1,838,491 people; 8,808 collections of incriminating materials for 550,552 people; 3208 materials so-called. “auxiliary” accounting; 887,761 personal and work files of agents for 887,761 people; 4,263,007 intelligence cases for 5,481,097 people.80 According to the results of the review, 2,684,263 persons were removed from the operational reference records– 52% of the total number of persons registered according to archival and operational documentation. In addition, employees of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR drew up acts for the disposal of 1,171,614 cases on 1,698,653 persons and transferred 828,712 cases on 985,610 persons to the fund of closed cases and cases of secret proceedings. They also transferred 297,550 criminal cases against various categories of persons to the MIA of the Ukrainian SSR. The legal basis for reviewing so many cases was the opening of operative and investigative proceedings by former employees of the MIA of the Ukrainian SSR for minor offenses or unverified operative data, which made their further implementation impossible due to their falsification. In general, according to the reporting documentation of the Soviet special services, their operational archives were reduced by 1,470,164 cases or by 34.3% because of the “cleaning.”81 79 SSU BSA. F. 9 (Ukr. SSR). File. 218. P. 66. 80 Олег Бажан “Реформування органів держбезпеки УРСР у 1950 – першій половині 1960-х рр. Радянські органи державної безпеки в Україні (1918–1991 рр.): історія, структура, функції.” Матеріали круглого столу, 19 грудня 2013 р., м. Київ / Упоряд.: О. Бажан, Р. Подкур. Київ: Інститут історії України НАН України (2014): 316. [Oleg Bazhan “Reform of the state security bodies of the Ukrainian SSR in 1950 – the first half of the 1960s. Soviet state security bodies in Ukraine (1918–1991): history, structure, functions.” Materials of the round table, December 19, 2013, Kyiv / Edited by: O. Bazhan, R. Podkur. Kyiv: Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (2014): 316]. 81 Ibid. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 17Employees of the anti-religious units of the MGB–KGB also carried out a review of operational reference accounting. According to the documentation of the MIA of the Ukrainian SSR in 1952, there were 3,543 persons in operative accounting and operational development of the “church-sectarians,” of which 1,298 persons were involved in 249 agent cases.82 As of January 1953, according to all types of operational accounting related to “church-sectarian” issues, there were already 2,606 people (which is 26% less than in 1952), while 1,075 people were involved in 235 agency cases.83 In the mid-1950s, the 6th Department of the 4th SPD of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR and its regional offices took only 1,657 people for operational registration and undercover development along the “church-sectarian” line, of which 603 people passed in 124 agency cases, and 1,054 persons in form cases (that is, 36% less than in 1953 and 52% less than in 1952).84 Consequently, the reduction of the contingent of operational accounting, because of the review of relevant cases, relieved case load of the KGB bodies of the Ukrainian SSR and their intelligence apparatus by half and created an opportunity to concentrate on improving intelligence-operational and investigative work. An inspection of the state of investigative work and compliance by KGB employees of the Ukrainian SSR with the norms of Soviet legislation, carried out on September 30, 1954, by the central apparatus of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR, showed that “in the intelligence, operational, and investigative work of the KGB of Ukraine, facts of violations of socialist legality and criminal procedure have still not been eliminated.”85 The use of mental and physical means of influence on persons under investigation, falsification of investigation materials, careless attitude towards its conduct (unfocused organization of interrogations, inept use of material evidence, weak evidence base, etc.), violation of certain deadlines and norms of investigation, etc. were named as typical violations.86 An inspection of the organization of investigative work along the “church-sectarian line” for the entire late Stalinist period revealed that MGB-KGB employees systematically made “mistakes in the preparation of materials about the arrest of participants in the anti-Soviet sectarian underground.”87 The Chekists were reproached for not distinguishing between “ordinary religious worship and hostile activities,” and therefore unlawfully raised “the question of arresting ordinary members of sects without establishing their specific anti-Soviet work.”88 82 SSU BSA. F. 1. Inv. 1. File 1102. P. 43. 83 Ibid, 52. 84 SSU BSA. F. 1. Inv. 1. File 1102. P. 266. 85 SSU BSA. F. 9 (Ukr. SSR). File 218. P. 86. 86 Ibid, 88, 90. 87 Ibid, 88. 88 Ibid. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 18Therefore, the commission concluded that the arrest and subsequent conviction of many believers who did not commit anti-Soviet activities (for example, Pentecostals or so-called “pure Baptists”), but only satisfied their own religious needs without the sanction of the Council for Religious Affairs, was recognized as illegal. Such actions were not qualified by criminal law as a crime that threatened the security of the Soviet state. They fell under the category of administrative offenses, the punishment for which could be a fine, rather than imprisonment for a term of 10 to 25 years. Due to the low quality of the investigative work, only in August 1954, district and regional courts of the Ukrainian SSR returned the cases of 216 people to the KGB for investigation, including 22 people from the UKDB of the Zakarpattia region, 17 from the Volyn region, 16 from the Stanislav region, 15 from the Lviv region, 13 from Ternopil, 12 from Drohobych, 11 from Crimea, 11 from Stalin, 8 from Zhytomyr, 8 from Kyiv, 7 from Chernivtsi, and 5 from Dnipropetrovsk.89 Based on the results of the inspection, the management of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR adopted a resolution in which the main reason for the unsatisfactory quality of investigative work was recognized as the negligent attitude of the employees of the investigative departments of the MGB-KGB of the Ukrainian SSR to their duties and their professional incompetence. It is significant that in 1954 there was not a single investigator with a higher or incomplete higher education in the UKDB of Drohobych, Zhytomyr, Crimea, Mykolaiv, Khmelnytskyi, Stalin (Donetsk), and Chernivtsi regions. In 1954, 19.2% of employees with incomplete secondary and primary education worked in the investigative bodies of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR, 20.6% with higher and incomplete higher education, of which only 12% had a higher legal education).90 To improve the educational level of KGB investigators, the CC CPSU and the KGB of the USSR issued several resolutions obliging the KGB bodies to hire only those employees who have a higher legal education for investigative work. As a result of the implementation of these resolutions, as of January 1, 1959, 95% of the employees of the investigative departments of the KGB of the USSR had a higher or unfinished higher legal education.91 89 Ibid, 89. 90 Олег Бажан “Реформування органів держбезпеки УРСР у 1950 – першій половині 1960-х рр. Радянські органи державної безпеки в Україні (1918–1991 рр.): історія, структура, функції.” Матеріали круглого столу, 19 грудня 2013 р., м. Київ / Упоряд.: О. Бажан, Р. Подкур. Київ: Інститут історії України НАН України (2014): 320. [Oleg Bazhan “Reform of the state security bodies of the Ukrainian SSR in 1950 – the first half of the 1960s. Soviet state security bodies in Ukraine (1918–1991): history, structure, functions.” Materials of the round table, December 19, 2013, Kyiv / Edited by: O. Bazhan, R. Podkur. Kyiv: Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (2014): 320]. 91 SSU BSA. F. 13. File 666. P. 505. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 19To improve investigative work along the “church-sectarian” line, the KGB of the USSR from 1954 to 1959 held a series of meetings of employees of anti-religious units and investigative departments and issued several different resolutions. Based on these resolutions, the KGB of the USSR eventually issued order No. 25cc “Review of the practice of investigations of criminal cases against churchmen and sectarians” on March 26, 1960.92 This document outlines the methodology for conducting investigations into criminal cases against members of the “anti-Soviet church-sectarian underground.” It was based on the “combination of investigative actions with undercover measures” in the fight against the “church-sectarian underground.”93 Employees of the anti-religious units were assigned the task of collecting indisputable evidence of “criminal” activity of the controlled entity while conducting undercover activities. When performing such work, it was recommended to use not only agent-operational (undercover) combinations along the “church-sectarian” line, but also such special measures94 as listening, external observation, perlustration of correspondence, etc.95 The employees of the investigative departments, in their turn, had to skillfully legalize the operational materials obtained with the help of special measures and the undercover way, to later attach them as physical evidence to the criminal case. On their basis, the investigators had to adequately organize the investigation and, in this way, prove the guilt of the suspects. At the same time, it was strictly forbidden to use means of mental and physical influence on the subjects under investigation. After conducting the investigation, the KGB officers were supposed to take the criminal cases against the organizers of the “anti-Soviet sectarian groups” and their closest assistants to court. As for "Ordinary believers, in the absence of serious offenses, were recommended not to be held criminally liable, but to be limited to preventive measures."96 With the assistance of the CC CPSU during 1954-1959, employees of the KGB of the USSR developed a set of special preventive measures that should be used simultaneously with 92 SSU BSA. F. 9 (USSR). File 281. P. 76-84. 93 Ibid, P. 78 94 Special measures (later – operational and technical measures) – pre-planned and carried out actions by state security agencies, related to the covert use of operational equipment against criminals and persons suspected of conducting subversive or "anti-Soviet" activities (Контрразведывательный словарь / под ред. Л. Калюжной, Ю. Смирнова (Москва: ВКШ КГБ, 1971): 154, 161. [Counterintelligence Dictionary / ed. L. Kalyuzhny, Yu. Smirnova (Moscow: Higher School of the KGB, 1971): 154, 161]). 95 Ibid. 96 Prevention is a set of measures of educational influence applied by the KGB bodies independently or together with other state bodies or public organizations in relation to specific individuals in order to prevent them from committing state crimes and politically harmful acts (Контрразведывательный словарь / под ред. Л. Калюжной, Ю. Смирнова (Москва: ВКШ КГБ, 1971): 238 [Counterintelligence Dictionary / ed. L. Kalyuzhny, Yu. Smirnova (Moscow: Higher School of the KGB, 1971): 238]).  See SSU BSA. F. 9 (USSR). File 274. P. 78, 79, 81. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 20intelligence, undercover, and investigative work in the fight against the “anti-Soviet church-sectarian underground.” An exhaustive list of such measures is set out in the order of the KGB of the USSR No. 37cc “Review of preventive measures carried out in 1958 by some KGB bodies against churchmen and sectarians” dated April 17, 1959. All preventive measures are divided into two types: public and secret. Secret forms of prevention were to be implemented by KGB officers through agents and proxies of “educational” influence on believers to convince them of the need to break with religion and further publicly recognize their own “criminal” actions as unacceptable. Public forms of prevention consisted of a 1. “secret” invitation of a believer by employees of anti-religious units for a preventive conversation in the KGB department; 2. an official summons to the KGB; 3. preventive measures with the participation of the leadership of Communist Party, Komsomol, and trade union bodies at the place of work or training; 4. prevention through public bailouts; 5. preventive hearings in comrade’s courts; 6. prevention through the media (press, radio, cinema, etc.); 7. the belief of the believer in the advisability of making a public repentance and making a statement in the media about a break with religion, etc.97  The application of preventive measures against believers in operations combining undercover and investigative work along the “church-sectarian line” was supposed to become, according to the Chekist’s plan, a “humane” yet at the same time effective means of combating the “anti-Soviet underground” in the religious sphere. It is worth noting that the persons against whom KGB officials carried out so-called preventive measures believed that “extrajudicial repression” and measures of indirect psychological pressure were used against them (the use of which was strictly prohibited by the KGB leadership). The validity of such assessments, the so-called preventive measures of the KGB, is confirmed in modern historical research. For example, Alex Cherkasov, a member of the board of the human rights society “Memorial,” found out based on content analysis that “in preventive conversations of the late Soviet period, the ratio of sentences containing the words "prison," and "camp" to the rest was approximately 1:100.”98 Having reduced the state security apparatus and the agency network, as well as laying the foundations for the reform of the Soviet special services, the members of the Presidium of the CC CPSU announced the rehabilitation of victims of the criminal activities by penal 97 Ibid, P. 127-142. 98 Александр Черкасов.“День Газонокосильщика, или Канун Всех святых”. https://polit.ru/articles/mir/den-gazonokosilshchika-ili-kanun-vsekh-svyatykh-2003-10-30/ [Aleksandr Cherkasov “Lawnmower Day, or All Hallows Eve.” https://polit.ru/articles/mir/den-gazonokosilshchika-ili-kanun-vsekh-svyatykh-2003-10-30/] OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 21authorities. But it should be noted that Khrushchev, the first secretary of the CC CPSU, was not guided by motives of humanism or justice. According to researchers Andrei Artyzov and Yuriy Sygachiev, “Khrushchev well mastered Stalin’s methods of using compromising materials to weaken rivals in the struggle for power,” and therefore supported the rehabilitation process launched by Beria. Khrushchev aimed to compromise his main opponent  Malenkov,99 involved in the falsification of the so-called “Leningrad case,” in which 246 Comparty members of the Leningrad Central Committee were innocently convicted, of which 26 were executed. After the rehabilitation of the Comparty elite and other powerful persons, the rehabilitation process was extended to the rest of the Soviet citizens. On May 4, 1954, the CC CPSU issued a resolution “On the review of cases of persons convicted of counter-revolutionary crimes who are held in camps, colonies, and prisons of the MIA of the USSR and are in exile in a settlement.” To implement the provisions of this document, under the control of the CC CPSU, Central and local commissions for the review of criminal cases of convicts were formed. These structures included representatives from the prosecutor’s office, the Ministry of Justice, the MIA, and the KGB.100 Twenty-two such regional commissions were created in the Ukrainian SSR. In the course of their work from June 1954 to February 1956, 81,921 criminal cases were reviewed against 130,464 persons convicted of counter-revolutionary and “anti-Soviet’ crimes, because of which 4,000 believers were released from concentration camps.101 Among those released were the bishops of the AUCEC, previously arrested as part of the centralized agent case “Prophets” (Panas Bidash, Pylyp Shokalo, Porfiry Ilchuk, etc.), individual leaders of the so-called “pure” Baptists (for example, Aleksei Prokofiev), as well as many persons from the presbyterial and preaching activity of the ECB and Pentecostals, arrested because of large-scale agent-operational operations of the NKGB-MGB in 1944-1953. At the same time, the analyzed resolution did not become a basis for reviewing the cases of persons who closely cooperated with the Nazi occupation regime or whose “anti-Soviet” activity, according to the conviction of the commission members, was thoroughly proven. For 99 Реабилитация: как это было. Документы Президиума ЦК КПСС и другие материалы. В 3-х томах. Том 1. Март 1953 – февраль 1956. / сост. А. Артизов и др. (Москва: МФД, 2003): 9. [Rehabilitation: how it happened. Documents of the Presidium of the CC CPSU and other materials. In 3 volumes. Volume 1. March 1953 – February 1956 / comp. A. Artyzov et al. (Moscow: MFD, 2003): 9]. 100 SSU BSA. F. 13. File 666. P. 499-500. 101 Олег Бажан. “Реабілітація жертв сталінських репресій в Українській РСР у другій половині 1950 – на початку 1960-х років: соціально-правовий аспект”. Емінак. (Вип. 1-2, 2015): 30. [Oleg Bazhan. “Rehabilitation of victims of Stalinist repressions in the Ukrainian SSR in the second half of the 1950s – early 1960s: socio-legal aspect.” Eminak. (Issues 1-2, 2015): 30]. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 22similar reasons, rehabilitation was denied to the chief bishop of the AUCEC Gavriil Ponurko, the head of the All-Ukrainian Council of Baptist Daniil Shapovalov, his deputy Peter Podzorov, the organizers of the movement of “pure” Baptists Mikhail Zyubanov, Yakov Litvinenko, Aleksei Zernov, Aleksei Garazha, et al. Persons who actively supported the Nazi occupation regime in exchange for freedom of religion, but were released from the Gulag after serving their full sentence, were not subject to rehabilitation. To prevent the further use of illegal actions by officials of the Soviet authorities against believers, the CC CPSU issued a resolution on October 11, 1954 “On errors in the conduct of scientific and atheistic propaganda among the population.” It draws the attention of the employees of all Soviet institutions to the fact that the main mistake in the implementation of the anti-religious policy of the communists was the organization of the struggle not against the actual religious worldview, but against believers. Therefore, the CC CPSU faced the responsible workers of the regional committees of the CPSU, the Central Committee of the Union Republics, as well as all the Comparty institutions of the USSR, and a controversial task was set to correct the consequences of this mistake and start the fight against “religious superstitions” without affecting the feelings of believers.  Conclusions  The reform of the Soviet special services carried out by the apparatus of the CC CPSU, according to the secret resolution of the CC CPSU dated March 12, 1954, pursued two main goals. One goal was the reform of the state security bodies was aimed at their complete subordination to the apparatus of the CC CPSU, which ultimately led to the lowering of their state status (from the rank of an independent ministry /MGB to a commission /committee under the Soviet People's Committee of the USSR). The other goal was to weaken the repressive component in their work and limit the functions of internal political control. However, the reform did not make it impossible for the Soviet special services to perform repressive and control functions. The reform was only about giving them more civilized forms of control  and repression that would correspond to the new political conditions. In the work along religious lines, the changes affected not only the reduction of the agent contingent, but the agent network itself, which was created in the environment of the AUCECB from its presbytery-management staff during the late Stalinism and was never liquidated. It was cleaned of unnecessary “ballast,” replenished with young and promising agents (“Narton,” “Klyuch,” “Abramov,” “Gorsky”) and secured by various internal orders for employees of anti-religious units. The implementation of these measures was aimed at OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 23strengthening the undercover control of the KGB over the activities of the communities of the AUCECB during the Khrushchev “thaw.” About such unregistered denominations as the Pentecostals, the tasks of the KGB remained unchanged since the late Stalinism, which were the final liquidation of this “anti-Soviet underground” and the unification of the communities of the AUCEC with the AUCECB. While leaving the object of work along this line unchanged, the CC CPSU only demanded from the KGB to soften the forms and methods of its implementation. In practice, this meant the use of point repressions in combination with undercover and preventive work. Such tasks, set by the CC CPSU before the KGB in the work among Protestants, contradicted the official course of the religious policy of the USSR, formulated in the resolution of the CC CPSU “On errors in conducting scientific and atheistic propaganda among the population,” issued on October 11, 1954. This contradiction, in our opinion, is a vivid example of the communist regime’s double standards in treating “sectarians” that existed throughout the period of de-Stalinization. In summary, it can be stated that because of the introduced reforms, the Soviet special services were not completely deprived of their punitive functions, which gave the functionaries of the CC CPSU the opportunity to use them during the period of de-Stalinization to strengthen their power and fight against the “internal enemies” of the communist regime.  Published Sources Бажан, Олег. “Реформування органів держбезпеки УРСР у 1950 – першій половині 1960-х рр. Радянські органи державної безпеки в Україні (1918–1991 рр.): історія, структура, функції.” Матеріали круглого столу, 19 грудня 2013 р., м. Київ / Упоряд.: О. Бажан, Р. Подкур. Київ: Інститут історії України НАН України (2014): 312-33. [Bazhan, Oleh. “Reform of the state security bodies of the Ukrainian SSR in 1950 – the first half of the 1960s. Soviet state security bodies in Ukraine (1918–1991): history, structure, functions.” Materials of the round table, December 19, 2013, Kyiv / Edited by: O. Bazhan, R. Podkur. Kyiv: Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (2014): 312-33]. Бажан, Олег. “Реабілітація жертв сталінських репресій в Українській РСР у другій половині 1950 – на початку 1960-х років: соціально-правовий аспект”. Емінак. (Вип. 1-2, 2015): 30. [Bazhan, Oleh. “Rehabilitation of victims of Stalinist repressions in the Ukrainian SSR in the second half of the 1950s – early 1960s: socio-legal aspect.” Eminak. (Issues 1-2, 2015): 30]. Веденеев, Дмитрий. Атеисты в мундирах: Советские спецслужбы и религиозная сфера Украины. (Москва: Алгоритм, 2016): 496. [Viedienieiev, Dmytro. Atheists in uniform: Soviet intelligence services and the religious sphere of Ukraine. (Moscow: Algorithm, 2016): 496]. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 24Контрразведывательный словарь / под ред. Л. Калюжной, Ю. Смирнова (Москва: ВКШ КГБ, 1971): 238 [Counterintelligence Dictionary / ed. Kalyuzhny L, Smirnova Yu. (Moscow: Higher School of the KGB, 1971): 238] Лаврентий Берия. 1953. Стенограмма июльского пленума ЦК КПСС и другие документы / Под ред. акад. А. Яковлева; сост. В. Наумов, Ю. Сигачев. (Россия. XX век. Документы). (Москва: МФД, 2003): 371. [Lavrentiy Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents / Ed. acad. A. Yakovleva; comp. V. Naumov, Yu. Sigachev. (Russia. XX century. Documents). (Moscow: MFD, 2003): 371.]. Лисюк, Юрій, Чисніков, Володимир. “Керівники органів держ. безпеки рад. України (1953—1991 рр.)”. З архівів ВУЧК-ГПУ-НКВС-КГБ. (2001. Вип. № 2): 3. [Lysyuk, Yuriy, Chisnikov, Volodymyr. “Heads of state bodies. Security Council of Ukraine (1953-1991)”. From the archives of the VUCHK-GPU-NKVS-KGB. (2001. Issue No. 2): 3.]. Никита Сергеевич Хрущев. Два цвета времени. Документы из личного фонда Н.С. Хрущева. В 2 томах / гл. ред. Н. Томилина (Т. 1. 2009): 507-23. [Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. Two colors of time. Documents from the personal fund of N.S. Khrushchev. In 2 volumes / chapter. ed. N. Tomilina (Vol. 1. 2009): 507-23.]. Черкасов, Александр.“День Газонокосильщика, или Канун Всех святых”. https://polit.ru/articles/mir/den-gazonokosilshchika-ili-kanun-vsekh-svyatykh-2003-10-30/ [Cherkasov, Aleksandr. “Lawnmower Day, or All Hallows Eve.” https://polit.ru/articles/mir/den-gazonokosilshchika-ili-kanun-vsekh-svyatykh-2003-10-30/] Реабилитация: как это было. Документы Президиума ЦК КПСС и другие материалы. В 3-х томах. Том 1. Март 1953 – февраль 1956. / сост. А. Артизов и др. (Москва: МФД, 2003): 116–117. [Rehabilitation: how it happened. Documents of the Presidium of the CC CPSU and other materials. In 3 volumes. Volume 1. March 1953 – February 1956 / comp. A. Artyzov et al. (Moscow: MFD, 2003): 116–17]. Петров, Никита. “КГБ и ХХ съезд КПСС (1954–1960 гг.)”. Россия и современный мир, Вып. 2. (2016): 136-154. [Nikita Petrov. “The KGB and the XX congress of the CPSU (1954–1960).” Russia and the modern world, Vol. 2. (2016): 136–154]. Петров, Никита. Первый председатель КГБ Иван Серов. (Москва: Материк, 2005): 156–58.  [Petrov, Nikita. The first chairman of the KGB, Ivan Serov. (Moscow: Materik, 2005): 156–58]. Пожаров, Александр. “КГБ и партия (1954–1964 гг.)” Отечественная история. Вып. 4. (1999): 169-174. [ Pozharov, Aleksandr. “KGB and the Party (1954-1964),” National History, No. 4 (1999): 169–74]. Санников, Георгий. Большая охота. Разгром украинской повстанческой армии. (Москва, Олма Пресс, 2002): 85. [Sannikov, Georgy. Big hunt. The defeat of the Ukrainian rebel army. (Moscow, Olma Press, 2002): 85].). Черкасов, Александр.“День Газонокосильщика, или Канун Всех святых”. https://polit.ru/articles/mir/den-gazonokosilshchika-ili-kanun-vsekh-svyatykh-2003-10-30/ [Cherkasov, Aleksandr. “Lawnmower Day, or All Hallows Eve.” https://polit.ru/articles/mir/den-gazonokosilshchika-ili-kanun-vsekh-svyatykh-2003-10-30/] OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 25Appendix   PHOTOS OF OFFICERS OF THE ANTI-RELIGIOUS UNIT (6th OFFICE OF THE 4th DEPARTMENT) OF THE KGB UNDER THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR IN 1954–1956 AND THE AGENTS THEY SUPERVISED  PUBLISHED FOR THE FIRST TIME                  KRIKUN  Serafim Ivanovich SSU BSA. Fond 12. F. 20392 Head of the 4th (Secret-political) Department of the KGB  under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR  (1954 – December 1956) OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 26               Viktor SUKHONIN supervised secret agents:         SUKHONIN  Viktor Pavlovich SSU BSA. Fond 12. F. 15957 Head of the 6th Office (from July 10, 1956 – 5th   Office) of the 4th Department of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR  (May 1, 1954 – 1959) “RYAZANSKIY” Aleksei  ANDREIEV, Republican Presbyter AUCECB in Ukraine Fellowship Bulletin, 1966.  Iss. 4. P. 71   “PTITSIN” Metropolitan of Kiev and Galician, Exarch of the ROC of Ukraine IOANN secular name:  Ivan SOKOLOV SSU BSA. Fond 1. F. 1103. P. 24 “KOSAREV”  Artur  MITSKEVICH,  Andreiev’s First Deputy Fellowship Bulletin, 1972.  Iss. 2. P. 68   OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 27PUBLISHED FOR THE FIRST TIME                The deputy head of the 6th department, Vladimir SEKARIEV, was in contact with agents “FLINT” and “MURATOV” (possibly the heads of the Jewish and Muslim communities of Ukraine, respectively).   SEKARIEV  Vladimir Karpovich SSU BSA. Fond 12. F. 18882 Deputy Head of the 6th Office (from 1956 – 5th Office) of the 4th Department of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR (1954 – 1957) OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 28PUBLISHED FOR THE FIRST TIME                  The head of this section, Vladimir KALASHNIKOV and his staff were assigned agents who worked in the exarchate of the ROC in Ukraine and were rectors of various cathedrals and monasteries of the ROC in Kiev and the Kiev region: “OMEGA,” “RYAZANTSEV,” “FEDULIN,” “KOREVICH,” “KORKIN,”  “NATASHA,” etc.  KALASHNIKOV  Vladimir Pavlovich SSU BSA. Fond 12. F. 19813 Head of the First Section (undercover work among the clergy, monks, parishioners of the ROC and currents that broke away from it: True Orthodox Church, Ioannites, Mikhailovtsy, Podgornovtsy, etc.) of the 6th Office of the 4th SPD MGB-KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR (1953 – 1956) OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 29PUBLISHED FOR THE FIRST TIME                  Carried out undercover and intelligence work among the Roman Catholic Church (RCC), the liquidated Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), Jews, and Muslims, also reinforced the respective agents: “FRUCTOVYI,” “SOLOMON,” “ISAKOVSKIY,” “SKOROBOGATOV,” “BRININ,” etc.  KUPTSOV Mikhail Yakovlevich SSU BSA. Fond 12. F. 19813 Head of the Second Section (undercover and intelligence work among the Roman Catholic Church, the liquidated Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Jews and Muslims) of the 6th Office of the 4th SPD MGB-KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR  (1953 – 1955) OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 30PUBLISHED FOR THE FIRST TIME                 Kuzma SALTYKOV, supervised secret agents:  1. “Berezovskiy” (Dmitriy PONOMARCHUK, Aleksei Andreiev’s Deputy in the matter of work with Pentecostals) 2. Young leaders of the Kiev communities of AUCECB (“NARTON,” “GORSKIY,” “KLUCH”).  3. There were agents working among “illegal” communities, namely, bishops of All-Ukrainian Council of Evangelical Christians /Pentecostals/ (AUCEC): “GOROSHKO” (Gavriil PONURKO), “DONETSKIY” (Moisei MURZA), “DUBOVSKIY” (Porfiry ILCHUK), and others.   SALTYKOV  Kuzma Emelyanovich SSU BSA. Fond 12. F. 17546 Head of the Third Section (served the legally active communities of AUCECB and All-Union Council of Seventh-day Adventist Church (AUCSAC), as well as developed “illegal” communities of Pentecostals, Jehovah Witnesses, Adventist-reformists, etc.) of the 6th Office of the 4th SPD KGB under the Council of Ministers of the  Ukrainian SSR (1955 – 1956) OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 31PUBLISHED FOR THE FIRST TIME               “BEREZOVSKIY” Dmitriy PONOMARCHUK, Aleksei Andreiev’s Deputy in the matter of work with Pentecostals Archives of temporary storage of the SSU Office in the Dnipropetrovsk region F. 6(P). File П-22537 (1935) “GOROSHKO”  Gavriil  PONURKO Chief Bishop of AUCEC Archives of temporary storage of the SSU Office in the Dnipropetrovsk region F. 6(P). File П-21827 “DONETSKIY”  Moisei  MURZA  Bishop of AUCEC SSU BSA F. 6. File 44825 ФП  “DUBOVSKIY”  Porfiry ILCHUK  Bishop of AUCEC CSA POU  F. 263. Inv. 1. File 58286 Vol. 2 OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 32PUBLISHED FOR THE FIRST TIME               Archives of temporary storage of the SBU Office in the Dnipropetrovsk region  F. 6(P). File П-24610 (with material evidence No3)     Mikhail BUT (All-Union evangelist AUCEC), agent “LYSOV” (center); Gavril PONURKO (Chief Bishop of AUCEC), agent “GOROSHKO” (third from right) participants of operation “FANATICS”  (preventive work with Bishop AUCEC Panas BIDASH),  Pyatikhatki, Dnipropetrovsk region, 1956 Archives of temporary storage of the SSU Office in the Dnipropetrovsk region  F. 6(P). File П-24610. Folder-3 with material evidence    OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 33PUBLISHED FOR THE FIRST TIME                    Vladimir CHASHNIKOV was directly involved in secret intelligence work in the Protestant environment of Soviet Ukraine, namely: he carried out undercover operations, intelligence work, recruitment and arrests of prominent Protestant leaders of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic.    CHASHNIKOV  Vladimir Alexievich SSU BSA. Fond 12. F. 21055 Operational Commissioner of Third Section (served the legally active communities of AUCECB and All-Union Council of Seventh-day Adventist Church (AUCSAC), as well as developed “illegal” communities of Pentecostals, Jehovah, Adventist-reformists, etc) of the 6th Office of the 4th SPD KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR (1955 – 1956) OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (AUGUST 2024) XLIV, 6 34

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