Update Article: 189

Original Title

Sanitized Title

Clean Title

Source ID

Article Id01

Article Id02

Corpus ID

Dup

Dup ID

Url

Publication Url

Download Url

Original Abstract

Clean Abstract

Tags

Original Full Text

www.ssoar.infoReligious Freedom and Populism: TheAppropriation of a Human Right and How toCounter ItHirschberger, Bernd (Ed.); Voges, Katja (Ed.)Veröffentlichungsversion / Published VersionSammelwerk / collectionZur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:transcript VerlagEmpfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:Hirschberger, B., & Voges, K. (Eds.). (2024). Religious Freedom and Populism: The Appropriation of a Human Rightand How to Counter It (Political Science, 158). Bielefeld: transcript Verlag. https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839468272Nutzungsbedingungen:Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zurVerfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen findenSie hier:https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.deTerms of use:This document is made available under a CC BY Licence(Attribution). For more Information see:https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-93107-3Bernd Hirschberger, Katja Voges (eds.)Religious Freedom and PopulismPolitical Science Volume 158Vollsponsoren: Technische Universität Braunschweig | Carl von Ossietzky-Uni-versität Oldenburg | Eberhard-Karls Uni-versität Tübingen | Freie Universität Berlin – Universitätsbibliothek | Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göt-tingen | Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main | Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Biblio-thek – Niedersächsische Landesbiblio-thek | TIB – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek | Humboldt-Uni-versität zu Berlin | Justus-Liebig-Uni-versität Gießen | Universitätsbibliothek Eichstätt-Ingolstadt | Ludwig-Maximi-lians-Universität München | Max Planck Digital Library (MPDL) | Rheinische Fried-rich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn | Ruhr-Universität Bochum | Staats- und Uni-versitätsbibliothek Carl von Ossietzky, Hamburg | SLUB Dresden | Staatsbiblio-thek zu Berlin | Bibliothek der Technischen Universität Chemnitz | Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Darmstadt | Universi-tätsbibliothek „Georgius Agricola“ der TU Bergakademie Freiberg | Universitätsbib-liothek Kiel (CAU) | Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig | Universitäts- und Landesbiblio-thek Düsseldorf | Universitäts- und Lan-desbibliothek Münster | Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek Köln | Universitätsbiblio-thek Bielefeld | Universitätsbibliothek Er-furt | Universitätsbibliothek der FernUni-versität in Hagen | Universitätsbibliothek Kaiserslautern-Landau | Universitätsbi-bliothek Kassel | Universitätsbibliothek Osnabrück | Universität Potsdam | Uni-versitätsbibliothek St. Gallen | Universi-tätsbibliothek Vechta | Zentralbibliothek ZürichSponsoring Light: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung | Bibliothek der Hochschule für Technik und Wirtschaft Dresden | Bib-liothek der Hochschule für Technik, Wirt-schaft und Kultur Leipzig | Bibliothek der Westsächsischen Hochschule Zwickau | Bi-bliothek der Hochschule Zittau/Görlitz, Hochschulbibliothek | Hochschulbiblio-thek der Hochschule Mittweida | Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (IfA) | Landesbi-bliothek Oldenburg | Österreichische Par-lamentsbibliothekMikrosponsoring: Bibliothek der Berufs-akademie Sachsen | Bibliothek der Evange-lische Hochschule Dresden | Bibliothek der Hochschule für Musik und Theater „Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy“ Leipzig | Biblio-thek der Hochschule für Bildende Küns-te Dresden | Bibliothek der Hochschule für Musik „Carl Maria von Weber“ Dres-den | Bibliothek der Hochschule für Grafik und Buchkunst Leipzig | Bibliothek der Palucca-Hochschule für Tanz Dresden | Leibniz-Institut für Europäische Geschich-te | Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) – Deutsches Institut für Internatio-nale Politik und SicherheitDie freie Verfügbarkeit der E-Book-Ausgabe dieser Publikation wurde ermöglicht durch Pollux – Informationsdienst Politikwissenschaf t und die Open Library Community Politik 2024 – einem Netzwerk wissenschaftlicher Bib-liotheken zur Förderung von Open Access in den Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften:Bernd Hirschberger, Katja Voges (eds.)Religious Freedom and PopulismThe Appropriation of a Human Rightand How to Counter ItThe opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not nec-essarily reflect the opinions, views or positions of the editors or the editing organ-isations.Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche NationalbibliothekTheDeutscheNationalbibliothek lists this publication in theDeutscheNationalbib-liografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at https://dnb.dnb.de/This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (BY) license, whichmeans that the text may be remixed, transformed and built upon and be copied andredistributed in any medium or format even commercially, provided credit is given to theauthor.https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Creative Commons license terms for re-use do not apply to any content (such as graphs,figures, photos, excerpts, etc.) not original to the Open Access publication and furtherpermission may be required from the rights holder. The obligation to research and clearpermission lies solely with the party re-using the material.First published in 2024 by transcript Verlag, Bielefeld© Bernd Hirschberger, Katja Voges (eds.)Cover layout: Maria Arndt, BielefeldCover illustration: Universal logo for human rights, www.humanrightslogo.net,open sourcePrinted by: Majuskel Medienproduktion GmbH,Wetzlarhttps://doi.org/10.14361/9783839468272Print-ISBN: 978-3-8376-6827-8PDF-ISBN: 978-3-8394-6827-2EPUB-ISBN: 978-3-7328-6827-8ISSN of series: 2702-9050eISSN of series: 2702-9069Printed on permanent acid-free text paper.ContentsIntroduction: Conservative, Right-Wing Populist or Far-Right Extremist?Conceptual ClarificationsBernd Hirschberger and Katja Voges ................................................. 13Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriationof Religious Freedom WorldwideReinterpretations of Religious Freedomby the Far Right in the German-Speaking WorldThe Case of the AfDBernd Hirschberger and Katja Voges ................................................ 29Escalating the Populist ApproachThe Case of Russia and the Significance of HistoryRegina Elsner ....................................................................... 41Hungary under Viktor Orbán“Illiberal Christian Democracy” and the Instrumentalisation of Religious FreedomRita Perintfalvi and Katja Voges .................................................... 53Religious Freedom for Christian MajoritiesThe Brazilian CaseLeandro L. B. Fontana .............................................................. 67Abuse of Religious Freedom?Ethical Preliminary Remarks on “Religion-Based” Resistance against COVID-19Protective MeasuresAndreas Lob-Hüdepohl ............................................................. 79The Political Instrumentalization of the Topicsof Secularism, Religious Freedom and Islamophobia in TurkeyBernd Hirschberger and Friedrich Püttmann ......................................... 91Populism, Religious Identity, and the Instrumentalization of “ReligiousFreedom” in the United States during the Era of Donald TrumpT. Jeremy Gunn ....................................................................105Societal Dynamics and ProblematicReactions towards Populist AppropriationA Recipe for Political Polarization?Tackling Distorted Views on Freedom of Religion or BeliefHeiner Bielefeldt ................................................................... 121Religious Freedom in the Field of Tensionbetween Populist Anti-Muslim Sentimentsand Islamist Radicalisation TendenciesSociological Observations Using the Case of GermanyYoussef Dennaoui .................................................................. 131Secularism in France and the Challenge of PopulismValentine Zuber ................................................................... 143Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief in DenmarkA Populist Move?Eva Maria Lassen and Marie Juul Petersen ......................................... 153Commitment to Religious Freedom at the Level of the European UnionA Victim of Polarisation?Bernd Hirschberger and Katja Voges ................................................165Signs of Hope and Proposals for SolutionsInternational Religious Freedom (or Belief) AllianceFrom Populist to not yet PopularJos Douma........................................................................ 183Populism in the Land of EqualityCross-Party Consensus in the Face of ExtremismJorunn Økland .....................................................................199Populist Appropriation and Reinterpretation of Religious FreedomThe Special Responsibility and Concern of the Churchesand Religious CommunitiesKatja Dorothea Buck, Bernd Hirschberger and Katja Voges ......................... 209Beliefs, Brains and Breaking ChainsHow Education on “Living Together” can PromoteFreedom of Religion or Belief in Lebanon amid rising Populist NarrativesAnna Maria Daou ...................................................................221Social Media as a Tool against Populist Appropriation of FoRB and forPromoting FoRB?Challenges, Ideas and StrategiesJulia Bauer, Juliane Chakrabarti and Bernd Hirschberger .......................... 233Conclusion: The Case of Religious Freedom and PopulismWhat Perspectives Can We Develop for a Constructive Culture of Discussion andProblem-Solving as well as Strengthening Human Rights?Bernd Hirschberger and Katja Voges ............................................... 247List of Contributors ..............................................................261Acknowledgements .............................................................. 265About the cover design .......................................................... 267Contents 9ForewordsProf. Nazila Ghanea(United Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief)As a human right, the freedomof thought, conscience and religion (henceforthfreedom of religion or belief ) is neither understood nor used in the same way byeveryone. In fact, some weaponize it to divide, prefer, exclude or even dehu-manize rather than respect, empower, support and promote inclusion.Nonetheless, the international human rights law framework shapes free-domof religion or belief, situates it, and grounds it legally. Itmay be appropri-ated or misappropriated by different actors in different ways. However, onceorphaned from its legal and normative foundations, it loses its power. Moreaccurately, it loses its legitimate claim as an international legal human right.This book captures the variousways inwhich efforts aremade inmany con-texts around the world to appropriate this freedom to foster discrimination,exclusion and–effectively – violations of human rights. In some contexts, thiseffort towards appropriation is camouflaged and subtle, as it takes some legalknow-how to identify and expose its faulty underpinnings. In others, it is quiteblatant and even somewhat comical,whereby it doesn’t takemuch to recognizethe falsity of its claims.One of the responsibilities upon us in relation to freedom of religion orbelief in these turbulent times is to be on the lookout for such shaky claims.Having once been a somewhat specialist and rare claim, freedomof religion orbelief has entered into the mainstream in many legal, political and advocacycircles. For all the opportunities that this has offered, it has also given rise tothe challenge of how to deal with freedom of religion or belief ’s “false friends.”This book helps us to understand the underlying factors that are giving riseto the proliferation of such false friends and their related false claims, as wellas analyzing and addressing them in a sober, intelligent, and resolutemanner,whenever and wherever they arise.10 Religious Freedom and PopulismBishop Dr Heiner Wilmer SCJ(President of the German Commission for Justice and Peace)Reverend Dirk Bingener(President of the Pontifical Mission Society missio Aachen)Human rights are a thorn in the side of right-wing populists and extremists.Human rights are committed to the dignity of every individual and – as uni-versal rights of freedomand equality –stand in stark contrast to the exclusivistpower interests of revisionist forces, not least due to their high emancipatorypotential.They are not compatible with themisanthropic, discriminatory ide-ologies that these forces use to justify or disguise their power interests or thatthey even believe and live out of radical delusion.In this context, corresponding actors typically do not openly denounce hu-man rights. Instead, their fight against human rights takes on a more sub-tle form that is no less perilous: rather than calling for the abolition of hu-man rights, they simply reinterpret them in terms of their own ideologies andpower interests. Violations of human dignity are put into fine words, with thegoal being a creeping degradation that obliterates human rights in their gen-uine essence to the point of unrecognizability and inmany respects turns theminto their opposite. Understanding the patterns and strategies of appropria-tion and distortion is essential to effectively counteract them and ensure thathuman rights can fulfill their potential.This bookmakes a crucial contributionin this regard by focusing on a human right that is particularly often the tar-get of populist attempts of appropriation and reinterpretation by the far rightaround the world, namely freedom of religion or belief.To understand why and how populist appropriations succeed, it is insuf-ficient to describe their rhetorical patterns. Rather, it is crucial to also graspthe social context in which the appropriation takes place and analyze what dy-namics emerge from it. Regarding the freedom of religion or belief, it can beobserved that political forces from the far right present themselves as defend-ers of this human right and as “true conservatives,” and that religious free-dom often has a somewhat dusty reputation in the societies of Western Eu-rope and North America, which have become increasingly secular. The rightis sometimes incorrectly perceived as an antiquated relic. Commitment to re-ligious freedom is then misunderstood as conservative clientelistic politics.Some even raise the question of whether religious freedom is still needed ina secular society. There are a number of widespread misunderstandings be-Contents 11hind this: freedomof religion or belief is not a protective program for outdatedstructures, but rather a right to freedom that enables everyone to practice a re-ligion or belief freely. It is about the possibility of forming and expressing one’sown beliefs and convictions, and thus seeking answers to fundamental ques-tions of human existence. Here, an essential dimension of human existence isfulfilled for religious aswell as non-religious people.Freedomof religion or be-lief touches us all, and without it the canon of universal human rights wouldnot be complete.It is not in the interest of populists to resolve these misconceptions. Onthe contrary, the withdrawal of democratic forces from open involvement inpromoting freedom of religion or belief and the increasing polarization of thedebate are playing into the hands of the extreme right.Thus, religious freedomis coming under pressure from two sides and is in danger of being damaged.This is partly the case because the dynamics described above make it difficultto find constructive solutions to problems and tensions that exist in the con-text of religion, such as the question of how to deal with religiously motivatedviolence.Wewould therefore like to express our sincere thanks to the authors of thisbook for presenting not only competent analyses of the problems but also con-crete approaches to counteracting populist appropriation, strengthening free-domof religion or belief and shaping a culture of debate that enables construc-tive and productive solutions to even sensitive problems.Counteringpopulist appropriation andmisinterpretation and strengthen-ing human rights is a task for society as a whole. At the same time, the Chris-tian churches have a special responsibility. Particularly when it comes to thepopulist appropriation of religious freedom, we are called upon to oppose itin the clearest possible terms and raise awareness of the problems associatedwith suchnarratives and resentments,not leastwhen they are spreading in thecontext of church communities and structures. In a timemarked by numerouscrises, there is also a pressing imperative to enable us as churches in West-ern Europe to offer people in search of meaning, orientation and communitya real alternative to the false promises and sham solutions of the populists andextremists.12 Religious Freedom and PopulismAbout thePontificalMission SocietymissioAachen:The Pontifical Mission Society missio Aachen (German: Internationales Katho-lisches Missionswerk missio e.V.) was founded in 1832 and is the world churchpartner of the local churches in Africa, Asia and Oceania. Every year, the aidagency supports about 1,000 projects of its partners in the areas of educationand training, pastoral, social and interreligiouswork aswell as infrastructure.As a specialised agency for international church cooperation,missio is one ofmore than100papalmissionagenciesworldwide.missio considers themutualexchange of experience between the local churches as a community of learn-ing, prayer and solidarity as essential. Thehuman right to religious freedomisa priority issue.missio carries out information and education work, builds na-tional and international networks of church, civil society and political actorsat home and abroad andmobilises people to campaign for religious freedomworldwide.About theGermanCommission for Justice andPeace:TheGermanCommission for Justice and Peace (German:Deutsche KommissionJustitia et Pax) was founded in 1967 and considers itself to be the joint forumof Catholic institutions and organizations active in the field of internationalresponsibility of the Church in Germany. The German Commission for Justiceand Peace is their common voice in society and politics and thus an agent ofsocietal and political dialogue. The commission elaborates contributions toGermany’s development cooperation, peace and human rights policies anddevelops concepts for the internationalworkof theCatholic Church. For years,abasso continuoof thehuman rightsworkof theGermanCommission for Jus-tice and Peace has been the commitment to the freedom of religion or beliefas a human right. At the same time, the aim of the commission’s work is toidentify new or hitherto unjustly neglected issues and – in cooperation withinternational partners – develop innovative concepts and proposals for prob-lem-solving.Introduction: Conservative, Right-Wing Populistor Far-Right Extremist?Conceptual ClarificationsBernd Hirschberger and Katja VogesA liberal-democratic, pluralistic society depends on allowing space for a widevariety of beliefs and opinions: progressive as well as conservative, left-wingas well as neoliberal, secularist as well as religious.There is even room for vul-garity and provocation, although this does not mean that one is not allowedto speak out against these beliefs and opinions. While it can even be a moralimperative to express one’s dissent openly, a limit is reached as soon as lib-eral-democratic societies and their constituting foundations (such as respectfor human dignity, pluralism and the rule of law) are deliberately attacked andundermined. The rationale for this is concisely summarised in Karl Popper’sparadox of tolerance: “Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance oftolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant,if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of theintolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them.”1Determining the boundary of what constitutes a serious threat to the veryfoundations of liberal democracy2 is crucial. On the one hand, the thresholdfor what constitutes such a threat can be set too low. In this case, there is thedanger – to the detriment of liberal democracy – of legitimate ideas that aredisagreeable from the perspective of one’s own political convictions being sup-pressed with reference to the fight against supposed extremism, and of con-structive dialogue and exchange,which characterise and invigorate a pluralis-tic society, being prevented. On the other hand, the threshold for what consti-1 Popper, Karl: The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume 1, London: George Routledge& Sons 1945, Reprint of 1947, p. 226 (note 4 in chapter 7).2 The term “liberal democracy” is used in the sense of the German term “freiheitlichedemokratische Grundordnung.”14 Religious Freedom and Populismtutes such a threat can be set too high and threats to liberal democracymay beoverlooked, underestimated and downplayed. It becomes evident that defin-ing the limit is bynomeansa trivialmatter.However, the followingdistinctionscan be made:On the right edge of the political spectrum,political forces that refuse non-necessary societal change3 but clearly respect the fundamental principles ofliberal democracy are nowadays usually referred to as “conservative.” By con-trast, forces to which the latter clearly no longer applies are referred to as “far-right extremist.”The distance and opposition to liberal democracy and its coreprinciples become visible – for example – in the fact that corresponding actorsopenly show their racist, völkisch-nationalist, supremacist and/or anti-Semiticbeliefs, often deny or even glorify the crimes of Nazism, do not hide their in-tention to overthrow the democratic system and publicly endorse violence as apolitical means.Between the ideal-typical poles of “conservative” and “far-right extremist,”there are also actors who partly reveal thematic-ideological overlaps with far-right extremism (for example rejection of pluralism, also often group-focusedenmity) but proceed more subtly in their communication and avoid particu-larly radical statements, at least in their public appearance. These actors canbe referred to as “right-wing populists.” Unlike ideal-typical far-right extrem-ists, they (at least in the short term) do not strive to overthrow the democraticsystem or at least do not announce this publicly.43 See the definition provided in the final report of the task group established pursuantto the decision of the 27th Evangelical Lutheran State Synod of Saxony, on page 14,paragraph 8, in March 2021: https://engagiert.evlks.de/fileadmin/userfiles/EVLKS_engagiert/B._Landeskirche/Landessynode/Digitalsynode_Maerz_2021/Schlussbericht-AG-Spurgruppe.pdf, accessed on: 6 Sep. 2023.4 In academia and practice, different characteristics are used to define “far-rightextremism,” sometimes in distinction to “right-wing populism.” This is also dueto the fact that far-right extremism and populism occur in different forms. Thedefinitions introduced in the last two paragraphs summarise core elements thatare used by various relevant experts for classification, see e.g. Priester, Karin:“Fließende Grenzen zwischen Rechtsextremismus und Rechtspopulismus in Europa?”(28 Oct. 2010), https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/32423/fliessende-grenzen-zwischen-rechtsextremismus-und-rechtspopulismus-in-europa/, accessed on: 17Jan. 2024; Amadeu Antonio Stiftung: Was ist Rechtsextremismus und Rechtspopulis-mus?, https://www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/rechtsextremismus-rechtspopulismus/was-ist-rechtsextremismus/, accessed on 17. Jan. 2024.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Introduction 15The transitions between categories are often seamless and sometimes dif-ficult to detect: the boundary between right-wingpopulismand right-wing ex-tremism is blurred not only because overlaps often exist both at thematic-ide-ological level and also at the level of relationships and structures. In this sense,right-wing populismmust not be underestimated in terms of its potential forradicalisation towards extremism and its potential for the subtly subversive.It is not uncommon for actors with far-right extremist goals to resort to moremoderate right-wing populist rhetoric in order to reach a broader public andfacilitate and promote a normalisation of their right-wing ideas.5It is also difficult to distinguish between the fringes of conservatism andright-wing populism, especially since there are different understandings ofthe two terms, which are often not clearly contoured. Right-wing forces de-liberately exploit this blurriness by presenting themselves as supposedly “trueconservatives,” often linked to the accusation that centre-right parties are not(or no longer) conservative enough. Such a moderate external image is sup-posed to help them to appeal to broader voter groups and make their policiesand thought patterns socially acceptable and normalise them in this sense. Infact, there is a danger that right-wing narratives and thought patterns partlybased onwidespread resentments will spread far into the centre of society andthat even “traditional” and “bourgeois” circles –which see themselves as “clas-sically conservative” – will internalise rhetorical patterns and ideas that origi-nate from right-wing circles and transgress the boundaries of what is compat-ible with liberal democracy.65 Normalisation as a misguided societal reaction to the far right and normalisation as astrategy of far-right actors to appeal to broader audiences has been documented andexamined in numerous academic studies and journalistic articles (see e.g. de Jonge,Léonie/Gaufman, Elizaveta: “The normalisation of the far right in the Dutch mediain the run-up to the 2021 general elections,” in: Discourse & Society, 33(6/2022), pp.773–787.6 A good example for this is the “Christian right” in Germany, as analysed well by LianeBednarz: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung: Die Angstprediger –Wie rechte Christen Gesellschaftund Kirchen unterwandern (21 Jun. 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bVmfXRha5AU&t=3580s, accessed on: 6 Sep. 2023.16 Religious Freedom and PopulismRight-wing populist rhetoric: Characteristics and typical patternsof argumentationPopulist rhetoric is so promising for far-right actors because this communica-tion strategy allows themto feignnormalisation and still present themselves asa new alternative – as being self-confident and power-conscious.The capacityto maintain this ambivalence is strategically crucial for them to gain new sup-porters or voters and assert their own interests. It enables populist actors touse the energy and emotions associatedwith protestmovements for their ownimage.At the same time, this leads the broader public to underestimate the farright in terms of its radical and extremist potential.In order to maintain such a tension (which is profitable for the far right),these actors resort to various rhetorical and psychological tricks. Typical pat-terns that have proven successful for the far right to have an impact far intosociety include the following:7• It is characteristic for populism and its rhetoric that it claims to expressthe “true will of the people,” even though a unified popular will is admit-tedly a dangerous fiction. Populists reject other views as inadmissible. Le-gitimate criticism of their own positions, statements and actions is oftenpresented as discrimination or even oppression (for example in the formofallegedpolitical correctnessor “cancel culture”). Ingeneral,populists like topresent themselves as the only resistance against a domestic political “es-tablishment”or a “globalist elite” that is allegedly corrupt, incompetent andtreacherous. In doing so, populists often blanketly deny integrity to polit-ical competitors and sow hatred and distrust of institutions that they do7 Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz (ed.): Dem Populismus widerstehen. Ar-beitshilfe zum kirchlichen Umgang mit rechtspopulistischen Tendenzen (= Arbeits-hilfe Nr. 305), Bonn 2019; Hirschberger, Bernd/Voges, Katja: “Vereinnahmt und ver-zerrt. Wie der Rechtspopulismus die Religionsfreiheit instrumentalisiert,” in: ForumWeltkirche (6/2021), pp. 19–22; Diakonie Deutschland. Evangelisches Werk für Dia-konie und Entwicklung (ed.): Umgang mit Rechtsextremismus und Rechtspopulis-mus. Eine Handreichung für die Diakonie, 2. erw. Aufl., Berlin 2022; Spier, Tim: “Wasversteht man unter ‘Populismus’” (25 Sep. 2014), https://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtspopulismus/192118/was-versteht-man-unter-populismus, accessed on: 25Aug. 2023; Priester, Karin: “Definitionen und Typologien des Populismus,” in: SozialeWelt 62 (2/2011), pp. 185–198.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Introduction 17not themselves control. While the reference to “the people” serves the de-sire to belong to a community, the demarcation according to the scheme of“us against them” –which is often linked to a scapegoat logic – activates amobilising resistance identity.• In addition to accusations against domestic political opponents, multilat-eral institutions such as the EU, anonymous “globalist elites” or allegedlythreatening minorities, simple answers to the complex challenges ofthe present are also at the centre of populist argumentation patterns.Of course, populist answers – which are often based on anti-liberal anddiscriminatory demands and baseless simplifications – cannot offerfunctional and sustainable solutions. Nevertheless, it has been shownthat simplification, exaggeration and sometimes radicalisation have thepotential to generate support from considerable parts of the population.• This effect is often reinforced by a demagogic style of rhetoric that de-liberately relies on dramatisation, enemy stereotypes, taboo-breaking,incitement and emotionalisation. Not infrequently, populists also invokedoomsday and conspiracy scenarios.• Populists are often extremely flexible when it comes to issues that are notdirectly related to their drive to gain and maintain power or their radicalconvictions.They re-interpret, instrumentalise and distort these issues sothat they serve their own agenda and suit their own interests.Human rights populism: The populist appropriationof the human rights discourseHuman dignity and human rights are the backbone of liberal democracy. Forthe far right, human rights are inconvenient: on the one hand, because manyof their political demands and ideological concepts are in contradiction to hu-man rights guarantees and principles; on the other hand, because talk of hu-man rights is widespread in societal debates and hardly anyone openly admitsto being against human rights. Indeed, the term human rights is far too popu-lar andconnectedwithpositive connotations,especially inWestern countries.88 The rare exceptions include critical perspectives within the framework of postcolonialtheories that highlight the ambivalences of theWest in its pursuit of human rights, andinquiries into the effectiveness and enforceability of human rights against the back-drop of the still incredibly large number of human rights violations worldwide (See18 Religious Freedom and PopulismInstead of openly questioning human rights, the strategy of relativising andre-interpreting them is therefore used much more often, both defensively toconceal one’s own contradictions to and violations of human rights and of-fensively to use the semantics of human rights for one’s own purposes. Suchactors often use the powerful sound of human rights terms to promote theirownpopularity,henceprofiting fromthepositive connotationsassociatedwiththese terms.At the same time, they hollow out the content of the terms, distortand twist them to suit their own political goals and ideologies, use them as asource of (supposed) legitimacy and thus tear themout of the context of thehu-man rights approach.9 For example, the concept of “freedom”canbe embeddedwell in the narrative of one’s supposed struggle for freedom against the “main-stream,”and the imageof rights being takenawayorwithheld canalso be easilyharnessed into a narrative of resistance against the allegedly oppressive elite.Of course, in such reinterpretations and instrumentalisations, little remainsof the substance of human rights.Often, theirmeaning is even turned into theopposite. Ultimately, a battle of interpretation fundamentally challenges thecharacter of human rights as universal rights of freedom.10Patterns of the right-wing populist appropriationand reinterpretation of religious freedomOne human right that is particularly often the target of populist appropria-tions and reinterpretations by the far right is religious freedom. In addition toe.g. Martinsen, Franziska: Grenzen der Menschenrechte. Staatsbürgerschaft, Zugehö-rigkeit, Partizipation, Bielefeld: transcript 2019, pp. 137–147; Maier, Hans: Menschen-rechte. Eine Einführung in ihr Verständnis, Kevelaer: Topos plus 2015, p. 40–43).9 Mégret, Frédéric: “Human Rights Populism,” in: Humanity: An International Journal ofHuman Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 13 (2/2022), pp. 240–259.10 In addition to freedom of religion or belief, other human rights are also subject to ap-propriation and reinterpretation by the far right. For instance, far-right actors ofteninvoke freedom of speech when they are criticised with good reason. Although theyare free to express their opinions and often have ample media exposure to do so, theyclaim to be disadvantaged or even oppressed. They frequently perceive themselvesas victims of an alleged “political correctness.” Similarly, freedom of the press is por-trayed as under threat when themedia (especially public broadcasters) do not providefavourable coverage of the far right and its agenda.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Introduction 19the appropriation of human rights semantics in general described above, it isattractive for right-wing populist actors to address the issue of religion.Even if this stereotype does not do justice to the actual diversity of reli-giosity, the associative equation of “religion” and “conservative” is widespread,especially in countrieswith strong secularisation tendencies. In this respect, itcan be promising for the far right to play on this themewhen pursuing the goalof constructing a conservative image and staging oneself as a defender of tra-dition. Additionally, religion can also provide identity and community. Theseare fields that the far right also eagerly addresses, albeit only with pseudo-so-lutions that are highly problematic, since community and identity are usuallyunderstood in an exclusionary way as an ethno-nationalist, supremacist iden-tity and an ethnically homogenous national community.11Such motivations are matched by the rhetorical, strategic and argumen-tative patterns typically followed by populist attempts to appropriate andreinterpret religious freedom ormore narrowly defined aspects of this humanright, such as advocacy for persecuted and discriminated members of theirrespective own religious group. Usually, the far right resorts to the character-istics of populist rhetoric described in the previous sections and reinterpretsterms such as “religious freedom” and “persecution of Christians” in such away that they fit their own ideology and serve their own power-political goalsand ambitions.The following patterns can be observed particularly frequently:• Religious freedomis interpreted ina selective andclientelisticmanner. It isdemanded for one’s own religious group, in Western countries usually forChristianity as themajority religionor–in somecases–also for anational-istically charged secular belief. However, right-wing populist and extrem-ist forces demand restrictions for other religious and ideological groups,inWestern countries especially for Muslimminorities.• Points of legitimate criticism – for example demands for stronger actionagainst violence towards Christians in certain regions, for more effectiveprotection of domestic security and against hate crime and organisedcrime, or the concern to limit the influence of authoritarian governmentsfrom abroad – are mixed with problematic and even inhumane narrativesand resentments from the spectrumof far-right ideologies and conspiracytheories.Parts of these theories are for example implicitly or even explicitly11 See also the German terms “völkische Identität” and “Volksgemeinschaft.”20 Religious Freedom and Populismformulated theses on an alleged ethnic replacement12 or the “Islamisationof Europe,” an alleged threat to the “Christian-Jewish occident,” criticismof a “gender and rainbow culture” or allegedly exaggerated “political cor-rectness.” Frequently, illegitimate and/or disproportionate measures aresimultaneously demanded, for example discriminatory measures such astravel bans against certain religious groups.• Right-wing populist and extremist forces present themselves as the onlysincere defenders of religious freedom and persecuted members of theircountry’s majority religion worldwide. At the same time, they blame theirpolitical opponents of inaction and accuse the opposing domestic political“establishment,” multinational “elites” and “foreign,” “alien” religious mi-norities of betraying or threatening the values of the national majority re-ligion.• Criticismof their ownargumentationpatterns is presented as illegitimate.In this context, right-wing populist and extremist forces often stage them-selves as victimsof a conspiracy of themainstream,“cancel culture,”or “po-litical correctness.”• Religious freedom is misused as a pretext to justify populist and/or inhu-mane policies, for example excessive criticism of proportionate measuresfor pandemic control or demands for measures that discriminate againstwomen or minorities.• Religious freedom is taken out of the context of indivisible human rightsand abstractly played off against other human rights.• These populist reinterpretations distort the concept of freedom of religionor belief in a manner that fundamentally contradicts the logic of universalrights to freedom.1312 In German, the NS-language term “Umvolkung” is often used by far-right actors.13 See the overview of various patterns of populist appropriation and reinterpreta-tion authored by Bernd Hirschberger in the chapter “Religious Freedom and Right-Wing Populism” of the Third Ecumenical Report on Religious Freedom: Sekretariatder Deutschen Bischofskonferenz/Kirchenamt der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutsch-land (eds.): 3. Ökumenischer Bericht zur Religionsfreiheit weltweit. Eine christlichePerspektive auf ein universelles Menschenrecht (= Gemeinsame Texte Nr. 28), Bonn/Hannover 2023.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Introduction 21A trend towards withdrawal and dangerous socio-political reactionstowards populismAttempts at appropriation and reinterpretation of the kind described in theprevious section become particularly problematic when they coincide with asecond trend, namely the fact that in societies which have becomemore secu-lar, parts of the democratic spectrum – such as more left-wing or liberal-ori-ented secular forces – are increasingly withdrawing from open involvementin public activities promoting freedom of religion or belief. This is not onlyproblematic because freedom of religion or belief – like other human rights– depends on a broad commitment of all democratic parts of society, but alsobecause this withdrawal leaves room for the populist appropriation describedearlier.Thepopulist appropriation in turn risks turning issues suchas religiousfreedom or the solidarity with Christians in need into toxic topics with whichthey do not want to be associated.This can even scare off representatives fromwithin the democratic spectrumwho have previously been actively involved incorresponding activities, but who do not want to be associated with the in-human narratives of the populist forces, which have unfortunately become fartoo prevalent in public debate.This–conscious or unconscious–withdrawal ispart of a vicious circle, as it in turn leaves room for further populist appropria-tions of religious freedom.Moreover, one form of collateral damage from thisdevelopment is that polarisation is further increased, making the construc-tive discourse required for debating and solving actually existing problems in-creasingly difficult.In addition to the trend towards withdrawal described above, a secondform of reacting to the populist attempts at appropriation and reinterpreta-tion is no less problematic: In some countries, it can be observed that politicalforces from the centre of the democratic spectrum take over or even anticipateclientelist-populist narratives and policies, virtually being driven by populism.For instance, this is reflected in political demands for disproportionate con-trol of religious minorities or discriminatory restrictions. Such a destructiveclimate of discourse and such problematic proposals can contribute to estab-lishing or perpetuating misunderstandings and resentments. If democratsthemselves also resort to populist-clientelist narratives, they risk normalisingsuch narratives and ideas, falsely giving the impression that these narrativesand ideas are legitimate.Togetherwith populist appropriation and reinterpre-tation, such reflexes of imitation and anticipation provide the ideal breeding22 Religious Freedom and Populismground for discrimination, hate speech and other violations and threats tofreedom of religion or belief.Accordingly, it is important to resist the temptations to withdraw, imitateor anticipate and build broad alliances for the promotion and support freedomof religion or belief within the democratic spectrum.Right-wing populist appropriations – Societal dynamicsand reactions – approaches to solutionsOur book explores the challenge of populist appropriation of religious free-dom in three steps. The aim is to help with the understanding of populiststrategies of appropriation and reinterpretation by the far right and explainthe goals associated with them. The first part “Populist Reinterpretationand Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwide” presents a series ofconcrete case studies, identifying characteristics and narratives of the pop-ulist appropriation and reinterpretation.The second part “Societal Dynamicsand Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriation” demonstratesthat the populist appropriation moves trigger counterproductive types ofpolitical reactions and reinforce a number of widespread misunderstand-ings and problematic societal dynamics, which in turn facilitate the successof populist appropriation moves. Finally, the third part “Signs of Hope andProposals for Solutions” discusses possible solutions to counteract populistappropriation and strengthen religious freedom in the process. The variouscontributions in this book have been selected because they are particularlywell suited to illustrate the essential facets of the widespread phenomenon byway of example.The first part of the book is opened by Bernd Hirschberger and Katja Voges,who illustrate typical patterns of populist appropriation and reinterpretationmoves by studying the example of far-right parties and networks in German-speaking countries, with a particular focus on the German far-right partyAfD and its clientelistic and demagogic approach towards religious freedom.The authors highlight that there is a particular risk of populist appropriationmoves, resulting in religious freedom being perceived as an exclusively “right-wing” topic, thus impeding advocacy for this human right free of prejudices.In the next contribution, Regina Elsner analyses how the Russian Ortho-dox Church uses the memory of Orthodox believers being oppressed duringthe Soviet era to establish an understanding of religious freedom presentingB. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Introduction 23Russia – in opposition to “the West” – as the ultimate defender of Christian-ity and Christian values. Thereby, Elsner exposes the entanglements betweenthe church and the state regime and shows how the argument of defendingreligious freedom has been made the official justification for the Russian waragainst Ukraine.Meanwhile, the Hungarian government is forming strategic allianceswith the leadership of the Russian Orthodoxy and Patriarch Kyrill is praisingVictor Orbán for his fight for “Christian values.” Rita Perintfalvi and Katja Vogesshow how the Hungarian president strategically instrumentalises the issueof religious freedom for his concept of illiberal Christian democracy and pro-motes numerous networks and international initiatives in this context. Forinstance, Orbán’s call for solidarity with persecuted Christians worldwide ischaracterised by populist rhetoric.In the next contribution,Leandro L.B. Fontana observes an increase in casesof religious harassment in Brazil over the past decade – especially againstmembers of Afro-Brazilian religions – and examines how this development islinked to the increased public and political presence of Evangelicals and Pen-tecostals. He demonstrates that the struggle against an alleged Christophobiahas become a leitmotif for them and the rise of the Christian Right and itsalliance with Christian fundamentalism are the foundation for advancing anationalist project for Brazil.Andreas Lob-Hüdepohl shows that religious freedom has been invoked to re-ject government measures to contain the COVID-19 pandemic and that far-right movements and parties have fuelled corresponding sentiments and ex-ploited them for their own purposes.The author places particular emphasis onweighing up in which cases references to religious freedom are legitimate inthe discussed context and when – by contrast – such a reference is to be clas-sified as abusive.In the next contribution, Bernd Hirschberger and Friedrich Püttmann showthat the topics of secularism and religious freedom are key themes in Turkishpolitics. While in the past Kemalist-oriented decision-makers justified auto-cratic restrictions by referring to the defence of secularism, today’s PresidentRecepTayyipErdoğan andhis party use the political instrumentalisation of thefight against Islamophobia and clientelistic references to religious freedom fortheir power-political interests.T. JeremyGunn concludes the first part with his analysis of Donald Trump’ssuccessful campaign for the American presidential election in 2015, which hedescribes as one of the most important populist movements in the history of24 Religious Freedom and PopulismtheUnited States.Gunn shows howTrump instrumentalised the issues of reli-gious freedom and religious identity before and during his presidency to mo-bilise white Evangelicals as a key electoral group to support him.Heiner Bielefeldt opens the second part of the book by focussing on societaldynamics and problematic reactions towards populist appropriation. He ex-plores how polarising views of religious freedom arise, what basic misunder-standings and misinterpretations exist and how they can be countered argu-mentatively.Youssef Dennaoui then explains how anti-Muslim hostility and the appeal ofIslamist groupsmutually legitimiseandempowereachother.Hedescribes it ashighly problematic when Islamophobic prejudices and narratives fomented bythe far right are also taken up or even anticipated by democrats. As – for exam-ple – the many heated discussions about mosque-building and the muezzin’scall in German-speaking countries show, this leads to a dangerous normalisa-tion and reinforcement of far-right discourses in public perception.In France, laïcité has been supposed to guarantee religious freedom sincethe 19th century. Valentine Zuber delineates how right-wing populists and ex-tremists make use of this concept to specifically exclude one religion, namelyIslam.If corresponding ideas are takenupbyabroaderpublic, there is adangerthat laïcité – as a legal principle regulating pluralism – is misused as a meansof state control over religion.EvaMaria Lassen andMarie Juul Petersen analyse why there has been a grow-ing number of legal acts in Denmark in recent years that potentially threatenfreedomof religionor belief, especially forMuslims.They recognise that, in ad-dition to right-wing populist incitement, especially secularist tendencies anda religious illiteracy in Danish society have led to a willingness to restrict thefree exercise of religion.Bernd Hirschberger and Katja Voges then discuss the extent to which the ac-tive commitment to freedom of religion or belief at the level of the EuropeanUnion has fallen victim to political polarisation.While the political right is try-ing to seize the issue, it seems that liberal and left-wing policymakers increas-ingly withdraw from open advocacy activities to promote freedom of religionor belief.At the beginning of the third part of the book,which discusses possible so-lutions against populist appropriation, Jos Douma focuses on the InternationalReligious Freedom or Belief Alliance launched by the Trump administration.As Dutch Commissioner for Freedom of Religion and Conviction,Douma rep-resented the Dutch government in the alliance and played a decisive role inB. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Introduction 25shaping it.While initiallymanyWesternEuropeancountries inparticularweresceptical about the alliance being initiated by the right-wing populist Trumpadministration and joined by like-minded governments, the counteracting ofliberal governments prevented the alliance from taking a populist course.JorunnØkland shows that – unlike in other countries – the populist appro-priation of religious freedom and “Christian family values” plays only a sub-ordinate role in Norway, even in debates on gender issues. In addition to anactive, broad cross-party commitment to religious freedom, real successes inachieving gender equality can also be regarded as reasons for this. However,a drop of bitterness remains, as instead of religious freedom, another humanissue – gender equality – has now become a focus of populist appropriation inNorway.Katja Buck, Bernd Hirschberger and Katja Voges recognise a special respon-sibility of the churches in the fight against right-wing populism and extrem-ism, especially when religious freedom is at stake.Holding strong potential asspaces that createmeaning, community and identitymeans that churches andreligious communities have valuable resources for fighting populism sustain-ably, which should be considered as a moral obligation by them.Ana Maria Daou then examines how education can mitigate and counter-act the negative effects of exclusionary populist narratives. According toDaou,civil society organisations that use the human rights approach for promot-ing inclusive citizenship and co-existence play an essential role in creating re-silience to the temptations of populism and extremism.Finally, JuliaBauer, JulianeChakrabarti andBerndHirschberger reflect on howand towhat extent socialmedia can act as a tool for countering populist appro-priation of religious freedom and promoting human rights at the same time.WhileHirschbergerdrawsonhis researchon theuseof socialmedia in the con-text of conflict,14 Bauer andChakrabarti drawon their experiences fromwithinthe civil society initiative ichbinhier e.V.15, which takes action against group-fo-cused enmity and hate speech on Facebook.14 Hirschberger, Bernd: “External Communication in Social Media During AsymmetricConflicts: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Case Study of the Conflict in Israel andPalestine,” Bielefeld: transcript 2021.15 The name contains the German phrase Ich bin hier which means I am here.26 Religious Freedom and PopulismOn 14November 2022, theGermanCommission for Justice andPeace and thePontificalMission SocietymissioAachenhosted anonline conference on “Reli-gious FreedomandPopulism.” In thefirst part of the conference, experts fromdifferent countriespresentedanalysesof thephenomenonof right-wingpop-ulist appropriation of religious freedom and the resulting problems. In thesecond part of the conference, viable options for action to counteract thesetendencies were discussed. Representing German politics, Frank Schwabe,member of the German parliament and Federal Government Commissionerfor Freedom of Religion or Belief, and Petra Pau, spokesperson for religiouspolicy of the parliamentary group DIE LINKE (“The Left”) in the German par-liament and Vice-President of the German parliament, took part in this ex-change. Recordings of most of the conference contributions are available inthe original language on the YouTube channel of the German Commission forJustice and Peace:• Contributions in German:https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLcbxcwpYJUoEFyppjxAjtCQezYp96enGF• Contributions in English:https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLcbxcwpYJUoFfm_Riv25Ur9kjQVAZwX9XThe results of this conferencehave also beenusedduring the preparations forthis book.Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriationof Religious Freedom WorldwideReinterpretations of Religious Freedomby the Far Right in the German-Speaking WorldThe Case of the AfDBernd Hirschberger and Katja VogesOn 27th January 2023, for the first time amotion was on the agenda of the Ger-manparliament calling for the introductionof an InternationalDayagainst thePersecution of Christians. This motion was introduced by the far-right1 partyAlternative for Germany (Alternative fürDeutschland, AfD).2 In the debate, it be-came obvious that while all other parliamentary groups in the Bundestag (Par-liament) perceive the discrimination and persecution of Christians as a mas-1 While the party was initially described as „right-wing populist” inmanymedia reports,experts now classify the AfD party, which was founded in 2013, as clearly right-wingextremist: In Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia and Saxony, the state branches of the AfD havebeen classified as “firmly right-wing extremist” by the offices for the protection of theconstitution (German: Verfassungsschutz) of the respective federal states. A good sum-mary of the right-wing extremist characteristics of the party can be found in the jus-tification for this decision by the Saxon State Office for the Protection of the Constitu-tion: Sächsische Staatskanzlei: Sächsischer AfD-Landesverband als gesichert rechtsex-tremistische Bestrebung eingestuft (8 Dec. 2023), https://www.medienservice.sachsen.de/medien/news/1071656, accessed on: 21 Dec. 2023. The German Institute for Hu-man Rights even states that the legal requirements for a ban on the party under theterms of Article 21 of the Grundgesetz (German constitution) are met: Cremer, Hendrik:Warum die AfD verboten werden könnte. Empfehlungen an Staat und Politik, Berlin:Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte 2023, https://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/publikationen/detail/warum-die-afd-verboten-werden-koennte, accessed on:21 Dec. 2023. The AfD responded to this critical legal assessment by submitting a mo-tion to the Bundestag to cut off the Institute’s federal funding and withdraw its statusas a national human rights institution: Deutscher Bundestag: Debatte zumDeutschenInstitut für Menschenrechte (22 Jun. 2023), https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2023/kw25-de-institut-menschenrechte-954396, accessed on: 21 Dec. 2023.2 BT-Drucksache 20/5368 (printed matter Bundestag).30 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwidesive problem, they see the AfD’s motion as an instrumentalisation of religiousfreedom for their own political agenda and a dangerous polarisation betweendifferent faith communities. The incident exemplifies the approach of right-wing populist and extremist parties and networks in German-speaking coun-tries to narrow religious freedom to the issue of persecution of Christians andthereby reinterpret it in terms of their right-wing ideologies; for example byreferring to an alleged defence of Christian culture and values of the Westernworld.Their goal in doing so is to gain support among the broader populationand introduce and anchor their own ideological concerns in the public debate.This chapter analyseswhich patterns are central to these attempts at appropri-ation and reinterpretation, focusing on the AfD as a case study.However, sim-ilar patterns can also be observed in other right-wing parties and movementsin German-speaking countries.3Clientelistic interpretationWhen the AfD turns to the issue of religious freedom, it is usually concernedwith the rights and privileges of a single religious group. Selectively, it directsthe focus onChristianity as the historicalmajority religion, often referring to atraditionalist understanding ofChristianity in its supposedly original and trueform, which offers many points of contact for right-wing ideologies in par-ticular.4 Because corresponding traditionalist views are repeatedly the subjectof public criticism, the AfD portrays Christianity as threatened or even perse-cuted by a supposed “left-green mainstream” in Germany and other WesternEuropean countries.5 Often the focus here is not on religion in the narrower3 In part, this chapter takes up considerations and formulations that BerndHirschbergerestablished for the chapter “Religious Freedom and Right-Wing Populism” of the 3rdEcumenical Report on Religious Freedom: Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskon-ferenz/Kirchenamt der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland (eds): 3. ÖkumenischerBericht zur Religionsfreiheit weltweit. Eine christliche Perspektive auf ein universellesMenschenrecht (= Gemeinsame Texte Nr. 28), Bonn/Hannover 2023.4 Hidalgo, Oliver/Hildmann, Philipp W./Yendell, Alexander (eds.): RechtspopulismusundReligion.Wiesbaden: Springer VS 2018 (= Zeitschrift für Religion, Gesellschaft undPolitik. Issue 2/2018).5 However, this ignores the fact that although the exercise of the right to freedom ofreligion or belief is by no means generally dependent on a liberal attitude or a basicattitude that promotes human rights (Bielefeldt, Heiner/Wiener, Michael: Religions-freiheit auf dem Prüfstand. Konturen eines umkämpften Menschenrechts, Bielefeld:B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Populist Reinterpretation. The Case of the AfD 31sense, but rather culture and tradition.6 There is repeatedly talk of defendingthe “Christian Occident” and there are loud demands for a “Christian GermanLeitkultur” and the protection of supposed “traditional Christian values.” How-ever, what is meant by “Leitkultur” and “traditional values” is often not spelledout in detail.7 Ultimately, these patterns of justification aim at the preserva-tion or (re-)establishment of structural inequalities that go hand in hand withdiscrimination against one or various minorities.For Christianity as the original majority religion (interpreted by the AfDin terms of its own traditionalist-nationalist distorted image of Christianity),a dominant status is demanded, while religious freedom for other religions isplacedunder a cultural reservation.The imageof the enemy is Islam inparticu-lar,which is presented as amonolithic entity and a threat to one’s own culture.8Following the logic of their own ideological-nationalist exclusion, they call forsweepingmeasures thatwouldmean systematic unequal treatment ofMuslimreligious groups compared to other religious communities. The AfD’s mani-festo for the 2021 Bundestag elections makes numerous demands that relateexclusively to Islamandnot to other religious communities, focusing in partic-ular onbansonpublicly visibleMuslimsymbols suchasminarets and the call oftranscript 2020, p. 99), freedom of religion or belief as a right to freedom neverthelessallows criticism of corresponding traditionalist views.6 Indeed, in 2016, the then deputy federal spokesman and later party and parliamen-tary group leader of the AfD Alexander Gauland told Christ & Welt that his party wasnot concerned with Christianity per se, but rather with a “traditional attitude to life”and pointed out that the references in the AfD’s party programme to Christianity weremore cultural than religious: Löbbert, Raoul/Machowecz, Martin: “Interview: Gehörtdie AfD auf den Katholikentag?” (25 May 2016), https://www.zeit.de/2016/23/leipzig-afd-katholikentag-streitgespraech, accessed on: 18 Feb. 2023.7 The fact that the semantics are so diffuse makes it possible to connect with differentmilieus, with traditionalist Christians, more atheistically oriented “cultural Christians”as well as identitarians seeking meaning; see Diefenbach, Aletta J.: “Wie viel Chris-tentum steckt in der Heimatliebe? Potentiale und Grenzen des Christentums für einekollektive Identität der Neuen Rechte,” in: Birgit Blättel-Mink (ed.), Gesellschaft unterSpannung. Verhandlungen des 40. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Sozio-logie 2020, Mannheim: GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V. 2021.8 Bitzl, Christoph, “RechtsextremeMuslimhetze: Die Instrumentalisierung von Religionals Vote-Seeking-Strategie der AfD,” in: Zeitschrift für Religion, Gesellschaft undPolitik5 (2021), pp. 471–502.32 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwidethemuezzin:9 “Minarets and the call of themuezzin are not compatible with atolerant coexistence of religions as practised by the Christian churches.”10 In-stead of applying the same standards of administrative law to minarets andthe call of the muezzin as to church towers and the ringing of bells (for exam-ple regarding questions of building law and immission control), the AfD thusdenies Muslims the universal claims from the forum externum, that is the rightto practise one’s own faith even in public.11 At the same time, the same rightsare recognised and demanded for Christianity, in other words for the religionwith which most AfD members themselves feel culturally and/or religiouslyconnected. Apart from the idea that this is necessary to protect against a sup-posedMuslim “claim to power over the Christianmajority society,” among thejustifications for such unequal treatment there are no less problematic asser-tions such as that “religion is exclusively a privatematter” and that its “practice[...] should not take place in public places,”12 a statement that denies the forumexternum in its core.This logic of unequal treatment and generalising suspicion is also reflectedin the proposal to ban the so-called political Islam.13 Finally, the undifferenti-ated formulation that political engagement motivated by the Muslim faith is9 Quotes that have not been published in English have been translated into English bythe authors of the chapter.10 Programme of the AfD for the Election to the 20th German Bundestag: Alternati-ve für Deutschland (AfD): Deutschland. Aber normal. Programm der Alternative fürDeutschland für dieWahl zum 20. Deutschen Bundestag, p. 86, https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/20210611_AfD_Programm_2021.pdf, accessed on: 8 Aug.2023.11 For the legal background, see Hense, Ansgar: “Der islamische Gebetsruf,” in: CIBE-DO-Beiträge (1/2021); see also Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz (ed.): Mo-scheebau in Deutschland. Eine Orientierungshilfe (= Die deutschen Bischöfe Nr. 88),Bonn 2008; Terbuyken,Hanno: “AfD undReligionsfreiheit: GefährlicheGrundhaltung,”(2 May 2016), https://www.evangelisch.de/inhalte/134158/02-05-2016/afd-parteitag-kommentar-religionsfreiheit-islam-deutschland, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.12 This is the wording of the Hessian regional association of the AfD on its website: https://www.afd-hessen.de/aktuelles/2020/07/39717/, accessed on: 14 Dec. 2022.13 In addition to the AfD, other conservative and right-wing forces in Germany, Aus-tria and Switzerland have formulated similar demands, for example the then FederalChancellor of the Republic of Austria Sebastian Kurz, who announced in 2020 that hewanted to enforce a criminal offence of “political Islam,” or the “Christian Social Union”in Bavaria: Christlich Soziale Union (CSU): Beschluss des CSU-Parteitags am 4./5. No-vember 2016 in München. Leitantrag – Politischer Islam, https://www.csu.de/politik/beschluesse/leitantrag-politischer-islam/, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Populist Reinterpretation. The Case of the AfD 33per se bad, harmful or even a threat implies an equationwith the practices andideologies of Islamist extremism and the influence of autocratic governmentsfrom abroad that endangers democracy and human rights.This indirectly notonly relativises the actual dangers but also constitutes an inadmissible unequaltreatment and restriction of freedom. After all, hardly anyone demands thatChristian faith should not be a motivation for politics; for instance regardingthe strong role of Christian democracy in Central European politics.Strategic mixing of legitimate criticismwith right-wing ideological narrativesClearly inhumaneanddiscriminatory statements anddemandsby theAfDandits representatives regarding Islamare sometimes relativised elsewhere, albeitoften only at a later stage. For example, there is the statement that Islam is“not just a religion” but “a political system that is neither compatible with ourconstitution nor with European secularisation” by federal leader Alice Weideland former AfD candidate for the post of Bundestag Vice-President AlbrechtGlaser from 2017.14 Besides there is the statement by then deputy leader Beat-rix vonStorch from2018 that the AfD is a “party for religious freedom”and thatthere are “many integrated Muslims and migrants in our society” who couldalso find a political home in the AfD, as long as they do not advocate “Islamisa-tion” in the sense of pushing back German culture and claiming dominance.15Ultimately, however, the difference between Islam and Islamism is polemicallynegated.16 The occasional complementary self-framing as a moderate, bour-14 Kamann, Matthias: “‘... was hier unter dem Deckmantel der Religionsfreiheit abläuft’”(16 Nov. 2017), https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/plus170637216/was-hier-unter-dem-Deckmantel-der-Religionsfreiheit-ablaeuft.html; accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023,other AfD mandate holders even go so far as to deny that Islam is a religion at all andclaim that it is only a “political ideology”: Klatt, Thomas: “Die AfDunddas Christentum”(7 May 2018), https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/religion-in-der-politik-die-afd-und-das-christentum-100.html, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023. However, this is not at all com-patible with the broad understanding of religion that underlies freedom of religion orbelief.15 Frankfurter Allgemeine: “Von Storch offen für Muslime” (7 Oct. 2018), https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/muslime-in-der-afd-beatrix-von-storch-zeigt-sich-offen-15825604.html, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.16 Excellenzcluster Religion und Politik, Universität Münster: “Religionsfreiheit für alle.Entgegen AfD-Polemiken” (1 Jun. 2016), https://www.uni-muenster.de/Religion-und-34 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwidegeois force does not eliminate the radical, but on the contrary aims to nor-malise it.With the fight against Islamism, the AfD takes up an objective as a jus-tification for its radical policies, including one-sided restrictions on religiousfreedom. Combatting Islamism is perceived as important by large parts of thepopulation, and Islamism has been recognised as a real danger by the relevantauthorities. What is problematic in this sense is not that the AfD addressesthe danger of Islamism, but rather the intention, context and the way they aredoing so. Characteristic of the AfD’s reference to Islamism are not proposalsfor the prevention of terrorism that conform to the constitution, but a blanketrhetoric aimed at dissolving the difference between extremist Islamism andthe many other forms of Islam in the public perception. For example, repre-sentatives of the AfD often selectively refer to passages from the Koran to sup-posedly prove that “Islam” glorifies violence. Following this pattern, the AfD’sspokesperson on domestic policy, Dr Gottfried Curio, questioned the “demo-cratic compatibility of Islam” in thedebate on thegovernment statementon thedomestic policy course of the federal government on 23rd March 2018, quotedKoranic verses with references to violence and declared Islam and immigra-tion to be the sole cause of a number of murders of women committed by per-petrators with a migration background. He then spoke out against Muslimreligious education, claiming with reference to the Koran: “This agitation isnow to become a school subject; we are producing ticking time bombs withour eyes open: lessons in contempt for democracy for future perpetrators.”17Also in 2018, the AfD parliamentary group in the Bundestag submitted a mo-tion entitled “Islam and its inseparable Sharia do not belong to the rule of law,”which called for censorship of the Koran in Germany.18There is a certain ironyin the fact – as rightly noted by the Green Member of Parliament (MP) OmidNouripour – that the interpretation of Islam limited to glorification of vio-lence, homophobia and misogyny suggested by the AfD corresponds exactlyPolitik/aktuelles/2016/jun/PM_Religionsfreiheit_fuer_alle_entgegen_AfD_Polemiken.html, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.17 Plenarprotokoll 19/24 (Minutes of plenary proceedings), p. 2150, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btp/19/19024.pdf, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.18 Deutscher Bundestag: AfD-Antrag über Islam und Scharia erntetWiderspruch übrigerFraktionen (11 Oct. 2018), https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2018/kw41-de-scharia-570752, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Populist Reinterpretation. The Case of the AfD 35to that of the Islamists.19 Through its discussion impulses, the AfD not onlyassumes a civilisational backwardness of Islam compared to its own – in itsown view – superior culture, which cannot be overcome, but also securitisesthe issue of combating Islamism in a way that presents almost every conceiv-able measure as necessary – including strongly discriminatory ones – to pre-serve the secular order and the culture of the “Christian Occident.”This approachharms religious freedom in severalways: it perpetuates prej-udice and resentment that contributes to discrimination against Muslims, itincites hatred and agitation that leads to violence againstMuslims, and it callsinto question the universality of human rights by demanding severe restric-tions on Muslims that are justified by the defence of Christianity or its valuesand culture.The AfD also uses the issue of commitment to Christians in need for itsown political goals. For example, in 2018 the AfD submitted a motion to theBundestag formulating the goal of “stopping and sanctioning the persecutionof Christians.”While the goal of helping persecuted Christians is naturally le-gitimate and worthy of support, the wording of the motion’s justification im-plies that “Islam” is to be attributed the main responsibility for the persecu-tions. Among other things, themotionmakes the generalised claim that “thereis no freedom of religion in Islam according toWestern standards.”20The AfD may well achieve some success with this strategy in the fight forvotes and political agenda-setting. However, it avoids dealing with complexcontexts and turns legitimate concerns into toxic issues, making constructiveand objective debates very difficult.Staging themselves as the only sincere defendersof religious freedomThe AfD claims to be the only party in Germany that advocates effective pro-tection of religious freedom and persecuted Christians. This became clear– for example – when the AfD Member of the European Parliament (MEP)19 Konietzny, Benjamin: “‘AfD interpretiert Islamwie Islamisten’” (11 Oct. 2018), https://www.n-tv.de/politik/AfD-interpretiert-Islam-wie-Islamisten-article20666239.html, ac-cessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.20 BT-Drucksache 19/1698, p. 4, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/016/1901698.pdf,accessed on: 6 Sep. 2023.36 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom WorldwideJoachim Kuhs formulated the following in a statement with proposals forthe protection of persecuted Christians, criticising the Christian DemocraticUnion (Christlich Demokratische Union, CDU) and other parties: “Like millionsof other AfD voters, it is as clear as day to me that this lasting change for thesake of persecuted Christians and other harassed minorities will not happenwith the other parties. Not evenwith the CDU–as every observant person hasbeen able to recognise for decades.”21In many cases, the AfD also deliberately plays with the knowledge that itsmotions – as a politically isolated party – cannot expect any approval. For ex-ample, the party presents the cross-party rejection of amotion by the AfD par-liamentary group for the creation of the position of a Federal Commissioneragainst Christianophobia as proof that the fate of persecuted Christians is amatter close to the heart of the AfD alone. Other parties are portrayed as inac-tive or even hostile to Christians.22There are also attempts by the AfD to use people involved in the field ofreligious freedom for their own purposes. For example, in 2020 the AfD par-liamentary group in the Bundestag nominated Prof. Dr Christof Sauer, seniorconsultant of the International Institute for Religious Freedom,andAdoGreveof Open Doors – two experts who are committed to the protection of freedomof religion or belief and of Christians in need – for the board of trustees ofthe German Institute for Human Rights. However, ultimately the parliamen-tary group withdrew its nominations after Christof Sauer made it clear thathis nomination had been made without informing him. In a letter to the par-liamentary group, he described the nomination as an impertinence and calledon the AfD to “immediately withdraw the nomination and immediately with-draw the relevant documents from circulation.”2321 AfD: Joachim Kuhs: Christenverfolgung –Marktzugänge anMenschenrechte knüpfen!(9 Jun. 2021), https://www.afd.de/joachim-kuhs-christenverfolgung-marktzugaenge-an-menschenrechte-knuepfen/, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.22 AfD: Jürgen Braun: Ampel-Koalition schaut beim Thema Christenverfolgung weg (3Dec. 2021), https://afdbundestag.de/juergen-braun-ampel-koalition-schaut-beim-thema-christenverfolgung-weg/, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.23 Sauer, Christof: Absage für Nominierung als Kandidat für das Kuratorium des Deut-schen Instituts für Menschenrechte (DIMR), 13 Feb. 2020, https://www.bucer.de/fileadmin/dateien/Dokumente/BQs/BQ600ff/BQ638/2020-02-13_absage_dimr_nominierung_geschwaerzt.pdf, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Populist Reinterpretation. The Case of the AfD 37Self-attribution of the victim roleIf theAfDand its representatives are criticised for problematic statements anddemands, they often demonstrate that they are thin-skinned and even aggres-sive.Criticism such as the accusation of Islamophobia is rejected as inadmissi-ble.24 At the same time, the party itself anticipates or even provokes such crit-icism to present itself as the victim of a supposed political correctness.Frequently, the AfD also attacks the Protestant and Catholic Churches inGermany, which in their view have given in to the zeitgeist (the spirit of thetimes).25 Behind this seems to be a disappointment that the churches in themost important social positions considerably diverge from those of the AfD.With this in mind, in June 2019 the Thuringian state parliamentary group ofthe AfD – with the support of other prominent representatives of the party– published a paper entitled “Unholy Alliance – The Pact of the ProtestantChurchwith the Zeitgeist and the Powerful,” inwhich they criticise the Protes-tant Church in Germany (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, EKD), amongother things for its position on refugee aid and its commitment to climateprotection, and complain of exclusion on the part of the Church.26Further examples from German-speaking countriesSimilar patterns of attempted appropriation and reinterpretation of religiousfreedom can also be found in other larger and smaller far-right parties in24 In its manifesto, the AfD therefore speaks out “against defaming criticism of Islam as‘Islamophobia’ or ‘racism.’” (Programme of the AfD for the Election to the 20th GermanBundestag, p. 84.)25 Corresponding criticism comes – for example – from the chairperson of the work-ing group “Christians in the AfD” Joachim Kuhs: AfD-Christen-Sprecher Joachim Kuhs:‘Mehr Geist und Mut für die Kirchen!’ (7 Jun. 2019), https://www.joachimkuhs.de/christen-in-der-afd-mehr-geist-und-mut-fuer-die-kirchen/, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2019. OneAfD district association even claims that an AfD election victory is God’s will and thatit is not the “official church” and “antiquated clerics” who carry “the word of God tothe outside world”: Kirche+Leben: “Polenz entsetzt über ‘Gott will es’-Post der AfD” (26Apr. 2019), https://www.kirche-und-leben.de/artikel/polenz-entsetzt-ueber-gott-will-es-post-der-afd/, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.26 AfDHeiligenstadt: Unheilige Allianz. Der Pakt der evangelischen Kirchemit demZeit-geist und den Mächtigen (Jun. 2019), https://www.afd-heiligenstadt.de/fileadmin/Dateiablage/PDF/Kirchenpapier_Onlineversion.pdf, accessed on: 6 Sep. 2023.38 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom WorldwideGerman-speaking countries. For example, the Freedom Party of Austria (Frei-heitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) and the Swiss People’s Party (SchweizerischeVolkspartei, SVP) are the driving forces in their countries of a generalisingcampaign against Islam andmigration,which are presented as alleged threatsto Christian culture and the values of the West. For example, in the 2009European elections, the FPÖ put up posters with the slogan “Abendland inChristenhand” (“Occident in Christian hands”), and in Switzerland it is mostlypoliticians from the SVP and right-wing small parties who initiate legislativeand popular initiatives aimed at banning Islam and its symbols from thepublic sphere. After the ban on minaret building in Switzerland – which wasa result of one of these votes – was criticised by the Council of Europe, FranzObermayr, MEP for the FPÖ, in turn reacted by calling for the abolition of theCouncil of Europe, portraying the international organisation as a “centre ofleft-wing political correctness.”27Similar narratives and resentments as shown by the far-right parties arealso cultivated by right-wing movements, organisations and networks, creat-ing an even larger resonance space for corresponding ideas. A prominent ex-ample is the anti-Islammovement Pegida, whose supporters see themselves asdefenders of the “Christian Occident.” Leading politicians are regularly deni-grated from the ranks of themovement as “traitors to the people” because theydo not share the movement’s anti-Islam and anti-migration positions.28 ThePegida support association and several leading figures of the movement wereconvicted of incitement of the people or insult. In 2017, the Identitarianmove-ment also used the slogan “Religious freedom instead of Islamisation” during adisruptive action at the University of Regensburg to take up a narrative basedon a clientelist reinterpretation of religious freedom and construct and over-dramatize Islam as an enemy based on conspiracy theory.2927 APA-OTS: “FPÖ-Obermayr: Europarat als Zentrum der links-linken Political Correct-ness abschaffen!” (25 Jun. 2010), https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20100625_OTS0186/fpoe-obermayr-europarat-als-zentrum-der-links-linken-political-correctness-abschaffen, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.28 Die Welt: “Pegida-Demonstranten beschimpfen Merkel als ‘Volksverräter’” (3 Oct.2016), https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article158512578/Pegida-Demonstranten-beschimpfen-Merkel-als-Volksverraeter.html, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.29 Bayerischer Landtag, Drucksache 17/20749 (printedmatter Bavarian state parliament),p. 6, https://www1.bayern.landtag.de/www/ElanTextAblage_WP17/Drucksachen/Schriftliche%20Anfragen/17_0020749.pdf, accessed on: 6 Sep. 2023.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Populist Reinterpretation. The Case of the AfD 39In addition, research by the public broadcaster Norddeutscher Rundfunk(NDR) has revealed that representatives of the right-wing, conspiracy the-ory Reichsbürger movement30 have founded alleged Jewish associations. It waspossible to prove that in at least one case a corresponding sham religiouscommunity was used to apply for public subsidies. One interviewed memberof a corresponding association presented himself as a representative of “trueJudaism,” while blaming “Zionist Jews” for funding Hitler, thus spreadinganti-Semitic theories and at the same time abusing Judaism as a protectiveshield.31International networking of the stakeholdersBoth ideational and operational networking of right-wing actors is not lim-ited to the German-speaking region. For example, in 2019 the AfD founded theso-called InterparliamentaryHumanRights Commission (IPMK) in order to –according to its own statement – promote “Christian conservative values” andnetwork internationally for thispurpose.To this end, the chair of thebody,Ger-man parliamentarian Waldemar Herdt, has established contacts with a num-ber of right-wingEvangelicals andgovernment representatives and anti-LGBTactivists on at least four different continents.3230 The Reichsbürger movement is a form of conspiracy-ideological sovereigntism found inGermany. Reichsbürger is a collective term for groups and individuals who have in com-mon that they deny the legitimacy and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germanyand its legal system. In doing so, they invoke the conspiracy theory argument that theGermanReich continues to exist. SomeReichsbürger claim that Germany is still in a stateofwar and that the Federal Republic (sometimes referred toby themas analleged com-pany “BRDGmbH”) is only a fabricated construct for occupation administration. Follow-ing such conspiracy theory ideas,Reichsbürger typically reject the legitimacy of the lawsof the Federal Republic of Germany and refuse to pay taxes and fees, for example. Theyoften use self-made passports and driving licenses. Anti-Semitic and anti-democraticnarratives are widespread in the Reichsbürger scene. Esoteric and sect-like, sometimeseven openly right-wing extremist attitudes can often be observed.31 Feldmann, Julian: “‘Reichsbürger’ gründen ‘Jüdische Gemeinden’” (14 Sep. 2023), https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/panorama/reichsbuerger-juden-juedische-gemeinde-100.html, accessed on: 28 Sep. 2023.32 Becker, Andrea/Franzen, Niklas: “Globale Allianzen der neuen Rechten: Predigt vonganz rechts” (20 Aug. 2021), https://taz.de/Globale-Allianzen-der-neuen-Rechten/!5792401/, accessed on: 6 Sep. 2023.40 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom WorldwideConclusionRight-wing networks in German-speaking countries refer to topics such as re-ligious freedom,persecution of Christians or supposedly threatenedChristianvalues or culture. They often refer to a kind of cultural Christianity, which isjust as connectable in traditionalist and right-wing conservativemilieus as it isamong identitarians and secularists with an affinity to authoritarian and illib-eral thinking. In doing so, they reinterpret religious freedom in a clientelisticway to suit their right-wing ideologies. Islam,migration and a supposed gen-der ideology are conjured up as images of the enemy. In this way, these move-ments fuel conspiracy theories on the one hand and tie in with widespreadprejudices and fears on the other. The right-wing actors present themselvesas the only sincere defenders of religious freedom and the Christian Occidentand its values and culture.The corresponding narratives and strands of argu-mentation are not free of contradictions; for example when they emphasisethe threat to homosexuals posed by Islam and migration and promote a “tra-ditional image of the family” and stir up sentiment against a “gender ideol-ogy.” By persistently repeating the samemessages and narratives, these actorsremain at least partly entrenched in a broader public. The situation becomesparticularly problematic when religious freedom is subsequently perceived asa “right-wing issue” and ultimately the unprejudiced commitment to this hu-man right is mademore difficult.Escalating the Populist ApproachThe Case of Russia and the Significance of HistoryRegina ElsnerConstructing a useful history is a crucial element of populist approaches tothe public discourse. Since the end of the Soviet Union, the Russian OrthodoxChurch (ROC) has become amastermind of history andmemory constructionin Russia, and at the same time an important actor in international networksof the defense of the freedom of religion or belief (FoRB).While the defense ofso-called “traditional Christian values” is a strategy of many populists to limitrights of other religious communities or the rights of free speech or artisticfreedom, the history of the ROC’s approach to religious freedomdeserves spe-cial attention. In a rather uniqueway, theROCappropriated thememory of re-pression of Orthodox faithful during the Soviet Union to claim a special rightto define where, when and whose religious freedom is under threat. The of-ficial justification of Russia’s war against Ukraine by arguments of defendingreligious freedom symbolizes the peak of populist appropriation and perver-sion of this human right, and the limits of efficiency of international humanrights coalitions.Constructing a useful history by appropriating repressionRussia and especially the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) have been amongthemost influential actors in global networks for the protection of the freedomof religion or belief (FoRB) for a long time.The roots of this engagement traceback to the Cold War, and this history is particular important to understandthe way in which the ROC uses the human rights discourse in the post-Soviettime. Since the 1950s, two developments that might seem paradoxical havetakenplace.On the one hand, the persecution of religion by the Soviet atheisticgovernment gained new intensity after a short period of concessions during42 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom WorldwideWorld War II. On the other hand, after the late-1940s, representatives of theROC were implemented in all major international institutions concernedwith human rights and the human dimension of global politics, such as theUnited Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Co-operation inEurope (OSCE), the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the Conferenceof European Churches (CEC). The simultaneous persecution of faithful andcollaboration of church representatives caused a kind of ecclesial schizophre-nia, which was difficult to capture by ecclesiological concepts and thereforeremained unaddressed in Russian as well as ecumenical discourses.As part of Josef Stalin’s attempt to use the ROC first for war mobilizationand later for state propaganda, in 1946 the ROCwas allowed to establish a “De-partment for External Church Relations.”This department enabled the churchto develop international ecumenical relationships, but it also served the taskto support the Soviet foreign agenda. While the faith community in the So-viet Union underwent repression and partly direct persecution, the leadershipadvocated for religious freedom and against discrimination on internationalforums.This time of international religious diplomacy had several highly sus-tainable affects.First, it taught the church the languageofhumanrights,whichthrough the publications in church journals empowered the educated faithfuland priests to reflect on their own rights and freedoms, but it also empoweredthe church diplomats to be a respected part of the international discourse evenbefore conducting a theological discourse of the fundaments of human rights.Second, the church learned theprotocol of international relations.As a result, arather stable groupof diplomats developedwithin the church,who as so-calledtravel cadre (“Reisekader”1) maintained a closed discourse about the place of theSoviet Union and the ROC in the international peacemovement. As a third re-sult, the participation of church representatives in the exchange between theblocks and the task to adapt theological ideas to the geopolitical discoursesabout disarmament, deterrence, social justice and coexistence strengtheneda consciousness of a dualistic world.This dualistic approach is not alien to thetheological perspective on worldly matters; however, with the dualism of sys-tems, the theological approach shifted from eschatological to current sociopo-litical aspects. Finally, the ROC and Russia became important allies and overtime the leader of the societies and countries with a strong anti-American and1 Beljakova, Nadezhda/Bremer, Thomas/Kunter, Katharina: “Es gibt keinen Gott!” Kir-chen und Kommunismus. Eine Konfliktgeschichte, Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder 2016,p. 128.R. Elsner: Escalating the Populist Approach. The Case of Russia 43anti-Capitalist sentiment. The anti-colonial rhetoric and the demand for so-cial justice – mainly advocated by protestant churches from the Global South– appeared very compatible with Christian principles and easy to comply within contrast to the anti-Communist currents within the Catholic Church.Thesealliances proved sustainable beyond the end of the ColdWar.The ROC became a crucial actor in the discourse about religious freedomduring theColdWar. ForWestern churches and other participants of the peacemovement during the Cold War, the presence of the ROC was important be-cause everyone was aware of the persecution of religions in the Soviet Union.Giving a leading voice to one of the most persecuted communities of a worldreligion in the international human rights activities was an important way tohighlight the problem at that time. At the same time, especially German ecu-menical partners tried to include the ROC in international contexts as a partof coping with their own guilt of WorldWar II. Of course, most partners wereaware of the political instrumentalization of the international activities of theROC, but the aim to build bridges over the Iron Curtain was mostly stronger.The ROC thus received remarkable moral capital in the international contextdue to the persecution that Christians suffered under the Soviet regime,whichat the same time supported the church diplomacy.The legacy of a repressed and persecuted church remained with the ROCand was effectively used in ecumenical and human rights networks after theend of the Soviet Union. Additionally, since the late-1980s, the revival of reli-gious life strengthened the self-consciousness of the church and the attentionof the international community. Relatively quickly, the ROC claimed to be thelargestOrthodoxchurchbynumbersof faithful, thusdemandingapriority rolewithin the Orthodox community. As a result of the Cold War times, the ROCwas an established participant in international networks, where other Ortho-dox churches or other religious communities especially fromthe socialist blockonly started to build contacts.On the other hand, the ecumenical and other in-ternational partnerswere grateful for the new freedomof faithful in the regionand proud of their important contacts, and they valued the ecumenical open-ness of the ROC, which was not common for other Orthodox churches.In 2000, theROC took twodecisive steps nourishing its reputation in theseinternational contexts.The Jubilee Bishops Council approved the “Basis of the44 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom WorldwideSocial Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church,”2 the first socio-ethical doc-ument of an Orthodox church in history. The same council approved the col-lective canonization ofmore than 1,000NewMartyrs, Orthodox believers whodied during the persecution of religion by the Bolsheviks and the Great Terrorin the 1920 to 1930s.3 The international ecumenical community paid consid-erable attention to both decisions. Without exploring these crucial events ingreater depth, in the context of the discourse about FoRB two aspects are im-portant. First, the Social Concept dedicates several paragraphs to the questionof freedom of conscience in particular and human rights in general, markingthem notably as lesser evil because they serve the defense of traditional reli-gions in a secular world.However, they also underline in chapter III.6 “[…] thatthe spiritual value system has disintegrated and that most people in a societywhich affirms the freedom of conscience no longer aspire for salvation. If ini-tially the state emerged as an instrument of asserting divine law in society, thefreedom of conscience has ultimately turned state in an exclusively temporalinstitute with no religious commitments.The adoption of the freedom of con-science as legal principle points to the fact that society has lost religious goalsand values and becomemassively apostate and actually indifferent to the taskof the Church and to the overcoming of sin.”4 In the special document on hu-man rights from 2008, the ROC underlined this understanding of FoRB as aright of religious communities to be protected, rather than a right of individ-uals to freely choose a religion, or none. FoRB thus has to serve the church toconduct its salvificmission, and remains alien to the perceived core of RussianOrthodox Christianity.Second, the canonization of theNewMartyrs drew attention to the historyof repressed and persecuted believers and thus was a strong marker for thecommitment of the ROC to FoRB.Without doubt, the losses of live and suffer-ing of believers of the ROC due to their individual religious confession was ex-2 Bishop’s Council of the Russian Orthodox Church: The Basis of the Social Concept,Moskau 2000, https://mospatusa.com/files/THE-BASIS-OF-THE-SOCIAL-CONCEPT.pdf, accessed on: 20 Jul. 2023.3 Bishop’s Council of the Russian Orthodox Church: Деяние ЮбилейногоАрхиерейскогоСобора о соборномпрославленииНовомучениковиисповедниковРоссийских ХХ века (Acts of the Jubilee Council of Bishops on the Conciliar Glorifica-tion of the New Martyrs and Confessors of Russia of the Twentieth Century), Moskau2000, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/423849.html, accessed on: 20 Jul. 2023.4 For the English version, see: https://old.mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/iii/,accessed on: 26 Oct. 2023.R. Elsner: Escalating the Populist Approach. The Case of Russia 45ceptional in numbers and strategy, althoughother religious communitieswerealso under the threat of extinction.However, the canonization isolated the suf-fering of the believers from the history of collaboration and guilt within theinstitutionalized church and thus appropriated the legacy of the suffering forthe whole church without addressing the different layers of entanglement ofthe church itself. For the commitment to FoRB, this means an immunizationof the institutional church against the accusation of limiting religious freedom(practically through support of according political programs or theoretically bydevelopingaccording ideologies).AsOlegMorozovdescribes, the canonizationserved to establish themythology of a victim,whichprevented any further pro-cess of self-critical approach.5 For the international partner, it seems impossi-ble or at least unimaginable that a church could favor limitations of religiousfreedom having suffered it so much in the nearest past, and honor the mem-ory of the victims of religious persecution in such a way as the canonization ofhundreds of martyrs. Who could be a better advocate for FoRB than a churchresurrected from devastation?Thepost-Soviet leadership of theROCappropriated the identity of a perse-cuted church without the authentic experience of persecution.They used it asmoral capital within the Russian society, framing critique against the churchas new persecution and demanding legal persecution of its critiques to avoidfalling back into communist times,6 but also in its relations with the West.The authority of this church in alliances for religious freedom largely drawson its claim to “know what persecution really means” and therefore being ableto recognize destructive ideologies fromafar and being somehowanatural de-fender of true religious freedom.Thus, the ROC established permanent repre-sentations to the European institutions and the UN to defend the rights of re-5 Morozov, Oleg: “Легендыимифыроссийской истории: историческая политика руко-водства Русской православной церкви в начале XXI в.” (The Legends and Myths ofRussian History: the Russian Orthodox Church’s Approach to History at the Start of theTwenty-First Century), in: Alexey Malashenko/Sergej Filatov (eds.), Монтаж и демон-таж секулярного мира (Assembling and Disassembling the Secular World), Москва:Российская политическая энциклопедия (Росспен) 2014, pp. 255–322.6 Filatov, Sergej: “Русское православие, общество и власть во времена политиче-ской турбулентности. РПЦ после осени 2011 г.” (Russian Orthodoxy, Society, andthe Regime During the Times of Political Turbulence. The Russian Orthodox ChurchAfter the Autumn of 2011), in: Alexey Malashenko/Sergej Filatov (eds.): Монтаж идемонтаж секулярного мира (Assembling and Disassembling the Secular World),Москва: Российская политическая энциклопедия (Росспен) 2014, pp. 9–41.46 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwideligious communities, and the topic of religious freedombecame a cornerstoneof its international appearance in ecumenical and interreligious contexts.7 Es-pecially in ecumenical dialogues, the end of the obvious Soviet political instru-mentalization of the dialogues nurtured the hope for a constructive and ex-perienced Orthodox partner with an ecumenical openness, which many otherOrthodox churches lacked.However, the appreciation of the ROC in ecumenical and human rightsnetworks ignored several important aspects. First, the ROCwas no longer rep-resentative for the churches in former Soviet countries such as Ukraine, Be-larus,Moldova,Georgia or theBaltic states.Although theMoscowPatriarchateclaims the structural jurisdiction over large parts of the former Soviet Union,the people of these new independent countries often developed an indepen-dent social consciousness and – seemingly even more importantly – an inde-pendentmemory culture.Repression and instrumentalization of religion dur-ing Soviet times played a visible role in the public discourse as other than Or-thodox repressed communities, which came back from the underground anddemanded justice. In the international contexts, the religious communities ofUkraine, Belarus or Moldova nevertheless appeared exclusively as part of theRussian Orthodox delegations, without its own voice.Second, the leadership of the ROC has been complicit with the Sovietleadership in the persecution of religious minorities, most prominently theGreek-Catholic Church in Ukraine and Belarus, as well as Orthodox dissi-dents, reflecting a historical fact that has never been addressed by the church.This leadership of the church did not change or undergo de-communizationafter the end of the Soviet Union. The memory of the New Martyrs allowedessentially eliminating the collaboration of church representatives from theofficial historical narrative and underlining the picture of a persecuted andresurrected church. In addition, religious dissidents in the Soviet Union – ifthey survived – largely remained repressed dissidents within their church inpost-Soviet Russia. None of the officially and individually repressed priestslike Gleb Yakunin, Alexandr Ogorodnikov, Georgij Edelshtejn or AlexandrMen– all of whom fought for FoRB with quite severe personal consequences –gained some kind of acknowledgment or promotion. Finally, the appreciationof FoRB by the leadership of the ROC never included a similar engagement for7 Stoeckl, Kristina/Medvedeva, Kseniya: “Double Bind at the UN:Western actors, Russia,and the traditionalist agenda,” in: Global Constitutionalism:HumanRights, democracyand the rule of law 7 (3/2018), pp. 383–421.R. Elsner: Escalating the Populist Approach. The Case of Russia 47the freedom of other religious communities. In the late-1990s, the negativeattitude in relation to other religious communities in Russia among Ortho-dox elites was still very high.8 Since then, the Orthodox currents in growingxenophobia and faith-based discrimination within Russian society have beenconstantly growing, without any intervention by the ROC’s leadership.9Looking at this history of appropriation of the experience of repression bythe ROC leadership, the problematic conditions of an international actor inthe system of advocating and protecting religious freedom who has its ownlong and publicly negated story of fighting human rights become obvious.Thesituation of the ROC since 2012 –when the church leadership enforced its col-laborationwith the autocratic state against a free civil society– is therefore nota new development. Thus, acknowledging this distinct pre-history could be afirst step towards understanding the ambiguity of the ROC’s participation ininternational coalitions for FoRB.Freedom of religion as a weaponThe second dimension of the ROC’s instrumental approach to FoRB after theconstruction of the useful history of faith-based repression during the SovietUnion is the consolidation of a post-Soviet civilizational identity as the lastdefender of traditional – redemptive – Christianity. During its engagementin overcoming the East-West divide during the ColdWar, the ROC positionedRussia and Russian Orthodoxy as an organic part of Europe, namely theWest-ern civilizational sphere. With the end of the Soviet Union and the search forthe roots of Russian identity, anti-Western sentiments and an alleged onto-logical difference to theWestern identity were revived, having been part of Or-thodox and Russian thinking in the previous centuries. Using different older8 Furmann, Dmitrij/Kääriäinen, Kimmo: “Люди на тающей льдине (Ценностныеориентации религиозной элиты России)” (People on the Melting Ice Floe. Value Ori-entations of Russia’s Religious Elite), in: Voprosy Filosofii (1/1999), pp. 27–33.9 Verkhovskij, Alexandr/Pain, Emil: Цивилизационный национализм: российскаяверсия «особого пути» (Civilisational nationalism: the Russian Version of the “Spe-cial Path”), in: Emil Pain (eds.): Идеология «особого пути»: истоки, содержание,последствия (Ideology of the “Special Path”: origins, content, consequences), Москва:Три квадрата 2010, pp. 171–210; Sibireva, Olga: “Challenges to Freedom of Consciencein Russia in 2022” (13 Apr. 2023), https://www.sova-center.ru/en/religion/publications/2023/04/d47036/, accessed on: 21 Jul. 2023.48 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwideconcepts of Moscow as the Third Rome, Eurasia, the Holy Rus’ or the ancientKatechon, this worldview sees Russia as opposing a collective West, which itdescribes as secular, liberal, hedonistic, persecuting Christians in the name ofminority rights and disseminating destructive ideologies like gender ideologyto commit genocide against traditional cultures. This is depicted as an exis-tential threat not only for Russia but also humankind, including paying specialattention to the anti-colonial currents in societies of the Global South. Thus,Russia fulfills a messianic role in an apocalyptic battle.These ideas build on deep anxieties of a society, which for seven decadesheard about the will of a fascist West to destroy it.The only power able to stopfascism has been Russia during the Second World War with the help of theROC. In this construction, Russia and the ROC will be the only credible forceable to stop new offenses of fascism or other destructive ideologies like Marx-ism in the future. Both the ROC leadership and the political elites in post-So-viet Russia invested huge efforts in constructing a paradigmof Russia’s victoryover evil through the history of World War II as the main identity marker forRussian society in the 21st century.Within this construction, againmany ques-tions had no place, such as the issue of guilt, failure, atrocities by the Sovietarmy, the annihilation of the diverse ethnic, cultural and religious identitieswithin the Soviet Union and the distinct alternative narratives of this histori-cal landmark by the people of the republics, especially in Ukraine, Belarus andthe Baltic states.The homogenization of diversememories and identities pro-vided by the Soviets was continued by the jointmemory politics of the politicaland ecclesiastical elites in 21st-century Russia.When Patriarch Kirill spoke about the war in Ukraine as a “metaphysical”battle inMarch 2022, he consequently relied on this prepared narrative of Rus-sia fighting the good battle against evil. Russian civil society has experiencedthis battle before when the Russian state together with the ROC instrumental-ized the human rights discourse to enforce illiberal politics.10 Individual andcivil rights and freedoms have been repressed since 2012, at the latest. Theselegal repressions have been strategically justified with the “defense of tradi-tional Christian values”: spiritual-moral values and a concept of “spiritual se-curity” became part of the National Security Strategy,11 NGOs and religious10 Stoeckl: Double Bind.11 Stoeckl, Kristina: “Russia’s Spiritual Security Doctrine as a Challenge to European Com-prehensive Security Approaches,” in: The Review of Faith & International Affairs 20(4/2022), pp. 37–44.R. Elsner: Escalating the Populist Approach. The Case of Russia 49organizations like Jehovah’s Witness or non-mainstream Muslim communi-ties have been banned as extremists or “foreign agents,” domestic violence hasbeen de-criminalized to defend the sacred sphere of the nuclear family, LGB-TIQ people have been forced to invisibility, and criticism of the ROC in artisticways has been framed as “humiliation of religious feelings.” At the same time,the so-called “traditional values” have remained extremely fluid and vague.It was Ukraine’s commitment to the European integration since at least2013/2014with theEuro-Maidan that posedaparticular danger forRussia’s sal-vatory civilizational project. For Russia,Ukraine and Belarus are integral partsof their Russian space, as they are for the ROC as part of the ecclesial juris-diction and spiritual civilization. However, in Ukraine, independent nationalpolicies and social dynamics as well as a rule-of-law approach to the historicalreligious plurality made it impossible to push the same legal restrictions. Thepopulist attempts of simplification and enemy images could not gain compa-rable success due to the strong appreciation of cultural and religious diversityafter the Soviet Union and the lack of glorification of the past.The narration of“traditional values” could not take ground in a society with diverse traditions.The same counts for an exclusive claim of religious freedom for one Orthodoxtradition as there are other Orthodox and several other confessional and reli-gious communities that shape the public discourses.After 1990, the Ukrainian Orthodox community tried to detach from theRussian influence, although even the global Christian community accepted theclaim of the ROC that Ukraine “somehow” belongs to the Russian church. Un-til now, the majority of observers in the West perceive Orthodoxy in Ukraineas Russian Orthodoxy in Ukraine and therefore support the Russian colonialapproach toUkraine and consequently the accusation of the ROC that Ukrainewould oppress parts of the Russian faithful.The reluctance to acknowledge re-ligious autonomy inUkraine (andBelarus) on theglobal stage and the tendencyto subscribe to the Russian view on Ukraine had a crucial impact on the abilityof Russia to develop a narrative about the persecuted Christians in Ukraine.Since 2018 and the establishment of the independent Orthodox Church ofUkraine, the ROC –with the support of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – hasengaged in systematic reporting and monitoring of violent and rhetorical at-tacks on the Ukrainian Orthodox church. They have reported about the “statepersecution of Christians” on the international level, namely to the European50 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom WorldwideParliament, OSCE and the UN.12 This argument is an important part of theRussian propaganda about Ukraine as a Nazi regime with satanic and genoci-dal tactics. At the same time, religious freedom is restricted extensively in alloccupied territories, priests and faithful are deported, temples destroyed andsacred places humiliated.13In the first weeks of 2023, the whole dilemma of the role of the ROC in theinternational defense of FoRB became obvious. Aftermonths of hesitating, theUkrainian government changed its politics in relation to the UkrainianOrtho-dox Church, which has been amajor gateway for Russian influence in Ukrainebut tried to detach from Moscow since spring 2022. In an attempt to defeatall collaboration and impact from the Russian aggressor within Ukraine, thestate enforced pressure on the church, its major monasteries and hierarchs,posing legal investigations and sanctions on them. Empowered by this strat-egy, large parts of society supported a radical ban of the UOC and cases of vi-olence against buildings and faithful of the UOC emerged. Several draft lawsagainst the churchwere submitted,most of them in conflict with general prin-ciples of FoRB. The international community – both political and ecumenical– had kept silent on these developments for quite a long time, asmost of themwere sympathetic with the emotional sentiment behind the developments andwith a country threatened with elimination. As a tragical result, the ROC –whowas amajor ideological pillowof the aggression againstUkraine–was theonly public voice advocating for the rights of theUOC to religious freedom.Af-ter months of ambivalent signals from the ecumenical partners in relation tothewarmongering position of the ROC leadership, all attempts to isolate themfrom international recognition failed at the moment when the internationalcommunity had to acknowledge the highly questionable course of religiouspolicies of the Ukrainian government. Arguing with the historical memory of12 Elsner, Regina: ‘Verfolgte’ Kirche in der Ukraine? Kriegspropaganda, Kirchenkonfliktund globale Konsequenzen, ed. by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (= Monitor Religionund Politik), Berlin 2022, https://www.kas.de/de/monitor/detail/-/content/verfolgte-kirche-in-der-ukraine, accessed on: 21 Jul. 2023; Elsner, Regina/Fenno, Iryna:Religionsfreiheit: Ukraine, ed. by Internationales Katholisches Missionswerk missioe.V./Renovabis e.V. (= Länderberichte Religionsfreiheit 59), Aachen 2023, https://www.missio-hilft.de/missio/informieren/wofuer-wir-uns-einsetzen/religionsfreiheit-menschenrechte/laenderberichte-religionsfreiheit/laenderbericht-059-ukraine.pdf,accessed on: 23 Dec. 2023.13 Institute for Religious Freedom: Project Locked Faith. The voice of believers during thewar in Ukraine (2022), https://lockedfaith.org/en/c/4, accessed on: 21 Jul. 2023.R. Elsner: Escalating the Populist Approach. The Case of Russia 51Soviet politics against the Orthodox community and expecting “newmartyrs”on Ukrainian soil, the ROC masterfully appropriated the FoRB discourse togain international recognition despite its justification of months of Russianatrocities.Culture wars learned and escalatedAs a final point, it is worth recalling that Russia and the ROChave not inventednew or original ways ofmisusing the freedomof religion in theways describedby Bernd Hirschberger and Katja Voges in the introduction to this book. AsKristina Stoeckl andDmitryUzlaner showed for the case of CultureWars,Rus-sia and the ROCfirst learned a lot fromWestern populist allies.14 However, themajor difference compared with the Western ways of populist appropriationis the fact that in Russia it is the institutionalized church, its leadership andofficial structures who support this appropriation in systematic ways and inclose alliance with the state. At present, forWestern societies the leadership ofchurches are an important opposition to populists, even in such countries likeItaly or Hungary, and to some extent even in Poland. However, the ROC is nomarginal player inbothOrthodoxyandChristian ecumenism.It seems that thestraight commitment of this official church to a perverted concept of humanrights and freedom of religion has been very attractive for Western conserva-tive actors. Prior to the escalation of Russia’s war, with the ROC conservativeactors in the West received a recognized ecclesial authority that they miss intheir own churches.Russia’s war against Ukraine and its outright justification with the allegeddefense of traditional values and Christian religious freedom are a radical andhorrible escalation of the populist appropriation of FoRB. At present, it is un-clear whether this escalation will have some kind of impact on the agenda ofother illiberal or populist actors. The ambivalent or hesitant reaction of con-servative networks and ecumenical allies like the Vatican or the WCC to theilliberal religious ideology of the war and the situation of religious communi-ties in Ukraine point to a certain deadlock of their engagement for FoRB.Theyappreciated Russia’s straight commitment to religious freedom–perceived asthe only conservative human right in contrast (and not in complementarity)14 Stoeckl, Kristina/Uzlaner, Dmitry: Moralist International: Russia in the Global CultureWars, New York: Fordham University Press 2022.52 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwideto other, liberal individual human rights for too long – and it is still not obvi-ous that they changed their mind in the face of this militant escalation.15 Theshort analysis given before suggests that the former uncritical approach to theROC’s history of repression and usage of history is one important key to thisdeadlock. Take this history seriously and confronting the ROCwith these am-biguities at least on the ecumenical level would be a first step for a credibleadvocacy for FoRB in Ukraine and Russia as well as in those regions like Africaor the Middle East where the ROC also claims a leading role in defending per-secuted Christians.15 Elsner, Regina: “Frieden im ökumenischen Dialog mit der Russischen Orthodoxen Kir-che,“ in: RGOW 51 (2023), pp. 18–21.Hungary under Viktor Orbán“Illiberal Christian Democracy” and theInstrumentalisation of Religious FreedomRita Perintfalvi and Katja VogesViktor Orbán’s government has boasted of its commitment to religious free-dom on many occasions. A closer look reveals that this commitment is verylimited – namely to helping Christians in need abroad, and that, moreover,restrictions on religious freedom are increasing inHungary itself.The govern-ment deliberately links the issue of religious freedomwith its populist politicsand rhetoric, thus creating a dangerous reinterpretation of religious freedomin the public perception.The development of an “Illiberal Christian Democracy”Since 2010, Hungarian democracy has undergone a fundamental transforma-tion.Most critics of PrimeMinister Viktor Orbán of the Fidesz party were notsurprised when Orbán outlined his vision of building an “illiberal democracy”in Hungary during a speech in Băile Tuşnad (Hungarian: Tusnádfürdő), Roma-nia, in July 2014.1 Part of Orbán’s plan for such a democracy is the formalisticreduction of democracy to elections, the centralisation of government powerand the criticismof liberal concepts of freedomand rights.Theaim is toprotectthe “cultural order” and thus reject issues such as immigration, feminism andgender in particular. Especially since 2018, Orbán has focused on a Christianconcept of illiberal democracy, in which the narrative of Christian victimhoodis central, as will be shown later.1 Tóth, Csaba: “Full text of Viktor Orbán’s speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of 26 July2014” (29 Jul. 2014), https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/, accessed on: 5 Aug. 2023.54 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom WorldwideOrbán’s concept of illiberal democracy is reflected in constitutional amend-ments and international initiatives and has a direct impact on civil liberties.The Fidesz-KDNP2 coalition won the 2010 parliamentary election with atwo-thirds majority, creating a constitutional political force. After the elec-tion victory, the new coalition used this supermajority to make numerousamendments to the constitution. Subsequently, on 18 April 2011, after a non-transparent preparatory phase, parliament adopted a new constitution calledFundamental Law (Magyarország Alaptörvénye).3 Since this Fundamental Lawwas signed by the President of the Republic, Pál Schmitt, on 25 April 2011,Easter Monday, it has been referred to as the Easter Constitution. The datingtakes on a symbolic significance by linking the birth of Hungarian statehoodwith the resurrection of Jesus.According to Hungarian political scientist András Bozóki,4 the preambleof the Fundamental Law in particular highlights “the political fusion betweennationalism and Christianity.”5 It states: “We recognise the role of Christianityin the preservation of the nation.”6 The Basic Law of 2011 only treats individ-ual rights of freedom as linked to the common good, whereby it does not con-sider them a value in themselves.The fundamental rights cannot be separatedfrom the basic duties, with the latter being derived from a Christian world-view. The textual formulations place a much stronger emphasis on religion,traditions and “national values” than before.The Fundamental Law is based onthe concept of a homogeneous nation.When it refers to equality before the lawin Article XV (2), gender, ethnicity and religion are mentioned; however, legalprotection has not been extended to sexual minorities.2 KDNP is the Christian Democratic People’s Party, the smaller governing party next toFidesz in Hungary.3 Fundamental Law of Hungary, 2011: https://www.parlament.hu/irom39/02627/02627.pdf, accessed on: 14 Sep. 2023. For the English translation, see https://www.parlament.hu/documents/125505/138409/Fundamental+law/73811993-c377-428d-9808-ee03d6fb8178.4 Unless otherwise noted, quotes that have not been published in English have beentranslated into English by the authors of the chapter.5 Zoltán, Ádám/Bozóki, András: “Vallás és jobboldali populizmus Magyarországon,” in:Mozgó világ 44 (3/2018), pp. 17–38, p. 26.6 Fundamental Law of Hungary, 2011.R. Perintfalvi/K. Voges: “Illiberal Christian Democracy.” Hungary under Victor Orbán 55In recent years, there have again been numerous amendments to thislaw,7 which the populist government pushed through according to its ownpower interests and without real consultation with the opposition.8 In manyrespects, there have been steps backwards in the protection of fundamentalrights since 2010. In connection with freedom of religion and its instrumen-talisation, some peculiarities of the Basic Law and other laws as well as someamendments should be mentioned.The Hungarian Fundamental Law provides in Article R (4) that “[t]he pro-tection of the constitutional identity and Christian culture ofHungary shall bean obligation of every organ of the state.” This is reflected in particular in theconstitutionalisation of the traditional concept of family andmarriage. ArticleL (1) of the Fundamental Law defines marriage “as the union of one man andone woman established by voluntary decision, and the family as the basis ofthe survival of the nation. Family ties shall be based on marriage or the rela-tionship between parents and children.” This definition of family was alreadyintegrated into the constitutional text by the Fourth Amendment in 2013.9The Ninth Amendment in 2020 added the provision that “[t]he mother shallbe a woman, the father shall be a man.”10 The constitutional enshrinement ofthis form of marriage explicitly excludes same-sex marriages. Unlike otherforms of relationships, the classical family model is not only constitutionallyprotected but must be explicitly favoured by the state.Furthermore, this amendment of 2020 constitutionally enshrined in Arti-cle XVI (1) discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation declaring that itis the duty of the state to “protect the right of children to a self-identity corre-sponding to their sex at birth, and shall ensure an upbringing for them that isin accordance with the values based on the constitutional identity and Chris-tian culture of our country.” Under the guise of protecting the best interests ofthe child, the constitutional amendment thus formulates a norm that is highlyproblematic. Completely ignoring current scientific knowledge on transsexu-ality, the constitution postulates that it wants to protect the self-identity of the7 Szente, Zoltán: “Constitutional Changes in Populist Times,” in: Revue of Central andEast European Law 47 (2022), pp. 12–36, p. 15.8 Zoltán: Constitutional Changes, p. 16.9 Bill T/9929. Fourth Amendment of the Fundamental Law of Hungary (8 Feb. 2013).10 Bill T/13647. Ninth Amendment of the Fundamental Law of Hungary (23 Dec. 2020).The current status of the legislation (12 Sep. 2023): https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1100425.atv.56 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwidechild,which is consideredunchangeably frombirth.11Thedetailed explanatorymemorandum to Article 3 of the amendment warns that “[t]he new, modernideological processes in theWestern world […] are […] threatening the wellbe-ing of children.”12 It is considered part of human dignity that children have aright to a gender that corresponds to their sex at birth: “Sex at birth is an at-tribute that cannot be changed: people are born either male or female.” On theproposal of the Minister of Justice, Judit Varga, the parliament presented an-other amendment to the law, which excluded single persons as well as same-sex couples from the possibility of adopting children.13In addition, in May 2020 the Hungarian National Assembly passed a newlaw that ended the legal recognition of gender reassignment in official docu-ments.This is achieved by replacing the term “sex” in civil status registers withthe term “sex at birth,” which is legally defined by “the primary sexual charac-teristics” or “biological sex determined by chromosomes.”14This change in thelaw – which was passed by parliament in May 2020 despite a wave of fiercenational and international protests – constitutes serious legal discriminationagainst transgender and intersexpersons.Not least, the amendment to the lawviolated the European standards established by the Council of Europe, whichguarantee transsexuals in all EU states the right to have their gender identityrecognised in a quickly accessible and transparent procedure.15For years, Hungary has been working on a global network on “traditionalfamily values” and organising demographic summits with prominent inter-national speakers, significantly including a Hungarian-Polish signature cam-11 Szente: Constitutional Changes, pp. 31–32.12 Bill T/13647, General justification, Art. 3, p. 9–10, https://www.parlament.hu/irom41/13647/13647.pdf, accessed on: 30 Sep. 2023.13 Bill T/13648. Draft law amending certain laws on justice of 10 Nov. 2020, § 99, https://www.parlament.hu/irom41/13648/13648.pdf, accessed on: 14 Sep. 2023.14 Bill T/9934. Changes of Certain Administrative Laws and Free Donation of Property (31Mar. 2020), § 33 Art. 2 and 3, pp. 9–10, https://www.parlament.hu/irom41/09934/09934.pdf, accessed on: 14 Sep. 2023.15 Council of Europe: Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 of the Committee of Ministers tomember states on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orien-tation or gender identity, Art. IV. 21, http://tinyurl.com/cp32kfa, accessed on: 14 Sep.2023; see also United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner: Hun-gary LGBT: New law proposal endangers rights of the trans and gender diverse per-sons, warns UN expert (29 Apr. 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2020/04/hungary-lgbt-new-law-proposal-endangers-rights-trans-and-gender-diverse, ac-cessed on: 18 Oct. 2023.R. Perintfalvi/K. Voges: “Illiberal Christian Democracy.” Hungary under Victor Orbán 57paign to prevent the EU’s accession to the Istanbul Convention on the Promo-tion of the Protection ofWomen’s Rights andGender Equality,which–accord-ing to the Hungarian government-affiliated conservative Centre for Funda-mental Rights (Alapjogokért Központ) – is designed according to the “principlesof gender ideology.”16Strengthening “Christian values” and violations of religious freedomAll of these national and international initiatives and encroachments on fun-damental rights are linked to the declared aim of strengthening the country’s“Christian values” and “Christian identity.” However, shortly after 2010, free-dom of religion or belief (FoRB) in the country was increasingly restricted.Renáta Uitz describes this in particular regarding the changed registrationprocedures for religious communities through a new law of 2011,17 which wasoriginally justified with the alleged need to reduce the number of registeredchurches18 and strengthen Hungarian traditions. However, “the Hungarianparliament regards the recognition of churches not as a question concern-ing freedom of religion but as a matter reserved for the discretion of thesovereign.”19Thus, until 2011, Hungarian legislation guaranteed church status for reli-gious organisations through a unified judicial registration procedure.20 Based16 On human rights issues of gender justice within religious communities, includingwithin the Catholic Church, see Third Ecumenical Report on Religious Freedom:Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz/Kirchenamt der Evangelischen Kirchein Deutschland (eds.): 3. Ökumenischer Bericht zur Religionsfreiheit weltweit. Einechristliche Perspektive auf ein universelles Menschenrecht (= Gemeinsame Texte Nr.28), Bonn/Hannover 2023, pp. 38–49, pp. 44–45.17 Act CCVI of 2011 on the right to freedom of conscience and religion and the legal statusof churches, denominations and religious communities, https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1100206.tv, accessed on: 28 Sep. 2023.18 The term church is used equally in the law for all religious communities, regardless ofwhether they call themselves a “church.”19 Uitz, Renáta: “Hungary’s New Constitution and Its New Law on Freedom of Religionand Churches: The Return of the Sovereign,” in: BYU Law Review (3/2012), pp. 931–965,p. 948.20 Law IV/1990 on Freedomof Conscience andReligion and on Churcheswas the basic leg-islation of the relevant area of law from the period after the regime change (1989). Thislaw addressed the fundamental issues of freedom of conscience and religion based on58 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwideon the newChurchAct, the recognition of churcheswas clearly relegated to thecompetence of the parliament (decision by a two-thirds majority) and it wasstipulated that the churches recognised by the parliament will be included inthe Annex to the Act. Each of these established churches receives tax and otherrelated benefits as well as budgetary support and is entitled to 1% of the per-sonal income tax paid by individuals on a voluntary basis as well as their statesupplement.Through this new church law, the Fidesz-KDNP government has come tohave strong influence over the churches. Since this law determines the churchstatus of a religious organisation by the decision of parliament on a politicalbasis, it can be used as an autocratic instrument of control and punishment.As a result, this lawdemandsuncritical loyalty fromchurch leaders,which thusbecomes a survival strategy. Although the new law was qualified as unaccept-able by theHungarian Constitutional Court in 2013 and the European Court ofHuman Rights found in 2014 that the new church law violates the freedom ofreligion and the state’s duty of neutrality,21 many religious communities havenot yet regained their lost church status.As long as this law is in force, it is quite certain that Hungarian churcheswill be completely dependent on and politically instrumentalised by theHungarian government, which is trying to set a deterrent example for themby punishing the former church Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (Mag-yarországi Evangéliumi Testvérközösség, MET) under the leadership of GáborIványi since 2011. The church status of this Methodist church was already re-voked in 2011, although this religious community had been active in Hungarysince 1982 and continuously also carried out educational activities, social andcharitable work. The reason for this punishment is that Iványi – formerly aconfidant of Orbán – has long been an open critic of the government and theprime minister. He has since become an iconic symbol of the resistance to thegovernment.the 1989 Constitution by applying a very open model that introduced simple judicialregistration of churches instead of licensing, https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=99000004.TV, accessed on: 28 Sep. 2023.21 Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and Others v. Hungary (dec.), nos. 70945/11 and 8others, 8 Sep. 2014, §102, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-142196%22]}, accessed on: 25 Oct. 2023.R. Perintfalvi/K. Voges: “Illiberal Christian Democracy.” Hungary under Victor Orbán 59The narrative of the Christian victim role and the threatto “Christian culture”Viktor Orbán sees a competition of cultures emerging, inwhich Christianity isin danger of falling victim to the “Islamic threat.”He sees himself as the saviourof the Christian West, in the tradition of the Calvinist concept of divine elec-tion.22 On the Hungarian Conservative portal, Orbán is praised for this atti-tude and portrayed as a protector of Christianity: “Those wishing to see a fullysecularised European Union and who seek to ultimately undermine religioncannot help but tremble now thatHungarians overwhelmingly gave Viktor Or-bán amandate to safeguard and promoteChristian democracy.”23The fact thatOrbán not only presents himself as the defender of Christianity but further-more has a clearly patronage-based understanding of religious freedom be-comes evident on numerous occasions. Some articles reporting on the years-long conflict between Viktor Orbán and Pastor Gábor Iványi referred to abovequote a speech in which Orbán expresses that “the essence of illiberal democ-racy is Christian liberty and the protection of Christian liberty.”24In his 2017 Christmas address, Orbán reduced Christianity to its culturalsignificance and described Christian culture as a prerequisite for the “correct”understanding of human rights:“Our culture is the culture of life. Our starting-point – the alpha and omegaof our philosophy of life – is the value of life, the dignity that every personhas received from God. Without this we could not evaluate ‘human rights’and similar modern conceptions. This is why we doubt whether we can ex-port this into the life of civilisations built on other foundations.”2522 Prömpers, Klaus: “Viktor Orbán. Retter des christlichen Abendlandes?” (20 Jun.2016), https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/viktor-orban-retter-des-christlichen-abendlandes-100.html, accessed on: 26 Aug. 2023.23 Portella, Mario Alexis: “Orbán’s Challenge to Uphold Christian Democracy” (10 May2022), https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/politics/orbans-challenge-to-uphold-christian-democracy/, accessed on: 26 Aug. 2023.24 Silliman, Daniel: “Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship Raided amid Ongoing Conflictwith Viktor Orbán” (25 Feb. 2022), https://www.christianitytoday.com/news/2022/february/hungarian-evangelical-fellowship-raid-conflict-orban-nation.html, accessed on:26 Aug. 2023.25 Here translated by a traditionalistic-conservative website: Orbán, Viktor: “‘We Euro-peans Are Christians’: Christmas Address” (29 Dec. 2017), https://theimaginativecon60 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom WorldwideAt the same time, Orbán opposes the alleged renaming of Christmas marketsand outlines a threat scenario:“Today the attack is targeting the foundations of our life and our world. Eu-rope’s immune system is being deliberately weakened. They do not want usto be who we are. They want us to become something which we do not wantto be. They want us to mix together with peoples from another world and,so that the process will be smooth, they want us to change. By the light ofChristmas candles we can clearly see that when they attack Christian culturethey are also attempting to eliminate Europe.”Anti-Muslim and anti-migrant positionsPart of Viktor Orbán’s populist rhetoric and his appropriation and reinterpre-tation of the issue of religious freedom is an anti-Muslim and anti-migrantpolitical agenda. For example, in 2016, he postulated in an interview with thePassauerNeue Presse: “The civilisation that arose fromChristianity and the civil-isation that arose from Islam do not go together. They cannot mix, they canonly coexist.”26In one of his Friday morning interviews on Kossuth Radio in March 2019,he underlined that his priorities are Christian culture and migration. “Wewon’t compromise on the issue of the protection of Christian culture and mi-gration. Everything else is open for discussion.”27 Here, again, the Hungarianprimeminister reduces Christianity to a kind of Christian culture, thus reveal-ing that he is more concerned with the alleged protection of a cultural identitythan with matters of faith. Indeed, Ádám Zoltán and András Bozóki speakof a “strikingly nationalistically coloured substitute for religion,”28 which isservative.org/2017/12/europeans-christians-christmas-address-viktor-orban.html, ac-cessed on: 26 Aug. 2023.26 Miniszterelnöki Kabinetiroda (Prime Minister’s Office): “Interview der deutschen Pas-sauer Neuen Presse mit Viktor Orbán” (20 Oct. 2016), https://miniszterelnok.hu/interview-der-deutschen-passauer-neuen-presse-mit-viktor-orban/, accessed on: 26 Aug.2023.27 Kovács, Zoltán: “PM Orbán: We won’t compromise on migration and the protectionof Christian culture” (8 Mar. 2019), https://abouthungary.hu/blog/pm-orban-we-wont-compromise-on-migration-and-the-protection-of-christian-culture, accessed on: 26Aug. 2023.28 Zoltán: Vallás és jobboldali populizmus, p. 33.R. Perintfalvi/K. Voges: “Illiberal Christian Democracy.” Hungary under Victor Orbán 61an ideological principle that gives the nation as a collective identity a quasi-religious status to which the individual subordinates himself.29Significantly, theHungarian governmentwas even criticised by theUnitedStates’ administrationunderPresidentDonaldTrumpfor its rhetoric. In its In-ternational Religious Freedom Reports during the Trump presidency, the U.S.State Department noted that the Hungarian government regularly resortedto anti-Muslim and anti-migrant rhetoric and – in some cases – anti-Semiticpatterns of communication. A report from 2021 states:“Senior government officials, including Prime Minister (PM) Viktor Or-ban, continued to make statements in defence of what they called a‘Christian Europe’ and against Muslim immigration. In September, Orbansaid present-day migrants were ‘all Muslims’ who changed the culturalidentity of Europe. Other politicians made anti-Semitic and anti-Muslimstatements.”30In 2017, in the first session of parliament, Viktor Orbán warned against a SorosPlan,31 “an action plan that describes exactly how disobedient, non-immigrantCentral European countries should be transformed into immigrant countries,”which is why it is worth giving “more power and authority than ever to thosewho are prepared to defend the future of ChristianHungary,” againstwhich hesees a “new global offensive by one of the main religions, Islam.”32Budapest Report on Christian PersecutionIn 2016, as part of its self-declared development of a Christian democracy, theHungarian government established the State Secretariat for Aid to Persecuted29 Zoltán: Vallás és jobboldali populizmus, p. 39.30 U.S. State Department: Hungary 2021 International Religious Freedom Report, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/HUNGARY-2021-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf, accessed on: 26 Aug. 2023.31 Schlagwein, Felix: “Wie George Soros zum Feindbild wurde” (27 May 2020), https://www.dw.com/de/wie-george-soros-zum-feindbild-wurde/a-53572731, accessed on: 26Aug. 2023; see also Kalmar, Ivan: „Islamophobia and anti-antisemitism: the case ofHungary and the ‘Soros plot’,” in: Patterns of Prejudice 54 (1–2/2020), pp. 182–198.32 Visegrád Post: “Viktor Orbán: Christianity and identity versus western liberalism” (20Sep. 2017), https://visegradpost.com/en/2017/09/20/viktor-orban-christianity-and-identity-versus-western-liberalism/, accessed on: 26 Aug. 2023.62 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom WorldwideChristians and, in 2017, it launched the Hungary Helps programme, a state-run, non-profit agency that aims to support Christians worldwide in theircountries of origin and thus stands in opposition to Western and – fromHungary’s perspective – pro-migration policies.Since then, the State Secretariat for Aid to PersecutedChristians andHun-gary Helps have regularly commissioned the publication of religious freedomreports, theBudapestReports onChristianPersecution. Inall reports– includ-ing the fifth one of 2021 – the described appropriations and reinterpretationsof the topic of religious freedom are particularly evident in the preface writtenbyViktorOrbán.33Orbán links andmixes the legitimate demand for a commit-ment to persecuted Christians worldwide with typically populist motives.TheEuropean andWestern mainstream –which plays the role of the “elite” in Or-bán’s narrative – is sharply attacked. By idly standing by, they are complicit inthe fate of persecuted Christians. Orbán speaks of an anti-Christian attitudeof new political movements whose “goal is to eradicate all of those character-istics that have emerged from Christian culture: the nation, the family basedon the marriage of a man and a woman [...].” At the same time, he speaks of“sexual propaganda” promoted by NGOs. In the preface to the fourth reportof 2020, Orbán is even more explicit in some places.34 He explains that talk-ing about violence against Christians has even become a “taboo.” The liberal“anti-Christian forces” of the mainstream would push the “rainbow ideology”and specifically attack politicians and church people who reject this ideology.On the other hand, Hungary is presented as a saviour who “first had to breakthrough thewalls of hypocrisy and the hypocrisy that hides behind the guise ofpolitical correctness.” As it has done for centuries, Hungary exercises the roleof the “shield of Christianity” in Europe. In doing so,Orbán outlines the threatscenarios of 1.5 billion refugees in Europe and an end to “Christian civilisa-tion and values” in the event that the elites continue to “bury their heads in thesand.”3533 Ujházi, Lóránd/Boér Zoltán/Kaló, József/Petruska, Ferenc (eds.): Budapest Report onChristian Persecution 2021, https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/19SQCd5tqcrnAcpPAu-giNDceYfQvZEO5, accessed on: 26 Aug. 2023.34 Ujházi, Lóránd (ed.): Budapest Report on Christian Persecution 2020, https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/10Ehnj4b46icv56G9iG7W2fsmkoXoY3ap, accessed on: 26 Aug.2023.35 Hirschberger, Bernd/Voges, Katja: “Vereinnahmt und verzerrt. Wie der Rechtspopulis-mus die Religionsfreiheit instrumentalisiert,” in: ForumWeltkirche (6/2021), pp. 19–22.R. Perintfalvi/K. Voges: “Illiberal Christian Democracy.” Hungary under Victor Orbán 63International networking and strategiesHungary embeds its policy of illiberal Christian democracy in a large-scaleinternational networking strategy.The State Secretariat for Aid to PersecutedChristians is not a mere international aid programme but an instrument forpolitical networking. Thus, numerous large-scale international conferenceshave already taken place. In 2019, the prime minister welcomed 650 religiousleaders and experts from 40 countries.36Within the framework of the Conservative Political Action Conference(CPAC), the Hungarian government establishes contacts not least with theevangelical right in the USA. This annual conference gathers internationalreligious rights and has had a foreign policy networking function in recentyears. In May 2022, this conference was held in Europe for the first time, inBudapest.ViktorOrbán gave the keynote speech anddefendedhis populist na-tionalism.He referred to his opponents as “progressives,Marxists” and as “theinternational liberal left.”37 This rhetoric is common during meetings, withthe main enemy images being liberal democracy, feminism, queer people andrefugees, who are seen as a threat to Christian civilisation. Anti-Semitic andanti-Islamic conspiracy theories are commonplace. In 2023, the conferencewas held in Budapest for a second time.The issue of outreach to Christians also provides a perfect networking op-portunity between Hungary and Orthodoxy, including Russia. When ViktorOrbánopposedEUsanctions against PatriarchCyril, he invoked religious free-dom, which supposedly does not allow sanctioning church leaders.38 Variouschurch leaders, including Mor Ignatius Aphrem II, Patriarch of Antioch andtheWhole East, the head of the Syrian Orthodox Church, expressed gratitude36 Rome Reports: “Hungary seeks allies against Christian persecution with political andreligious leaders” (26 Nov. 2019), https://www.romereports.com/en/2019/11/26/hungary-seeks-allies-against-christian-persecution-with-political-and-religious-leaders/,accessed on: 26 Aug. 2023.37 Cullen, Ross: “Hungary a ‘fortress of conservative and Christian values’ says Orban”(20 May 2022), https://newseu.cgtn.com/news/2022-05-20/Hungary-a-fortress-of-conservative-and-Christian-values-says-Orban-1abYjtDWG3u/index.html, accessed on:26 Aug. 2023.38 Tidey, Alice: “Orban criticises EU plans to sanction head of Russian Orthodox Church”(5 Jun. 2022), https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/05/06/orban-criticises-eu-plans-to-sanction-head-of-russian-orthodox-church, accessed on: 26 Aug. 2023.64 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwidefor Orbán’s commitment against the sanctions.39 For his part, Patriarch Cyrilpraised Orbán several times for his fight for “Christian values.”40It is also necessary to critically examine the political staging around theHungary Helps programme. During presentations of the programme, theHungarian State Secretary for Aid to Persecuted Christians, Christian Asbej,often demonstratively anticipates common criticisms of the programme –such as its one-sided focus on Christians –with an accusatory undertone. Forexample, he emphasises that the initiative is necessary because Christians arethemost persecuted religious groupworldwide, but also becauseHungary is a“proud Christian nation” and wants to strengthen its Christian identity. In in-terviews, the question is often asked whether Hungary’s commitment wouldmake the country popular in other European countries. The state secretary’sanswer often mixes populist rhetoric with the topic of religion and religiousfreedom: “We have been told: It is against political correctness to supportChristians [...] In fact it is against political correctness to be Christian.”41What also becomes evident on many occasions is the connection betweenthe claimed central role in the defence of Christianity with the fight againstLGBTIQ rights, whereby the political agenda is linked to the commitmentto Christians. Critics of Hungary Helps claim that the commitment is purepolitics and ask – for example – why the Hungarian government does notactively support religious freedom for Christians in Turkey, Russia and Chinaas part of their program.4239 Daily News Hungary: “Orban meets Syriac Orthodox Partiarch” (12 May 2022), https://dailynewshungary.com/orban-meets-syriac-orthodox-partiarch/, accessed on: 28 Sep.2023.40 Hungary Today: “Russian Patriarch Kirill Congratulates PM Orbán” (17 May 2023), https://hungarytoday.hu/patriarch-kirill-congratulates-orban/, accessed on: 26 Aug. 2023.41 Wishon, Jennifer: “Hungary Defends Biblical Principles and Helps the Persecuted:‘Hungary is a Christian Nation’” (27 Sep. 2021), https://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2021/august/hungary-defends-biblical-principles-and-helps-the-persecuted-hungary-is-a-christian-nation, accessed on: 28 Sep. 2023.42 Hungarian spectrum. Reflections on politics, economics, and culture: “InternationalConference on Christian persecution in Budapest” (29 Nov. 2019), https://hungarianspectrum.org/2019/11/29/international-conference-on-christian-persecution-in-budapest/, accessed on: 26 Aug. 2023.R. Perintfalvi/K. Voges: “Illiberal Christian Democracy.” Hungary under Victor Orbán 65Final remarksThe examples given in this article show that, while the Orbán governmentseems to fully support the cause of religious freedom, the reality behind thestrategically well-constructed scenes of political deception is different. Theright-wing populist government politically instrumentalised the Christianchurches and Christianity itself to such an extent that it did not promotereligious freedom, but on the contrary restricted their freedom and turnedChristianity into a political weapon. The tragic consequences of this becameclear to the church leadership only recently when the data of the 2022 censuscame to light. In a country with a current population of 9.6million, the RomanCatholic Church has lost 1.1million believerswithin eleven years since 2011 andhas thus halved in the last 20 years. According to the Central Statistical Office,in 2001 there were still 5.3 million believers in the Hungarian Roman CatholicChurch, of whom only 3.7 million remained in 2011 and only 2.6 million in2022.43 Although all churches used a very intensive campaign to persuadetheir followers to make a clear statement in the census, 40% of the populationrefused to answer the question of which church they felt they belonged to.There are obviously complex reasons behind this, but one of them might bethat many church leaders showed no resistance and allowed the governmentto deprive them of their sovereignty.43 Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (Central Statistical Office): Népszámlálás 2022 (Popula-tion Census), https://nepszamlalas2022.ksh.hu/eredmenyek/vegleges-adatok/kiadvany/assets/nepszamlalas2022-vegleges-adatok.pdf, accessed on: 28 Sep. 2023.Religious Freedom for Christian MajoritiesThe Brazilian CaseLeandro L. B. FontanaThebook“Brazil: Landof the Future”by the famousAustrianwriter andpacifistStefan Zweig went down in history as a declaration of love to Brazil and itspeople.Among the things that fascinatedhimmost in this landwereBrazilians’tolerance, open-mindedness, and in particular their ability to live courteouslyand peacefully in themidst of a high degree of cultural, ethnic, and geographicdiversity.1 Far from being merely a foreign, romanticized view of Brazil, thisstereotype has also been cherished and nurtured for decades by the Brazilianpeople.This is partly due to the fact that this narrative was constructed in theprocess of formation of the Brazilian national identity that took place in thefirst half of the twentieth century andgradually found itsway into theBrazilianDNA.2Against this backdrop, the significant increase in cases of religious harass-ment in Brazil over the last decade has not only shocked the public but alsoposed several challenges to analysts from various disciplines. In fact, varioussources point to an increase in the number of cases by about 315% from 2015 to2021.How tomake sense of this unprecedentedmagnitude of violence, intoler-ance, and stigmatization? What could be the causes, who are the main actorsinvolved, and for what reasons? This paper aims to explore these questions,with particular emphasis onmapping ethnographic-hermeneutic attempts toboth describe and analyze this phenomenon. For this purpose, it begins by ex-amining the empirical evidence for the rise in cases of religious intolerance.1 Zweig, Stefan: Brasilien. Ein Land der Zukunft, Stockholm: Bermann-Fischer 1941, pp.153–158.2 Souza, Jessé: A ralé brasileira. Quem é e como vive, Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG2009, pp. 29–39.68 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom WorldwideIt then looks for basic patterns in the reported cases to outline a profile of in-tolerance, as it were.The next section occupies center stage inasmuch as it fo-cuses the research interest on performances of intolerance and non-cognitivefactors rather than hermeneutic efforts to scrutinize the content and imagescirculated by the main actors or assess the cogency of their arguments. Thismethodological choice is crucial to the analytical reflection that follows, giventhat this final part delves into the scripts of these performances and offers abrief account of the current Brazilian scholarly debate on this phenomenon.The empirical evidence for religious intoleranceOverall, issues related to religious intolerance or freedom of religion or beliefwere not part of the public debate in Brazil until recently. A turning point wasmarked in 2015,when these issues also began to appear on the public agenda.3The case of the eleven-year-old girl Kaylane Campos in that year epitomizedthe kind of religious intolerance taking place in Brazil in several respects andhad significant national repercussions.After being hit on the headwith a stoneas she left herCandomblé terreiro4, the perpetrators continued to insult Kaylane,using abusive language and saying she should now burn in hell on account ofher religion.5This regrettable incident prompted not only a new public debatebut also initiatives such as the “Reports of Religious Intolerance in Brazil” –inter alia – whose data are indeed impressive. For instance, whereas fifteencases of religious intolerance were registered in 2011, four years later in 2015this figure had increased to 223.6 Even more alarming was the 2023 report,3 Nogueira, Sidnei: Intolerância Religiosa, São Paulo: Jandaíra 2020, p. 70.4 Terreiros are temples or houses run by a male or female Candomblé priest where prac-titioners can gather, hold their ceremonies and worship, offer their sacrifices, and re-ceive counselling. In the absence of a corresponding word/translation in English, thisterm will be used throughout.5 For more details, see Santos, Carlos Alberto Ivanir dos/Gino, Mariana: “A menina e apedra. Uma breve delineação sobre a intolerância religiosa no Brasil,” in: Ivanir dosSantos/Maria das Graças Nascimento/Juliana B. Calvacanti M. T./Mariana Gino/VítorAlmeida (eds.), Intolerância religiosa no Brasil. Relatório e balanço, Rio de Janeiro:CEAP 2016, pp. 58–68, p. 58f.6 Santos, Ivanir dos/Nascimento, Maria das Graças/Calvacanti M. T., Juliana B./Gino,Mariana/Almeida, Vítor (eds.): Intolerância religiosa no Brasil. Relatório e balanço, Riode Janeiro: CEAP 2016, p. 23.L. L. B. Fontana: Religious Freedom for Christian Majorities. The Brasilian Case 69which compiled data from 2019 to 2021 and showed an increase to 966 regis-tered cases of religious intolerance in 2021 alone.7Based on these reports, it does not appear to be a coincidence that in thecase of Kaylane Campos the victim was a member of Candomblé – an Afro-Brazilian religion – and the perpetrators – in addition to being Christians– acted out of religious convictions and/or motivations. In fact, out of 966reported acts of religious intolerance in 2021, 244 (25% of the total) were in-flicted on members of Afro-Brazilian religions. This is followed by 186 acts ofintolerance suffered by Evangelicals (19%) and 125 by Catholics (13%). Takenby themselves, these numbers may not seem that impressive. However, whencontrasted with the broader picture of the country’s religious landscape, theproportions acquire entirely new dimensions.The proportions should then beinterpreted in the following terms: 244 cases were reported among 590,000practitioners of Afro-Brazilian religions (0.3% of the total Brazilian popula-tion), 186 cases among 43million Evangelicals (22.2%) and 125 cases among 124million Catholics (64.6%).8 It is therefore fair to say that proportionally, themembers of the majority religion in Brazil – namely Christianity – have notexperienced as much religious harassment as members of religious minori-ties.9 With this being the case, another question that emerges is why amongall of the religious minorities in Brazil such as Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism,Candomblé, Umbanda, etc. – all making up less than 1% of the population –the largest number of attacks were concentrated in the Afro-Brazilian com-munities alone. This question will be the focus of the following section, since7 Santos, Carlos Alberto Ivanir dos/Dias, Bruno Bonsanto/Santos, Luan Costa Ivanir dos:II Relatório sobre Intolerância religiosa. Brasil, América Latina e Caribe, Rio de Janeiro:CEAP 2023, p. 35.8 The numbers relative to the Brazilian population were taken from the last officiallypublished census of 2010 (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística – IBGE: CensoDemográfico 2010. Características gerais da população, religião e pessoas com defi-ciência, Rio de Janeiro: IBGE 2012, pp. 143–144), as are other statistics used in this text,unless indicated otherwise. Although a new national census was conducted in 2022,at the time of writing of this paper the results were not yet made public.9 Dias, Bruno Bonsanto/Santos, Luan Costa Ivanir dos: “II Relatório sobre Intolerân-cia Religiosa. Brasil, América Latina e Caribe, Reflexões teóricas e a necessidade daconstrução de bases de dados e de estatísticas públicas sólidas,” in: Carlos Alberto Iva-nir dos Santos/Bruno Bonsanto Dias/Luan Costa Ivanir dos Santos: II Relatório sobreIntolerância Religiosa. Brasil, América Latina e Caribe, Rio de Janeiro: CEAP 2023, pp.167–181, p. 180.70 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwide– apart from the Jewish community, which is currently also alarmed by an un-precedented increase in the number of neo-Nazi groups throughout Brazil10 –there is no evidence that any other minority religion is as threatened as Afro-Brazilians.The forms of intolerance described in the reports ranged from insult, hu-miliation, threats, and coercion to thedestructionof places ofworship, vandal-ization of offerings, displacement from territory, and abuse of power by stateauthorities, to crimes of bodily injury.11 As for the aggressors, according to thereports, themajority belong to Evangelical denominations, although the num-ber of Catholics is also significant. This corroborates the argument put for-ward by several analysts who have established a correlation between the recentincrease in cases of religious intolerance and the emergence of Evangelicalsand Pentecostals as increasingly influential actors on the public and politicalscene.12The performance of intoleranceThe stigmatization of Afro-Brazilian religions as well as ethnicity has a longtradition in Brazil’s history. Obviously, the Catholic Church has her share ofguilt in this bitter chapter, as does the Brazilian state, even after the colonialperiod, from the nineteenth century onwards. However, while the state intro-duced the principle of religious freedom into its legislation and the Catholic10 For more details, see Grattan, Steven: “Neo-Nazi Groups Multiply in a More Conserva-tive Brazil” (14 Jun. 2023), https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/neo-nazi-groups-multiply-more-conservative-brazil-2023-06-13/, accessed on: 08 Jul. 2023; Santos: IIRelatório, p. 104–105.11 Santos: Il Relatório, p. 69.12 See e.g., Silva, Vagner Gonçalves da: “Neopentecostalismo e religiões afro-brasileiras.Significados do ataque aos símbolos da herança religiosa africana no Brasil contem-porâneo,” in: MANA 13 (2007), pp. 207–236, https://doi.org/10.1590/S0104-93132007000100008; Miranda, Ana Paula Mendes de: “‘Terreiro Politics.’ Against Religious Racismand ‘Christofascist’ Politics,” in: Vibrant Virtual Brazil Anthropology 17 (2020), pp.3–20, https://doi.org/10.1590/1809-43412020v17d456; Cunha, Magali do Nascimento:Do púlpito às mídias sociais. Evangélicos na política e ativismo digital, Curitiba: Ap-pris Editora 2019, pp. 32–36; Dias, João Ferreira: “‘Chuta que é macumba.’ O percursohistórico-legal da perseguição às religiões afro-brasileiras,” in: Sankofa 12 (2019), pp.39–62, https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1983-6023.sank.2019.158257; Nogueira, Sidnei: In-tolerância.L. L. B. Fontana: Religious Freedom for Christian Majorities. The Brasilian Case 71Church in the second half of the twentieth century – imbued with the spirit ofthe Second Vatican Council –made significant efforts to promote ecumenismand interreligious dialogue, another kind of intolerance began to be rehearsedin some Pentecostal churches. In fact, there is a broad consensus amongexperts in attributing to Bishop Edir Macedo – the founder of the UniversalChurch of the Kingdom of God – a key role in the waging of a “holy war”13against Afro-Brazilian religions.14 This war was also taken up by a few otherneo-Pentecostal churches that were emerging in the 1980s. “In our church” –writes Macedo in a polemic book published in the 1980s,15 explicitly attackingAfro-Brazilian religions – “[…] demons are humiliated and even mocked.”16 Infact, in their sessions of exorcisms, performances are extremely humiliating,and all demons that are driven out are attributed to the works (trabalhos)of Afro-Brazilian sorcerers, who are also mocked. For “[…] umbanda, quim-banda, candomblé, and spiritist religions and practices are, in general, fordemons, the main channels of action.”17These performances of humiliation, contempt, and even disgust not onlytook place inworship services, but theywere also daily broadcast on television.“Many of these TV shows present ‘reconstructions of real cases’ or dramatiza-tions in which symbols and elements of Afro-Brazilian religions are construedas spiritual means with the sole purpose of causing harm: the death of ene-mies, the spread of diseases, the separation of couples or love relationships,discord in the family, etc.”18Whether in the formof testimonies by formerCan-domblé priests or quarrels with demons being driven out from attendants ofthe services, Afro-Brazilian religions had been constantly depicted as satanicand extremely harmful for one’s personal and social life. Moreover, as the me-dia power of these churches has expanded (TV broadcasters, newspapers, in-13 Mariano, Ricardo: Neopentecostais. Sociologia do novo pentecostalismo no Brasil, SãoPaulo: Loyola 2014, p. 111.14 For more details, see Mariano: Neopentecostais, p. 119; Oro, Ari Pedro: “Neopente-costais e afro-brasileiros. Quem vencerá esta guerra?,” in: Debates do NER 1 (1997),p. 10–36, p. 13, https://doi.org/10.22456/1982-8136.2686; Silva: Neopentecostalismo, p.212; Dias: Chuta que é macumba, p. 48.15 Unless otherwise noted, quotes that have not been published in English have beentranslated into English by the author of the chapter.16 Macedo, Edir: Orixás, Caboclos e Guias. Deuses ou Demônios?, Rio de Janeiro: Univer-sal Produções 1987, p. 134.17 Macedo: Orixás, p. 113.18 Silva: Neopentecostalismo, p. 217.72 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwideternet platforms, social media,mobile apps, etc.), so has the reach of this nar-rative.19However, it is more important – considering the purpose of the presentpaper – to bear in mind that this theology has exerted a profound impact onconcrete lives, material objects, and geographical spaces. For example, thefact that members of these churches go to terreiros to destroy altars, breakimages, and exorcise their members should come as no surprise in light ofthe above.20 In the same vein, scholars have identified another layer to thisproblem, which is a much more complex phenomenon arising on the fringesof large urban centers such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Belo Horizonte,among others. It concerns the entanglement of drug traffickers, criminalorganizations, politicians, and Evangelical-Pentecostal churches in an explicitoffensive against Afro-Brazilian communities.21 Once Catholics and/or adher-ents of Candomblé, these populations have increasingly become Evangelicalor Pentecostal, as has the territorial space. Former traffickers – now convertedto Evangelicalism or associated with a church/pastor – have launched a “witchhunt” against Afro-Brazilian practitioners and their places of worship to “clearthe land,” eliminate terreiros and other authority figures, and impose “a beliefthat convinces, regulates and produces obedience”.22 Experts emphasize thatit is not merely about religious expansion and missionary efforts to win overnew souls, but instead, “the phenomenon has favored the consolidation ofan agenda of customs and increased attacks on gender, religious and racialminorities in the country.”23 Furthermore, the performative character of this19 For more details see Cunha, Magali do Nascimento: Fundamentalisms, the Crisis ofDemocracy and the Threat to Human Rights in South America. Trends and Challengesfor Action, San Salvador: Koinonia 2020.20 Silva: Neopentecostalismo, p. 217.21 Miranda: Terreiro Politics, pp. 3–20; Vital da Cunha, Christina: “‘Traficantes evangéli-cos’. Novas formas de experimentação do sagrado em favelas cariocas,” in: Plural 15(2008), pp. 13–46, https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2176-8099.pcso.2008.75226; Pereira,Réia Silvia/Mesquita, Wania Amélia Belchior: “Entre setas e demônios. Pentecosta-lidade performática guerreira em um território de favela,” in: Ciencias Sociales y Re-ligión 24 (2022), https://doi.org/10.20396/csr.v24i00.8671021.22 Miranda, Ana Paula Mendes de/Muniz, Jacqueline de Oliveira/Almeida, Rosiane Ro-drigues de/Cafezeiro, Fausto: “‘Terreiros’ Under Attack? Criminal Governance in theName of God and Armed Dominion Disputes Over Control in Rio de Janeiro,” in: Dile-mas, Special Edition 4 (2022), pp. 651–682, pp. 654–659, https://doi.org/10.4322/dilemas.v15esp4.52535.23 Miranda: Terreiros, p. 671.L. L. B. Fontana: Religious Freedom for Christian Majorities. The Brasilian Case 73phenomenon is not without bearing on the impact of these actions. “The the-atricalized performance of the attacks/assaults […] allows for the productionof a subservient local public and audiences threatened remotely through smartphone screens.”24 As with the aforementioned televised exorcism sessions inwhich the humiliation and triumph over demons are performed on a dailybasis, communication media also plays a central role in these milieus, therebyproving to be a key component in the design of this religiopolitical project.Another factor that has enormously contributed to the escalation of thisconflict was the rise of Evangelicals to public and political influence.25 In addi-tion to their ability to channel their social capital into political influence, theseactors owe much of their success to their capacity to construct simple narra-tives and use rhetorical devices with great impact. In this regard, again per-formance and staging have held fundamental importance.26 In Brazil, one ofthemost effective narratives deployed by Evangelicals/Pentecostals in the pub-lic/political sphere has been the idea – or rather sentiment – of Christopho-bia. On the one hand, this device implies that Christians are being persecutedworldwide, against which they are to speak up, and on the other hand thatChristians are also under threat in Brazil.27While identifying at once the per-secutors and the cause of themajor crisis that Brazil is going through–namelythe minorities – due to their moral/spiritual decay, this device proposes as asolution the bending of the minorities to the values of the majority – namelyChristians – by means of a single public morality/religiosity.24 Miranda: Terreiros, p. 663.25 For more details see Pérez Guadalupe, José Luis/Carranza, Brenda (eds.): Novoativismo político no Brasil. Os evangélicos do século XXI, Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Ade-nauer-Stiftung 2020.26 See also Adelakun, Abimbola Adunni: Performing Power in Nigeria. Identity, Politics,and Pentecostalism, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press 2021.27 For an account on this concept, see Carranza, Brenda: “Die neue christliche Rechte.Politische Subjektivität, Gender-Ideologie und Christophobie,” in: Leandro L. B. Fon-tana/Markus Luber (eds.), Politischer Pentekostalismus. Transformation des globalenChristentums imSpiegel theologischerMotive undpluralerNormativität, Regensburg:Friedrich Pustet 2023, pp. 66–94; see also former President Bolsonaro’s speech at the2020 UNGeneral Assembly: Nações Unidas: “Em discurso na ONU, Jair Bolsonaro pedecombate à ‘cristofobia’” (20 Sep 2020), https://news.un.org/pt/story/2020/09/1727002,accessed on: 10 Aug. 2022.74 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom WorldwideIt should be noted that these narratives are not only deployed in theseactors’ “propaganda feedback loops”28 but also in the Brazilian NationalCongress, among other spaces, in alliance with other conservative Christiangroups. PL 1804/2015 and PL 4152/2019 can be cited as examples of bills thatexplicitly deploy the Cristophobia argument to justify the tightening of thecurrent legislation on crimes of mockery (against Christians), increasing boththe term of imprisonment and the bail. By way of illustration, the justificationfor PL 1804/2015 reads as follows: “[…] for what has happened in recent years indemonstrations,mainly in LGBT events, is what we could call ‘Christophobia’,and involves the practice of obscene and degrading acts that express prejudiceagainst Catholics and Evangelicals.”29 For these crimes, PL 4152 provides fora prison sentence of up to nine years.30 Meanwhile, there are 72 bills underconsideration that seek to regulate the principle of freedom of religion in oneway or another.31 These range from excluding religious ministers from thecrime of insult and defamation in the exercise of their ministry (PL 6314/2005)to exemptions from taxes on property, income, and religious services (PLP21/2020), and the prohibition of state intervention in pastoral and priestlyactivities (PL 2756/2011). Afro-Brazilian religions would be particularly af-fected by bills PL 8062/2017 and PL 4331/2012, which propose prohibiting thesacrifice and/or use of animals in religious rituals. Thus, under the aegis ofthe principle of laïcité, Evangelicals and some Catholic groups are seeking toreshape the country’s legislation to further expand the rights of Christians,while circumscribing those of other (minority) religions and/or groups.3228 Benkler, Yochai/Faris, Robert/Roberts, Hal: Network Propaganda.Manipulation, Disin-formation, and Radicalization in American Politics, New York: Oxford University Press2018, p. 57.29 Câmara dos Deputados: Projeto de Lei No. 1804, de 2015, p. 2, https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra;jsessionid=node01lz81dnrhnkcipu3j9ui7zbhz13374989.node0?codteor=2161028&filename=Avulso+-PL+1804/2015, accessedon: 20 Jun. 2022.30 Câmara dos Deputados: Projeto de Lei No. 4152, de 2019, p. 1, https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=1781213&filename=Tramitacao-PL+4152/2019, accessed on: 20 Jun. 2022.31 Weber, Bruno Curtis: “Em nome do Laico, do Cisma, da Liberdade Religiosa, amém,”in: Plural 28, pp. 184–208, https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2176-8099.pcso.2021.179714.32 Weber: Liberdade Religiosa, p. 202–204.L. L. B. Fontana: Religious Freedom for Christian Majorities. The Brasilian Case 75The architecture of intoleranceHaving considered someof themost prominentmanifestations of religious in-tolerance, the question remains how tomake sense of this recent phenomenonthat is gradually gaining ground in Brazil. The first observation in this regardconcerns the very term “religious intolerance.” Far from simply mirroring – inthe public debate – forms of religious polarization or conflicts involving dif-fering worldviews, this category has taken on a very specific connotation inBrazil. It “[…] has circumscribed the experiences of victimization by religiousprejudice and expresses, in our times, the growth of conflicts between Afro-Brazilian groups and those of an Evangelical-Pentecostal religious profile.”33In light of this, some scholars as well as Afro-Brazilian activists have come upwith the term “religious racism” instead, arguing that it better captures andconceptualizes this notion.34 In their view, what is ultimately at stake is a reli-giopolitical project of hegemonic power that includes – among other things –an“epistemicide,” that is the erasure of a people’s knowledge,practices,beliefs,memories, and origins35 and a “religious genocide against black people.”36 Al-beit acknowledging that thismay appear to be an excessive assessment, at firstglance one of the reasons that nevertheless renders these claims tenable is thefact that other religious or ethnic collectives have been far less affected thanthese. It should therefore be noted that the category of “religious intolerance”today refers less to general forms of intolerance than to this specific, targetedvariant.In the same vein, some scholars have been working with the concept of“Christofascism.”37 Coined by the German theologian Dorothee Sölle in the1970s in a completely different context, this concept has been reinterpretedin Brazil, especially in view of the rise of the so-called Christian Right tokey positions of power and influence, of which former President Bolsonaro’sadministration represented a high point. As with the term “religious racism,”33 Miranda: Terreiros, p. 652.34 For more details, see Nogueira: Intolerância Religiosa; Fernandes, Nathalia Vince Es-galha: “A discriminação contra religiões afro-brasileiras. Um debate entre intolerânciae racismo religioso no Estado brasileiro,” in: Revista Calundu 5 (2/2021); Miranda: Ter-reiro Politics, pp. 3–20.35 Nogueira: Intolerância Religiosa, p. 122.36 Miranda: Terreiro Politics, p. 12.37 For more details, see Py, Fábio: Pandemia Cristofascista, São Paulo: Recriar 2020; Mi-randa: Terreiro Politics.76 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwidethe analytical potential of this concept resides in its ability to decode andexpose the very architecture of this kind of intolerance. Fábio Py defines it asthe interweaving of Christian language and symbolism with a Manichaeanworldview to underpin and legitimize an authoritarian power project for thecountry along the lines of a “Christian Nation.”38 If this analysis proceeds, onecan indeed recognize – as claimed by the above-cited authors – an overlapbetween the new performances of religious intolerance and the new projectthat has been advanced by the New (Christian) Right for the Brazilian nation.While acknowledging that this concept is often employed with a lack ofconceptual precision and empirical evidence, bringing up the notion of theNewRight – closely related to, and sometimes overlapping with, the ChristianRight – seems helpful at this point in at least two respects: it sheds some lighton the actors involved in this project, and it exposes the tenets at its core. Asfor the former, Benjamin Cowan’s studies have shown that this movement wascapable of bringing together very “strange bedfellows” who were not histori-cally closely related. It comprises “[…] Brazilians, North Americans, Catholics,Protestants, secular conservatives, neo-medieval fantasists, authoritarian op-portunists,andothers.”39 Inhis assessment, the corevalues that appeal to thesedifferent groups are “veneration for private property, hierarchy, nationalism,and traditional culture; and rejection of ethnic and religious pluralism, globalliberal humanitarianismand cooperation,modernism […], secularization, and‘communism.’”40 Bearing this in mind, one may better grasp why the Christo-phobia narrative works so well in the Brazilian context. As it appears, it es-sentially accomplishes two things. For one thing, Evangelicals – who actuallyare a “minority” – bracket themselves together with Catholics, thereby placingthemselves on the side of the “majority,” as well as appealing to the sympathyand engagement of Catholics.41 For another thing, these actors invert the roles38 Py: Pandemia, p. 29–30; see also Borda, Guillermo Flores: “A construção de uma ‘Na-ção Cristã’ na América Latina,” in: José Luis Pérez Guadalupe/Brenda Carranza (eds.),Novo ativismo político no Brasil: Os evangélicos do século XXI, Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2020, pp. 131–151.39 Cowan, Benjamin A.: Moral Majorities Across the Americas. Brazil, the United States,and the Creation of the Religious Right, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press2021, p. 2.40 Cowan: Moral Majorities, p. 15.41 For more details, see Burity, Joanildo A.: “Minoritization and Pluralization. What Is the‘People’ That Pentecostal Politicization Is Building?,” in: Latin American Perspectives43 (2016), pp. 116–132, https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X16639238.L. L. B. Fontana: Religious Freedom for Christian Majorities. The Brasilian Case 77of victims and persecutors, create a common enemy – namely the minorities– and spread a sense of moral panic in the ubiquitous public sphere.Final remarksThis contribution has attempted to provide a brief account of the significantchanges observed in Brazil in recent years regarding religious (in)tolerance.Throughout, the religiopolitical orientation of the performances of intolerancestands out as the most salient feature of this recent phenomenon. Nonethe-less, despite this fundamental political component, the concept of populismalone has not proved adequate to capture and account for this multifacetedphenomenon, for which other concepts have been tentatively explored. Ratherthan a political strategy or a general attitude of intolerance towards otherreligions, Brazilian scholars essentially concur that at the heart of this phe-nomenon is a very specific, contingent form of religious intolerance, whichmight as well be conceived of in terms of “religious racism.” For its part, thisconcept exposes the idiosyncratic sources of this development: the alliance of afundamentalist, agonistic variant of Christianity with authoritarian economicelites who – under the flag of conservatism and with recourse to populistrhetoric – are advancing a nationalist project for Brazil.It has been emphasized that this heterogeneous group of Christianscomprises Evangelicals, Pentecostals, Mainline Protestants, and Catholicsalike, with none of them representing the full spectrum of their respectivedenominations. However, their narratives and performance-oriented use ofcommunication media have catapulted them into prominent positions onthe public and political scene. Far from seeking to downplay or de-value theimportant contributions of these actors to society, this paper has attemptedto lay bare the contingent (rather than necessary, normative, teleological)character of this variant of Christianity,42 thereby suggesting the need forbothmore (theological) debate and finding forms of balancing the presence ofdifferent political, social and religious actors on the public scene.Evangelicals,Pentecostals, and Catholics have also certainly been – and remain – victimsof religious intolerance. However, the prerogative of interpretation of the42 See e.g., Burity, Joanildo: “El pueblo evangélico. Construcción hegemónica, disputasminoritarias y reaccion conservadora,” in: Encartes 3 (2021), pp. 1–35, p. 6, https://doi.org/10.29340/en.v3n6.158.78 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwideright to freedom of religion or belief should not be highjacked by anymajorityreligion, let alone by a minority group such as the Christian Right, as in thecase of Brazil.Abuse of Religious Freedom?Ethical Preliminary Remarks on “Religion-Based”Resistance against COVID-19 Protective MeasuresAndreas Lob-HüdepohlIntroduction: Religion-based rejectionof COVID-19 protection measuresOn Sunday, 31 January 2021, a few hundred people marched through the cen-tre of Vienna to take a visible public stand against the protectivemeasures im-posedby theAustriangovernment in thewakeof theCOVID-19pandemic.Theypassed off their Sunday inner-city procession as a “Christian procession” to es-cape the bans on political demonstrations previously prescribed by the courtsand police under the protection of the free exercise of religion. In the days be-fore, about a dozen gatherings had been registered for Austria’s capital but hadnot beenapprovedby the responsible authorities,with reference to the relevantprotection measures against COVID-19, prohibiting any larger gatherings forthe purpose of interrupting chains of infection. As a result, many of the ini-tiatives affected by the assembly ban called upon people in the relevant socialmedia to take part in this same Sunday “Christian procession.” For its part, theCatholic Church in Vienna immediately warned against the demonstration,whichwasmerely declared as aChristianprocession and thus superficially dis-guised.The spokesperson of the Archdiocese of Vienna spoke of a “clear abuseof religion and religious freedom.”1As early as 2012, the so-called Celtic Druidic Faith Community (Keltisch-Druidische Glaubensgemeinschaft) was founded in Germany. It sees itself as ananti-vaccination religion: as the self-description accessible online states, “theCeltic Druidic Faith Community was brought into being to protect us from1 Kleine Zeitung (31 Jan. 2021).80 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwidesome state obligations.”2 The “faith community” makes no secret of the factthat the invocation of religious freedom is of a purely instrumental-strate-gic nature: there are no priests, rituals, prayers or prohibitions in the CelticDruidic Faith Community. According to their opinion, people do not reallyneed any religious or church affiliation at all and they think that the leadersof the established churches bully their believers and suppress their personaldevelopment simply to “secure a good income.” Nevertheless, nationally andinternationally, “freedom of religion and church law are held in high esteemin conjunction with constitutionally guaranteed freedoms.Wemust use theseadvantages for the members of our community by demanding and claimingthese guaranteed rights for ourselves.” In this way, it is possible to effectivelyprotect self-responsible lifestyles from the encroachments of the state: “Ourfaith and our dignity protect us from state encroachments on our privateautonomy. As a faith community, we resist, for example, compulsory vacci-nation as in Switzerland, which was introduced via an Epidemic DiseasesAct. In Germany, we are taking ways to escape the increasing paternalism by‘authorities’ and thus the violation of our dignity, our private autonomy andour principles of faith.”Right at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Catholic commu-nity Institute of St. Philip Neri in Berlin filed a lawsuit against the completeban on church services, which was also imposed by the state of Berlin at thetime. While the two large Christian churches – the Archdiocese of Berlin andthe Evangelical Church of Berlin-Brandenburg-SilesianUpper Lusatia (EKBO)– expressly welcomed the ban on even the Holy and Easter liturgies and de-clared it binding for all of their congregations,3 some free-church or diocesan-independent Catholic communities resisted these orders and took legal actionagainst the general decrees or state ordinances on which the bans were based,citing the freedom of religion, which is particularly protected under constitu-tional law and precisely comprises the public and communal practice of reli-gious beliefs. Above all, the congregation leader and provost told the press that2 Keltisch-Druidische Glaubensgemeinschaft: Über uns, https://keltisch-druidisch.de/keltisch-druidisch/grundsaetze/uber-uns, accessed on: 23 Jan. 2023.3 For an overview of the reactions of the twomajor churches in Germany, seeMückl, Ste-fan: “Die Katholische Kirche in Deutschland in der Corona-Pandemie,” in: StefanMückl(ed.), Religionsfreiheit in Seuchezeiten, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2021, pp. 135–162;Frisch, Michael: “Das bisherige normative Handeln der evangelischen Landeskirchenin Deutschland aufgrund der Corona-Pandemie,” in: Mückl (ed.), Religionsfreiheit inSeuchezeiten, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2021, pp. 163–186.A. Lob-Hüdepohl: “Religion-Based” Resistance against COVID-19 Protective Measures 81they are opposed to unjustified unequal treatment that reveals a lack of knowl-edgeor evenappreciationof communalworship.ProvostGeraldGösche stated:“I don’t begrudge everyone towork in their free time,but it’s not vitalwhenDIYstores open. I think it is wrong for the state to consider onlymaterial things asnecessary. In church services we praise God which strengthens and comfortsthe faithful. Especially in times of crisis, this gives support. Some people arereally disturbed that this is no longer possible.”4Three examples from German-speaking countries with comparable stateor constitutional structures shed light on the very heterogeneous picture ofreligion-based rejection of the respective state’s COVID-19 protection policy.Here, “religion-based” stands for a broad range of ways in which institutionsand associations justify their sometimes vehement, sometimes even militantrejection, with reference to their (alleged) religious potential. For example,the Celtic Druidic Faith Community finds its home in the German Reichs-bürger movement5 against the globally prevailing protection policies againstCOVID-19. Further facets of this picture could be added from the interna-tional scene. Particularly striking are state actors who–with reference to theirreligious convictions – oppose the widely recognised COVID-19 protectionmeasures, such as those repeatedly called for by the World Health Organi-sation. Moreover, they prevent their implementation in their own areas ofresponsibility, such as the (now former) Presidents of Brazil (Bolsonaro) andthe U.S. (Trump) or the strictly Catholic President of Tanzania, JohnMagufuli,who was in power at the beginning of the pandemic. The latter explicitlydemanded and promoted to keep churches and mosques open, since it wasprecisely praying and celebrating communities that promised true healing,stating: “COVID is the devil, and it cannot survive in the body and church ofChrist.”64 Weiss, Julia: “Gemeinde klagte gegen Gottesdienstverbot. ‘Uns wurde das Coronavirusan den Hals gewünscht’” (16 Apr. 2020), https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/uns-wurde-das-coronavirus-an-den-hals-gewunscht-4695676.html, accessed on: 23 Jan. 2023.5 See chapter “Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious FreedomWorldwide,” footnote 30.6 Jacobs, Andreas: “Corona-Test für Religionspolitik. Das Verhältnis von Staaten und Re-ligionsgemeinschaften zu Beginn der COVID-19-Pandemie,” in: Jeannine Kunert (ed.),Religion und Corona. Religiöse Praxis in Zeiten der Pandemie (EZW-Texte 268), pp.35–49, p. 42.82 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom WorldwideAdmittedly, not all opposition to the prevailing protection measures againstthe COVID-19 pandemic that is in any way identified as religion-based is au-tomatically an abuse of religious freedom. What is obvious for the disguisedprotests against COVID-19 restrictions in Vienna and elsewhere7 or the CelticDruidic Faith Community does not automatically apply to the efforts of indi-vidual communities such as the Institute of St. Philip Neri, who – with refer-ence to religious freedom – are defending themselves in court against certainprotective measures against COVID-19. One may judge such efforts as lack-ing solidarity or their religious convictions as being theologically untenable. Ajudicial review of considerable restrictions of a fundamental right – and theprohibition of a service on the highest holiday of a religious community un-doubtedly represents such a restriction – is a legal and legitimate exercise ofconstitutional rights, which is also open to people who consider themselves tobe at home in strictly conservative and – formany – largely inaccessible think-ing environments. Indeed,even the formerpresident of Tanzania,whoaccord-ing to some sources might have died of COVID-19, will not be directly accusedof an abuse of his religious freedom, in the knowledge of his deep Catholic re-ligiosity, unless – as the highest representative and regent of his state – he infact denied his population essential protective measures in gross negligence,and took them hostage for his religious convictions.When looking back at the course of the COVID-19 pandemic (so far), onemay observe that the religion-based resistance to governmental protectivemea-sures against the coronavirus has remained within a manageable framework,at least in the overall picture.After all, religious communities around theworldhave not only accepted the respective protective measures and the sometimesextremely sensitive losses of religious practice associated with them, but haveeven explicitly justified them for religious reasons; for example with referenceto the religiously commanded duty of solidarity and love of one’s neighbour.Nevertheless, it is instructive and significant to address this phenomenon ofreligion-based rejection.However, it occurs, abuse of religious freedom in the7 There were similar attempts in Germany, such as in Nuremberg on 16 January 2021(Der Spiegel: “Kirche warnt vor falschem Gottesdienst durch Corona-Leugnerinnenund -Leugner” [16 Jan. 2021], https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/nuernberg-kirche-warnt-vor-falschem-gottesdienst-durch-corona-leugner-a-2ca14d04-09cb-414d-a215-f0e296376a89, accessed on: 23 Jan. 2023) or Munich on 2 November 2020 (Kirche+Leben:“Anti-Corona-Demo in München als ,Gottesdienst‘ – Kirchen protestieren,” [2 Nov.2020], https://www.kirche-und-leben.de/artikel/anti-corona-demo-in-muenchen-als-gottesdienst-kirchen-protestieren, accessed on: 23 Jan. 2023).A. Lob-Hüdepohl: “Religion-Based” Resistance against COVID-19 Protective Measures 83context of protective measures against the coronavirus can not only severelyendanger entire populations but can also backfire on themeaning and value ofreligious freedom itself. In a public increasingly critical of religion, the abuseof religious freedom can discredit it at the same time.Abusive vs. erroneous references to religious freedom:The legal frameworkTheCeltic Druidic Faith Community is bluntlymaking public whatmany otheropponents of protectivemeasures against the coronavirus are probably count-ing on, namely the special protection that they hope to receive from invok-ing religious freedom, and if not legal protection, necessarily, then the protec-tion of public opinion. Legally, the courts dealingwith this request have largelyrejected this instrument, as the abusive appeal of such movements comingfrom coronavirus deniers, Querdenker8 or right-wing populist circles was tooobvious. On the other hand, they could benefit politically – at least upon firstglance – from the fact that with the invocation of religious freedom amomentof “higher” absoluteness flashes up, which can at least count on a certain un-derstanding among the general public.8 Querdenker („lateral thinkers“) are a protest movement against coronavirus protectionmeasures in the German-speaking world. The roots of the movement are heteroge-neous. While in south-western Germany the movement was initially mainly drivenby anthroposophical, alternative and esoteric milieus, right-wing extremists played acentral role in eastern Germany from the outset. A pronounced skepticism towardsvaccinations is widespread in the scene; in line with a distorted concept of freedom,coronavirus protection measures are perceived as oppressive. Protesting is perceivedas an act of resistance against alleged deception and oppression. There is a strongmistrust of political institutions and traditional media; in the course of increasing rad-icalization, these institutions have even been stylized as the enemy. Conspiracy the-ories, such as that influential businessmen are having the population forcibly vacci-nated, are popular in the scene. There is also a particular susceptibility to anti-Semiticand anti-democratic narratives; in some cases, there is also great sympathy of Quer-denker protesters for the US conspiracy ideology QAnon. Central figures in the move-ment avoided a clear demarcation to the far right, which in turn was used by radicalactors such as the right-wing extremist AfD to present themselves as representativesof the protesters’ interests to promote themselves to gain support from within themovement.84 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom WorldwideIn fact, freedomof religion already has a very high status under the consti-tution. Article 4 of the German Basic Law is unambiguous: “Freedom of faithand of conscience and freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creedshall be inviolable” (Art. 4 para. 1 GG). Moreover, “the undisturbed practice ofreligion shall be guaranteed” (Art. 4 para. 2 GG). Unlike other fundamentalrights (Art. 2 (2) GG: Right to freedom of the person; Art. 5 (2) GG: freedomof expression, freedom of the press), the practice of religion is not even sub-ject to a direct legal restriction clause. Attempts in the Parliamentary Councilto add the words “within the framework of the general laws” to the granting ofreligious freedom and at least address the exercise of religious freedom in thepublic sphere failed.9The (public) practice of religion can only be subject to re-strictions if it conflictswithother fundamental rights,suchas the fundamentalright to life andphysical integrity (Article 2 (2) of theBasic Law).Freedomof re-ligious and ideological confession– like freedomof faith andconscience–evenhas a special proximity to the core of human dignity: according to the formerPresident of the German Federal Constitutional Court and Federal PresidentRoman Herzog, “if it applies to any fundamental right article, Article 4 is a di-rect outflow of the principle of human dignity declared inviolable in Article 1 Iand thus at the same time one of the ‘inalienable and inviolable human rights’addressed by Article 1 II.”10Even without this direct reference to the core of human dignity, freedomof religion – in its unity with freedom of thought and conscience – has a highstatus in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), interms of both its internal conviction (forum internum) and its public and com-munal exercise (forum externum). Consequently, this International Covenantalso subjects any restrictions on these rights to a similarly high barrier asthe German Basic Law: “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may besubject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary toprotect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights andfreedoms of others” (Art. 18 (3) ICCPR).Theprotectivemeasures against the coronavirus that have been imposed inmany parts of the world on a legal basis and led to considerable restrictions on9 Hillgruber, Christian: “‘Ungestörte’ Religionsausübung in der Pandemie?,” in: StefanMückl (ed.), Religionsfreiheit in Seuchezeiten, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2021, pp.113–132, p. 116f.10 Herzog, Roman, in: Maunz/Dürig, Grundgesetz Kommentar Loseblatt, Stand 92. Lfg.August 2020, Art. 4 Rn.11.A. Lob-Hüdepohl: “Religion-Based” Resistance against COVID-19 Protective Measures 85freedom (including freedomof religion) over a long periodmust also be judgedagainst this normative background. In Germany, the protective measures in-clude (or included) a wide range of instruments: in addition to basic protec-tive measures such as basic hygiene rules, room ventilation, distance require-ments or the obligation to wear a medical mouth and nose protectionmask orthe quarantines and domestic isolation of infected persons and proven closecontacts, it was above all the sometimes comprehensive restrictions on move-ment and contact that massively impaired the public and private co-existenceof people and in turn caused considerable social, health, cultural or even eco-nomic damage.11 All measures served to stop chains of infection and thus pre-vent an unacceptable number of severe and fatal courses of disease, as well asprotecting the intensive care health system from collapse.As the pandemic progressed, further protective measures became possi-ble and were also taken, which allowed movement and contact restrictions inparticular to be eased: a far-reaching testing strategy as well as the start ofthe vaccination campaign in spring 2021 and associated “2G” or “3G” rules12made it possible for part of the population to enter spaces of communal life(restaurants, cultural institutions, visits to inpatient facilities for particularlyvulnerable groups, travel, etc.). While in principle the COVID-19 protectionmeasures were met with widespread acceptance in large parts of the popula-tion, the basic protection measures and later especially the vaccination cam-paignmobilised an initially still heterogeneous groupof so-called “Querdenker,”11 See the statement of the German Ethics Council on the presentation and effects on in-dividuals and society in detail: “Vulnerabilität und Resilienz in Krise – Ethische Kriteri-en für Entscheidungen in einer Pandemie,” Berlin: Deutscher Ethikrat 2022, p. 94. Therestrictions on religious freedom are only mentioned in two sentences: “The publicpractice of religion was also severely restricted. In many cases, digital event formatswere offered as a substitute.” (Translated into English by the editors of this book.) Aparticular concern of the 24-member panel, which in addition to two constitutionallawyers also includes six theologians of different denominations and religions, is def-initely not discernible from this rather casual remark.12 During the pandemic, at times rules were in place in Germany that tied access to someplaces or activities to certain requirements. “3G” stands for the three German terms“geimpft,” “genesen” and “getestet.” The access requirement under the 3G rule was there-fore either to be vaccinated against COVID-19, to have recovered from the virus or tohave tested negative for the virus. “2G” stands for the German terms “geimpft” and“genesen.” Accordingly, the entry requirement under the 2G rule was to be vaccinatedor recovered.86 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwide“Corona deniers,” “Reichsbürger movement” or “vaccination opponents” to op-pose the protection measures against the coronavirus.They were very quicklyjoinedby theusual right-wingpopulist or extremist groups andparties, as theysensed considerable potential support for their own political agenda.With the vaccination campaign, a new facet of religion-based rejection ofprotectivemeasures against the coronavirus emerged.Up to this point, restric-tions onmovement and contact led to bans on liturgical services with physicalpresence of the faithful13 or the limitation of worship celebrations such as bap-tisms, first communions or even funerals. They thus considerably restrictedthe public and communal practice of religion. The situation is different nowwith compulsory vaccination, although the introduction of a statutory obliga-tion to vaccinate everyone ultimately failed in Germany in the spring of 2022.14However, prior to this the German parliament had passed an institution-re-lated vaccination obligation for members of such professions who inevitablycome into contact orhave to come into contactwithparticularly vulnerableper-sons (groups). Moreover, quite a few people felt pressured to be vaccinated atleast because a sufficient vaccination status was a prerequisite for admissionto public events in the course of the so-called “2-G” or “3-G” rules. However,what happens if one refuses any form of vaccination for religious or ideologi-cal reasons and thus this form of highly personal private religious practice in-evitably radiates into the public sphere, precisely because vaccination refusersmust expect consequences (non-admission to professional practice or to com-munity events, etc.)? Would this not constitute discrimination on religious orideological grounds? If so, shouldn’t this virtually act as an invitation to every-one to take refuge under the (supposedly) safe roof of this very specific exerciseof religious freedom with their opposition to vaccination or their rejection ofCOVID-19 protection measures in general?Of course, even in this constellation, religious freedom offers only limitedprotection to escape protective measures against the coronavirus.The refusal13 Online liturgies are of course ordinary liturgies, even if they are not atmosphericallycomfortable (for understandable reasons!). The best-known (short) liturgical act is thepapal blessing urbi et orbi, the liberating effect of which (indulgence of even serioustransgressions) is even granted to TV viewers without any loss.14 Only those who cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons should be excluded. Thesemedical reasons should also include those that trigger traumatic fear reactions to newvaccinations as a result of previous vaccination damage or complications.A. Lob-Hüdepohl: “Religion-Based” Resistance against COVID-19 Protective Measures 87of medical measures on religious grounds is accepted, even if they are medi-cally indicated to save life.The example of Jehovah’s Witnesses who refuse anyblood transfusion–even in a life-threatening condition– is appropriate.How-ever, the acceptance of their religiously based refusal finds its legitimate limitexactly where their religious conviction endangers others. Thus, parents arethreatened with the loss of custody of their children whenever they withholdmedically imperative measures from their children out of religious or ideo-logical conviction.The same applies to vaccination refusers,whose (religiouslybased) decision is to be respected. Nevertheless, there is a considerable qual-itative difference between the obligation to vaccinate (possibly with sanctions)and compulsory vaccination.15 However, the persons concerned are not funda-mentally protected from the possible consequences of such a decision, at leastnot if it involves serious risks and harm to others. It is true that such conse-quencesmust be limited towhat is absolutely necessary andnever sanction thereligious or ideological conviction as such. However, if certain consequencesare suitable and necessary to protect the fundamental rights of others, any un-avoidable disadvantages are legitimate.Moreover, the mere invocation of a decision based on conscience or reli-gion is insufficient. Decisions of conscience – like beliefs –must also undergoelementary tests of plausibility and truthfulness. In principle, if one claimsa moral dilemma, “one must be able to demonstrate the seriousness of one’smoral dilemma in a comprehensible way.”16 The European Court of HumanRights (ECHR) argued similarly when it affirmed this in principle in a land-mark decision on the legality of religion-based rejection of vaccination obli-gations, but made it dependent on a sufficient degree of validity, seriousness,coherence and significance.17Motives for the abusive reference to religious freedomEven if it should emerge that the quantitative extent of the abusive referenceto religious freedomas a defence against COVID-19 protectionmeasures is na-15 Deutscher Ethikrat: Impfen als Pflicht?, Berlin: Deutscher Ethikrat 2019.16 Rixen, Stephan: “Die Gewissensfreiheit der Gesundheitsberufe aus verfassungsrechtli-cher Sicht,” in: Franz-Josef Bormann/Verena Wetzstein (eds.), Gewissen. Dimensioneneines Grundbegriffs medizinischer Ethik, Berlin: De Gruyter 2014, pp. 65–88, p. 73.17 Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], nos. 47621/13, EHCR 8 Apr. 2021.88 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwidetionally and internationally kept within reasonable limits after a concomitantanalysis of the empirical findings,18 it should not be neglected as it is a quali-tatively relevant problem.On the one hand, in the very obvious cases of abusive reference to religiousfreedom, such as in the case of the Celtic Druidic Faith Community or demon-strating anti-vaccination activists and “Querdenker,” the question emerges con-cerningwhy thesemovements donot simply refer to the freedomof conscienceor ideology – which holds equal importance under constitutional and humanrights law – but instead explicitly seek the protection of religious freedom. Inany case, an original religious interest that wouldmake this immediately plau-sible is not recognisable. It is possible that these groups and movements hopefor more acceptance in state and society by referring to religious freedom. Infact, with the reference to freedom of conscience, one is alone in case of doubt,and with the reference to a worldview, one always remains bound to life in thisworld. By contrast, the reference to an authority in the hereafter –which is asso-ciated with a religion – promises a special aura of the unconditional and im-movable. To see oneself (ostensibly) compelled by one’s own conscience to de-fendoneself againstCOVID-19protectionmeasures always remains somewhatweaker – at least in terms of external effect – than seeing oneself (ostensibly)compelled by a higher and otherworldly authority, which one believes one canonly oppose by sacrificing the salvation of one’s soul.On the other hand, another motive may be responsible for the abuse ofreligious freedom. Indeed, it is striking that especially right-wing populistgroups andmovements use their opposition to the COVID-19 protectionmea-sures to give new impetus to their anti-etatist agenda against the “politicalelites” in governments, parliaments, business, science, culture or even inchurches. For this purpose, they need new allies or at least supporters whoare sympathetic to their cause. Right-wing conservative circles – especially inthe Christian churches – offer themselves directly for this purpose.There havebeen “cultural bridges” to thesemilieus for a long time, with which right-wingpopulist agendas are intended to and can bemade compatible.19 Occasionally,18 There is currently no relevant empirical social science survey on this. The present pre-liminary considerations also draw their empirical basis more from “anecdotal” evi-dence, which is mainly fed by everyday observations.19 I cannot discuss these questions in more detail here. See also Sekretariat der Deut-schenBischofskonferenz (ed.): DemPopulismuswiderstehen. Arbeitshilfe zumkirchli-chen Umgangmit rechtspopulistischen Tendenzen (= Arbeitshilfe Nr. 305), Bonn 2019;Lob-Hüdepohl, Andreas: “Kirche gegen Rechtspopulismus – auch in den eigenen Rei-A. Lob-Hüdepohl: “Religion-Based” Resistance against COVID-19 Protective Measures 89even right-wing populist actors such as a board member of the association“Christians in the AfD” andmember of the European Parliament explicitly callon churches to value and support their commitment to religious freedom.20It is certainly no coincidence that even leading right-wing Catholic circlesaround the former officials ArchbishopCarloMariaVigano andCuriaCardinalGerhard Ludwig Müller follow the right-wing populist narrative that the pro-tective measures against the coronavirus – including against the practice ofreligion – actually only served those in power as a tried-and-tested means ofpushing the religious life of theChristian churches inparticular out of thepub-lic eye. Even if church members are not receptive to such conspiracy-theoret-ical suggestions, they may start to wonder when even in actually scientificallyhigh-quality statements there are still fragments of beliefs that call for spe-cial caution regarding COVID-19 protectionmeasures, although this directionhas long since been overcome both theologically and church-officially: consti-tutional lawyer Christian Hillgruber states that “according to the teachings ofthe Catholic Church, theHolyMass is aboutmaking present the sacrifice of Je-sus Christ on the cross, through which the individual believer receives a sharein the redemptive graces acquired through Christ’s death on the cross. Theso-called personal fruit of the Mass is only given to the priest who celebratesand to the faithful who are physically present.”21 Shouldn’t we do everythingin our power to avert the impending loss of salvation for Catholics at the lastminute?“Abusive” is tobe carefullydistinguished from“erroneous.” If believers referto a (supposed) requirement of their religious tradition and therefore defendthemselves (in court) against protectivemeasures against the coronavirus, theymay falsely invoke the absolute nature of their religious freedom.Thiswill havetobedecidedby the court anddoesnot yet constitute anabuseof their religiousfreedom. However, this is definitely the case when political movements andgroupsmerelymake use of the protection and social prestige of religious free-dom as a helpful instrument to better stage their actual political agenda, andhen,” in: Bernd Emunds (ed.), Christliche Sozialethik – Orientierung welcher Praxis?,Baden-Baden: Nomos 2018, pp. 239–259.20 Kuhs, Joachim: Offener Brief: Gottesdienste für alle – ohne Corona-Beschränkungen (2Dec. 2021), https://www.joachimkuhs.de/offener-brief-gottesdienste-fuer-alle-ohne-beschraenkungen/, accessed on: 6 Feb. 2023; Kuhs, Joachim: Massenexodus: Rekordbei Austritten aus katholischer Kirche (11 Jul. 2022), https://www.joachimkuhs.de/massenexodus-rekord-bei-austritten-aus-katholischer-kirche/, accessed on: 6 Feb. 2023.21 Hillgruber: Religionsausübung, p. 129.90 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwidewhen they consciously seek to fish in such milieus for which certain religiouspractices are particularly sacred and can thus at least become secret support-ers.The Political Instrumentalization of the Topicsof Secularism, Religious Freedomand Islamophobia in TurkeyBernd Hirschberger and Friedrich PüttmannThe topics of secularism and religious freedom are central themes in politicaldebates in Turkey. Over the course of the Turkish Republic’s history, the in-terpretation of the terms has constantly shifted, yielding different levels of in-clusiveness at different times.However,power-political interests have stronglypoliticized the terms at all times.Kemalism’s political instrumentalization of secularismThe Turkish Republic was built by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his supportersupon the supposedly Frenchmodel of laïcité and the idea that religious practiceshould be private rather than public.TheKemalist interpretation of secularismwas part of Kemalist and thus Turkish state ideology. Authoritarian secular-ists and leftists tended to perceive religion – in particular Islam – as a threator competition to their positivist worldview and an obstacle to their ideologi-cal projects.1Therefore, for Turkey’s Kemalist founding fathers, the Republic’s1 Bilgin, Pinar: “The Politics of Security and Secularism in Turkey: From the Early Repub-lican Era to EU Accession Negotiations,” in: Dietrich Jung/Catharina Raudvere (eds.),Religion, Politics, and Turkey’s EU Accession, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2008, pp.139–156, p. 141; Orhan, Gözde: “Religious Freedom Governance or Institutionalizationof a Heterodox Religion? Turkey’s Urban Policies with Respect to Alevi Population,” in:Peace Human Rights Governance 3 (2/2019), pp. 193–214, p. 211.92 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwidemain concern was “freedom from religion, and almost never freedom of reli-gion.”2In this interpretation, secularismwas not an approach that promoted reli-gious freedom.On the contrary, the traditional Kemalist reading of secularismimplies a considerable curtailment of religious freedom. However, in practicerestrictions were applied sometimes more and sometimes less strictly. For in-stance, since the 1960s, despite the strict Kemalist principles, it has repeatedlybeen possible for parties with an Islamist orientation to participate in gov-ernment in Turkey.3 However, secularism has repeatedly been misused as aninstrument of political control. For example, in the wake of the 1980 militarycoup, the (in)famous Turkish headscarf ban was enacted (as the Dress and Ap-pearance Regulation of 1982) as a reaction to the growing influence of Islamistelements in the country.4 However, it took until 1997 and an ultimatum by themilitary for the ban to be fully enforced.5The role of the topic of religious freedom in the contextof the transition of power to the AKP in the 2000sWhile it was long unheard of in Turkey to show one’s religiosity in public, newparties and leaders from the social periphery of Turkey gradually introduceda cultural change by no longer disguising their religious affinities. Especiallythe current ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), and RecepTayyip Erdoğan, who first became prime minister then president of Turkey,have placed the topic of religious freedom at the center of their politics.In 2007, the wife of former President Abdullah Gül became the first pres-idential wife to wear a headscarf, inciting a serious fury among Turkey’s sec-2 Akyol, Mustafa: “Turkey’s Troubled Experiment with Secularism. Lessons from Turkey’sStruggle to Balance Democracy and Laiklik” (25 Apr. 2019), https://tcf.org/content/report/turkeys-troubled-experiment-secularism/, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.3 Zubaida, Sami: “The survival of kemalism,” in: Cahiers D’études Sur La MéditerranéeOrientale et Le Monde Turco-Iranien 21 (1996), pp. 291 –296.4 Arik, Hulya: “Speaking of Women? Exploring Violence against Women through Polit-ical Discourses: A Case Study of Headscarf Debates in Turkey,” in: e-cadernos CES 16(2012), pp. 10–31, p. 17, https://doi.org/10.4000/eces.1009.5 Wiles, Ellen: “Headscarves, Human Rights, and Harmonious Multicultural Society: Im-plications of the French Ban for Interpretations of Equality,” in: Law & Society Review41 (3/2007), pp. 699–735, p. 709.B. Hirschberger/F. Püttmann: Religious Freedom and Populism in Turkey 93ularist media and citizens. Later, in 2013, the current President Recep TayyipErdoğan lifted the headscarf ban as part of a “democratization package,” in-terestingly by basing himself on the fact that freedom of religion was a centralvalue of the European Union, which Turkey was seeking to join. Indeed, by re-ferring to the “Western” institutionof theEuropeanUnion,Erdoğanwasable torhetorically disarm his political opponents in the Kemalist camp, as they sup-ported the project of European integration.This incident became iconic in recent Turkish history and domestic polit-ical debates on religious freedom.This is the case because for Erdoğan’s sup-porters the issue of religious freedom has since then been closely connectedto the issue of democracy and democratization overall.Within the frameworkof European integration, President Erdoğan liberalized many of Turkey’s in-stitutions – whether political or economic – and reduced the influence of theTurkish military over Turkish politics, which was an explicit requirement bythe EU’s acquis communautaire and took place against this background of sev-eral military coups that Turkey had previously experienced. This is tied to re-ligious freedom because the Kemalist founding fathers of the Republic insti-tutionalized the military as the guardian of the Republic’s Kemalist secularorder and gave it the authority and mission to intervene in democratic poli-tics when they saw this order (including secularism) as being at risk. Given themilitary’s long record of interventions against religious expression in Turkishpolitics (for example, Erdoğan himself was imprisoned for fourmonths in 1999for reciting a religious poem in public to mobilize his supporters), the curtail-ment of the military’s influence thus also expanded the exercise of religiousfreedom.These changesunderErdoğan in termsof religious freedomstillmat-ter today because they have created a profound loyalty to him among his sup-porters. In Turkey, it is common for people to closely associate changes in thecountry (from the building of roads to the spread of television) with not onlycertain periods but also the president of that time, and thankfully credit themfor it, even if later times under the same person may be tougher. As a result,Erdoğan’s achievements regarding religious freedomhave brought him strongpolitical credit, which he partly still lives off today.94 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom WorldwideThe populist reinterpretation of religious freedomunder the AKP ruleWhile many liberal intellectuals in Turkey and large parts of the West hopedfor a reconciliation of democracy and Islam through the AKP,6 the prospectof liberalization and democratization in Turkey was eventually disappointed.Instead, the Erdoğan-led AKP gradually adopted an illiberal interpretation ofdemocracy.Although references to EU integration in the context of religious freedomin Turkey have become rare these days, the AKP continues to use the seman-tics of human rights for its own power interests. Religious freedom is still be-ing framed as a centerpiece of democracy. However, the notion of democracythat is referred to when doing so is no longer a democracy in terms of a lib-eral democracy with an emphasis on rights but in terms of the rule of the ma-jority and the realization of their will. This change in how the ruling IslamistTurkish elite uses the term democracy also shapes the AKP’s reinterpretationof religious freedom.The idea of religious freedom as a universal right to free-dom benefiting all religious communities and individuals in Turkey has beenreplacedbyapopulistunderstanding that restricts religious freedominaclien-telistic and power-oriented way following a majoritarian and autocratic logic.When theAKPand its leadershipmakedemands and effortswith referenceto religious freedom, it is noticeable that a single, specific population is the fo-cus of attention: the majority group of pious, conservatively oriented SunniMuslims. This majority – that has long felt suppressed in Turkey by the secu-lar elites – is now encouraged to take up more space in society and the publicsphere. In addition, religiously conservative politicians demand more atten-tion to their ‘religious sensitivities,’ as it is often called in Turkish domestic po-litical debates.7Thesymbolicallymost prominent examples of this are certainlythe lifting of the headscarf ban in 2013 as well as the rededication of the HagiaSophia as amosque in 2020,whichwas presented as a revision of a violation of6 See e.g., Karakaya-Stump, Ayfer: “The AKP, sectarianism, and the Alevis’ struggle forequal rights in Turkey,” in: Celia Jenkins/Suavi Aydin/Umit Cetin (eds.), Alevism as anEthno-Religious Identity. Contested Boundaries, London: Routledge 2018, pp. 53–67.7 Bilgin: Politics, p. 140f., pp. 147–151; see also Alic, Anes: “Turkey’s secular-demo-cratic tightrope,” https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/88690, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.B. Hirschberger/F. Püttmann: Religious Freedom and Populism in Turkey 95religious freedom.8 However, in their rhetoric, the AKP and its leadership alsoclaim topromote the religious freedomofminorities.For example, in 2020, theAKP’s human rights department published a report entitled “Our silent revo-lutions in the field of religious freedom.”9 Nonetheless, in practice there is avisible gap between speech and actions. Even though some severe restrictionsfrom the Kemalist era were lifted in the course of Turkey’s application for EUmembership,10 including restrictions discriminating against non-Muslimmi-norities,11 experts continue to assess the state of religious freedom inTurkey asproblematic. For instance, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) internationalresearch network has even observed a deterioration in its Democracy Indicesin the area of religious freedom since the AKP took over government respon-sibilities in 2003 (the corresponding indicator fell from -0.2 in 2003 to -0.72 in8 Dogan, Taner: “Erdogan’s ‘New Turkey’ narrative is no longer selling” (29 Sep. 2020),https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/turkey-erdogan-narrative-not-selling, ac-cessed on: 11 Oct. 2023; Oztig, Lacin Idil/Adısönmez, Umut Can: “Sovereignty, power,and authority: understanding the conversion of Hagia Sophia from a performativeperspective,” in: Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies (2023), pp.1–21; TRT World: “Prayer restrictions lifted in Hagia Sophia,” https://www.trtworld.com/video/social-videos/prayer-restrictions-lifted-in-hagia-sophia/5f088d7c3e5d6b00171206de, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023; Attaman, Muhittin: “Reversion of Hagia Sophia:Normalization of Turkish politics” (29 Jul. 2020), https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/reversion-of-hagia-sophia-normalization-of-turkish-politics, accessedon: 11 Oct. 2023.9 Şahan, Fazlı: “En güzel cevap sessiz devrimler: Ayasofya’nın açılışını eleştirenlerbunları görmüyor” (13 Jul. 2020), https://www.yenisafak.com/hayat/en-guzel-cevap-sessiz-devrimler-ayasofyanin-acilisini-elestirenler-bunlari-gormuyor-3549129,accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023; Agenzia fides: “Ayasofya, Erdogan’s Party responds tocriticism: religious freedom has increased with our governments” (15 Jul.2020), http://www.fides.org/en/news/68359-ASIA_TURKEY_Ayasofya_Erdogan_s_Party_responds_to_criticism_religious_freedom_has_increased_with_our_governments, accessedon: 11 Oct. 2023.10 Küçükcan, Talip: “Are Muslim Democrats a Threat to Secularism and Freedom of Re-ligion? The Turkish Case,” in: Allen D. Hertzke (ed.), The Future of Religious Freedom:Global Challenges, New York: Oxford Academic 2013, pp. 270–289; see also The Insti-tute on Religion & Public Policy: Institute on Religion and Public Policy Report: Reli-gious Freedom in Turkey (7 Oct. 2008), https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/8/34238.pdf, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.11 Oztig, Lacin Idil/Aydın, Kenan: “The AKP’s Approach toward Non-Muslim Minorities,”in: Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 42 (2/2017), pp. 59–73.96 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwide2022).12 Minorities remain structurally discriminated against; for example, inthe field of theological formation.13Moreover, the Turkish government does not shy away from drawing on(widespread) prejudices14 against religious minorities and even fuels themthrough political agitation15 to gain the sympathy of Turkey’s Sunni major-ity or divert attention from political problems for which the government isresponsible. For example, the U.S. State Department remarked in its 2022International Religious Freedom Report that the Turkish government “con-tinued to treat Alevi Islam as a heterodox Muslim ‘sect’ and categorized Aleviworship as cultural rather than religious,”16 and did not recognize Alevi housesof worship. Moreover, individuals affiliated with the AKP have repeatedlymade use of anti-Semitic or anti-Zionist codes and narratives. Even thoughanti-Semitismand anti-Zionismwere alreadywidespread long before the AKPcame to power, it is noticeable that the media environment close to the AKPnow feels emboldened to openly express respective prejudices.17 For example,in publications such as the popular documentary Üst Akıl (“Mastermind”) bythe pro-government TV station AHaber, parallels to the anti-Semitic conspir-12 Varieties of Democracy: The V-Dem Project, https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/, accessed on: 26. Oct. 2023. Indicator: “Freedom of Religion,” negative trendalso for the indicator “Religious Organization Repression.”13 Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz/Kirchenamt der Evangelischen Kirche inDeutschland (eds.): 3. Ökumenischer Bericht zur Religionsfreiheit weltweit 2023. Einechristliche Perspektive auf ein universelles Menschenrecht (= Gemeinsame Texte Nr.28), Bonn/Hannover 2023, pp. 163–168.14 Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2023. Turkey, https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2023, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.15 Hintz, Lisel: “Challenges to Religious Freedom among Religious Minorities in Turkey,”https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Lisel%20Hintz-%20SAIS.pdf, accessed on:11 Oct. 2023.16 U.S. Department of State: 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Turkey, https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/turkey/, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.17 Bali, Rifat N.: “Antisemitism in Turkey: A New Phenomenon or More of the Same?,”in: Armin Lange/Kerstin Mayerhofer/Dina Porat/Lawrence H. Schiffmann (eds.), Con-fronting Antisemitism in Modern Media, the Legal and Political Words, Berlin/Boston:De Gruyter 2021, pp. 223–238, p. 232f; Waldmann, Simon A.: “Erdogan, the AKP andAntisemitism” (1 Jun. 2016), https://isgap.org/flashpoint/erdogan-the-akp-and-antisemitism/, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.B. Hirschberger/F. Püttmann: Religious Freedom and Populism in Turkey 97acy theory about the “Wise Men of Zion” are noticeable.18 Moreover, Erdoğanhimself occasionally toys with such sentiments. However, in contrast to hispolitical mentor, Necmettin Erbakan, this seems to be motivated by politicalcalculations rather than ideological convictions.19Inaddition, theAKP-ledgovernment’s control-oriented religiouspolicy to-wards both the Sunnimajority and religiousminorities stands in conflict withahumanrights-based interpretationof freedomof religionorbelief: regardingthe Sunni majority, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkan-lığı)–which had already been used byKemalist governments to exert influence–remains an important instrument of control for theAKP.20Nonetheless, con-trol is also a central goal for its religious policy towardsminorities. As a part ofthis, the government is increasingly attempting to influence the leadership ofthe religious communities, including the elections of patriarchs and chief rab-bis.21Altogether, it becomes evident that both its (alleged) commitment to reli-gious freedom and its positioning towards secularism as well as the Turkishgovernment’s religious policy as a whole are not primarily oriented towardshuman rights but rather power-political interests. Both the focus on the ma-jority group of conservative Sunni Muslims and the prioritization of their in-18 Balke, Ralf: “‘Antisemitismus spielt eine ganz zentrale Rolle.’ Simon Waldman überden Besuch von Recep Tayyip Erdogan, das Verhältnis zu Israel und Judenhass” (27Sep. 2018), https://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/juedische-welt/antisemitismus-spielt-eine-ganz-zentrale-rolle/, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023; Baer, Marc David: “Erdoğan ac-cuses Germany of echoing the Nazis – but his own record on anti-Semitism is shame-ful” (13 Apr. 2017), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/04/13/erdogan-accuses-germany-of-echoing-the-nazis-but-his-own-record-on-anti-semitism-is-shameful/, ac-cessed on: 11 Oct. 2023; Baer, Marc David: “Erdoğan und die Zinslobby” (10 Jun.2017), https://taz.de/Debatte-Antisemitismus-in-der-AKP/!5410004/, accessed on: 11Oct. 2023.19 Bali: Antisemitism, p. 228.20 Yildirim, Mine: “TURKEY: The Diyanet – the elephant in Turkey’s religious freedomroom?,” in: Forum 18 News (4 May 2011), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4dc24d952.pdf, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023; Yilmaz, Isan/Albayrak, Ismail: Populist and Pro-Vio-lence State Religion. The Diyanet’s Construction of Erdoğanist Islam in Turkey, Sin-gapore: Springer Nature Singapore 2022; Seufert, Günter: The changing nature of theTurkish State Authority for Religious Affairs (ARA) and Turkish Islam in Europe, Berlin:Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 2020.21 Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz/Kirchenamt der Evangelischen Kirche inDeutschland (eds.): Ökumenischer Bericht, p. 166.98 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwideterests as well as the instrumentalization of prejudices against minorities ul-timately emerge from an attempt to please a large electoral group and gathertheir votes for the AKP.Polarization of the political debates about religious freedomand secularism and the opposition’s likewise populist reactionThe AKP strongly relies on the use of identity politics and a harsh tone againstthe political opposition. For instance, despite claiming to be religiously toler-ant, thepejorative term gavur (infidel)–a termused to refer toOrthodoxChris-tians in the Ottoman Empire’s tax registers and which has become an insult tonon-Muslimsandnon-believers– is a commonelement in theAKP’s repertoireof rhetorical attacks onpolitical opponents.22 Furthermore, theAKPoftenusesa logic of “we vs. others”23 when dealingwith political opponents and claims tospeak for “the people” whereas opponents are portrayed as “the enemy” of thepeople.24 It is also not uncommon for the AKP to accuse political opponents ofbeing Islamophobic.25On the other hand, the secular Kemalist-oriented forces in the oppositioncriticized the fact that Erdoğan’s references to the EU and democratizationmerely served as a fig leave for him to advance his secret agenda of gradu-ally Islamising Turkish society and introducing conservative cultural change.22 Ertan, Nazlan: “Turkey’s rulers need to stop using the word ‘infidel’” (19 Apr. 2021), https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkeys-rulers-need-to-stop-using-the-word-infidel-article-57131, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023; Liphshiz, Cnaan: “Turkey school textbooks callJews and Christians ‘infidels’” (5 Mar. 2021), https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/antisemitism/turkey-school-textbooks-call-jews-and-christians-infidels-661051, accessedon: 11 Oct. 2023; Erdemir, Aykan/Maenza, Nadine: “Turkey Needs to Change its Policyand Rhetoric Toward Religious Minorities | Opinion” (29 Apr. 2021), https://www.newsweek.com/turkey-needs-change-its-policy-rhetoric-toward-religious-minorities-opinion-1586803, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.23 Hintz: Challenges.24 Yilmaz, Ihsan: “Erdogan’s Political Journey: From Victimised Muslim Democrat to Au-thoritarian, Islamist Populist,” in: ECPS Leader Profiles. European Center for PopulismStudies (14 Feb. 2021), https://www.populismstudies.org/erdogans-political-journey-from-victimised-muslim-democrat-to-authoritarian-islamist-populist/, accessed on:11 Oct. 2023.25 Aydindag, Didem/Isiksal, Huseyin: “Securitization of Identity in Turkey During theAKP Era,” in: Revista Gênero e Interdisciplinaridade 2 (1/2021), pp. 498–523, p. 515.B. Hirschberger/F. Püttmann: Religious Freedom and Populism in Turkey 99This rhetoric can be seen as a reaction to the shock of their loss of power withtheir own, different form of populism. While the AKP’s populism focuses onthe interests of the Sunnimajority, this “secular populism”26 focuses on a glori-fication, idealization and romanticization ofKemalist secularismwhile largelyignoring its deficits and curtailments of democracy and human rights. As aresult, the aggressive populist style of the government as well as the at timespopulist reactionary strategies of the opposition contribute to a strong polar-izationof thedebates on religious freedomand secularism inTurkey andTurk-ish society as awhole.While fiercemutual attacks continue to characterize theculture of political debate in Turkey, a repositioning of the oppositional Re-publican People’s Party’s (CHP) approach to secularism has become apparentin recent years.After the strategy of secular populism had proven unsuccessful, the partybegan to loosen its ideological principles regardingKemalist secularismand inturn also tried to appeal to conservative Muslim voters.27 For example, KemalKılıçdaroğlu – presidential candidate of themain opposition parties in 2023 –advocated a doctrine of helalleşme (reconciliation) in the run-up to the generalelections,particularly targeting the religiously conservativeMuslimpart of thepopulation.28 Already in 2017, the CHP leader had presented his party as a “de-fender of the freedomof religion and conscience,” protecting various lifestyles,including conservative ones.29 In October 2022, breaking with a rigid applica-tion of Kemalist principles, Kılıçdaroğlu proposed a law to protect the right to26 Tambar, Kabir: “Secular Populism and the Semiotics of the Crowd in Turkey,” in: PublicCulture 21 (3/2009), pp. 517–537.27 See e.g., Bajec, Alessandra: “Turkey’s opposition opens up to the hijab” (12 May2023), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/12/turkeys-opposition-opens-up-to-the-hijab, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023; Aydın, Selçuk: “Turkey elections: Why the CHP haschanged its stance on headscarves” (12 Oct. 2022), https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/turkey-elections-why-chp-has-changed-its-stance-headscarves, accessed on: 11Oct. 2023.28 Kendrick, Leo: “Opposition leader’s call for reconciliation spark discussion on Turkey’shistorical wrongdoings and current polarization” (19 Nov. 2023), https://medyascope.tv/2021/11/19/opposition-leaders-call-for-reconciliation-spark-discussion-on-turkeys-historical-wrongdoings-and-current-polarization/, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.29 BirGün Daily: “CHP the ‘guarantor of lifestyles’ in Turkey” (23 Oct. 2017), https://www.birgun.net/haber/chp-the-guarantor-of-lifestyles-in-turkey-186045, accessed on: 11Oct. 2023.100 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwidewear headscarves even in public institutions.30The AKP’s reaction to such ad-vances fromthe ranksof theopposition is typically tooutdo them.For example,theAKPsuggested that the right towear aheadscarf should evenbe included inthe constitution via an amendment31 and evenmore strongly drew on an anti-LGBT rhetoric in an alleged defense of the traditional family.32 In the strugglefor votes from the conservative population, they portrayed the opposition as“pro-LGBT,” while according to them only the government alliance protectedthe “sanctity of the family.”33The instrumentalization of the fight against Islamophobiaas a diaspora and foreign policy toolThe topic of religious freedom also plays a central role in the AKP-led govern-ment’s rhetoric in the realmof international politics. In particular, theAKPhasestablished the fight against Islamophobia as a central theme of Turkish for-eign and diaspora policy.In doing so, the AKP is certainly taking up an important issue, as xeno-phobic and also Islamophobic prejudices are widespread in many Westerncountries. There is often a lack of commitment to counteracting the corre-sponding group-focused enmity. On the contrary, many media sources inWestern countries offer considerable space to corresponding narratives, andsometimes even politicians and parties from the democratic center take uprhetorics and proposals from the far right in the hope of gaining voters’ ap-30 Euro|topics: “Turkey: CHP calls for law protecting headscarves” (7 Oct. 2022), https://www.eurotopics.net/en/289620/turkey-chp-calls-for-law-protecting-headscarves, ac-cessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.31 Daily Sabah: “Turkish constitutional committee approves amendment on headscarf”(25 Jan. 2023), https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/legislation/turkish-constitutional-committee-approves-amendment-on-headscarf, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.32 Wilks, Andrew: “Headscarf debate returns to Turkish politics at initiative of secularistopposition” (6 Oct. 2022),https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/10/headscarf-debate-returns-turkish-politics-initiative-secularist-opposition, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.33 Stockholm Center for Freedom: “Erdoğan reiterates plan for anti-LGBT constitutionalamendment” (7 Jun. 2023), https://stockholmcf.org/erdogan-reiterates-plan-for-anti-lgbt-constitutional-amendment/, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.B. Hirschberger/F. Püttmann: Religious Freedom and Populism in Turkey 101proval in this way. This lays the ground for the AKP and its leadership to takeup this issue in a populist way.Especially ahead of elections in Turkey, leading AKP politicians are con-spicuous for using a very harsh tone to attack Western allies. For example, in2017, in the run-up to the constitutional referendum on the expansion of thepresidential powers, Erdoğan criticized a controversial ruling by the EuropeanCourt of Justice on the wearing of religious symbols by employees as a “cru-sade struggle against the (Muslim) crescent.”34Moreover, after having beende-nied entry to the Netherlands to campaign for the referendum, Foreign Min-ister Cavuşoğlu warned of “religious wars”35 in Europe and claimed that therewas “no difference between Dutch social democrats and the fascistWilders.”36Before the 2018 Turkish general elections, Erdoğan in turn sharply attackedthe Austrian chancellor for his actions against “political Islam” and the clo-sure of mosques, focusing less on factual criticism and more on questioningKurz’s ability to govern due to his young age.37 During campaign rallies aheadof the 2019 local elections, President Erdoğan played a video of the Islamopho-bic attack on a Christchurchmosque, even thoughminors were also present,38sharply attacked New Zealand and Australia,39 accusing “the West of ‘prepar-ing’ the manifesto of the Christchurch attacker” and claiming “that the West34 Arab News: “Erdogan accuses EU of launching anti-Islam ‘crusade’” (16 Mar. 2017), https://www.arabnews.com/node/1069161/amp, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.35 VOA News: “Turkey’s Top Diplomat Warns of Religious Wars in Europe” (16 Mar.2017), https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-warns-of-religious-wars-in-europe/3768816.html, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.36 Khalidi, Ari: “Turkey FM expects religious wars in Europe” (16 Mar. 2017), https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/11036-Turkey-FM-expects-religious-wars-in-Europe, ac-cessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.37 Bernath, Markus: “Neue Attacken von Tayyip Erdoğan gegen Sebastian Kurz” (11 Jun.2018), https://www.derstandard.de/story/2000081350287/neue-attacken-erdogans-gegen-kurz, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023; Innerhofer, Hannes: “‘Unmoralischer Kanzler’:Erdogan greift Sebastian Kurz heftig an” (2 Jun. 2018), https://www.unsertirol24.com/2018/06/02/unmoralischer-kanzler-erdogan-greift-sebastian-kurz-heftig-an/, ac-cessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.38 Tremblay, Pinar: “Erdogan took Christchurch shooting to campaign trail” (19 Mar.2019), https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2019/03/turkey-erdogan-took-christchurch-shooting-to-campaign-trail.html, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2019.39 Ozerkan, Fulya: “Erdogan calls for fight on Islamophobia like ‘anti-Semitism afterHolocaust’” (22 Mar. 2019), https://www.timesofisrael.com/erdogan-calls-for-fight-on-islamophobia-like-anti-semitism-after-holocaust/, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.102 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwideand Western media have remained silent about the massacre,” promising tobring the attacker to justice if New Zealand would not, and calling on NewZealand to reinstate the death penalty.40 Furthermore, in 2020 he engaged inheatedargumentswithFrenchPresidentEmmanuelMacron,claiming that thelatter needed “mental treatment”41 and calling for a boycott of French prod-ucts.42 FahrettinAltun–then-President of theDirectorate ofCommunicationsof Turkey – also accused Macron of anti-Muslim rhetoric and following “theold Fascist playbook that targeted Jews in Europe in this manner.”43The AKP’slanguage in its fight against Islamophobia is thus characterizedbypersonal at-tacks andstrongpolemics. Inappropriate comparisonsof allegedly Islamopho-bic politics with the “crusades,”44 the Holocaust45 or the Covid-19 pandemic4640 Weise, Zia: “Turkey’s Erdoğan invokes Christchurch attacks on campaign trail” (20 Mar.2019), https://www.politico.eu/article/erdogan-invokes-christchurch-attacks-on-campaign-trail/, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2019.41 Deutsche Welle: “Erdogan blasts Macron and ‘Islamophobia’ in Europe” (24 Oct.2020), https://www.dw.com/en/erdogan-says-macron-needs-mental-treatment-blasts-europes-islamophobia/a-55385180, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.42 Devamı, Haberin: “President Erdoğan calls for boycott of French goods” (26 Oct.2020), https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-erdogan-calls-for-boycott-of-french-goods-159484, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.43 Zontur, Erdoğan Çağatay: “Turkey’s Communications director slams French president”(27 Oct. 2020), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/turkeys-communications-director-slams-french-president/2020206, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.44 See e.g., Deutsche Welle: “Erdogan accuses EU of ‘crusade’ against Islam” (17 Mar.2017), https://www.dw.com/en/erdogan-accuses-eu-of-crusade-against-islam/a-37979126, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.45 See e.g., Aharon, Eldad Ben: “Erdogan’s comparison of Islamophobia, antisemitismdoesn’t work – opinion” (17 Dec. 2020), https://www.jpost.com/opinion/erdogans-comparison-of-islamophobia-antisemitism-doesnt-work-opinion-652489, accessed on:11 Oct. 2023; Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye: “The rising Islamophobia in theWest has turned into an all-out attack on our Book, our Prophet and all our sacredvalues” (26 Oct. 2020), https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/122501/-the-rising-islamophobia-in-the-west-has-turned-into-an-all-out-attack-on-our-book-our-prophet-and-all-our-sacred-values-, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.46 See e.g., Höhler, Gerd: “Türkischer Staatschef vergleicht Islamophobie mit dem Ho-locaust” (14 May 2021), https://www.rnd.de/politik/tuerkischer-staatschef-vergleicht-islamophobie-mit-dem-holocaust-BYFWYZTHZNCJDNQY6WMLALGIVE.html, acces-sed on: 11 Oct. 2023.B. Hirschberger/F. Püttmann: Religious Freedom and Populism in Turkey 103as well as accusations of supporting terrorists are recurring elements of thisjargon.47This suggests that themotivation behind this rhetoric ismore rooted in theTurkishgovernment’s ownpower-political interests than inactually protectingMuslimminorities in Europe:The topic of the fight against Islamophobia offers President Erdoğan andhis party the opportunity to stage Erdoğan himself in the heroic role of the “de-fender” of Islam and Islamic values and traditions as well as the “champion”against Islamophobia.48 Adopting the language of colonial liberation and thefight against oppression, the Turkish government presents itself as the “voiceof the voiceless.”49 In this way, it hopes to gain approval and sympathy amongTurkish voters, especially among the large diaspora in Western countries andto expand its public diplomacy vis-à-visMuslim societies abroad.This rhetoricgoes hand in hand with Turkey’s domestic discourse about conservative Mus-lims’ victimhood.50In some cases, the references to the problem of Islamophobia are also usedto place pressure on partners to obtain political concessions that can be pre-sented as domestic successes. A prominent example of this is the Turkish gov-ernment’s blockade of Sweden’s NATO accession in 2022/23 after rallies withQuranburnings tookplace there.While theTurkishgovernmentpublicly calledfor “sincere steps from Sweden in the fight against Islamophobia,”51 other in-47 See e.g., Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye: Islamophobia; Hürriyet Daily News:“Turkey’s Erdoğan says his only concern is Islam, takes jab at atheists” (2 Aug.2015), https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-erdogan-says-his-only-concern-is-islam-takes-jab-at-atheists-86228, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.48 See e.g., Hussein, Rikar: “How Turkey’s Erdogan Portrayed Syria Offensive as a Pan-Is-lam Struggle” (13 Nov. 2019), https://www.voanews.com/a/extremism-watch_how-turkeys-erdogan-portrayed-syria-offensive-pan-islam-struggle/6179309.html, accessedon: 11 Oct. 2023.49 See e.g., Mengü, Nevşin: “How China’s influence flipped Turkey’s position on Uighurs”(27 Jan. 2021), https://www.duvarenglish.com/how-chinas-influence-flipped-turkeys-position-on-uighurs-article-56020, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.50 Yesil, Bilge: “Mediating Muslim Victimhood: An Analysis of Religion and Populism inInternational Communication,” in: International Journal of Communication 17 (2023),pp. 2904–2924.51 Zorlu, Faruk: “Türkiye concerned by ‘increasing anti-Islamic rhetoric, actions inEurope’: President Erdogan” (1 Feb. 2023), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkiye-concerned-by-increasing-anti-islamic-rhetoric-actions-in-europe-president-erdogan/2803868, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.104 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwideterests were also at stake, including the extradition of Kurdish activists andincreased access to USmilitary equipment.52The political power perspective thus seems to prevail over the normativeone and the Turkish government’s primary concern appears to be to harvestpolitical capital out of its criticism of others.This is shown not only by the factthat this rhetoric is used especially during election campaigns but also thatthe criticism of Islamophobia in other, non-Western countries is very selec-tive. For example, the Turkish government is conspicuously reticent about crit-icizing the Chinese regime’s treatment of themajority Muslimminority of theUyghurs.53 It is also striking that countries that are portrayed as theworst per-petrators in the Turkish government’s rhetoric at one point in time are oftenpresented later againas the closest partners and friends,andvice versa, insofaras this is politically opportune.54ConclusionTo conclude, the role of religious freedom inTurkishdomestic political debatescan hardly be understated as it represents a pivotal arena for Turkey’s generalstruggle over democracy and its meaning, and because – given the major roleof identity politics inTurkey– it remains an issue that candetermine elections.52 Al Jazeera: “Turkey’s been busy at NATO: Sweden’s bid, F-16s and war mediation” (13Jul. 2023), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/13/turkeys-busy-nato-swedens-bid-f-16-jets-war-mediation, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.53 Mengü: China’s Influence; Dorian, Jones: “Turkish Opposition Challenge Erdogan OverUighur Silence” (28 Jan. 2021), https://www.voanews.com/a/europe_turkish-opposition-challenge-erdogan-over-uighur-silence/6201354.html, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.54 See e.g., Turkey’s relations with the governments of Israel: Frantzmann, Seth J.:“Turkey’s shift from hating Israel to mending relations – analysis” (22 Sep. 2022), https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-717859, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023; Sarıaslan,Kübra Zeynep/Avetisyan, Armine: “What the Turkish election means for Armenia-Turkey relations” (18 May 2023), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2023/05/18/what-the-turkish-election-means-for-armenia-turkey-relations/, accessed on: 11 Oct. 2023.Populism, Religious Identity, and theInstrumentalization of “Religious Freedom” in theUnited States during the Era of Donald TrumpT. Jeremy GunnIntroduction: Christian identity rather than gospel ChristianityOne of the most important populist movements in the history of the UnitedStates (U.S.) began in 2015 with Donald Trump’s successful campaign forthe American presidency. This populist movement – often named “MAGA”(“Make America Great Again”) – deployed traditional populist rhetoric of“the people” against the “elites” and appealed to widespread resentmentsagainst entrenched politicians and established interests. Within the MAGAmovement, one salient theme was that religious freedom was under attack inAmerica and that it was necessary for religious people tomobilize and “to takeback the country.” The White Evangelical community was a key demographiccomponent of the MAGA movement that led to the electoral victory of TrumpinNovember 2016.1 Although themajority ofWhiteEvangelicals –both leadersand grassroots – were initially skeptical of Trump and his candidacy due tohis dubious moral character, a full 77% of White Evangelicals ultimately votedfor him for president (as opposed to 16% for Hillary Clinton).This chapter willrefer to Trump’s White Evangelical supporters, combined with others whoadopted his religio-political themes, as “MAGA Christians.”1 The term “evangelical” traditionally refers to people who share with others the goodnews of the New Testament and the gift of salvation offered to mankind throughthe sacrifice of Jesus Christ. As used in the United States – and differently from howthe terms is generally used in Europe – “Evangelical” refers to a trinitarian subgroupof Protestant Christianity that traditionally emphasizes the infallibility of the Bible.There are numerous varieties of American Evangelicalism, and between 10% and 15%might be identified as “progressive” or “liberal.”106 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom WorldwideWhydidWhiteEvangelicals,who initiallywere skeptical of Trump,becomearguably the strongest MAGA supporters?This chapter argues that the Trumpcandidacy and presidency successfully instrumentalized the themes of “reli-gious freedom” and “religious identity” to mobilize these supporters, a demo-graphic group that was critical for his electoral success. Trump and theMAGAChristians did not invoke the Gospel themes of caring for the sick and injured,giving to the poor, loving one’s enemies, turning the other cheek, helping wid-ows and orphans, forgiveness, or praying in private.2 Rather, they prioritizedChristian identity themes, including “Christians versus Muslims,” attackingone’s enemies, encouraging state financial support for Christians, promotingpublic displays of Christian symbols, as well as the use of the rhetoric of “reli-gious freedom.”Instrumentalizing religious freedom to win an electionFor more than a hundred years, Evangelicals (including Fundamentalists) hadinsisted that a worthy moral character is a necessary qualification for anyoneseeking public office. Among the many vices that traditionally were seen asdisqualifying for candidates were extra-marital sex, divorce, ignorance of re-ligion, dishonesty, and gambling. Between the 1920s and 1940s, many conser-vative Christians refused even to vote or participate in politics because it wasseen as inherently corrupt. By the 1970s, the willingness of Evangelicals to en-gage in political activity had grown considerably, and 1979 to 1980 marked asea change with the creation of the Moral Majority and several other religio-political activist groups that promoted Republican Party candidates.At the time of his June 2015 announcement, Donald Trump was already apublic figure who was well known for his New York-style braggadocio, pursuitof self-aggrandizing publicity, promiscuous sexual behavior, showydisplays ofwealth, promotion of commercial ventures branded with the name “Trump,”hosting a popular reality-television show where he frequently insulted partic-ipants, ownership of casinos, as well as his bankruptcies and spectacular busi-ness failures (threeTrumpcasinos inAtlanticCity,TrumpAirlines,TrumpUni-versity, TrumpVodka, Trump Steaks, and TrumpMagazine). A thrice-marriedman, he frequently and publicly boasted of his extra-marital sexual escapadesand having impregnated girlfriends while married to other women.2 Matthew 6:5–6. See discussion below.T. J. Gunn: Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom during the Era of D. Trump 107In addition to his disreputable lifestyle,Trumphadno recognizable knowl-edge or interest in the religious values that are at the heart of the Evangelicalworldview.3 Trumpwas never comfortable responding to questions about reli-gion, and typically answered them in such away as to turn the focus away fromGod and onto himself. At the time when Trump announced his candidacy, notonly was his knowledge of religion superficial, but he had earlier made state-ments on homosexuality and abortion that were unacceptable to Evangelicals.There are several positions that arewidely shared in the conservative Evan-gelical community regarding religio-political issues:• Promotion of “religious freedom” (and freedom from persecution forChristians);• Opposition to abortion;• Opposition to gay marriage and other LGBTQ rights;• Appointing Supreme Court justices who oppose abortion and favor reli-gious freedom;• Favoring religious exemptions from laws of general applicability;• Promoting religion in public schools;• Promoting public prayer in schools and in governmental bodies;• The threat posed byMuslims;4• Military and financial support for the State of Israel;• Encouraging state financial support for religion (including opposition tothe “Johnson Amendment” to the federal tax code).53 See Critchlow, Donald T.: The Conservative Ascendency. How the GOP Right Made Po-litical History, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2007, where Trump’s name doesnot appear; Balmer, Randall: Encyclopedia of Evangelicalism, Waco: Baylor UniversityPress 2004; Sutton, Matthew A.: American Apocalypse. A History of Modern Evan-gelicalism, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2014; Wodak, Ruth: The Politics ofFear. What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean, London: Sage Publications Ltd 2015;Thompson, Michael J.: Confronting the New Conservatism. The Rise of the Right inAmerica, New York: New York University Press 2007; Critchlow, Donald T.: PhyllisSchlafly and Grassroots Conservatism. A Woman’s Crusade, Princeton: Princeton Uni-versity Press 2005.4 “[W]hite evangelical Protestants tend to express more reservations about Muslimsand Islam than do those in other religious groups.” Pew Research Center: U.S. Mus-lims concerned about their place in society, but continue to believe in the Americandream (26 Jul. 2015), p. 127, https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2017/07/26/findings-from-pew-research-centers-2017-survey-of-us-muslims/, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.5 For the Johnson Amendment, see below.108 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom WorldwideDuring the first six months of his campaign, Trump largely ignored or was ig-norant of the importance of these themes to Evangelical voters. For example,hedidnotmention anyof them inhis declarationof candidacy on June 16,2015.He did not even bother to attend the first major forum in 2015 for Evangelicalvoters.Hewas the only Republican candidate not to appear at the event, spon-sored by the Prestonwood Baptist Church in Plano, Texas, on October 18, 2015.So foreignwas Trump toEvangelicals at the time that his absence–as reportedat the time – “practically went unmentioned.”The polls at the end of 2015 gavehim less than 20% of the Evangelical vote.In December 2015, as he came to understand that he was not gaining suf-ficient support from the key Evangelical community, Trump began to promotetheir favored religio-political themes. In that month, he hit squarely on oneof the principal Evangelical anxieties when he issued a press release accusingMuslims of endangering the religious freedomof Americans and promising toban them from entering the United States if he were to be elected president.Trump then sought a high-profile endorsement from thewell-known Jerry Fal-well Jr., President of Liberty University, and the namesake of one of the mostfamous and controversial Evangelical leaders of the 20th century. Trump wasinvited to speak at Liberty University in January 2016, in the same lecture se-rieswhere candidateTedCruzhadbeenenthusiasticallywelcomeda fewweeksearlier.In his LibertyUniversity address in 2016,Trumpvaguely called for the needto protect Christianity, albeit without explaining exactly why, where, or how.He did not yet link religious freedom to any of the trigger terms associatedwith it: abortion, gaymarriage, or the SupremeCourt.His stumblingmessagementioned “we are going to protect Christianity […] I do not have to be polit-ically correct. [applause] We’re going to protect it, you know. We’re going toprotect it. You know.”A week after Trump delivered the speech that demonstrated little famil-iarity with the Evangelical religion or Evangelical positions, Jerry Falwell Jr.stunned the Evangelical world by endorsing theworldly and biblically illiterateDonald Trump for president. While benefiting Trump’s credibility within theEvangelical community, Falwell’s endorsement was sharply criticized bymanyT. J. Gunn: Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom during the Era of D. Trump 109prominentEvangelical leaderswhocontinued to insist thatTrumpdidnothavethe moral character to be president.6Over the next six months, Trump gradually began to articulate the religio-political themes favored by Evangelicals and MAGA Christians by emphasiz-ing the danger ofMuslims, the evil of abortion, the growing threat to religiousfreedom, appointing favorable Justices to the Supreme Court, and promotingstate funding for religious activities. After many victories in Republican Partyprimaries, it became clear than Trump would win the Republican nominationfor president.With the combined interest of theMAGAChristians in support-ing the victorious candidate and Trump’s interest in enlisting the enthusiasticsupport of Evangelical leadership, the candidatemet withmore than 1,000 in-fluential Evangelical leaders and representatives on June 21, 2016, in the Mar-riottMarquis hotel on Times Square inNew York City. Among the participantswere former candidates Mike Huckabee and Ben Carson, whom Trump hadsoundly defeated, but also some of the most famous Evangelicals in the coun-try, including Franklin Graham, Jerry Falwell Jr., James Dobson, Tony Perkins,James Robison, and Kelly Shackelford. At this June 21 meeting, the leaders de-scribed themselves as a gathering of spiritual people doing God’s work.Trump acceded to and promoted the core Evangelical religio-political po-sitions at the Marriott Marquis meeting. He and the gathered leaders agreedthat:• Religious freedom is under attack in America and the Johnson amendmentis an infringement on religious liberty.• There is a need to appoint Supreme Court justices that would supportMAGA Christian positions on abortion, religious freedom, and gay rights.• Trump had been able to overcome many difficulties and obtain electoralvictories due to God’s intervention in the election.• Trump possesses identifiable and necessary moral and spiritual qualitiesfor holding public office.• Political divisions in the United States should not be understood as legiti-mate differences among alternative approaches to complicated issues, butas a stark contrast between good and evil.• There should be unquestioned support for the State of Israel.6 Collins, Eliza: “Christian leaders balk at Falwell’s Trump Endorsement” (26 Jan.2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/01/jerry-falwell-jr-endorses-trump-218238, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.110 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwide• Trump is a strong and forceful leader whowill protect Americans from en-emies, foreign and domestic.7Between the time that he announced his candidacy in June 2015 and his presi-dential victory with strong Evangelical support in November 2016, Trump hadnot changed his moral character nor revealed any increased knowledge aboutreligion.While Trump’s character didnot change as he soughtEvangelical sup-port, he did change his campaignmessage by newly emphasizing the fears andconcernsof theEvangelical community,mostparticularly thedangersposedbyMuslims, that Christianitywas under threat, and the need to appoint SupremeCourt justiceswhowould promote religious freedomand end abortion.Trumpthus instrumentalized the rhetoric of religious freedom to enlist the supportof the crucial Evangelical voting bloc,which enabledhim todefeatHillaryClin-ton in November 2016. As president, he would later instrumentalize religiousfreedom tomobilize support for his political objectives.Instrumentalization of religious freedom by MAGA Christiansand the Trump administrationThe Supreme Court, abortion, and gay rightsAmong the many social-political issues of concern to MAGA Christians,there are two clusters that recur most frequently: first, those related to fam-ily planning (including most importantly abortion but also contraception);and second, issues related to gender identity (including gay marriage, gayrights, and transgender rights). Although the Gospels speak eloquently andclearly about the importance of loving one’s neighbor, giving to the poor,and ministering to the sick, it was not these Gospel-articulated issues thatmotivatedMAGAChristians’ political engagement, but opposition to abortionand gender rights, neither of which was ever raised in the Gospels.There is compelling evidence that the issue of abortion held little initial in-terest to the Evangelical community in 1973 at the time of the Supreme Court7 A transcript of the closed-door event can be found at Ward, Jon: “Transcript: DonaldTrump’s closed-door meeting with evangelical leaders” (22 Jun. 2016), https://news.yahoo.com/transcript-donald-trumps-closed-door-meeting-with-evangelical-leaders-195810824.html?guccounter=1, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.T. J. Gunn: Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom during the Era of D. Trump 111case Roe v. Wade constitutionally legalized the right to abortion.8 However, in1979, as part of a political strategy to consolidate conservative religious com-munities– includingEvangelicals,Fundamentalists,ChristianOrthodox,con-servative Roman Catholics, and conservative Jews – into a unified voting blocto aid the Republican Party, several influential persons agreed to frame abor-tion as the definingmoral issue of our time.This newly discoveredmoral issuehelped Republicans elect Ronald Reagan in 1980. Prior to 1979, the legality ofabortion had troubledCatholics but not Protestants. After 1979, it became botha galvanizing and polarizing topic in American politics.In 2015 and2016, as Trumpcame tounderstand the importance of the issueto the Evangelical community and to gain their support, he spoke out in oppo-sition to abortion and promised to appoint Justices to the Supreme Court whowould overruleRoe v.Wade. Trumpwas later able to appoint three justices (withSenate confirmation) who stated during their Senate confirmation hearingsthat Roewas “settled law” and that they did not foresee overruling it. However,the first time that the opportunity presented itself, to the delight of Trump andMAGA Christians, all three Trump judges reversed their stated positions onabortion being settled law and voted with other justices to overturn Roe in the2022 decisionDobbs v. JacksonWomen’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. ___ (2022).Instrumentalizing “religious freedom” as a two-edged sword:Seeking state benefits on the grounds of religious freedomUnder American and international human rights law, the state is prohibitedfrom discrimination among religious groups, and should not demonstratepreferences or prejudice regarding the differences among Catholics, Hindus,Protestants, Muslims, or Buddhists. At the same time, both in the UnitedStates and internationally, religious people and religious groups are allowed todiscriminate on the basis of religion. Religions are not obligated to allownon-members to participate in sacred religious rituals, hire people of otherreligions to preside at religious ceremonies, or to admit into membershipthose whose values or behavior are anathema to their religion. Thus, under8 See Balmer, Randall: Redeemer. The Life of Jimmy Carter, New York: Basic Books 2014;Balmer, Randall: Bad Faith. Race and the Rise of the Religious Right, Chicago: WilliamB. Eerdmans Press 2021; and Balmer, Randall: “The Religious Right and the AbortionMyth” (10 May 2022), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/05/10/abortion-history-right-white-evangelical-1970s-00031480, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.112 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwidebasic principles of law, state discrimination on the basis of religion is prohibitedwhile religious individuals and entities are permitted to discriminate on the basis oftheir religious beliefs.However, this critical difference between the impermissi-bility of state discrimination and the permissibility of private discriminationbecomes problematic when individuals and groups are able to instrumental-ize the authority of the state to discriminate while simultaneously invokingtheir “religious freedom” as a shield to allow them to discriminate. To a greatextent, this is exactly what MAGA Christians and the Trump administrationpromoted: instrumentalizing the rhetoric of religious freedom to insist upontheir equal right to obtain governmental resources (such as state financialsupport for religious hospitals and schools) while simultaneously insisting ontheir religious freedom right to use state resources to discriminate againstothers.Wemay characterize this two-part use of “religious freedom” as a two-edged sword. On the one hand, religious freedom is invoked (defensively) todemand equal treatment to obtain state benefits, but then is used (offensively)to insist on the right to use state benefits to discriminate against others.Trump administration actions to provide state financial benefitsWith the active encouragement of theMAGAChristian community, the Trumpadministration (2017–2021) issued more than a dozen orders and regulationsto help religious individuals and groups obtain government benefits or ex-emptions from federal law, and then permit the beneficiaries of governmentalsupport to claim their “religious freedom” right to discriminate against otherswhose values and interests differ from their own.The twomost important ex-ampleswereExecutiveOrder (EO) 13798 “Promoting Free Speech andReligiousLiberty” (May 4,2017)9 andEO 13831 “Establishment of aWhiteHouseFaith andOpportunity Initiative” (May 3, 2018)10. Pursuant to EO 13798, theU.S.AttorneyGeneral issued guidelines for all federal agencies entitled “Federal Law Protec-tions for Religious Liberty” (Oct. 6, 2017)11. Following the issuance of these twoExecutive Orders and Attorney General guidelines, the Department of Health9 82 Fed. Reg. 21675 (9 May 2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-05-09/pdf/2017-09574.pdf, accessed on: 25 Aug. 2023.10 83 Fed. Reg. 20715 (8 May 2018), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-05-08/pdf/2018-09895.pdf, accessed on: 25 Aug. 2023.11 Attorney General [Jeff Sessions]: Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty(6 Oct. 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1001891/download, ac-cessed on: 25 Aug. 2023.T. J. Gunn: Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom during the Era of D. Trump 113and Human Services (HHS) in turn issued a series of orders and regulationsthat applied to government agencies, non-profit organizations, and for-profitbusinesses owned or operated by people making religious freedom claims.TheHHS rules were designed to facilitate religious freedom objections to lawsof general applicability, particularly regarding family planning (contraceptionand pregnancy) and providing services to the LGBTQ community.The HHS regulations undercut the rules of the Affordable Care Act (ACA,popularly known asObamacare) that required qualifying employers to providecontraception coverage for their employees. Although churches and religiousinstitutionswere already exempt from thismandate in theACA, theTrumpad-ministration – by executive fiat – extended this exemption to include not onlyreligious organizations, but also for-profit businesses that claimed religiousfreedom exemptions.12 Other regulations enhanced the authority of federallysubsidized health care providers to limit access to medical care for the LGBTQcommunity. The Department of Housing and Urban Development proposedrules to allow federally subsidized homeless shelters to refuse access to trans-gender people.Both theWhiteHouse (under EO 13831) and theHHS also created offices toadviseonpolicies topromote religious exemptions to laws.Theseofficesopenlyinvited and welcomed the participation of religious leaders in policy formula-tion. President Trump claimed substantial credit for these initiatives.Reminding MAGA Christians of his promises as a candidate, PresidentTrump also claimed to have abolished the Johnson amendment in EO 13798:“As I campaigned across the country, faith leaders explained that they wereprevented from speaking their minds because of a 1954 rule known as theJohnson Amendment. I spoke about it a lot. Under this rule, if a pastor,priest, or imam speaks about issues of public or political importance, theyare threatened with the loss of their tax-exempt status, a crippling financialpunishment. Very, very unfair. But no longer.”1312 Pear, Robert/Ruiz, Rebecca R./Goodstein, Laurie: “Trump Administration Rolls BackBirth Control Mandate” (6 Oct. 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/us/politics/trump-contraception-birth-control.html, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.13 Trump, Donald J.: Remarks on Signing a Proclamation on the National Day ofPrayer and an Executive Order Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty (4 May2017), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-signing-proclamation-the-national-day-prayer-and-executive-order-promoting-free, accessed on: 8 Aug.2023.114 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom WorldwideGiven that the Johnsonamendment is statutory law,andhasnot been repealed,Trump’s claim was exaggerated. It would be more accurate to say that John-son amendment had rarely been enforced prior to Trump, and then only in ex-treme cases, and that the longstanding policy effectively did not change underTrump.The Trump administration and MAGA Christian identityPublic prayer and religious displaysIn theGospels, Jesus criticized the “hypocrites”whoostentatiously pray inpub-lic so that others might see them (Matthew 6:5–6). Repudiating the form ofprayer taught by Jesus in the Gospels, Trump andmanyMAGAChristians pro-mote public prayer as a way of manifesting their religious identity. Perhapsthemost obvious example of promoting public prayer takes place at the annual“National Prayer Breakfast,”which has been held inWashington,DC, since the1950s.The annual event is attended by the newsmedia and is broadcast on na-tional television.One of themany recurring themes at the prayer breakfasts is the vital needto allow children to pray in public school, as if they are prohibited from do-ing so. In reality, children have a right to individual prayer in public schools.This form of individual prayer – apparently approved of by Jesus – has, how-ever, been insufficient for the religious right that has long sought to promoteschool-sponsoredprayers ledby teachers,athletic coaches,or other school offi-cials. Advocates of school-sponsored prayers have essentially argued that pub-lic school officials have a religious freedom right to lead children in prayer.Other MAGA Christian objectives that have long been part of the agendaof the religious right include promoting official prayers not only in the U.S.Congress but also statehouses and local governmentmeetings throughout thecountry. Trump frequently staged photo opportunities in the White Houseshowing religious leaders praying for him.Displays of religious symbolsIndividuals and religious communities have a long-recognized constitutionalright to display religious symbols in public. Churchesmay display crosses, TenCommandments monuments, and Bibles. Individuals also have the constitu-T. J. Gunn: Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom during the Era of D. Trump 115tional right to wear religious symbols on their clothing. Many MAGA Chris-tians seek, however, not simply to exercise their right to display symbols indi-vidually and as religious communities, but also seek state support and financ-ing for the display of religious symbols on public property. Since the 1950s, andcontinuing under the Trump administration, there have been efforts to pro-mote governmental displays of Ten Commandments monuments, Christiancrosses and crucifixes, and biblical passages. Trump wanted to use his poweras president to pressure businesses to declare publicly “Merry Christmas,” re-gardless of the sentiments either of the businesses or of persons whowould beoffendedby it.Perhaps themost salientdisplayof a religious symbolismduringhis administration was on June 1, 2020,when Trump ordered the U.S.militaryto forcefully clear Lafayette Park of peaceful protestors so that he couldhavehisphotograph takenwhile holding a copy of theBible in front of St. John’s Episco-palChurch.14 Aswas the caseduringhis campaign,Trumpwasmore interestedin holding the Bible aloft for photographers than reading or understanding it.Support for the State of IsraelSince the 1960s, the Evangelical community has been strongly supportive ofthe State of Israel, regardless of Israeli foreign and domestic policy. WhereasEvangelicals have been critical of other foreign states that prohibit Christianmissionary activity, they have not offered such criticisms of Israel for its pro-hibition on proselytism.TheunwaveringMAGAChristian support of Israel haslittle to do with actual Israeli policy, but reflects the eschatological belief thatthe establishment of the State of Israel is part of a biblical prophecy and willlead to the Second Coming of Christ. Evangelical Christians have long sup-ported Israeli policy and have been among the principal proponents of acced-ing to the Israeli position that Jerusalem is the undivided capital of Israel andthat foreign states should move their embassies to Jerusalem, even when itmeans placing embassies on Palestinian land in East Jerusalem. Although sev-eral prior candidates for president had pledged to move the U.S. Embassy toJerusalem, Trump was the first actually to do so. On December 6, 2017, he is-sueda“ProclamationRecognizing Jerusalemas theCapital of theStateof Israel14 Bennett, Dalton/Cahlan, Sarah/Davis, Aaron C./Lee, Joyce Sohyun: “The crackdown be-fore Trump’s photo op” (8 Jun. 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2020/06/08/timeline-trump-church-photo-op/, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.116 Populist Reinterpretation and Appropriation of Religious Freedom Worldwideand Relocating the United States Embassy to Israel to Jerusalem.”15 Symboliz-ing theMAGAChristian support for this controversial politicalmove, twoof hiswell-known and controversial MAGA Christian supporters were invited to de-liver public prayers inaugurating the newly opened embassy on May 14, 2018.According to The New York Times coverage of the event, a “Dallas evangelicalpastor who once said that Jewish people are going to hell and a megachurchtelevangelist who claimed that Hitler was part of God’s plan to return Jews toIsrael both played prominent roles onMonday in the opening ceremony of thenew American Embassy in Jerusalem.”16Attempt to ban Muslims from entering the United StatesThe MAGA movement is well known for its hostile rhetoric directed at Mus-lims, both those who are American citizens and those who live outside of thecountry. Equally sharp anti-Semitismwas once pervasive among the Christianright, and now anti-Islam has become one of its new identifying character-istics. Whereas MAGA Christians support freedom of religion and non-dis-crimination for Christians, they have been much less supportive of religiousfreedom and non-discrimination regarding Muslims. Reflecting and promot-ing the bias against Muslims within the MAGA movement, candidate Trumprepeatedly called for banning their entry into the United States. On January27, 2017, within a week of his inauguration, President Trump issued ExecutiveOrder 13769, a provocative order designed to restrict Muslims from enteringthe United States. Entitled “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist En-try Into the United States,”17 it did not use the words “Muslim” or “Islam” ex-plicitly, but it identified several Muslim-majority countries in its ban and itsintent was clear. While MAGA Christians supported the ban, public demon-strations against the EO 13769 broke out across the United States and it waschallenged immediately in federal courts, where it was blocked from imple-mentation. In response to the serious legal challenges against theorder,Trump15 82 Fed. Reg (6 Dec. 2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-12-11/pdf/2017-26832.pdf, accessed on: 25 Aug. 2023.16 Haag, Matthew: “Robert Jeffress, Pastor Who Said Jews Are Going to Hell, Led Prayerat Jerusalem Embassy,” in: The New York Times (14 May 2018).17 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (1 Feb. 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/02/01/2017-02281/protecting-the-nation-from-foreign-terrorist-entry-into-the-united-states, accessed on: 25 Aug. 2023.T. J. Gunn: Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom during the Era of D. Trump 117revised it twice in order to make its original bias less stark.The doubly revisedandmodified order was partially upheld by the Supreme Court.Trumpand theMAGAChristians proposed exemptions fromstate laws (on thebasis of religious freedom) while simultaneously seeking state endorsement oftheir beliefs.Thus, they are instrumentalizing the language of religious freedomto promote their own freedomwhile at the same time limiting the freedoms ofothers.ConclusionTheMAGApopulistmovement–which coalesced in 2016–combined elementsof several pre-existing populist themes, including resentment against socialelites, a fear that freedoms are being lost (particularly religious freedom andthe right to bear arms), a fear of immigrants and Muslims, antipathy towardsgay marriage and LGBTQ rights, and opposition to abortion. Many withinthe MAGA movement were motivated by racist and anti-Semitic sentiments.Initially suspicious of Trump’s morality and character, White EvangelicalChristians ultimately became MAGA Christians, without whose supportTrump would not have won the election.While the language of religious freedom, Christian nationalism, and theChristian God were prevalent within MAGA populism, the specific religiousgoals were not the Gospel values of feeding the hungry, caring for widows, vis-iting those in prison, or loving one’s neighbor, but rather promoting hostilitytowards disfavored groups, supportingChristian-identity symbols, increasingstate financial aid for religion, and encouraging religious freedomexemptionsfor businesses from laws of general applicability.With the notable exception ofclaimsabout the right of communityworshipduring theCOVIDpandemic, theclaims for religious freedom fromMAGApopulismwere less about seeking theright to practice one’s religion, and more about symbols of religious identity,state financial support for religion, exemptions to laws prohibiting discrimi-nation against gays, and prohibiting women frommaking their own decisionsabout the viability of their own pregnancies.Societal Dynamics and ProblematicReactions towards Populist AppropriationA Recipe for Political Polarization?Tackling Distorted Views on Freedom of Religion or BeliefHeiner BielefeldtIntroduction: Populist distortions of a human rightMore than any other human right, freedomof religion or belief (FoRB) is at thecenter of political polarization.1 In a number of countries – including Poland,Brazil, the U.S. and others – it is even a component within fully-fledged cul-tural wars. Conservatives from different religious backgrounds have invokedFoRB to oppose same-sex marriage, question specific parts of the mandatoryschool curriculum or back up restrictive anti-blasphemy laws. In turn, someliberals have criticized FoRB as an anachronism, that is a largely outdated his-torical right that has lost its legitimate role in modern secular societies. Thefault lines may vary and shift back and forth in manifold ways: religious ver-sus secular worldviews (or vice versa), tradition versusmodernity (or the otherway around), gender-related emancipation versus patriarchal structures andmisogynic prejudices, Christian legacy versus “foreign invasion” (for example,by Muslim immigrants), or enlightenment versus obscurantism, to mentionjust a few random examples.What comes to the fore in all such configurationsis the polemical pattern.Prima facie, polarizing views on FoRB derive a certain degree of plausi-bility from a broad range of conflicts that have emerged around religious is-sues. While people from different religious backgrounds have brought theirconcerns to courts or other decision-making bodies, one should take note thatthis is part of “normal” human rights practice. No one should be surprised to1 For a detailed analysis, see Bielefeldt, Heiner/Wiener, Michael: Religious FreedomUn-der Scrutiny, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2020. This book (which isalso available in German and Indonesian languages) contains many examples and ref-erences.122 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationsee FoRB – like any other human right – coming up in litigation. Additionalcomplications may occur if conflicts take place in the intersection of differenthuman rights issues. For example, FoRB-related interests can collide with is-sues of gender justice, just as freedom of speech can come into conflict withanti-racism agendas. Again, dealing with conflicts between different rights-based concerns has always been part of human rights practice, and it is cer-tainly not an exclusive feature of FoRB. In such situations, the task is to findpractical solutions that should do justice – to themaximumdegree possible inthe specific context – to all human rights-based concerns at stake. However,many polarizing invocations of FoRB are characterized by the absence of anyinterest in finding viable solutions by which to settle the issues. Instead, con-textual conflicts (which can always emerge) are turned into abstract dichotomies.In fact, keeping the conflict alive appears to be a purpose in itself.The intended“solution” – if envisaged at all – can only be the total victory of one’s own posi-tion, according to the logic of “the winner takes it all.”Such polarizing invocations typically ignore the nature of FoRB as an inte-gral part of a broader human rights agenda.2 Building on existing confusionconcerning the content and purpose of FoRB, they exacerbate mispercep-tions or even promote deliberately distorted views. In extreme cases, thisculminates in turning FoRB into a bastion of anti-liberalism and anti-genderism.Notwithstanding the fact that this human right carries “freedom” in its title,FoRB ironically seems to function as a sort of anti-liberal “counter-right” em-ployed to disrupt emancipatory achievement in areas like school education,public health or gender justice. Whereas right-wing political movements fre-quently play themost active role in such projects of “weaponizing” FoRB for thepurposes of cultural warfare, people from other parts of the political spectrumalso contribute to obscuring the status and content of this human right.Ratherthan defending FoRB as an indispensable component within a holistic humanrights agenda, commentators from the left or the liberal political spectrumoften seem to treat FoRBwith a certain degree of suspicion, thus inadvertentlycorroborating the distortions caused by right-wing populist movements.In the face of misperceptions and distortions, this article aims to providea conceptual clarification of FoRB. I first present FoRB as the human rights-2 FoRB has been enshrined in numerous international human rights instruments, in-cluding the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 18) and the 1966 In-ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (again article 18).H. Bielefeldt: Tackling Distorted Views on FoRB 123based approach to dealing with religious and belief-related diversity. Subse-quently, I define some criteria on how to deal with conflicts between FoRBandother human rights, in particular rights concerning sexual orientation andgender identity. The article concludes with a short reflection on how to copewith illiberal uses of a liberal human right.FoRB: The rights-based approach to dealing with religious diversityMany misperceptions of FoRB rest on the assumption that it protects the au-thority of traditional religious views, norms or values.The fact that FoRB car-ries “religion” in its title may nourish expectations that it serves the purposeto strengthen the role of religion in general, including the values traditionallypromotedbymany religions.For example,peoplewho fear for the future of tra-ditional family structures in the face of new developments – like the recogni-tion of same-sexmarriage –often turn to FoRB as a potential defense strategy.Their aspiration may be to fortify the heteronormative family as a manifesta-tion of FoRB.When it comes to countering provocative or satirical commentson religious norms,practices or authorities, FoRB again seems to offer a politi-cal response.Someeven cite FoRBwhenarguing for restrictive anti-blasphemylaws.3 However, the underlying assumption that FoRB protects traditional re-ligious beliefs or values is flawed. FoRB does not protect the integrity of beliefsystems or the societal status of traditional values, but instead consistently fo-cuses on humanbeings.Like any other human right, FoRBprotects humanbeingsin their dignity, freedom and equality.4True, FoRB specifically deals with concerns relating to religion or belief,and it is no coincidence that the letters “R” and “B” stand out in this acronym.Nonetheless, the point is that religions or beliefs only indirectly come into thefocus of human rights, namely through claims brought forward by human be-ings.Theyare the right holders of FoRB,not religions or belief systems in them-selves.The same is true for religious values: rather than backing up existing re-ligious value systems, FoRB empowers human beings to hold, voice and stand3 Over more than a decade, various UN forums discussed resolutions titled “Combat-ing Defamation of Religions,” which factually supported blasphemy laws and otherrestrictive policies. The resolutions can easily be found on the internet.4 See article 1, first sentence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which fa-mously proclaims: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”124 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationup for their various religious ormoral convictions, including in public politicaldebates. In this case, again human beings are the ones receiving legal protec-tion of their rights. The general purpose of FoRB is to guarantee respect andprotection for human beings in the vast area of conscientious convictions, re-ligious orientations, spiritual practices, theological or non-theological beliefs,religious rules and so on.Why this strict focus on human beings? Does this not confirm the conser-vative diagnosis of a general decline of religion in public life? The opposite istrue. Above all, taking religion seriously implies appreciating the diversity thatwe witness in the field. Indeed, “religion” only exists in the plural, namely as“religions.”Theological views substantially differ between andwithin religioustraditions, and practical rules – from dietary stipulations or traditional cloth-ing to initiation rituals or the celebration of religious holidays – differ evenmore. The one common element to be found in all of this is human practice in thebroadest sense of the word. Obviously, human beings are the ones holding orchallenging religious views, they are the ones interpreting and observing com-munity-related religious rules, and they are the ones cherishingor abandoningreligious practices and promoting or criticizing certain religious values. Keep-ing the focus of legal protection consistently on human beings rather than re-ligions or beliefs themselves seems to be the only way of doing justice to theexisting – and further emerging – diversity in the broad area of faith, beliefand religiosity.Theclear focusonhumanbeings as rightholders thus accounts for thewidescope of FoRB.Qua its nature as a universal human right, FoRB cannot be con-fined to the orthodox followers of traditionally recognized “world religions.”Rather, it facilitates numerousmanifestations of inter-religious, intra-religiousand post-religiousdiversity. It protects promotors of feminist re-interpretationof religious sources no less than their conservative opponents.While certainlyfacilitating traditional religious practice, FoRB also opens the space for newreligious movements or theological reforms. Generally speaking, FoRB coverspeople’s identity-shaping existential convictions and related practices in thebroadest sense, including atheismandagnosticism.5Whoever claimsFoRB fortheir own – conservative, liberal, progressive, etc. – positions should be aware5 In paragraph 2 of its General Comment no. 22 (of 1993), dedicated to clarifying thenormative profile of FoRB, the UN Human Rights Committee has pointed out that“Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right notto profess any religion or belief. The terms ‘belief’ and ‘religion’ are to be broadly con-H. Bielefeldt: Tackling Distorted Views on FoRB 125that FoRB likewise protects the freedom of people holding other views or pur-suing alternative agendas.Against a widespread misperception, the clear focus on human beingsas right holders is not tantamount to promoting an “individualistic” way oflife, detached from societal expectations and communitarian demands. Al-though FoRB aims to protect individuals from coercion and undue pressure,it also covers numerous community-related features of religious life, such asreligious socialization of children, community-based worship, fasting andbreaking the fast together with others, carrying out pilgrimages and buryingcommunity members who have passed away. FoRB furthermore includesinstitutional preconditions of religious community life, like the establishmentof religious schools and training institutions, the building and restoring ofhouses of worship or the running of cemeteries. Nonetheless, this does notalter the fact that the protection provided by FoRB is due to human beings, asindividuals and together with others.Another misunderstanding concerns the “anthropocentric” nature ofhuman rights in general and FoRB in particular. While the consistent focuson human beings as right holders implies some sort of political and legal“anthropocentrism,” it would be incorrect to mix political concerns about thebasic rights of human beings with a fully-fledged anthropocentric doctrineor ideology. Human rights do not presuppose the understanding that thehuman being constitutes “the center of all things.”6 In fact, FoRB opens a widespace for most different religious and non-religious worldviews, includingtheocentric, biocentric, cosmocentric and other non-anthropocentric perspectivesand related practices. Nonetheless, even non-anthropocentric views are heldand cherished by human beings, which is what matters for the practice ofhuman rights.The clear and consistent focus on human beings as right holders remainsa decisive criterion by which to identify genuine FoRB claims from false ormisleading invocations. Vague references to existing “religious interests,” “re-ligious traditions” or “religious values” do not suffice to qualify political agen-das as being in line with FoRB. Sometimes, the opposite is the case. For ex-ample, restrictive policies aimed at protecting a country’s religious status quothrough anti-conversion laws are obviously incompatible with FoRB.The samestrued.” This important clarification has been regularly cited by other human rightsbodies, including the UN Special Rapporteurs on FoRB.6 A well-known proverb ascribed to the Ancient Greek sophist Protagoras.126 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationis true for anti-blasphemy laws, which stifle public dissent or critique of reli-gion, or laws designed to fortify collective observance of traditional religiousvalues against public criticism and internal reformmovements. Evenwhen hi-jacking a superficial language of “religious freedom,” as it sometimes happens,such restrictive policies or laws turn the logic of FoRB upside down.Owing to its nature as a human right, FoRB opens the space for manifes-tations of religious and belief-related diversity, often in conjunction with otherforms of diversity. Of course, no one is compelled to like this. Exposure to di-versity – whether in the field or religiosity or other areas – can be exhausting,and it is always a challenge.This experience has become the entry point for var-ious populistmovements and their vague promises to “clean up” themessinessofmodern life.However, policies of promoting ethnic, cultural or religious ho-mogeneity by stoking resentments against minorities or immigrants can cer-tainly not be in the interest of FoRB.How to assess conflicts between FoRB and other human rightsThe understanding that FoRB always focuses on human beings also changesthe perception of many of the conflicts that occur around religious issues. Insome cases, an adequate contextual analysis may reveal that a particular con-flict involving religious beliefs or values actually lacks any genuine FoRB di-mension. Indeed,many of the cases presented under the auspices of FoRB reston fundamentalmisunderstandings; for example, people who feel offended bythe sheer fact that their country recognizes same-sex marriages cannot legit-imately claim a violation of their FoRB. In a religiously pluralistic society, noone is entitled to expect that others cherish and observe the same values asthey themselves do. Persons with a conservative mindset concerning genderissues are certainly free to voice their reluctance, criticize the societal develop-ment and promote their own skeptical views: this is part of their freedom ofexpression and– if based on religious convictions – their freedomof religion,77 I cannot discuss here the issue of limitations on FoRB or freedom of expression, whichthe state can impose in the interest of preventing incitement to acts of hatred. Anylimitations deemed necessary require a detailed justification in conformity with thecriteria defined for that purpose. They are inter alia contained in article 18, paragraph3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.H. Bielefeldt: Tackling Distorted Views on FoRB 127although they cannot impose their value systems on others.This example illus-trates that not every rhetorical invocation of FoRB has a solid normative basis.Whether or not a specific conflict with religious overtones contains a genuineFoRB dimension always requires a diligent contextual analysis.8Nonetheless, conflicts between FoRB and other human rights concerns canactually occur. Examples include the refusal of parents to have their childrenparticipate in sex-education, even though this is part of themandatory schoolcurriculum, or parental opposition against co-education of girls and boys, inparticular in sports and swimming classes. Hotel owners refusing to host gaycouples or bakers who do not wish to prepare a wedding cake for homosexu-als have justified their position by pointing to their religious convictions, thusclaiming recognition of their interests under FoRB. Registrars not wishing tobecome professionally involved with same-sex marriage ceremonies have in-voked conscientious objection on religious grounds. Pharmacists who refuseto sell contraceptives have likewise referred to FoRB. One could easily prolongthe list of examples of conflicts in the intersection of FoRB and gender justice.Given the high degree of public attention attributed to such issues, the conflictconfiguration of “FoRB versus gender” hasmeanwhile become a litmus test forthe possibility of reconciling different human rights concerns in general.How should one cope with this kind of conflict? It is impossible to providea comprehensive general answer, because adequate judicial decisions will al-ways be contextual. There is no “one-size-fits-all” solution. The task is to dojustice – to themaximum degree possible9 – to all genuine human rights con-cerns at stake in the specific context.This precludes constructing abstract hier-archies, according to which one right would generally “trump” the conflictingright. Neither can the invocation of FoRB push aside rights claims relating togender justice, nor can the interest in promoting more gender justice justifythe neglect of FoRB. All of the human rights-based concerns involved in a par-ticular conflict must be taken seriously. Ultimately, it may be inevitable to takea decision that prioritizes one rights-based concern over the other, although8 It should be noted in passing that conflicts presented under the auspices of FoRB alsowarrant a diligent empirical analysis, not only a normative assessment. For example,assumptions that wearing the Islamic hijab indicates an inferior position of womenincompatible with gender equality have often proven empirically wrong.9 This caveat is important. Human rights are based on the insight that we obviously livein a non-ideal world.128 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationit is important not to turn such contextual priorities into abstract dichotomies or ageneral ranking of rights.While the idea of one right generally “trumping” another right is obvi-ously incompatible with elevated normative status of all human rights, italso seems flawed to search for a lukewarm compromise somewhere in the“middle ground” between the (seemingly) conflicting rights. A vague 50/50compromise would be no less problematic than the logic of “winner takes itall.” In order to move beyond those two problematic lines of thinking, one hasto challenge ametaphor that regularly emerges in discussions on the adequatetreatment of conflicting rights-based concerns, namely that of “balancing.”Many people seem to like “balancing,” since it stands for a nuanced and com-plex perspective, which may account for the extraordinary popularity of theterm. However, the underlying picture of the two weighing scales is mislead-ing,10 as it suggests a zero-sum conflict in which the two scales necessarilymove in opposite directions: whenever one scale goes down, the other onewill inevitably move up, and vice versa. In other words, gains on the one sidewill always be linked to losses on the other side, or at least this what the pic-ture suggests. Applying this zero-sum logic to different human rights issuesdiscourages the search for holistic solutions, thus reflecting the problem.For example, it may nourish the assumption that any progress concerninggender justice necessarily threatens the status of FoRB and that any additionalemphasis placed on FoRB necessarily reduces the weight accorded to gender-related rights.In the interest of a holistic human rights approach, it seems imperativeto overcome this kind of zero-sum logic suggested by the metaphor of theweighing scales.Without downplaying contextual contestation between FoRBissues and LGBTIQ+ rights, it is actually quite possible to simultaneouslypromote both human rights. Working for both human rights is certainlynot schizophrenic. When understood as universal right owned by humanbeings, FoRB does not constitute a general obstacle to the implementationof gender-related rights, nor does progress in the area of gender justice inany way diminish the significance of FoRB. Pursuing a holistic human rightsagenda proves particularly important in view of the many millions of peopleworldwide who live in circumstances where they would actually need both10 For a detailed analysis, see Bielefeldt, Heiner: “Limiting Permissible Limitations. Howto Preserve the Substance of Religious Freedom,” in: Religion and Human Rights 15(1–2/2020), pp. 3–19.H. Bielefeldt: Tackling Distorted Views on FoRB 129respect for their freely articulated religious identities in accordance with theirreligious self-understandings as well as the freedom to live in harmony withtheir sexual orientations or gender identities. Dichotomized constructions ofthe relationship between FoRB and gender justice would tear those people’slife world apart and rob them of a much-needed source of hope.One should bear in mind that the invocation of FoRB is not a privilege forconservative religious believers. As previously mentioned, FoRB facilitates abroad rangeof different uses. Just as it functions as a reference for conservativefollowers of religious traditions, it can also empower people with liberal viewsor progressive religious aspirations. As a human right that generally promotesdiversity not only between but alsowithin religious communities, FoRB can in-directly11 contribute to broadening the space for religious reform agendas, notleast for projects that try to reconcile religious traditions with modern aspi-rations of gender justice. The way in which FoRB comes to the fore ultimatelydepends on the right holders themselves, who have to decide on whether andhow to make use of their human rights, including their right to FoRB.Coping with illiberal uses of a liberal rightFoRB is a liberal right that explicitly proclaims “freedom” in its title. In thisregard, it displays structural similarities with the freedom of expression,freedom of assembly or freedom of association, to name just a few examples.However, liberal rights are not rights for liberals only, just as human rightsin general cannot remain reserved for the friends of Amnesty Internationalor other human rights organizations. Due to their universalistic aspiration,human rights belong to all humans equally, regardless of whether a person’s at-titude is liberal or less liberal, ultra-liberal or even openly anti-liberal. Rights-based diversity even includes those who do not appreciate such diversityand would prefer living in a much more homogeneous religious, cultural orpolitical environment.Leaders, followers and supporters of populist movements also enjoy theirhuman rights, as individuals and togetherwith others.They are free to express11 Highlighting this “indirectness” seems important to avoid a possible misunderstand-ing. Just as FoRB does not protect traditional religious values, it does not promoteliberal or progressive religious agendas in themselves. In any case, the appreciationof diversity does promote openness for internal discussions and reform projects.130 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationtheir positions, except when openly inciting to acts of hatred. They can holdpublic demonstrations, establish political parties and participate in nationalelections. People are also free to propose their own idiosyncratic re-concep-tualizations of human rights, including strange, problematic and dangerouslymisleading interpretations of FoRB, which actually happens quite frequently.However, it is one thing touse a right to freedomfor voicing conservative orultra-conservative positions, including skepticism concerning gender-relatedemancipation.This happens not only in the name of FoRB but also in relationto other human rights, like the freedom of expression, freedom of associationor freedom of assembly. Twisting one specific human right into a bastion ofanti-liberalism or anti-genderism – as it happens with FoRB – is somethingelse.Beyond obscuring the human rights nature of FoRB, such ideological con-structions are an attack on the indivisibility of all human rights in general. Asprohibition cannot be a solution, it seems all the more important to exposeflagrantmisunderstandings and ideological distortions of FoRB to public crit-icism. This cannot be an exclusive task for experts; rather, what is requiredto counter the simplistic and polarizing slogans of populist movements is thecommitment of many people who take an active ownership in human rights.Working for a clear understanding of the normative contours and purpose ofFoRB is an integral part of such much-needed political commitment againstpopulism.Religious Freedom in the Field of Tensionbetween Populist Anti-Muslim Sentimentsand Islamist Radicalisation TendenciesSociological Observations Using the Case of GermanyYoussef DennaouiIntroductionSociological research on Islam offers an important conceptual tool for exam-ining the genesis and inner dynamics of the religious field of Islam as a self-organised minority religion in the context of German society, without losingsight of the religious conflicts and disputes that arise from it, including reli-gious self-organisation conflicts, social integration conflicts, legal institution-alisation conflicts, etc.1 Islamophobic tendencies are also just asmuch apart ofa well-founded sociological description of the conflicts and debates surround-ing Islam and Muslims as the legal possibilities of institutionalising Islam ac-cording to religious law standards in Germany, at the centre of which is thefundamental right to freedom of religion. It is therefore unsurprising if “legaldisputes about religious freedom and thus about human rights have becomean important part of the institutionalisation process of Islam in Europe.”2While these dynamics of religious self-organisation and the legal and in-stitutional integration of Islam in Germany have brought about legal and reli-gious emancipation opportunities for Muslims, they have been accompaniedby side-effects and conflicts, which are evident in increasing populist and far-1 Wohlrab-Sahr, Monika/Tezcan, Levent: “Einleitung,” in: Monika Wolhrab Sahr/LeventTezcan (eds.), Islam in Europa. Institutionalisierung und Konflikt, Baden-Baden: No-mos 2022, pp. 7–23.2 Wohlrab-Sahr: Einleitung, p. 17. Quotes that have not been published in English havebeen translated into English by the editors of this book.132 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationright Islamophobia in German society3 and visible in the strengthening of Is-lamist forces. Recent sociological research shows how both developments arein a spiralling relationship with each other, which drives and legitimises radi-calism and resentment on both sides.4While the former are afraid of “Islam”5and equate it with Islamism, their opponents from the Islamist spectrum fearfor “Islam,”which is understoodandpractisedhere in a fundamentalist sense.6The human right to religious freedom is instrumentalised by both extremesand accordingly appears as the object of different and contradictory interpre-tations and appropriations.In this article, in a first step I will briefly outline the genesis and institu-tionalisation of the religious field of Islam in Germany. In a second step, I willshow why the discussion about the equal treatment of Islam in Germany cansociologically only be described in fields of tension between increasing socialIslamophobia and Islamist radicalism, whereby the right to religious freedomappears to be contested within society. In a third step, I will use the exam-ple of themosque building debates in Germany to demonstrate howmoderate3 Bielefeldt, Heiner: Das Islambild in Deutschland. Zum öffentlichen Umgang mit derAngst vor dem Islam, Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte 2007; Benz,Wolf-gang:Die Feinde aus demMorgenland.Wie die Angst vor denMuslimenunsereDemo-kratie gefährdet,München: Beck 2012; Pollack, Detlef: “ÖffentlicheWahrnehmung desIslam in Deutschland,” in: Dirk Halm/HendrikMeyer (eds.), Islam und die deutsche Ge-sellschaft,Wiesbaden: Springer FachmedienWiesbaden 2013, pp. 89–118; Pickel, Gert:“Religion als Ressource für Rechtspopulismus? Zwischen Wahlverwandtschaften undFremdzuschreibungen,” in: Zeitschrift für Religion, Gesellschaft und Politik 2 (2/2018),pp. 277–312; Pickel, Gert: Weltanschauliche Vielfalt und Demokratie. Wie sich religiö-se Vielfalt auf die Demokratie auswirkt, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2019; Hafez,Kai/Schmidt, Sabrina: Die Wahrnehmung des Islam in Deutschland, Gütersloh: Ber-telsmann Stiftung 2015; Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (BMI): Mus-limfeindlichkeit – Eine deutsche Bilanz. Berlin: BMI 2023.4 Pickel, Gert/Öztürk, Cemal: “Die Bedeutung antimuslimischer Ressentiments für dieErfolge desRechtspopulismus in Europa –KonzeptuelleÜberlegungenundempirischeBefunde,” in: MonikaWolhrab Sahr/Levent Tezcan (eds.), Islam in Europa. Institutiona-lisierung und Konflikt, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2022, pp. 303–355; Pickel, Gert/Pickel, Su-sanne: “Elemente und Rahmenbedingungen der (Co-)Radikalisierung. Erste Analysenund Erkundungen des Forschungsfeldes,” in: Hikma 14 (1/2023), pp. 31–53.5 Bielefeldt: Islambild; Benz: Feinde.6 Dennaoui, Youssef: “Reflexiver Islam: Islamsoziologie als Kosmopolitisierungsfor-schung,” in: Ulrich Becks/Oliver Römer/Clemens Boehncke/Markus Holzinger (eds.),SoziologischePhantasie und kosmopolitischesGemeinwesen: Perspektiven einerWei-terführung der Soziologie, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2020, pp. 239–271.Y. Dennaoui: Between Anti-Muslim Sentiments and Islamist Radicalisation 133forces among Muslims and non-Muslims alike are among the major losers inthis formof populist and radical Islamist instrumentalisation of religious free-dom. In the concluding part of the article, perspectives are briefly outlined onhow religious freedom and its significance for society as a whole can be rede-fined for all and across all religious contexts.Religious institutionalisation of Islam in Germany:Internal dynamics and external factorsReligious conflicts and disputes about Islam can be divided into those thatarise from the logic and dynamics of internal religious differences and dis-agreements amongMuslims, and those that relate to the social environment ofthe Islamic field (social and constitutional framework, social integration andinstitutionalisation processes, etc.). For an understanding of the former, theaspect of Islam’s self-organisation amongMuslimsmust be given greater con-sideration. Self-organisation refers to processes of religious self-sufficiencythat significantly shape the formation of a religious field of Islam in Germany.By contrast, external general conditions refer to religious constitutional andinstitutional requirements, at the centre of which is the freedom of religion asa fundamental right.While in the 1980s conservative religiously-oriented Muslims (mostly laypeople) were significantly involved in building the first mosques to meet thegrowing need for religious places of communal faith practice on the part ofthe growing number of Muslims (family reunifications of the first generationof immigrants), these first religious structures were taken over by Islamic(self-)organisations (mostly from the respective countries of origin) from the1990s onwards, largely partially professionalised (sending imams and preach-ers, etc.) and successively expanded in their competences. In a further phase,this led to the established organisations seeking the cooperation and supportof the state. This enabled new areas of Muslims’ lives to be served religiouslyand new needs to be awakened (charitable institutions, cemeteries, Islamicinstruction in public schools, etc.).7 In this way, professional actorswho repre-sented the interests ofMuslims in societymore or less successfully established7 Ceylan, Rauf: “Orthodoxe versus heterodoxe Gemeinden. Machtaufbau undMachtver-lust der etablierten Gemeinden,” in: Lamya Kaddor (ed.), Muslimisch und liberal. Waseinen zeitgemäßen Islam ausmacht, München: Piper 2020, p. 164.134 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationthemselves. These established actors are characterised by two features: first,the orientation of their activities towards the possibilities that the Germanconstitutional law on religion offers to religious communities, and second, theorientation towards established religious – usually Christian – institutionsand their religious-political actions. Interest in the religious and religious-political institutionalisation possibilities offered by religious law has grownover time. Even though many Islamic organisations to date have been deniedlegal recognition as corporations under public law, they continue to show a stablewillingness to pursue their self-defined religious interests and needs in thisdirection. Already at this point, it becomes apparent how the religious field ofIslam – including the organisations that claim a substitute entitlement – isdetermined by religious constitutional requirements, which in turn find theirfirst justification in the fundamental right to freedomof religion.Here, no lessis at issue than the question of what Islam is and how it can be appropriatelypractised and organised under the conditions of a modern secular societywithout “the bureaucratised corset of the semi-state religious organisationbeing imposed on it.”8While the first small backyard mosques were hardly noticed in the 1970sand 1980s, over time they have become a public issue and the subject of socialdebate.Themore expressive or larger that themosques became, the greater theconflicts and themore heated the debates about them in themedia and public.In this respect,Thomas Schmitt can be agreed with when he writes:“The most violent conflicts occur [...] precisely over visible architecture thatcan be identified as Islamic (or the audible call of the muezzin). These arealways also symbolic conflicts that have an ‘added value’ compared to thelimited cause of the conflict. They are symbolic and symptomatic conflictsaround the integration of migrants and the position of Islam in Germany.”98 Ulrich Beck says here that the legal equality of Islam with the other – above all Chris-tian – religious communities in Germany and Europe can lead to a kind of “organi-sational assimilation,” since it must treat Islam according to the standards and rulesof religious constitutional law without taking into account its own religious constitu-tionality: Beck, Ulrich: Der eigene Gott. Von der Friedensfähigkeit und demGewaltpo-tential der Religionen, Frankfurt amMain: Verlag der Weltreligionen 2008, pp. 198 ff.;in detail Dennaoui: Reflexiver Islam, p. 256.9 Schmitt, Thomas: “Moschee-Konflikte und deutsche Gesellschaft,” in: Dirk Halm/HendrikMeyer (eds.), Islam und die deutsche Gesellschaft,Wiesbaden: Springer Fach-medien Wiesbaden 2013, pp. 145–166.Y. Dennaoui: Between Anti-Muslim Sentiments and Islamist Radicalisation 135Mosques can thus be understood as symbols of the increasing religious pres-ence of Muslims in an environment influenced by Christianity. The larger themosques, the larger and more violent the conflicts that arise. This situationis currently accompanied not only by tense challenges for German society butalso by repercussions for Muslim life environments, traditions and organisa-tional forms of the religious, and ultimately leads to debates about Islam andMuslims in Germany increasingly revolving around the political question ofwhether certain religiouspractices and spaces can still beplacedunder thepro-tection of the fundamental right to freedom of religion. This politicisation ofthe debate has led to a radicalisation of positions in different directions: whileright-wing extremist groups in Germany equate Islam with Islamism (for ex-ample Islam as a political ideology) to denigrate Muslims and discriminateagainst them under religious law, radical Islamist groups instrumentalise theincreasing Islamophobia and Muslimophobia in the country and exert pres-sureonmoderateMuslimswhoact as cooperationpartnersof the state inmanyreligious policy projects, such as the German Islam Conference (Deutsche IslamKonferenz, DIK), which has been held regularly since 2006.Equal legal treatment of Islam in Germany in the field of tensionbetween social Islamophobia and Islamist radicalisation tendenciesThe right to religious freedom is a human right anchored in both the inter-national and the European human rights system. In the German Basic Law,it is enshrined in Article 4 as a fundamental pillar of freedom. It is about thefreedom that – according to Heiner Bielefeldt – “opens up the space for thearticulation of religious or ideological convictions, interests, needs and prac-tices. This is not only about questions of inner faith, but also about shapingone’s life in accordance with religious or ideological postulates. Moreover, re-ligious freedom is not limited to strengthening the position of the individ-ual, but equally includes communal and infrastructural dimensions of reli-gious practice.”10 Freedom of religion is thus protected by the state, which –under the conditions ofmodern secular societies –has the task of legally guar-anteeing freedom of religion for everyone and enabling it in terms of religiouspolicy, without privileging a particular religion or even identifying with it and10 Bielefeldt, Heiner/Wiener, Michael: Religionsfreiheit auf dem Prüfstand. Konturen ei-nes umkämpften Menschenrechts, Bielefeld: transcript 2020, p. 12.136 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationthus undermining the state’s neutrality requirement in religious-ideologicalmatters and indirectly calling into question the secularity of the constitutionalstate.11Within Islam, Muslims refer differently to religious freedom, with differ-ent intentions and expectations. Self-organisedMuslims – religious as well asnon-religious – are open to different degrees to the possibilities that the con-stitutional law on religion offers to everyone.WhenMuslims articulate them-selves differently under the umbrella of religious freedom and make differentdemands on the state regarding the practical exercise of this right, these ar-ticulations and demands are increasingly perceived negatively within society,and beyond the boundaries of religious communities.12The negative perception of Islam in Germany in its interaction with thestate triggers paradoxical effects both in society as a whole and among Mus-lims, in which prejudices about Muslims13 and Islamophobic attitudes andmisunderstandings – especially in Islamist circles – about the meaning of theright to religious freedom play a central role. The prejudices in society as awhole are not justified or well-founded criticism of Islam as a religion, whichincidentally also exists, but are false generalisations (allMuslims are Islamists,radical, misogynistic, prone to violence, intolerant, etc.). The social dissemi-nation of a negative image of Islam – which for example equates Islam withIslamism – has the effect of creating an environment of culturally acceptedinequality in which it becomes possible to devalue Muslims religiously andsocially to then exclude them from the right to religious freedom.Moreover, the equation of “Islam” and “Islamism” serves not only as a de-marcation mark but also as a mobilisation strategy for the long-term estab-lishment of an Islamophobic consensus that can be resorted to –depending onthe political situation– to articulate one’s ownproblems and fears in a populistmanner and mark “scapegoats.” In this respect, it is only logical that “right-wing populist parties that are spreading throughout Europe [...] have quicklyrecognised the potential of ‘Islam as a bogeyman.’”14 It even takes on “a central11 Bielefeldt, Heiner: Muslime im säkularen Rechtsstaat. Integrationschancen durch Re-ligionsfreiheit, Bielefeld: transcript 2003; Bielefeldt: Religionsfreiheit.12 Hafez: Wahrnehmung; Pickel: Weltanschauliche Vielfalt.13 Zick, Andreas: “Das Vorurteil über Muslime,” in: Peter Antes/Rauf Ceylan, Muslime inDeutschland. Historische Bestandsaufnahme, aktuelle Entwicklungen und zukünftigeForschungsfragen, Wiesbaden: Springer VS Wiesbaden 2017.14 Hafez, Kai: Freiheit, Gleichheit und Intoleranz. Der Islam in der liberalen GesellschaftDeutschlands und Europas, Bielefeld: transcript 2014, p. 8.Y. Dennaoui: Between Anti-Muslim Sentiments and Islamist Radicalisation 137political function”15 and thus encodes an anti-modern and anti-democratic at-titude of denial aimedat questioning equality and freedomrights forMuslims.By equating Islam and Islamism,Muslims are placed under general suspicionand countered by mistrust and fear, as recent studies clearly show.16Paradoxically, the main beneficiaries of this development in the field ofIslam are radical forces from the Islamist and Salafist spectrum.Through thepopulist equation of Islam and Islamism, Islamist forces are moved to thecentre of the field of Islam and being presented in the media and politicallyas “Islam.” It is very important to mention this aspect here to understandhow processes of populist equation of Islam and Islamism work and howIslamists benefit from it. Radical Islamist and radical Salafist forces skil-fully use prejudice and discrimination against Muslims to propagate theirversion of a threatened Islam in Germany, recruit new followers and thusplace pressure on moderate Islamic associations, which they accuse of co-operating politically and legally with the German state to distort “Islam.” Indoing so, they polemicise in a conspiracy-theorymanner against all those whorepresent a different understanding of Islam: against state institutions andmedia, Muslim associations and liberal Muslims, whom they derogatorily call“modernists” and accuse of takfir (unbelief). Especially Salafist – mostly self-proclaimed –preachers and spokespersons have gainedmassive power within15 Decker, Oliver/Brähler, Elmar: Autoritäre Dynamiken. Alte Ressentiments – neue Ra-dikalität / Leipziger Autoritarismus Studie 2020, Gießen: Psychosozial Verlag: 2021, p.25.16 In the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Religionsmonitor, Gert Pickel even states that a “neg-ative perception of Islam” (Pickel: Weltanschauliche Vielfalt, p. 12) has solidified andstabilised at a high level. The Authoritarianism Study 2020 of the University of Leipziggoes in a similar direction, and in addition to the solidification of old resentments andthe emergence of new forms of far-right radicalism in the middle of society, it stateshigh stable values for Muslim hostility, which is “strongly pronounced and also signif-icantly higher in the East than in the West in 2020” (Decker: Autoritäre Dynamiken, p.64). For the German context, the report of the Independent Expert Group onMuslimo-phobia commissioned by the Federal Ministry of the Interior has recently expandedthe empirical research on this development to include further data from police crimestatistics as well as anti-discrimination agencies and counselling organisations, andhas highlighted the extent of anti-Muslim reservations and incidents as well as theirdifferentmanifestations and the consolidation of Islamophobic prejudices in themid-dle of society as a real social fact (BMI: Muslimfeindlichkeit, p. 8).138 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationthe Islamic field in recent years.17 Their conspiracy-theoretical and polemicaldiscourse goes as far as to cleverly portray all processes of institutionalisationof Islam in Germany as attempts to “tame” Islam.They see in the right to reli-gious freedom above all the right that guarantees them the freedom to pursuetheir religious-radical mission. In doing so, radical Islamic forces positionthemselves not only against other Muslims and Islamic organisations withinIslam but also against other non-Muslim groups, social institutions and like-minded people from the right-wing populist spectrum.Through the right-wing extremist appropriation of Islamic issues, corre-sponding actors prove to be further profiteers of debates on Islam, especiallyin times of crisis. For example, simply drawing attention to IslamnowprovidestheAfD inGermanywith thenecessarypolitical leeway toput its radical agendacentre stage and place other parties under pressure. Although it professes “un-restricted freedom of faith, conscience and confession in accordance with Ar-ticle 4 of the Basic Law”18 in its political manifesto, the AfD polemicises in asweeping manner against everything that is important for the religious life ofMuslims in Germany: the building of mosques and minarets, Islamic instruc-tion in schools, theological Islamic centres, etc. Using questionable objectionsand populist themes, they pursue a strategy that amounts to the de facto abo-lition of the human right to religious freedom for large sections of Muslims.The protests, citizens’ petitions and initiatives initiated by the AfD through-out Germany in the last ten years should also be seen in this context.They areprimarily concerned with using certain occasions to scandalise and thus neg-atively portray Islam in the media as Islamist, radical, foreign, misogynistic,anti-Semitic, etc. and portray the established parties as incapable of counter-ing the increasing Islamisation of the country and presenting themselves asthe saviours of the “Christian Occident” without themselves being religious inthe Christian sense.17 Dennaoui, Youssef: “Religiöse Überbietung: Dimensionen und Folgen einer Sonder-form religiöser Konkurrenz im Feld des Islam in Deutschland am Beispiel des Neosala-fismus,” in: Paula-Irene Villa-Braslavsky (ed.), PolarisierteWelten. Verhandlungen des41. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in Bielefeld 2022.18 Alternative für Deutschland (AfD): Deutschland. Aber normal. Programmder Alterna-tive für Deutschland für dieWahl zum 20. Deutschen Bundestag, p. 84, https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/20210611_AfD_Programm_2021.pdf, accessed on:8 Aug. 2023.Y. Dennaoui: Between Anti-Muslim Sentiments and Islamist Radicalisation 139Religious freedom in the context of debates on the buildingof mosques, minarets and muezzin calls in GermanyLike all human rights, freedomof religion or beliefmust prove itself in the con-crete conditions and constraints on the ground. InGermany, every applicationfor a building permit for a mosque or an application for a muezzin call hasto reckon with the fact that decisions are made not only based on construc-tion law but also how strongly right-wing extremist parties are representedlocally and how well they are organised, as the disputes in recent years overthe DITIB (Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs) mosque in Colognehave clearly shown.The right-wing extremistmovements andparties have suc-ceeded in shifting the debate about the building of themosque and later aboutthemuezzin call into adebate about the influence of political Islam inGermanyand organising broad alliances for this.They argue that the muezzin call doesnot fall under the protection of the right to religious freedom and should beseen as a symbol of an increasing politicisation of Islam in Germany. This isan attempt to relativise the fundamental right to freedom of religion on thegrounds that this is not a religion but a political ideology that seeks tomark itssphere of influence and impact through further visible (mosque,minaret) andaudible (muezzin call over loudspeaker) signs of power. Indeed, it is only alongthese and similar lines of argumentation that theAfDcanwrite sentences in itsmost recent political manifesto such as: “Minarets and the call of the muezzinare not compatible with a tolerant coexistence of religions as practised by theChristian churches.”19 In this way, it places other parties and religious organ-isations under pressure and can present itself to its supporters as a bulwarkagainst “political Islam” and as a protector of “Christian religious traditions.”With this strategy, the AfD succeeds in placing pressure on and divid-ing established politics. While some politicians – across all party lines – arepublicly advocating the unrestricted validity of the right to religious freedomfor Muslims, others are calling on Muslims for restraint in building mosquesor minarets, yet others position themselves similarly to the AfD, adopting oreven anticipating its slogans such as “Islam does not belong to Germany,” asthe then Interior Minister Horst Seehofer did when he took office in 2018,thereby politicising the issue of Islam in his own way and not only taking astand against the AfD but also attempting to position himself against the19 AfD: Deutschland, p. 86.140 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationthen Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel in order to make her appear “Islam-friendly” in the political contest.ConclusionThis article was not about constitutional law on religion in the context of dis-cussions about religious freedom and Islam in Germany but the sociologicalobservation of how the right to religious freedom is instrumentalised or mis-understood by populist forces – right-wing extremists as well as Islamists –and thus comes under strong right-wing extremist and religious-radical pres-sure. The clash between right-wing populist discourses of Islamophobia andMuslimophobia and the attractiveness of radical Salafist groups (especially foryoung people) ultimately leads to the actors involved legitimising and empow-ering each other through ideologically pejorative attributions. We are dealinghere with dynamic and reflexive stabilisation processes20 that cannot be un-derstood in isolation from each other and that lead to different understand-ings of human rights in general and the right to religious freedom in partic-ular. While right-wing populist groups want to cut off the religious constitu-tional rights of Muslims as religious communities because they see “Islami-sation” byMuslims at work,21 radical Islamist forces evaluate efforts to institu-tionalise Islam inGerman society as a “deformation” of Islamand inadmissibleassimilation to Christian institutions,which in their eyesmust be rejected andfought with all means. In this way, the extreme poles (right-wing extremists,Islamists) succeed in placing the moderates and those willing to compromisein both camps under pressure, with fatal consequences for Muslims as well associety as a whole.From this perspective, the article has taken up in particular the conflict-ridden debates about mosque construction and the calling of the muezzin inGermany to showhowdifferent instrumentalisations of the fundamental rightto freedom of religion decisively shape the debate about Islam in German so-ciety and contribute to the fact that increasinglymoreGermans perceive Islamas foreign or even threatening.How, in viewof this situation, the fundamental right to freedomof religioncan develop its overall social significance and validity for all and across all re-20 Dennaoui: Reflexiver Islam.21 AfD: Deutschland: p. 14.Y. Dennaoui: Between Anti-Muslim Sentiments and Islamist Radicalisation 141ligious contexts within the framework of a “coherent and systematic religiouspolicy”22 appears as a task for state religious policy and the religious commu-nities alike. Cooperative institutionalisation processes of Islam (constructionof representative mosques, Islamic instruction in schools, Islamic theologicalcentres, etc.) – which are covered and supported by the right to religious free-dom – are inconceivable without committed and equal cooperation partnerson both the state andMuslim sides.The further development and strengthen-ing of democratic institutions in Germany depends to a strong extent on theplace that Islam in its diversity occupies in them.22 BMI: Muslimfeindlichkeit.Secularism in France and the Challengeof PopulismValentine ZuberReligious freedom in France is rooted in a long and tumultuous history. Firstproclaimed in Article X of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Cit-izen of 1789 (“No one shall be disturbed on account of his opinions, even of areligious nature, provided that their manifestation does not disturb the pub-lic order established by law”), freedom of conscience and worship for all wasreinforced by the gradual secularisation of the state during the 19th and 20thcenturies.1Thefirst article of the 1905 lawon the separation of church and stateproclaims that “the Republic ensures freedom of conscience. It guarantees thefree exercise of worship”. Finally, the current constitution of the Fifth Repub-lic (1958) describes the latter as a “secular republic” and specifies in its Article 1that it “respects all beliefs”.2From a legal and constitutional perspective, the defence of freedom of re-ligion or belief in France follows the overarching criteria defined internation-ally by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights in its Article 18: “Ev-eryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this rightincludes freedom to change one’s religion or belief, and freedom, either aloneor in communitywith others and in public or private, tomanifest one’s religionor belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” It is expressed by theprivileged term laïcité (or secularism) of the state.3 For several years, the very1 Picq, Jean: La liberté de religion dans la République: L’esprit de laïcité, Paris: OdileJacob 2014.2 Calvès, Gwénaele: La laïcité, Paris: La Découverte 2022.3 Zuber, Valentine: “Laizität – eine französische Ausnahme? Zum Verhältnis von Staatund Religion,” in: Corine Defrance/Ulrich Pfeil (eds.), Länderbericht Frankreich, Bonn:Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2021, pp. 409–419.144 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationprinciple and definition of secularism have been fiercely debated in French so-ciety, and they regularly reappear in the political andmedia debate on the inte-gration of foreign populations of Muslim culture or religion. Secularism – anachievement of republican programmes and of the left since the 19th century –is now claimed by the populist right, including the extreme right. From beinga principle of equality and fairness in the treatment by the state of all its citi-zens regardless of their religious affiliation, for some secularism has becomea solution for the exclusion of an exogenous religion considered as a threat toFrench identity.The “new secularism” (“nouvelle laïcité”4) appeared at the turnof the millennium and was gradually clarified by new laws on the control ofreligion. However, is this new secularism threatening the universal guaranteeof fundamental freedomsnecessary for perpetuating a genuine state governedby law by turning a legal principle of regulating pluralism into ameans of statecontrol of religion?The eventful history of the establishment of the freedom of religionor belief in FranceTheprocess of secularisation in France has been long and conflictual, proceed-ing for several centuries before taking the form that we know today. Far frombeing uniform, it has gone through all sorts of stages,made up of comings andgoings, modifications and historical and geographical exceptions. Indeed, itshistory – which began with the introduction of the Reformation in France –is not yet complete. This process has seen a succession of different politicaland conceptual models, albeit in which one could already detect sketches ofthe different secular principles that currently characterise French secularism.Several regimes for themanagementof religionbypolitics have thus succeededone another in the course of modern French history: a model of religious co-existence with the Edict of Nantes of 1598 granted by King Henry IV, whichallowed French Protestants – in well-defined areas – to benefit from civil andpolitical recognition until King Louis XIV withdrew it from them in 1685 withthe Edict of Fontainebleau revoking the previous Edict; a model of civil toler-ance with the granting in extremis by King Louis XVI in 1787 of a civil statusissued by the king’s officials to Protestants who had previously been hunted4 Hennette-Vauchez, Stéphanie/Valentin, Vincent: L’Affaire Baby Loup ou la NouvelleLaïcité, Paris: Lextenso éditions 2014.V. Zuber: Secularism in France and the Challenge of Populism 145down and had no civil status; a model of religious pluralism regulated by statecontrol with the proclamation of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1791,which made clerics paid by the state into civil servants who had to swear anoath of loyalty; the first separatist model with the decree of 3 Ventôse Year III(1795), which established the separation of the Catholic Church and the Stateand the end of subsidies for religions following the failure of the constitutionalchurch; and the recognitionmodel with the system known as “recognised reli-gions,” which combined the signing of a concordat with the Pope in 1801 withthe organic articles regulating the police of Catholic and Protestant religions(1802). Issued unilaterally by the state, the latter granted subsidies to the vari-ous religions represented on the territory–Catholicism,Lutheranism,Calvin-ism and, a few years later, a non-Christian religion, Judaism – under the con-dition of reinforced and tactful control. This conventional regime was excep-tionally long-lived (just over a century of operation) and survived all of the po-litical upheavals that have marked French history except for the last one, therepublican regime of the Third Republic, which marked its end with the lawof separation of Church and State of 9 December 1905. However, it persists inthree French departments –Haut- and Bas-Rhin andMoselle – for essentiallyhistorical reasons.The separatistmodel of 1905 pronounced the divorce (withoutmutual con-sent) of the State and the cults and put an end to the public service of the cultsand the state subsidy of the latter. Religious institutions were henceforth gov-erned solely by private law and their legal organisation involved the creationof religious associations, which were somewhat different from the general as-sociations governed by the 1901 law. Although they are more difficult to set upthan the former, they benefit from some tax advantages. Moreover, religiousassociationsmust be chaired by an electedmember and their executive bodiesmustmeet the requirements of a democratic body.This is the legal model gov-erning the majority of French religious denominations (even the Catholic de-nomination, forwhich the religiousassociations initially rejectedby its author-ities were converted into diocesan associations directly headed by the bishop).Although the regime resulting from the 1905 Act was applied to severalFrench overseas departments such as Reunion Island, Guadeloupe and Mar-tinique (from 1911), other French territories remain subject to older legislation.This is the case in the department of Guyana, where – by virtue of a royal de-cree dating from the reign of Charles X (1828) – the only religion recognisedis Catholicism. Its clerics (bishops and priests) are employees of the GeneralCouncil of French Guyana and have the status of civil servants. The other146 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationreligions and all those present in the other overseas territories are governedby decree-laws dating from 1939 (known as the Mandel decrees), whether inthe overseas collectivities (such as French Polynesia,Wallis and Futuna, Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, French Southern and Antarctic Territories), but also inthe collectivity – with a special status of autonomy – of New Caledonia andeven in Mayotte, whose elevation to the status of department on 31 March2011 did not change the legal situation of worship. Due to the non-applicationof the 1905 law to these territories, the religious regime resulting from thesedecrees authorises public funding of worship. Moreover, placed under closestate supervision, the boards of directors of the various religions enjoy taxbenefits as in France.These different systems of worship – all of which derogate from the 1905separation of the Churches and the State – allow us to better appreciate thedepth and complexity of French history in terms of the management of re-ligion, compared with what the vulgate most often teaches us. This provesthe French inventiveness and flexibility in this area, which has enabled betteradapting the legal system for guaranteeing the freedom of religion or belief tolocal situations.5Secularism disfigured by both authoritarian republicanismand far-right populism?Legal secularism is a principle that guarantees the exercise of all positive free-domsoffered to individual citizens in France. It can in noway be confusedwitha strictly philosophical value, nor can it be transformed into a particular ideol-ogy supported by the state. On the contrary, the latter must defend it againstanyone who wants to impose it in a unilateral and authoritarian manner as aphilosophyprofessingmilitant atheism.If thiswere the case,secularismwouldrisk being transformed into a kind of disguised republican civil religion, exclu-sive and therefore – in the long run –necessarily intolerant of other belief andvalue systems. Its transformation into a kind of secularism of combat, into akind of opposable secularism, would then inevitably attack the public expres-sion of the diversity of particular opinions. Beyond the obvious restrictions onfreedom of religion or belief that it might induce, such a vision of secularism5 Portier, Philippe: L’État et les religions en France. Une sociologie historique de la laï-cité, Rennes: PUR 2016.V. Zuber: Secularism in France and the Challenge of Populism 147would therefore seriously undermine the guarantee of another essential hu-man right, namely freedom of expression for all, framed only by the legal re-strictions deemed necessary to preserve the rule of law.The French state mustbe secular, neutral, impartial and intrinsically indifferent to all ideological andreligious proposals. Only this neutrality of the state and its legal representa-tives can ensure that society is not subjected to it. The stakes are high: a so-ciety that is forced to be secular runs the risk of being artificially consensualand therefore fatally impoverished in its vital forces. It is in fact because theindividuals making up society are not obliged to be neutral in any way that so-ciety can continue to be a space common to all, in which contradictory debate–a prerequisite for any democratic functioning – remains possible and alwaysalive.The incessant controversies and anathemas – today as in the past in thepublic debate, about the “true” definition of French secularism6 – unfortu-nately maintain this dangerous confusion for the preservation of freedom ofreligion or belief. Moreover, calls to ban religious symbols in the social sphereas a whole – which generally emanate from the political extremes of the rightor the left – are a symptom of this very political struggle that aims to weakenthe democratic liberalism that constitutes society in the long term. In a contexttroubled by the Islamist attacks, marked by an almost desperate demand formore and more security, this anti-liberal fight is even infecting some actorsof the more moderate parties. The “fight for secularism” is chanted by boththe declinists – forever nostalgic for a mythical traditional society – and thesupporters of a French republican identity with a xenophobic tone. Theseapproaches seriously threaten individual freedom and the carefully balancednature of our pluralist society.For several years, a widely circulated current of thought has been givinga particularly ethnicised and essentialised reading of the principle of sec-ularism, based on the questionable hypothesis of a “clash of civilizations.”7The primary matrix of secularism is said to be essentially constituted by itsChristian theological roots, conveniently disregarding the equally Greco-Latinphilosophical origin ofWestern culture. Islam as a religion and thematrix of aparticular civilisation – considered authoritarian, submissive and retrograde6 Baubérot, Jean: Les Sept Laïcités françaises. Lemodèle français de laïcité n’existe pas,Paris: Maison des sciences de l’homme 2015.7 Huntington, Samuel: Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, NewYork: Simon and Schuster 1996.148 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriation– could not therefore think of the idea of secularism, let alone apply it to thepolitical reality in its sphere of influence.There would therefore be incompat-ibility – in fact and in principle – between a Christian vision progressivelyacclimatised to modern liberalism and pluralism and a Muslim vision neces-sarily exclusive of these liberal legal-political principles that it could only fight,including by arms and terror.However, looking back to the past, these ethnocentric and anti-religiousdiscourses are not new. As early as 1905, certain radical republicans – propo-nents of progress – considered that the Catholic religion as a theological-po-litical system was necessarily and definitively incompatible with secularism.Since then, following the Catholic acceptance of the modern principle of lib-eral anddemocratic state government, the traditional anti-clericalismof a cer-tain left has spread beyond its political spectrum to influence the discourses ofthe right and the populist extreme right. Under the guise of defending secu-larism, for some decades the latter been advocating a political radicalism thatis properly anti-Muslim.The traditional anti-religious discourse has thus beentransformedand–playingonsocial fears–gradually tingedwith racism.Ithasdone so bymore or less consciously confusing an ethnic group (NorthAfricans,Middle Easterners, etc.) with a supposed religious group (Muslims).This ten-dency has been further aggravated by the trauma caused by jihadist-inspiredterrorism, which invokes its supposedly unconditional respect for the Islamicinjunctions of the mythical beginnings of this religion in support of its mur-derous struggle.Since the end of the 1970s and the global shock of Iran’s successful Islamicrevolution in 1979, debates about immigrant populations from Muslim coun-tries have often focused solely on the Islamic character of their identity, blam-ing their difficult integration into Western society solely on their religion. Ig-noring other explanatory factors such as the cultural deficit linked to povertyand social relegation, “Islamic values” quickly appeared to be the absolute an-tithesis ofWestern values and thus the secular ideal.Mixing the promotion ofgender equality, religious fundamentalism and terrorism, religious visibilityand the supposed neutrality of the public space, the debate has become con-siderably impoverished and deeply divisive. Religious and social intoleranceare dangerously combined in a xenophobic approach, especially in the rise ofpopulist and identity-based movements in the run-up to important electionsthat polarise the sides.V. Zuber: Secularism in France and the Challenge of Populism 149The return of a policy of religious controlHowever, the Muslim presence has forced Western states – including France– to question their conception of nationhood and citizenship to reassure thenatives while integrating the newcomers.8 At the same time, themodern statemust fight against discrimination, not only racial discrimination but also in-creasingly cultural and religious discrimination (anti-Semitism and Islamo-phobia). Thus, to varying degrees, the state’s involvement in the organisationof the Muslim religion on French soil has highlighted a concern for renewedcontrol of the religion of these populations by the public authorities (the law of15 March 2004 on religious symbols in schools, the law consolidating the prin-ciples of the Republic of 24 August 2021, insistent demands for repressive leg-islation on the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in early childhood structures,during school outings, at university, in the public space, etc.).This control alsoinvolves the invention–and thedifficult implementation–of “mainstream”re-ligious or community bodies that are strongly encouraged by the state to com-bat radicalisation and the terrorism practised by political Islamism.9 Amongstthese, the French Council of the Muslim Faith created in 2003 (Conseil françaisdu culte musulman, CFCM) was finally disavowed by the state in 2022 and re-placed by a new body, the Forum for the Islam of France (Forum de l’Islam deFrance, FORIF). Aiming to move from a secularism of freedom to a secularismof control, this type of public policy is currently gaining strength in France. Inthe long term, it threatens the initial liberalism of secularism as defined by the1905 law by arbitrarily subjecting individuals to their supposed community af-filiation.Even if the law of 15 March 2004 is not presented as a law applicable onlytoMuslims in France, and young Sikh boys have been called to order due to thewearing of their traditional turban in public school, it is nevertheless part ofa context marked by a strong rise in anti-Muslim sentiment in French societysince the late-1980s. This state of mind has been fuelled by a populist polit-ical proposal that makes immigrants the scapegoats of the French economicand identity crisis. Indeed, these immigrants are regularly accused by someof not wanting to assimilate as they should into their host society. This feel-ing of rejection has further developed in a troubled national and international8 Roy, Olivier: La Laïcité face à l’islam, Paris: Stock 2005.9 Fregosi, Franck: L’Islam dans la laïcité, Paris: Hachette Pluriel 2011.150 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationcontext,marked inWestern countries and particularly in France by jihadist at-tacks (from 1995 to the present day). A disturbing and xenophobic equivalencehas beenmade in someminds between Islamist projects (and attacks) and thedemand for visibility and recognition presented by Muslims in society. In theface of social distress and silence about the symbolic consequences of the colo-nialwars,and inparticular theAlgerianwar, thedemand forassimilationmadeto immigrants and their descendants has proved to be more incantatory thaneffective. It is based on a demand for the abstract equalisation of all citizens,which no longer works in our increasingly open,multi-racial and pluralist so-cieties. It is through this prism that we can understand the existence of recur-rent debates over the past 30 years about the wearing of religious symbols inthe public space, as well as – for example – the possibility or not of alternativemenus to pork in school canteens or in closed public establishments.They arerelayed in the media sphere by the highlighting of a few examples of incivilitynoticed in public establishments, such as the questioning of gender equality ininterpersonal relations (challenging a doctor due to his or her sex, refusing toshake the hand of a colleague of the other sex, requesting exemption from cer-tain courses – even though they are compulsory – or sports sessions practisedin mixed classes).Religious visibility through clothing choices is the sign of a real societaltension, which is stronger in France than elsewhere. This can be partly ex-plained by the strength of an anti-religious tradition held by a part of Frenchsociety, generally on the left. Raised with a visceral distrust of the publicexpression of religious affiliation, they see only obscurantism and obstinateirrationality in the phenomena of belief.The rhetoric of the necessary emanci-pation from religious control seems to always mark the discourses that claimto be progressive. This may help to explain the disturbing convergence – em-anating from the two extremes of the political spectrum – of these rejectionsof religious visibility in the public space, and more specifically of the Muslimone, in a context of particularly reinforced security demands. Faced withthe renewed tension between the ideal of a secularism of abstention and theactual practice of a secularism of recognition and control, the French politicalconception of secularism is particularly questioned. The idea of a purifiedsecularism as a French exception increasingly appears to be a national mythand a discourse that is partisan, instrumentalised and disconnected fromreality. Combining the state’s requirement for neutrality and philosophicaland religious impartiality with the preservation of public order in a societyaffected by the globalisation remains a challenge. The requirements of theV. Zuber: Secularism in France and the Challenge of Populism 151rule of law are thus put into perspective in a context marked by a legitimatedemand for security in the face of jihadist attacks. However, it is to be hopedthat the regulatory adjustments necessary for civil peace will always be madewith primary respect for the liberal principles enshrined in international texts,and in particularwith respect for the non-discrimination on religious groundsthat they imply.ConclusionTheprinciple of secularism is therefore facedwith renewed challenges, includ-ing the tension between the need to welcome immigrant or displaced popula-tions and the concern to preserve the security of populations already settled.Current policies more or less intentionally undermine a more reassuring so-ciological reality that shows that French Muslims are in favour of secularism.This is proven by regular surveys with relatively unanimous conclusions on theeffectiveness of the integration of recent immigrant populations.10They showthat FrenchMuslims are quite comfortable with their civil and religious life ina plural society and regularly demonstrate their attachment to it, particularlyduring the major challenges faced by the French nation. However, these chal-lenges place not only the idea of secularism at stake, but also the guarantee ofindividual freedoms for all, whether or not they are Muslim.It is important to remember the difference between secularism as a le-gal-political principle and secularism as an ideological, moral and/or securityvalue.Conceptualwords always have ahistory and their evolution is significantof contextual changes.11 Legal secularism is not an ideological movement, butthe principle that allows for the free expression of all beliefs while respectingthe law and public order. Discourses of the secular-identitarian type, trans-posing the logic of the scapegoat, Jews,Muslims, Roma, refugees, instrumen-talised and racialised by certain politicians, are a real deviation from the prin-ciple of liberal origin that is secularism. Because the individuals whomake up10 INSEE (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques): Immigrés etdescendants d’immigrés (= Insée Références Édition 2023), https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/6793314?sommaire=6793391, accessed on: 24 Apr. 2023.11 Thiéry-Riboulot, Véronica: Usage, abus et usure du mot laïcité, Paris: Les Conférencesde l’EPHE 2022.152 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationminorities are unjustly feared, despised, or even rejected, it is urgent for citi-zens to be vigilant and combative.Secularism is first and foremost the guarantee of the freedom of each in-dividual in all his or her uniqueness. Because they are necessary for collectivelife in a truly democratic state, freedoms – of conscience, religion, belief andexpression – must be scrupulously reaffirmed and applied to all without ex-ception, in accordance with the wording of Article 1 of the Constitution: theRepublic “ensures the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinc-tion of origin, race or religion.”In order to renewand revitalise the principle of secularism,wemust there-fore continue to respect themost fundamental human rights, such as the free-domof expression spontaneously defended by severalmillion people who tookto the streets on 11 January 2015, following the murderous attacks on the ed-itorial staff of the weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo and the customers of theHypercasher.However, thismust be allowed for all, and certainly not at the ex-pense of freedom of religion or belief of certain politically or socially stigma-tised groups. In practice, respect for the legal principle of secularism as it hasbeenhistorically defined in Francemust not lead to the sole implementation bythe state of a policy of control and targeted bans, but rather seek to deepen theprocess of integration and adherence of all citizens to shared values throughdialogue, beyond their differences of religious belief or non-belief.Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Beliefin DenmarkA Populist Move?Eva Maria Lassen and Marie Juul PetersenIntroduction: Freedom of religion or belief under pressureDenmark is a democracy with high human rights standards, including theright to freedom of religion or belief. However, in recent years an increasingnumber of laws have been introduced that implicitly or explicitly limit – orhave the potential to limit – freedom of religion or belief.The substantial partof this legislation targets Muslim individuals and communities in particular.1This trend towards increasing restrictions on religiousmanifestations andpractices is not unique to Denmark, as other European countries display sim-ilar developments. The introduction to this volume as well as several of thebook’s chapters argue that these developments can be understood as expres-sionsof an increasinglypopulist understandinganduseof the right to freedomof religion or belief, in the sense that restrictions are selective and particular-istic (aimed at restricting the religious practices andmanifestations of partic-ular religious groups) and clientelistic (aimed at protecting the religious prac-tices andmanifestations of one’s own group).However,while there are aspectsof the Danish legislation on freedom of religion or belief – and the debates1 For an overview of legal restrictions on religion in Denmark, see Lassen, Eva Maria:“Limitations to Freedom of Religion or Belief in Denmark,” in: Religion & HumanRights 15 (2020), pp. 134–152; Vinding, Niels V.: Annotated Legal Documents on Is-lam in Europe. Denmark (= Annotated legal documents on Islam in Europe 18), Leiden/Boston: Brill 2020. For an analysis of selected individual laws, see Petersen, Marie Juul:“Forkynderloven i et menneskeretligt perspektiv,” in: Anette Faye Jacobsen/StevenJensen/Pernille Boye Koch/Marie Juul Petersen (eds.), Menneskerettigheder i mod-vind, Kopenhagen: Samfundslitteratur 2023, pp. 137–153.154 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationaround it – thatmaybe characterised as populist, this chapter argues that pop-ulism is insufficient as an explanatory framework for understanding the situ-ation in Denmark. Indeed, there are other factors at play. More specifically,we argue that populist voices are intertwined with, first, the historically anddemographically determined place of Evangelical-Lutheran Christianity vis-à-vis other religious denominations and religions in Danish society andmen-tality, second, the kind of secularism experienced inDenmark, and thirdly, therelationship between themainstream political parties and right-wing parties,representing different assessments of human rights.“To protect Danish values”: A selective understanding of freedomof religion or beliefDenmark has historically been a largely homogeneous society, including reli-giously. The Danish Evangelical-Lutheran Church – of which the majority ofthe population aremembers –holds a special position as “the People’s Church”(in Danish, folkekirke) and is supported by the state in a number of ways, finan-cially and otherwise (for instance public holidays that follow the Evangelical-Lutheran calendar and university education of theologians to the Church).Theposition of the church as well as other religious communities is based on theConstitution of 1849, which was last amended in 1953.The constitution affordsthe People’s Church a privileged position compared to other religious commu-nities, as reflected in the saying: “In Denmark we have religious freedom butnot religious egality.”While 73% of the population are members of the Evangelical-LutheranChurch, a number of studies suggest that religion plays little – if any – role inthe lives of most Danes.2Since the 1970s, like other Western European countries, Denmark has ex-perienced increasing immigration in the form of guest workers, immigrantsand refugees from different parts of the world. The majority are Muslim, and2 Hackett, Conrad/Huynh, Timmy: “What is each country’s second-largest religiousgroup?” (22 Jun. 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2015/06/22/what-is-each-countrys-second-largest-religious-group/, accessed on: 22 Jul. 2023; Zucker-man, Phil: Society without God: What the Least Religious Nations Can Tell Us AboutContentment, New York: NYU Press 2008.E. M. Lassen/M. J. Petersen: Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief in Denmark 155Islam makes up the largest minority religion in Denmark today. The increas-ing religious diversity – and not least visibility – associated with immigrationhas challenged Danish society, having to encompass new religious norms andvalues, including some thatmay challenge themajority culture and lead to dis-comfort, disagreements, and outright conflict.3 Denmark hasmoved from be-ing a largely secular or “cultural Christian” society towhat theGermanphiloso-pher Jürgen Habermas has termed a “post-secular society.”4With this, Haber-mas does not mean a society in which all citizens have becomemore religious,but one with a changed consciousness about religion: an understanding of re-ligion as something that cannot be kept out of the public sphere butwill remainan inevitable part of society.5There is a focuson Islamasoneof the root causesof the various“integrationchallenges” that Danish society has encountered in the wake of increased im-migration.The issue of integration is highly complex, and this is not the placeto discuss whether or to what extent there is an empirical basis for this em-phasis on religion as an explanatory factor over economic, cultural, politicalor other factors, for instance. It suffices here to say that recent decades havewitnessed the emergence of anti-Islam – or indeed anti-Muslim – sentimentsamong politicians, in the media and the broader population, whereby certainMuslim norms and practices are perceived as colliding with certain “Danishvalues,” for example around democracy, gender equality and free speech.Reflecting broader trends towards the increasing “juridification” of soci-etal problems, one of theways inwhichDanish politicians have sought to solvethese –perceived or real – clashes between “Danish values” andMuslimnormsand practices has been to introduce legislation to restrict the latter in differentways.The so-called Imampackage adopted in 2017 is an illustrative example ofthis. The initiative was a direct reaction to a series of TV documentaries withthe title “The Mosques behind the Veil,” aired in February 2016.The documen-taries –whichwere based on under-cover observations and hidden recordingsin a number of Danish mosques – caused a major furore insofar as they gave3 Bielefeldt, Heiner: Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or beliefon his mission to Denmark (A/HRC/34/50/Add. 1), Human Rights Council 2017, p. 12.4 Habermas, Jürgen: “Notes on post-secular society,” in: New Perspectives Quarterly 25(4/2008), pp. 17–29.5 Kühle, Lene/VeyrupNielsen,Marie: “Mere kontrolmed religion?Den nye trossamfund-slov,” in: Religion i Danmark 10 (2021), pp. 38–48.156 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationan impression of some imams condoning intimate partner violence and cor-poral punishment of children,while they considered stoning to be a legitimatereligious reaction to for example infidelity.6Theprogrammeswere criticised by several academic experts, including fortheir use of problematic methods and their insufficient understanding of Is-lamic theology and practice.7 Nonetheless, many politicians were convincedthat the problems displayed in the documentaries were real and substantial,and that they required immediate legal action.8 InMay 2016, the government,Social Democrats, Danish People’s Party, and the Conservatives therefore en-tered an agreement to introduce a stricter oversight of religious communities,expanded possibilities for the withdrawal of economic support to these com-munities, an entry ban for certain religious preachers, and restrictions on cer-tain kinds of expressions made in the context of religious teaching.From this perspective, recent restrictions can be seen as expressions of aselective or particularistic understanding of the right to freedomof religion orbelief, implicitly or explicitly targeting the expressions, practices, and man-ifestations of a particular religious group. The fact that there seems to be acertain unwillingness on the part of politicians to apply the same rigid stan-dards in cases involving even strongly anti-Muslim discourses may contributeto this reading of the restrictions. It is noteworthy that “The Mosques behindthe Veil” led to immediate legal interventions, while authorities would go avery long way to protect the Danish provocateur Rasmus Paludan’s extremistexpressions and Quran burnings.9 Others have noted that cases of sexual ha-6 Commission on freedom of expression: Ytringsfrihedens rammer og vilkår i Danmark,Søborg: Danish Ministry of Justice 2020, p. 129.7 Vinding: Legal Documents; Suhr, Christian: “‘Usædvanlig bred og uafviselig dokumen-tation’ – undersøgende journalistik i danske moskéer,” in: Vibeke Borberg/Hjarn vonZernichow Borberg/Christian Suhr/Niels V. Vinding (eds.), Når medierne sætter dag-sordenen, København: Djøf Forlag 2021, chapter 7.8 Christoffersen, Lisbet: “Religionsretlig lovgivning 2014–2019 – bidrag og temaer i kirk-eretsantologi,” in: Lisbet Christoffersen/Anders Jørgensen/Svend Andersen (eds.), Re-ligionsretlig lovgivning. Kirkeretsantologi 2019, Frederiksberg: Eksistensen 2019, p.12.9 Rose, Flemming/Mchangama, Jacob: “Altinget: Drop racismeparagraffen for mi-noriteternes skyld” (12 May 2020), https://justitia-int.org/altinget-drop-racismeparagraffen-for-minoriteternes-skyld/, accessed on: 22 Jul. 2023. While government atti-tudes to Paludan’s and other right wing extremists’ Quran burnings have changed veryrecently, and a majority now seems to support criminalization of such actions, this ar-guably has little to do with concerns for the religious sentiments of Danish Muslims,E. M. Lassen/M. J. Petersen: Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief in Denmark 157rassment and gender discrimination in the Evangelical LutheranChurch,Pen-tecostal churches and the Catholic Church inDenmark have not beenmetwiththe same urgency by politicians compared with similar cases in Muslim com-munities.10“Denmark is a Christian country”Over the past decades, the Danish People’s Party – a self-declared “Islam-crit-ical” right-wing party – has played a key role in this development towards anincreasingly narrow conception of the right to freedom of religion or belief,consistently proposing restrictions that target Muslim practices andmanifes-tations.An important part of the party’s argumentation is that such restrictionsare necessary to protect Christian majority culture and values. As such, theirargumentation reflects a clientelistic conception of the freedom of religion orbelief as a right that can be used to restrict the beliefs and practices of oth-ers to protect one’s own religion. This is perhaps most clearly demonstratedin their proposal to ban headscarves in Danish elementary schools, where theparty argues that a ban is necessary to protect Christian culture from Islamicmission:11“Denmark is a Christian country and has for centuries been shaped byChristianity […] Our culture, and as such our public institutions are basedon Christianity and Christian values. Christianity and Christian holidaysare visible in schools and public institutions in the form of adornments,Christmas and Easter decorations, Christian holidays as well as other Chris-tian traditions, e.g. visits to the Church, hymn-singing, and possibly prayerat morning gatherings. At the same time as we in Denmark have a longtradition of Christianity being present everywhere, we also have a traditionandmore to do with international pressure and security risks. The present article doesnot consider these recent developments, since they occurred after themanuscript wasfinalised.10 Hussein, Tarek Z.: “Tavshed om kirkelige krænkelser er hyklerisk” (27 Feb. 2023), https://politiken.dk/debat/klummer/art9224667/Tavshed-om-kirkelige-kr%C3%A6nkelser-er-hyklerisk, accessed on: 22 Jul. 2023.11 Quotes that have been published in Danish have been translated into English by theauthors of the chapter.158 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationof not proselytising for other religions, sects, or political ideologies in pub-lic institutions [...] When women carry an Islamic headscarf, they engageconsciously or unconsciously in mission for Islam. There should be no spacefor this in Danish public institutions.”12However, the formal political power of theDanish People’s Party is limited, andit is not in a position to have laws passed through parliament without the sup-port of more mainstream parties, notably the Social Democrats, the LiberalParty, the Conservatives, and – most recently – the Moderates (a new liberalcentre-right party).These partiesmay –at least rhetorically – share the under-standing of Christianity as an essential part of Danish identity and culture: infact, the Political Programme of the current government – which comprisesthe Social Democrats, the Liberal Party, and theModerates – states that “Den-mark is a Christian country.”13 Nonetheless, they do not link this to the needfor restrictions on certain religious practices andmanifestations.Instead, they tend to justify restrictions with reference to secular “Danishvalues” of democracy, gender equality, children’s rights, etc. As Søren Pape –the leader of the Conservative Party – stated during the parliamentary debateon the Imampackage: “Ifwewant a society inwhich tolerance, freedomand se-curity can thrive, we will sometimes have to put our feet down when it comesto types like these preachers”.14 Alternatively, in the words of Mattias Tesfaye,then Minister of Integration: “When democracy and religion collide, democ-racy has the right of way.”15 From this perspective, the purpose of restrictionsis not to protect a particular religious culture or community but rather protectuniversally acknowledged values and principles.12 Beslutningsforslag nr. B 47: Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om forbud mod at bæreislamisk tørklæde i offentlige institutioner, Folketinget 2020.13 Regeringen (Danish Government): Regeringsgrundlag: Ansvar for Danmark Oct. 2022.The formulationwas introduced by the Liberal Party in their 2015 Political Programme,when they were a minority government with the Danish People’s Party as supportingparty.14 Lovforslag nr. L18: Forslag til Lov om ændring af straffeloven (Kriminalisering afudtrykkelig billigelse af visse strafbare handlinger som led i religiøs oplæring),Folketinget 2016, first debate.15 Socialdemokratiet: Mathias Tesfayes tale ved Socialdemokratiets kongres 2017 (17Sep. 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q_P2dKi469Y, accessed on: 22 Jul.2023.E. M. Lassen/M. J. Petersen: Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief in Denmark 159Staying within the limits of the European Human Rights ConventionThe strong adherence to human rights standards in Danish legislation furthercomplicates the understanding of recent restrictions on the right to freedomof religion or belief as selective and clientelistic. Despite increasing criticismin recent years, human rights are important to Danish politicians, and muchis done to ensure that legislation – including on freedom of religion or belief– lives up to the standards enshrined in the European Convention on HumanRights.As a result, proposals that clearly contradict international human rightsstandards are typically short-lived.For instance, this applies to theDanishPeo-ple’s Party’s 2021 proposal to register the religious affiliation of persons ap-plying for Danish citizenship. Arguing for the necessity of this initiative, theleaderof thepartyMortenMesserschmidt said: “Formanypeople,beingaMus-lim raises some fundamental problems with regard to living in a Danish way.Whether it is about views onwomen, or views on the law or democracy.That iswhy we want to know which background these people [who apply for citizen-ship] bring with them.”16 While individual members of the Social Democrats– the ruling party at the time –were initially open to discussing the proposal,the Minister of Justice soon highlighted that “[w]ithin the framework of Den-mark’s international obligations, it will not be possible to place any weight oninformation about an applicant’s religious conviction in the assessment of anapplication forDanish citizenship.”17 From this perspective, the EuropeanHu-man Rights Convention protects – including in practice – against overly selec-tive or discriminatory restrictions on the right to freedom of religion or belief.However, in other cases, adherence to European human rights principlesof non-discrimination is arguably of a more nominal character. To avoid ac-cusations of discrimination and stay safely within the limits of the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, the politicians aim at “universalising” restric-tions that may have originally been aimed at a particular religious group.Theban on face covering in public is an obvious example. The ban was explicitlymotivated by a desire to restrict Muslimwomen’s use of burka and niqab, seento be an expression of “negative social control” and oppression of women, and16 Broberg, Mads Bonde: “Dansk Folkeparti vil havemuslimer frem i lyset: Nye statsborg-eres religion skal stå i lov,” in: Jyllands-Posten (26 Feb. 2021).17 Kotkas, Birk Sebastian: “DF vil registrere nye statsborgeres religion: Nu har regeringenset på, om det er lovligt,” in: Altinget (27 Mar. 2021).160 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationas such a challenge to Danish values of gender equality and women’s rights.However, since a ban exclusively on burka and niqabwould have entailed a riskof indirect discrimination, the law ended up as a ban on different types of facecoverings, legitimisedmorebroadlywith reference to theneed to“promoteandfacilitate social interaction and co-existence.”18From the perspective of the EuropeanCourt ofHumanRights, this is legit-imate.The court applies an increasingly wide margin of appreciation in casesrelated to religion, meaning that member states can go quite far in limitingthe freedom of religion or belief within the framework of international obliga-tions, as long as restrictions arenot discriminatory,directly or indirectly.Sincethe case of S.A.S v. France, for instance, the court has allowed states to use theprotection of vaguely defined notions of “co-existence,” “social cohesion” and“living together” as legitimate grounds for restrictions on religious practicesand manifestations.19 In their argumentation for the ban on face covering inthe public sphere, Danish legislators leaned precisely on this and other recentcase law of the court. As such, the European Court of Human Rights can ar-guably be said to legitimise rather than prevent the increasingly expansive re-strictions on the freedom of religion or belief in Denmark.In practice, what seems to limit the intended particularism of restrictionsis not so much the European Convention on Human Rights but rather theextent to which particularistic restrictions can be “universalised” withoutextensive implications for other religious or non-religious groups in society.The “universalisation” of the burka ban was feasible to Danish politiciansbecause other types of face coverings could be banned with only few practicalimplications for others than women wearing burka and niqab. Proposals thatcannot be “universalised” in the same way without extensive implicationsfor other religious groups tend to fail. This was arguably the case with theproposal to introduce obligatory translation of all sermons into Danish,whichwas presented by the Social Democrats as part of its election campaign in2019 with the aim to counter anti-democratic expressions of certain Muslimpreachers.20 When the Social Democrats came into power, the proposal wasincluded in the government’s 2020 to 2021 legislative programme, stating18 Lovforslag nr. LSF 219: Forslag til lov omændring af straffeloven, Folketinget 2018, sub-section 1.19 S.A.S. v. France [GC], no. 43835/11, ECHR 2014.20 Krak, Nikolaj: “S. Der er brug for større åbenhed om, hvad der foregår i trossamfund,”in: Kristeligt Dagblad (30 May 2019).E. M. Lassen/M. J. Petersen: Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief in Denmark 161the need to “create more openness around religious preachers when theyare preaching in other languages than Danish.”21 The proposal was met withsubstantial criticism from international lawyers and human rights expertsas well as religious actors, both nationally and internationally. In addition toquestioning the legitimacy of such restrictions from a human rights perspec-tive or more broadly Denmark’s international obligations, the criticism alsomade it clear that obligatory translations would have extensive implicationsfor a wide range of religious communities, including non-Danish speakingChristian communities. The proposal is not on the law programme of thecurrent government (2023).Lack of religious literacyOver the past 20 yearsDenmark haswitnessed amove towards an increasinglyrestrictive understanding of the right to freedomof religion or belief, asmani-fested in various laws and lawproposals.While this development has beenmetwith criticism fromreligious actors, left-wing parties aswell as various humanrights experts and NGOs, opposition has largely beenmodest.The vast major-ity of laws were adopted with support from a wide range of political parties,and as such must be assumed to be supported by the majority of the popula-tion. Anti-Muslim sentiments and the – perceived or real – integration chal-lenges associated with Islam alone cannot explain this apparent acceptance ofrestrictions on a fundamental human right. Broader secularist tendencies andreligious illiteracy inDanish society arguably also play an important role in ex-plaining this willingness to restrict religious practices andmanifestations.Danish society is non-religious in many ways. Religion may very well beafforded greater attention in the post-secular society, although this is not nec-essarily the same as greater acceptance, understanding, or knowledge of re-ligion. Many people do not consider religion relevant at all, and among thosethat do, the majority seem to have a negative perception of religion. For ex-ample, a 2022 poll indicated that more than 70% of the Danish population seereligion as a source of conflict, while only 80% see it as a source of peace.2221 Regeringen: Lovgivning Folketingsåret 2020/2021, Oct. 2020, p. 29.22 Tulinius, Bjørg: “Et stort flertal af danskerne ser religion som kilde til konflikt. Kun fåtror, at religion fører til fred,” in: Kristeligt Dagblad (10 Jul. 2022).162 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist AppropriationMany of the laws mentioned above reflect this alienation from – and insomecases even suspicionof–religion,not only Islambut rather religionmorebroadly. One example is the 2022 law proposal to ensure youth organisations’access to youth educational institutions. Here, ordinary “youth organisationsthat are engaged in the society” are ensured access, while religious youth or-ganisations that are “seeking access in order to gain new members or [that]act in a brash or preaching manner” are not given the same right.23 Religionis thus understood to be something fundamentally different from – andmoreproblematic than – political and other (secular) world views and ideologies.24Summing upOver the past ten to fifteen years, Denmark has witnessed a move towards anincreasingly restrictiveunderstandingof the right to freedomof religionor be-lief, expressed in legal acts and proposals of such. Many factors contribute toan understanding of this development.Denmark has historically been a highlyhomogeneous society in religious terms, with the vast majority of the popu-lation belonging to the People’s Church, which holds a constitutionally-basedprivilegedposition.At the same time–andperhaps paradoxically –Danish so-ciety has also been strongly secularist, with large parts of the population con-sidering religion as something “private.”With immigration, Danish society has become more religiously diverse,and it now has to encompass new – andmuchmore visible – religious norms,practices and manifestations, including some that run counter to those of the“cultural Christian” or secular majority. In this post-secular society, Islam hascome to be seen by many as a threat to “Danishness,” whether understood interms of Christian or secular values. Reflecting this, the majority of recent re-strictions on freedom of religion or belief have been aimed selectively at Mus-lim practices andmanifestations.Populist political parties – in particular the Danish People’s Party – haveplayed an important role in facilitating this development, consistently propos-ing restrictions on a wide range of Muslim practices and manifestations with23 Law proposal on youth organisations’ access to youth education, remarks to §1.24 Ank, Ingrid: “Kritik af nyt lovforslag: Gymnasielever må gerne tro på demokratiet, menikke på Gud,” in: Kristeligt Dagblad (20 Jun. 2022).E. M. Lassen/M. J. Petersen: Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief in Denmark 163the somewhat clientelist aim to protect “Christian culture and values.” How-ever, the actual laws have been adopted by a broad range of parties, challengingthe understanding of restrictions as “populist.” While the mainstream politi-cal parties may share the desire to selectively restrict practices andmanifesta-tions of particular religious communities, they also emphasise the importanceof adhering to European human rights standards. As such, much is done to“universalise” restrictions, ensuring that legislation on freedom of religion orbelief lives up to the standards enshrined in the European Convention on Hu-man Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.Further complicating the picture, there are restrictions that cannot easilybe explainedwith reference to anti-Muslim sentiments and –perceived or real– integration challenges but instead reflect a broader scepticismor even suspi-cion of religionmore generally. From this perspective, restrictions of freedomof religion or belief may not be expressions of populist right-wing sentimentsbut rather of a dominant non-religious mentality among broad segments ofthe population, perceiving freedom of religion or belief as a right that is lessimportant than other human rights.What does the future hold? In December 2022, a new government madeup of Social Democrats, the Liberal Party and theModerates (a new Social Lib-eral party) came into power. Unlike previous governments, the new govern-ment has themajority in parliament, and as such does not depend on theDan-ish People’s Party or similar populist parties.Thismightmean that integrationand Islam – key issues for the Danish People’s Party –will receive less politicalattention in the coming years, in a trend already witnessed during electionswhere these issues were remarkably absent from political debates. As such,wemay expect a decrease in new restrictions on freedom of religion or belief, atleast when it comes to restrictions motivated by anti-Muslim sentiments and“integration challenges.” However, at the same time, there are no signs of thegovernment cancelling existing restrictions on freedomof religion or belief, orindeed encouraging amore religiously inclusive society in otherways. In otherwords, restrictions on certain religious practices and manifestations have be-come the “new normal” in Denmark.To conclude on a slightly more positive note, themove towards an increas-ingly restrictive understanding of freedom of religion or belief has also hada number of encouraging consequences. In recent history, the right to free-dom of religion or belief has not played a prominent role in Danish public de-bate: at best, it was a right that was taken for granted, and at worst one thatwas considered superfluous and irrelevant. However, recent restrictions have164 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationencouraged intense debates and a renewed acknowledgement of the impor-tance of this right, at least among segments of the population. Furthermore– and perhaps more importantly – opposition to the restrictions has broughttogether organisations, institutions, and individuals across religious divides,as well as across secular/religious divides, facilitating new alliances, partner-ships and friendships among actors united in their understanding of the rightto freedom of religion or belief as a universal right for all and a cornerstone ina democratic society.Commitment to Religious Freedom at the Levelof the European UnionA Victim of Polarisation?Bernd Hirschberger and Katja VogesAfter the various institutions of the EU had set things in motion in a positivemanner in several respects in the 2010s regarding advocacy for freedom of re-ligion or belief (FoRB), an increasing polarisation can be observed today in thedebates on this human right at the European level. The political right-wing isengaging in client politics, thereby seeking to appropriate the issue for them-selves,while liberal and left-wing forces seem to be increasingly reluctant fromengaging in activities promoting religious freedomwith high publicity.A positive development regarding advocacy for FoRB in the 2010sTherewas abrief phase in themid-2010swhenanumber of rather considerablesuccesses were achieved globally regarding promoting FoRB at the EU level:• June 2013 saw theEuropeanUnion’s ForeignAffairsCouncil (FAC) adoptingtheEUGuidelinesonthepromotionandprotectionof freedomofreligionor belief. The members of the Council established in the guidelines thatbreachesof FoRBmayexacerbate intolerance,andoften constitute early in-dicators of potential violence and conflicts.1Theguidelines provide the EUdelegations and member states’ embassies and consulates with practical1 Council of the European Union: EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection offreedom of religion or belief. Foreign Affairs Council meeting Luxembourg, 24 June2013, para. 1, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137585.pdf, accessed on: 4 Sep. 2023.166 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationinstructions for their work, and contain important information in this re-gard on the understanding of FoRB, as well as elucidating the link to otherhuman rights and formulating specific prospects for action for enhancingFoRB.• The office of a Special Envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion orbelief outside the European Union was furthermore established in 2016.Jean-Claude Juncker appointed the Slovak politician Ján Figeľ from theChristian Democratic Movement (KDH) as the first Special Envoy in thesame year.• Theworkof the IntergrouponFreedomofReligionorBeliefandReligiousTolerance in this phase can also be regarded as relatively successful. TheIntergroup is intended to ensure that in its international relations the EUpromotes and protects the right of the individual to freely express theirconvictions (whether theistic,non-theistic or atheistic).All political groupsof the European Parliament were actively involved in the Intergroup be-tween 2014 and 2019 on a broad basis, albeit to differing extents.Between withdrawal and polarisationHowever, these successful developments have unfortunately not been contin-ued in recent years. In fact, one may observe that religious freedom has in-creasingly become a polarising topic at the EU level:• For instance, there have repeatedly been heated debates concerning the of-fice of theSpecialEnvoy for thepromotionof freedomof religionorbeliefoutside theEuropeanUnion. Some criticised Ján Figeľ,with his detractorsparticularly including liberal, left-wing, green and social democratic del-egates who accuse him of having “undermined the credibility of the man-date by showing highly problematic acquaintances with organisations op-posing women’s sexual rights and LGBTI people’s rights.”2 In response to2 European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual and Reproductive Rights (EPF): Man-date of the EU Special Envoy on Freedom of Religion or Belief: Call to improvetransparency and to appoint a candidate with a strong human rights record (14Sep. 2020), https://www.epfweb.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/EU%20Special%20Envoy%20on%20FoRB-%20Final%20version%20EC%20President.pdf, accessed on:16 Oct. 2023.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Religious Freedom at the Level of the European Union 167such a complaint,EuropeanOmbudsmanEmilyO’Reilly found fault in thatthe mandate of the Special Envoy was not sufficiently clear, and that thedocuments setting out his mandate and work plan were not available tothe public.3 There was also repeated contention concerning whether theoffice should be continued at all. When the mandate of the Special Envoyexpired in October 2019, the European Commission initially stated shortlylater that the office was not to be extended. In response to criticism on thepart ofMembers of Parliament (MEPs) andMember States aswell as repre-sentatives of various religious communities, in July 2020 the Commissiondecided to appoint anewEnvoy,andChristosStylianides tookover thepostin May 2021. However, Stylianides only held the office for five months. Itwas only after the post had been vacant for more than one year that a newincumbent was appointed on 7 December 2022 in the person of the diplo-mat Frans van Daele, who was already 75 years old at that time.• There was also heated discussion of the European Guidelines on FoRB:while the guidelines set out an ambitious framework for promoting FoRB,the implementation of the guidelines fell short in practice.4 These short-comings made it easy for the far-right groups European Conservativesand Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy (ID) to level criticismin the debate on the tenth anniversary of the EUGuidelines on FoRB5 withinadequate efforts on the part of the EU for religious freedom.SomeMEPsfrom the far-right parties added to their criticism the accusation that theEuropean institutions appeared to be more active regarding gender andLGBTIQ issues than religious freedom. The MEP who speaks on behalf3 European Ombudsman: Decision in case 1553/2019/NH on the role of the EU’s Spe-cial Envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside of the EU (30Jul. 2020), https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/130887, accessed on:4 Sep. 2023.4 Portaru, Adina: “The EU Guidelines on Freedom of Religion or Belief at Their FifthAnniversary: Implementation Lagging Behind?,” in: Wolfgang Benedek/Philip Czech/Lisa Heschl/Karin Lukas/Manfred Nowak (eds.), European Yearbook on Human Rights2018, Cambridge: Intersentia 2018, pp. 193–210.5 Theminutes of the plenary debate – onwhich the summary and the quotes that followare based – can be accessed here: European Parliament: Verbatim report of proceed-ings (13 Jul. 2023), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2023-07-13-ITM-010_EN.html, accessed on: 16 Oct. 2023. Similar patterns were already on dis-play in the plenary debate held on 3 October 2022 on the topic of The EU’s actions inthe field of freedom of religion or belief worldwide, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2022-10-03-ITM-013_EN.html, accessed on: 16 Oct. 2023.168 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationof the ID group accuses “those on the left and the globalists” of “ruining”freedom of religion or belief, and betraying the “heritage of the forefa-thers” by promoting Islamism via a “multiculturalist ideology.” Criticism– albeit more moderate in tone – was also levelled by the representativeof the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP). However, one noticesthat the group chose to be represented by none other than an MEP fromthe right-wing Christian Democratic People’s Party KDNP, the partner ofFidesz in the Hungarian Government, an administration that has comeunder criticism due to shortcomings regarding the rule of law and whichtakes a clientelistic and patronistic approach to religious freedom.6 Therepresentative of the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) in the EuropeanParliament – who comes from Poland – in turn uses the debate to make acase for secularism, and in doing so makes scathing attacks on his coun-try’s right-wing government and accuses them of being implicated withproblematic clerical structures, as well as misusing the term “Christianvalues.” In turn, the representative of the liberal Renew group stresses theimportance of the fight against Islamism.MEPs from the far-right groups ECR and ID dominate the debate in quan-titative terms.They provide six out of elevenMEP contributions, althoughnot one singlemember spoke forTheGreens/EuropeanFreeAlliance (EFA).While twomembers fromTheLeft in the European Parliament (GUE/NGL)spoke, they did not so on behalf of their group,but rather as individual rep-resentatives.The overall impression formed is that the in some cases very heated contri-butions have given rise to few concrete proposals concerning how the im-plementation of the guidelines can be improved. Some of the speeches infact extendbeyond theactual topic,andareused instead tomakeattacksonpolitical opponents.One exception is the proposal of the ECRgroup to des-ignate 24th June as European Anti-Religious Persecution Day,7 albeit thiswas mostly symbolic in nature.6 See chapter “Hungary under Viktor Orbán: ‘Illiberal Christian Democracy’ and the In-strumentalisation of Religious Freedom”.7 MEP Bert-Jan Ruissen repeated the call only a few days later, albeit this time withthe diverging designation “European Day for the Promotion of Religion or Belief”:Ruissen, Bert-Jan: “It’s Time To Implement the EU Guidelines on the Promotion ofFreedom of Religion or Belief” (21 Jul. 2023), https://europeanconservative.com/articles/commentary/its-time-to-implement-the-eu-guidelines-on-the-promotion-of-freedom-of-religion-or-belief/, accessed on: 16 Oct. 2023.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Religious Freedom at the Level of the European Union 169• It is not only the distribution of speeches in central debates on FoRB thatclearly indicates a trend towards the far-right groups presenting them-selves as the defenders of religious freedom, particularly regarding thetopic of persecuted Christians, while the more left-wing and/or secular-oriented members are shrinking from an open commitment to religiousfreedom. This trend also becomes clear regarding the membership of theintergroups of the European Parliament focussing on topics related toFoRB:◦ For instance, the far-right group ECR clearly dominated the Inter-group on Freedom of Religion or Belief and Religious Tolerance inmid-September 2023, with eight out of fifteen representatives. More-over, with one representative from the ID group and one independentwho had previously represented far-right parties, two further mem-bers were present who can be attributed to the far-right camp. Theremaining groups together onlymade up one-third of themembers (3xRenew, 1x EPP, 1x S&D). The Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL groups wereno longer represented at all.8 In contrast to this, GUE/NGL had stillprovided twomembers of the Intergroup in the previous parliament in2014 to 2019, including a Co-Chair, andThe Greens/EFA also providedone of the Intergroup’s Vice-Chairs. By contrast, ECR only providedthree out of the fourteenmembers.9◦ An even more unambiguous dominance on the part of the far-rightgroups can be observed in mid-September 2023 in the Intergroup onChristians in theMiddleEast: 21members are provided by the extremeright-wing group ID, and three furthermembers by ECR.Seven othersare independent but are all active or formermembers of extreme right-8 European Parliament: Intergroup on Freedom of Religion or Belief and ReligiousTolerance [IG9-14], https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/intergroup/6301/Intergroupe%20%C2%ABLibert%C3%A9%20de%20religion%20et%20de%20conviction%20et%20tol%C3%A9rance%20religieuse%C2%BB, accessed on: 16 Oct. 2023.9 European Parliament: Intergroup ‘Freedom of Religion and Belief and ReligiousTolerance.’ List of the Members, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/files/organisation-and-rules/organisation/intergroups/legislative-list-of-member-freedom-of-religion-20151130.pdf, accessed on: 17 Oct. 2023.170 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationwing parties. Only two members belong to the EPP group. The otherparliamentary groups are not represented at all.10However, problems are caused by the withdrawal of left-wing and/or secular-oriented forces and their lack of replacement, not only because it providesscope to the far-right but also because it shows that it goes hand in hand witha loss of quality:• While the Intergroup on Freedom of Religion or Belief and Religious Tol-erance previously published reports on the situation of religious freedomat intervals of two years, only one single report to date has been released inthe current parliamentary term (2019–2024). It should also be noted thatthe 2017 report still emphasised cooperation with a consortium of inde-pendent scholars and with the European External Action Service (EEAS),while the 2021 report contains no such reference.The selection of civil so-ciety sources in the2021 report is also somewhat limited,as almost all of theorganisations named have a Christian or conservative background.More-over, one notices careless mistakes and methodical shortcomings, as wellas deteriorations, although it would exceed the scope of the present articleto discuss this extensively.11• Moreover, the public relations work of the Intergroup has also deterio-rated. Only highly sporadic updates are published on the Intergroup’ssocialmedia channels, and the Intergroup’s Facebook pagewas completelyabandoned between 2018 and 2022.12However, a particular problem is thatthe Intergroup’s Twitter channel is now also being used for sharing party-political posts unrelated to thework of the Intergroup. For instance, a con-gratulatory post from the ECR group for an election victory on the part ofthe far-right extremist Sweden Democrats was posted there in September10 European Parliament: Intergroup on Christians in the Middle East [IG9-07], https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/intergroup/details/6294/Intergroup%20on%20Christians%20in%20the%20Middle%20East, accessed on: 12 Sep. 2023.11 European Parliament Intergroup on Freedom of Religion or Belief and Religious Toler-ance (FoRB & RT): Reports, https://www.religiousfreedom.eu/work/, accessed on: 20Sep. 2023.12 European Parliament Intergroup on Freedom of Religion or Belief: https://www.facebook.com/epwgonforb, accessed on: 4 Sep. 2023.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Religious Freedom at the Level of the European Union 1712022.13 The blog on the website of the Intergroup on Freedom of Religionor Belief and Religious Tolerance has also been used in recent years for thedissemination of partisan political messages, often using patterns suchas those described in the section “Appropriation and reinterpretation ofreligious freedom by the far-right” later in this chapter.14The precise reasons for the increased withdrawal by left-wing and/or secular-oriented forces from an open commitment to religious freedom that has beenobserved should be analysed in future studies. However, it is conceivable thatattempts to appropriate the issue on the part of far-right regarding religiousfreedom as well as the commonly-held perception of the topic as “conserva-tive”are acting as adeterrent towards left-wingand/or secular-orientedMEPs.Moreover, a rolemight be played by the fact thatMEPs from such circles feel anuncertain or indeed distanced attitude towards religion as secularisation ad-vances in Europe. Organisational problems furthermore appear to have a roleto play.15Appropriation and reinterpretation of religious freedomby the far-rightAnother important reason for the increasing commitment to the issue of “reli-gious freedom” and especially the sub-aspect of “supporting persecuted Chris-tians”by the far-rightgroups isprobably that these issuesoffer themawelcomeopportunity to present themselves as “ordinary conservatives.” While leftists13 ECR Group (@ecrgroup): ‘Congratulations to @jimmieakesson & our friends from@sdriks for the excellent result in the Swedish national elections, coming out as the2nd strongest party. The conservative message has a growing appeal across Europe.’– ECR Co-Chairs Ryszard Legutko & @RaffaeleFitto (12 Sep. 2022), https://twitter.com/ecrgroup/status/1569231883317248000, accessed on: 4 Sep. 2023.14 European Parliament Intergroup on Freedom of Religion or Belief and Religious Tol-erance (FoRB & RT): Blog, https://www.religiousfreedom.eu/blog/, accessed on: 2 Jan.2024.15 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (ed.): Einsatz für Religionsfreiheit – gestern, heute, mor-gen. Interviews mit Expertinnen und Experten aus Politik und Zivilgesellschaft, Berlin2021, p. 43, https://www.kas.de/documents/252038/11055681/Einsatz+f%C3%BCr+Religionsfreiheit+%E2%80%93+gestern%2C+heute%2C+morgen.pdf/093435af-dc12-4917-4843-4884c8f110fd?version=1.2&t=1617993333142, accessed on: 17 Oct. 2023.172 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationand liberals need to recognise that conservative policy-making is perfectly le-gitimate in the democratic space (even in those cases where it is primarilymo-tivated by electoral considerations), theway inwhich the far-right groups referto religious freedom is no longer “conservative,” but in stark contrast to coreideas of the human rights approach. Looking at speeches,motions, social me-dia and website posts and publications of the far-right groups and far-rightEuropean parties and their representatives, it is striking that religious free-dom is repeatedly reinterpreted in a way that undermines its character as auniversal right to freedom, and instead the groups attempt to establish theirown ideological narratives and enemy stereotypes:Islam in particular is often made the enemy and bogeyman, and fearsof migration are exploited for constructing a scenario of intimidation, oftenechoing conspiracy theories. The far-right group ID describes the protectionof what it defines as national identities against an alleged islamisation as oneof its key priorities:“The ID Group aims to safeguard the identity of the citizens and nations inEurope. The right to control, regulate and limit immigration is a fundamen-tal principle shared by the Members of the Group. So is their willingness tofight for a safer Europe with well-protected external borders and a strongercooperation to tackle terrorism and islamisation. The Members unequivo-cally oppose the possible accession of Turkey.”16In even more drastic terms, this alleged threat was described in 2019 by Gior-gia Meloni, who has been the president of the ECR party since 2020 and hasrepresented Italy in the European Council as head of government since 2022:17“If the Muslims think they are bringing holy war into our home, the time hascome to take even drastic measures: all that remains is to block any kindof Islamic immigration until they have clarified their ideas. We intend to16 Statutes of the Identity and Democracy (ID) Group in den European Parlia-ment, https://assets.nationbuilder.com/idgroup/pages/54/attachments/original/1673443377/NEW_ID_Statutes__EN_11.2022.pdf?1673443377, accessed on: 18 Oct. 2023.17 Quotes that have not been published in English have been translated into English bythe authors of the chapter.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Religious Freedom at the Level of the European Union 173defend our classical and Christian roots from the process of the Islamisationof Europe, let the do-gooders and sultans of half the world get used to it.”18While the IDgroupportrays Islamas a threat, they describe the “Greek-Romanand Christian heritage as the pillars of European civilization”19:“The Europe of today needs a return to the values of its identity and Judeo-Christian roots, which are constantly threatened by widening Islamisation.The lack of clarity of relations with nations such as Turkey, as well as uncon-trolled illegal immigration, contributes to destroying EU cooperation andthe stability of our Member States.”20Some far-right representativesnot onlypostulate thedangerof growingChris-tianophobia but already speak of “persecution of Christians in the EuropeanUnion,” such as the Polish ECRMEPBogdan Rzońca in a question to the Euro-pean Commission from 2020.21Moreover, it is argued that the alleged islamisation is a threat to religiousfreedomand other human rights.A typical example is provided by thewordingof an IDgroupmotion proposing an alternative resolution text for the 2020EUStrategy for Gender Equality, in which ID condemns “mass migration and theensuing attempts at the Islamisation of Europe as a threat to our security andan attack on religious freedom and women’s rights.”2218 Giorgia Meloni: Se i musulmani pensano di portare la guerra santa in casa nostra, èarrivato il momento di prendere provvedimenti anche drastici (23 Apr. 2019), https://www.facebook.com/giorgiameloni.paginaufficiale/posts/pfbid0H5Yemf3ubpZBW5uZ6Z2bAjhzyYXenKvrws5QUQU2BnZezS8cn6DmVCpv5p5h83UDl, accessed on: 17Oct. 2023; for a summary of other similar statements by Meloni, see Bridge InitiativeTeam: Factsheet: Giorgia Meloni (2 Feb. 2023), https://bridge.georgetown.edu/research/factsheet-giorgia-meloni/, accessed on: 17 Oct. 2023.19 Statutes of the Identity and Democracy (ID) Group in den European Parliament.20 The Parliament: “La rentrée: Marco Zanni says it’s time for change” (18 Sep. 2020), https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/time-for-change, accessed on: 17Oct. 2023.21 European Parliament. Parliamentary question: Persecution of Christians in the Euro-pean Union (6 Apr. 2020), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-9-2020-002116_EN.html, accessed on: 17 Oct. 2023.22 European Parliament: European Parliament resolution on the EU Strategy for GenderEquality (13 Jan. 2021), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2020-0234-AM-001-001_EN.pdf, accessed on: 17 Oct. 2023.174 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist AppropriationThe far-right presents itself as the only force that takes these allegedthreats seriously and stands up for religious freedom and the protection ofpersecuted Christians and fights against Christianophobia, in Europe as wellas worldwide. This claim is underlined by symbolic gestures, whereby thenomination of the Archbishop of Mosul Najeeb Michaeel for the SakharovPrize 2020 by the ID group should also be interpreted in this sense. At theID group’s press conference on the nomination, it is noticeable that the IDrepresentatives hardly respond in their speeches to the Archbishop’s solution-oriented analysis, which emphasises the importance of interfaith coopera-tion, dialogue, peaceful coexistence, mutual respect and the language of theheart, and instead try to foreground the issue of defending Christian identityagainst radical Islamism, a theme that fits much better with their propagatedworldview.23On the other hand, political opponents are accused of inaction or evencomplicity. ECR MEP Carlo Fidanza – chair of the Intergroup on Freedom ofReligion or Belief andReligious Tolerance –accused the EUof being a “soullessbureaucratic giant plagued by the worst cultural relativism” suggesting thatits lack of commitment to religious freedom was a “submission to Islamicfanaticism.”24 In the process, the far-right likes to present itself as the voiceof the silent majority: “We, however, will continue to fight to protect the silentmajority.”25 Especially “leftists,” “liberals” and “globalists” are sharply attacked,with “multiculturalism,” “woke ideology,” “cancel culture” and similar incitingbuzzwords being used to construct a further enemy image and a further23 European Parliament, Multimedia Centre: Press conference by Marco Zanni, I&DPresident, Nicolas Bay, Thierry Mariani, Jérôme Riviére, Joachim Kuhs, and NajeebMichaeel, on ‘Archbishop of Mosul Najeeb Michaeel Moussa, nominated for theSakharov prize 2020’ (6 Oct. 2020), https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/de/webstreaming/press-conference-by-marco-zanni-i-d-president-nicolas-bay-thierry-mariani-jerome-riviere-joachim-kuh_20201006-1400-SPECIAL-PRESSER, accessed on: 17Oct. 2023.24 European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) – Fratelli d’Italia: Europa senz’anima,Von der Leyen non difende liberta’ religiosa (24 Jun. 2023), https://ecr-fratelliditalia.eu/europa-senzanima-von-der-leyen-non-difende-liberta-religiosa/, accessed on: 17Oct. 2023.25 Identity and Democracy Group: Plenary Booklet, Identity and Democracy, 2–5 May2022, Plenary Session, p. 5, https://www.idgroup.eu/2_5_may, accessed on: 4 Sep.2023.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Religious Freedom at the Level of the European Union 175alleged threat.26 The Finnish ID MEP Laura Huhtasaari even includes theterm “climate change” in this list and sketches some kind of alleged liberalre-education that endangers Christian traditions:“The hegemony prevailing in the EU sees increasing multiculturalism as anintrinsic value. At the same time, it wants to reduce the importance of Chris-tianity. Christian traditions, such as Christmas celebrations, are being drivenout of schools. Liberal politicians have become allergic to the message ofChristianity. Liberals want to change the message of the church to matchtheir political ideology, that is climate change and the rainbow idea. This isall done in the name of tolerance. Christ is not tolerated, but the spread ofIslam is seen as a progressive and miraculous thing.”27In particular, the ECR group perceives “family values” as being threatened by acorresponding “ideological monopoly of the left,” which is why the group hasset up a working group to counter it.28 Already in 2019, the future ECR partypresidentMeloniwarned at theWorldCongress of Families that the familywasallegedly beingmade the enemyand that national, religious,gender and familyidentities were under attack.29Thepatterns observed are the same patterns of populist appropriation andreinterpretation that have alreadybeendiscussed inother contributions to thisbook: religious freedom is interpreted in a clientelistic way. The religious isoften reduced to a role as a source of tradition and identity. Objectives that26 See e.g. Angeli, Matteo: “The National Rally’s anti-woke gamble” (1 May 2023), https://ytali.com/2023/05/01/the-national-rallys-anti-woke-gamble/, accessed on: 17 Oct.2023; Independent: “How a far-right politician could become Italy’s first femaleleader” (17 Sep. 2022), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/italy-prime-minister-far-right-giorgia-meloni-salvini-b2166887.html, accessed on: 17 Oct. 2023.27 Identity and Democracy Group: Plenary Booklet, Identity and Democracy, 12–15 Dec.2022, p. 8, https://www.idgroup.eu/12_15_december, accessed on: 4 Sep. 2023.28 European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR): New ECR Policy Working Group onFamily and Life launched (30 Mar. 2022), https://ecrgroup.eu/article/new_ecr_policy_working_group_on_family_and_life_launched, accessed on: 17 Oct. 2023.29 Bump, Philip: “That Giorgia Meloni speech captivating the U.S. right doesn’t makesense” (27 Sep. 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/27/meloni-italy-united-states-far-right/, accessed on: 17 Oct. 2023; Cassius: Giorgia Meloni’s elec-trifying speech at the World Congress of Families, English subtitles (17 Apr. 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y_Z1LClnhsk, accessed on: 17 Oct. 2023.176 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationare legitimate or even worthy of support when considered in isolation (com-bating Islamist violence, supporting families, cultivating customs and tradi-tions, protecting religious freedom and women’s rights, and helping Chris-tians in need) are mixed with problematic ideological or conspiracy-theoret-ical narratives and demands for discriminatory measures that disproportion-ately restrict human rights. By generalising, exaggerating, insinuating, coin-ing ideological inciting buzzwords, fuelling culture war debates, omitting im-portant contextual information or even citing unsubstantiated or even falseallegations, a scenario of intimidation is constructed and fear, hatred andprej-udice are stoked. Against this alleged threat, the far-right in turn stages itselfas the one and only saviour representing the true voice of the people,while po-litical opponents are denied legitimacy and dissenting views are portrayed ascomplicit with the threat.The examples presented above are only a small selection. Correspondingnarratives can also be found among other representatives andmember partiesof ID and ECR. It becomes evident that they are an internationally unifying el-ement of the far-right forces in Europe,which runs like a thread through theirargumentation, sometimes in amoderate form,with a subtle choice of words,sometimes in a more radical form. It may seem like a paradox that national-ists in particular are very well networked transnationally. However, the EU of-fers them a welcome projection surface to bundle hatred and thus to advancenational political goals and the international network an opportunity to learnabout successful populist strategies of others and to further refine ideologicalnarratives.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Religious Freedom at the Level of the European Union 177Cherry-picking approaches towards FoRB across all political groupsStudying speeches30 and amendments31 from the parliamentary work and thewebsites of the political groups represented in the European Parliament, it be-comes apparent that the other groups also have certain focal points when re-ferring to FoRB, even if – unlike the far-right – they do not focus on inhumanideologies or conspiracy-theoretical views: • For instance, the EPP group is particularly committed to Christians inneed.• Alongside a commitment to religious pluralism and inter-religious dia-logue, the S&D group has a particular focus on the connection betweenlabour issues and FoRB.• In linewith its anti-imperialist orientation, theGUE/NGL group resorts toanti-colonialist criticism.• In several contributions, Renew focuses on the fight against Islamist ex-tremism,matching the line of French President Macron’s party, the mem-ber party of Renew,which has the largest delegation ofMEPs in the group.30 For the current parliamentary term from 2019 to 2024, the database of the EuropeanParliament lists a total of 38 verbatim reports of proceedings in the category “Debatesand Videos” for the search terms “freedom of religion,” “religious freedom,” “Islamo-phobia” and “persecuted Christians” until the summer recess 2023 (setting: word(s):in text): https://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/debates-video.html.These included the following debates focussing in a general way, without a specificcountry focus, on issues related to FoRB: 10th anniversary of the EU Guidelines onFreedom of Religion or Belief (debate); The 30th anniversary of the UN Declarationon the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Mi-norities; The EU’s actions in the field of freedom of religion or belief worldwide (de-bate); Persecution of minorities on the grounds of belief or religion (short presenta-tion); The European Commission Guidelines on inclusive language (topical debate).By contrast, about two-thirds of the debates dealt with the human rights situation inspecific countries, with FoRB being a focal topic in about half of the discussions andappearing sporadically in individual contributions in the other half.31 For instance, there was a particularly intensive discussion in the Committee on ForeignAffairs and numerous amendments to the report on the persecution of minorities onthe grounds of belief or religion (2021/2055(INI)), for which Karol Karski from the ECRgroup was the rapporteur: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2022-0071_EN.html, accessed on: 4 Sep. 2023.178 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriation• The Greens/EFA stays largely out of debates that deal with general issuesaround FoRB. However, the group and its representatives get involvedwhen it comes to concrete cases of human rights violations. In such cases,they also courageously stand up for religious human rights defenders.Ideological lines – especially at the political fringes – can also be discernedwhen comparing which governments are criticised by which groups. For in-stance, it is noteworthy that the ID group holds back on criticising the Indiangovernmentunder the leadershipof theHindunationalistBJPparty evenwhenthe discussion focuses on human rights violations against Christian minori-ties.32 On the other hand, GUE/NGL and its representatives are often very re-luctant to criticise self-declared communist or socialist governments such asNicaragua33 or China,34 or even relativise their human rights violations in aform of “whataboutism” with reference to theWest’s own failings.Ingeneral, there is oftena tendency todivide into a “right-wing”anda“left-wing” camp:• The (centre)left and liberals are often more secularly oriented, while thecentre-right and far-right often emphasise the importance of Europe’sChristian heritage.• The centre-right and far-right particularly often call for a stronger com-mitment to supportingChristians in need.On the other hand, the problemof Islamophobia is more likely to be taken up by left-wing representatives(even if much less frequently than the aforementioned).• For left-wing and green representatives, it is an important concern thatFoRB should not be used to undermine LGBTIQ rights and access to abor-tion. By contrast, quite a few far-right representatives portray a supposedwoke culture as a threat to their identity and religious freedom.32 European Parliament: Verbatim report of proceedings (12 Jul. 2023), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2023-07-12-ITM-021-02_EN.html, accessedon: 17 Oct. 2023.33 European Parliament: Verbatim report of proceedings (14 Sep. 2022), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2022-09-14-ITM-015-03_EN.html, accessedon: 17 Oct. 2023.34 European Parliament: Verbatim report of proceedings (18 Dec. 2019), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2019-12-18-ITM-019_EN.html, accessed on:17 Oct. 2023.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Religious Freedom at the Level of the European Union 179• Leftist and green representatives seem to prefer a stronger general com-mitment to human rights instead of a specific commitment to religiousfreedom. On the other hand, (centre)right representatives often place aspecial focus on religious freedom (and especially that of Christians) evenwhen discussing cases where multiple human rights are violated.• Left-wing MEPs point to problems resulting from the colonial heritage,while far-right MEPs often focus on European self-interest and the role ofthe EU as a financial donor. One ID MEP even praises the French colonialrule in Algeria as a time of religious tolerance.35Conclusions and recommendationsSuch polarisation tendencies run the risk of weakening andmarginalising thepolitical centre. Indeed, regarding thepromotionof FoRB,strongerbridgesbe-tween the centre-left and the centre-right would be desirable.Thereby, the fol-lowing aspects hold particular importance:• For the EPP group, the tendency to split into a left-wing and right-wingcamp poses the challenge of an appropriate demarcation from the far-right. In fact, this demarcation is fragile, especially regarding the ECRgroup. At times, the two groups even have cooperative events on topicsrelated to religious freedom.36 This openness may be rooted in the factthat the ECR group at least partly presents itself more moderately andless aggressively in parliament than the ID group and actually startedout as a genuinely conservative group. However, especially against thebackground of Brexit, the group has increasingly opened up to the rightand admitted parties that are considered post-fascist, right-wing populistor even far-right extremist.37 Particularly due to the parallels with ID in35 European Parliament: Verbatim report of proceedings (28 Nov. 2019), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2019-11-28-ITM-003-01_EN.html, accessedon: 17 Oct. 2023.36 See e.g. European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR): Conference & Exhibition:Suffering Christians in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere (18 Sep. 2023), https://ecrgroup.eu/event/conference_exhibition_suffering_christians_in_sub_saharan_africa_and_elsewh, accessed on: 17 Oct. 2023.37 Noteworthy in this context is also the change of the Dutch party ChristenUnie fromthe ECR to the EPP group for this reason: ChristenUnie: Segers (ChristenUnie): ‘Coalitie180 Societal Dynamics and Problematic Reactions towards Populist Appropriationterms of content and framing outlined above, the ECR group remains aproblematic partner, especially when it comes to questions of religiousfreedom.• On the other hand, for greens, leftists and social democrats (especiallysecular-oriented ones), the challenge is not to be seduced into distancingthemselves fromdealingwith religion-related issues and underestimatingtheir relevance in the shadow of the polarisation fuelled by the far-right.On the contrary, it is crucial to discover FoRB in its fundamental characteras a human right and universal right to freedom, thus leaving no roomfor populist distortions of the right. In order to avoid making themselvesvulnerable to criticism, they would also be well advised to take note ofwhich rights are actually codified in the central human rights documents;for example regarding an alleged human right to abortion.38If the democratic forces within society and politics dare to engage in a sin-cere exchange, there is the potential that the diverse approaches to FoRB donot have to lead to isolated particular interests, but that with the help of thedifferent expertises, even synergies can be discovered. For instance, regard-ing the question of how religious women –who are often affected by multiplehuman rights violations – can be supported, an exchange between religiousconservatives and progressive feminists could be fruitful.met Forum niet geloofwaardig’ (6 Mar. 2020), https://www.christenunie.nl/blog/2020/03/06/Segers-ChristenUnie-Coalitie-met-Forum-niet-geloofwaardig, accessed on: 17Oct. 202338 See also Deutsche Kommission Justitia et Pax: Menschenrechte und kulturelle Tradi-tionen – Grundsatzreflexion und „Testfall” Recht auf Gesundheit. Erkenntnisse der Ar-beitsgruppe „Menschenrechte“derDeutschenKommission Justitia et Pax (=Gerechtigkeit und Frieden 139), p. 35, p. 42,http://justitia-et-pax.de/jp/publikationen/pdf/guf_139.pdf, accessed on: 17 Oct. 2023.Signs of Hope and Proposals for SolutionsInternational Religious Freedom(or Belief) AllianceFrom Populist to not yet PopularJos DoumaUnder the title “Protecting Human Rights from Exclusionary Populism,” Har-vard’s Gerald Neuman contributed to a 2023 publication, concluding his con-tribution1 with some critical paragraphs on the International Religious Free-dom (or Belief) Alliance.“The Trump administration also established a so-called International Reli-gious Freedom (or Belief) Alliance, enlisting primarily right-wing populistgovernments such as Hungary, Poland, and Brazil. The Alliance enabled re-ligiously intolerant governments to claim attachment to religious libertyby protesting persecution of their own coreligionists, and to argue for thesupremacy of religious freedom over the human rights of women and sexualminorities. The new administration has continued in the Alliance, providingits Secretariat in the State Department’s Office of International ReligiousFreedom and leading one of its working groups (on threats posed by tech-nology). The United States could resign from the Alliance, but it should con-sider expanding and reforming it. Rights-respecting countries reluctant tojoin a project of Mike Pompeo might be willing to contribute to a genuinelyevenhanded approach to religious freedom that is recalibrated to be consis-tent with the human rights of all. Actual religious persecution is definitelya serious problem in the world, and a diverse group of governments willingto help enforce existing international standards could decrease it – particu-larly if they are sufficiently diverse and committed to examining their ownfailings as well as those of others. A reconfigured alliance could support the1 Neuman, Gerald: “Protecting Human Rights from Exclusionary Populism,” in: Christo-pher Sabatini (ed.), Reclaiming Human Rights in a Changing World Order, Washing-ton D. C./London: Brookings Institution 2023, pp. 123–148, pp. 141–142.184 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionswork of existing human rights mechanisms rather than attempting to un-dermine or replace them. Domestically, the effort might also draw somereligious constituencies back toward shared values and away from populistdivisiveness. The problem of participation in the Alliance illustrates a dis-advantage of convening states as admitted members in a standing organi-zation to address the challenges of populism. Membership becomes a cre-dential that may be undeserved from the outset and that is politically verydifficult to withdraw, even after changes in a member’s government.”I will try to respond to the challenge that Neuman presented based on myown experience as the Netherlands’ representative between February 2020and September 2022, as a member of the Steering Committee over the sameperiod and chair in 2021. I will refer to publicly available documentation pub-lished until March 2023 and take not into account developments since. Pleaseaccept that I cannot reveal a number of details in national decision-makingnor bilateral consultations. Moreover, I also will not quote from InternationalReligious Freedom or Belief Alliance (IRFBA) documentation not published onIRFBA’s webpage, hosted by the United States (U.S.) Department of State.The allianceIRFBA is “a network of like-minded countries fully committed to advancingfreedom of religion or belief around the world.”2 According to the website –hosted by the U.S.Department of State – 37 countries have joined the alliance.There are also five IRFBA friends, and three IRFBA observers, including theUnited Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief.The idea for an allianceIn July 2018 and 2019, the U.S. Department of State hosted two ministerialsto advance religious freedom. In the margins of the second meeting, the U.S.hosts announced their initiative to build an “International Religious Freedom2 U.S. Department of State: International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance, https://www.state.gov/international-religious-freedom-or-belief-alliance/, accessed on: 29Aug. 2023.J. Douma: International Religious Freedom (or Belief) Alliance 185Alliance”3. A number of invited partners – such as members of the Interna-tional Contact Group (ICG) on FoRB –were critical for a number of reasons:A concept of the Trump administrationFor some European countries leading on the issue of FoRB, associating withthis “Trump thing”4 was a risky affair. At the 2019ministerial, both secretary ofstate Pompeo and IRF ambassador Brownback referred to “protecting a com-mon, unalienable human right” and Secretary Pompeo announced the estab-lishment of the “Commission on Unalienable Rights.”5 He had presented theplan in an article in the Wall Street Journal a week before the ministerial andclaimed that “[h]uman-rights advocacy has lost its bearings and becomemoreof an industry than a moral compass.”6Against the backdrop of earlier Trump administration initiatives (like the“MexicoCity Policy”7 and the instrumentalization of religion8), this raised sus-picion that was justified when the Commission started its discussions, heldhearings and presented its report.93 Banks, Adelle M.: “As religious freedom summit ends, State Department announcesnew alliance, sanctions” (18 Jul. 2019), https://religionnews.com/2019/07/18/as-religious-freedom-summit-ends-state-department-announces-new-alliance-sanctions/, ac-cessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.4 An expression used later by an anonymous Biden administration staff member.5 U.S. Department of State: 2019Ministerial To Advance Religious Freedom, https://2017-2021.state.gov/2019-ministerial-to-advance-religious-freedom/index.html, accessedon: 29 Aug. 2023; italics by the author.6 U.S. Department of State: Unalienable Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Founders’Principles Can Help Revitalize Liberal Democracy World-wide (7 Jul. 2019), https://2017-2021.state.gov/unalienable-rights-and-u-s-foreign-policy-the-founders-principles-can-help-revitalize-liberal-democracy-world-wide/index.html, accessed on: 29 Aug.2023.7 Hellmann, Jessie: “Trump reinstates ban on US funding for abortion overseas” in: (23Jan. 2017), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/abortion/315652-trump-signs-executive-order-reinstating-global-gag-rule-on/, accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.8 Casey, Shaun: “How the State Department Has Sidelined Religion’s Role in Diplomacy”(5 Sep. 2017), https://religionandpolitics.org/2017/09/05/how-the-state-department-has-sidelined-religions-role-in-diplomacy/, accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.9 U.S. Department of State: Commission on Unalienable Rights, https://2017-2021.state.gov/commission-on-unalienable-rights/index.html, accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.186 Signs of Hope and Proposals for SolutionsThe International Contact Group on Freedom of Religion or BeliefThis forum – comprising senior policy officers of nearly 30 like-minded coun-tries – was established by Canada in June 2015 to encourage and deepen coor-dination between countries committed to advancing FoRB for all.The contactgroup is co-chairedbyCanadaand theUnitedStates.10While itwasmentionedin the Potomac Plan of Action (a result of the 2018 ministerial) to “support col-lective action”11, it now seemed to become sidelined by an initiative of the prin-cipals of one of the co-chairs.IRF instead of FoRBThe difference between the U.S. acronym IRF and the UN/EU acronym FoRBwarrants some background details to better understand European resistance.In 1998, the U.S. enacted an International Religious Freedom Act, implying awide range of statutory institutions and obligations such as a bipartisan Com-mission (U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom–USCIRF), anambassador-at-large, and an annual report by the Department of State. The2016 Frank R.Wolf International Religious FreedomAct amended the 1998 Actby specifically extending protection to non-theists, as those who do not claimany particular religion.The freedom not to believe was expressed explicitly in the 2018 PotomacDeclaration: “Every person has the right to hold any faith or belief, or none atall, and enjoys the freedom to change faith.”12 However, political, oral, lan-guage was less clear, like in the statements by secretary Pompeo and ambas-sador Brownback at theWashingtonMinisterial in 2019. Against the backdropof the distrust of especially western-European partners and the tradition in10 Government of Canada: International Contact Group on Freedom of Religion or Belief(31 Aug. 2023), https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/freedom-religion-liberte-group_groupe.aspx?lang=eng, accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.11 See under “Strengthening the Response” at U.S. Department of State: Ministerial toAdvance Religious Freedom Potomac Plan of Action, https://www.state.gov/ministerial-to-advance-religious-freedom-potomac-plan-of-action/, accessed on: 26 Oct. 2023.12 U.S. Department of State: Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom Potomac Declara-tion, https://www.state.gov/ministerial-to-advance-religious-freedom-potomac-declaration/, accessed on: 26 Oct. 2023; italics by the author.J. Douma: International Religious Freedom (or Belief) Alliance 187Europe to explicitly include “belief” or “faith” in all expressions, this ambiguitymade partners critical of an IRF alliance.Technical, language and legal aspectsWhenambassadorBrownback solicited for supportwhile visiting theHague inNovember 2019 and addressing a meeting of the ICG on FoRB (co-chaired bythe architect of his plan), he held a passionate plea for “action by senior politi-cians, based on consensus.” With the IRF Act dating over 20 years, he wantedto “get into action, call people mandated to act.” Although his audience wassympathetic to this personal ambition, he somewhat received a cold shoulder.Delegates made a number of comments on the issues mentioned above andraised questions about the risk of undermining the multilateral system, therelationship with internationally agreed language and intersectionality with(wider) human rights. Apart from that, partners were critical on technical is-sues, financing and governance. None of the ICG members committed to theplan.Eliminating misconceptions, changing principlesBrownback now mandated his staff to negotiate with a number of partners– notably Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and The UnitedKingdom (UK) – to generate support and accommodate partners’ insights.Countries like Germany, France and Italy and the EU’s European ExternalAction Service (EEAS) did not participate but were informed by the others.KnoxThames and his team could not easily overcome the mistrust againstperceived Trump administration objectives but could at least clear the sky asmuch as the language. The small group of ICG-FoRB partners mentioned –advised by the UN Special Rapporteur on FoRB, Dr. Ahmed Shaheed – wereable to change the text and spirit of the IRFA principles, leading to a Declara-tion of Principles published on February 5, 2020, when secretary Pompeo of-ficially launched the alliance with an initial membership of 27 countries.13The13 Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, CzechRepublic, Estonia, Gambia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithua-nia, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Togo, Ukraine, UnitedKingdom and United States. (Banks, Adelle M.: “More than two dozen countries188 Signs of Hope and Proposals for SolutionsUK and the Netherlands joined – “in good company” –whereas Canada, Den-mark, Norway and Sweden delayed a decision.Sound principles of the allianceWhen reading the principles, onemay notice the influence of European think-ing and adaptation to multilateralism.The UN Special Rapporteur and Euro-pean partners underlined: “The actions of the alliance are intended to comple-ment existing work to promote freedom of religion or belief within the UnitedNations and other competent multilateral and regional organizations.”14Brownback presented the IRFA “as more a network than an alliance, withconsensual decision taking andnotmeant to take sanctions,” adding that thereis “a pretty high bar” for countries included in the group: “We want nationsthat respect religious freedom in their own country,obviously act thatway, andthen are willing to push religious freedom in international venues.”15 Brown-back’s “pretty high bar” triggered expectations and comments such as those byHumanists UK: “The ‘Declaration of Principles’ of the Alliance in some placesuses religiously exclusive language (much as does the Alliance’s name), but inmany places is inclusive of the non-religious […] Somemembers of the Allianceinclude strong defenders of freedom of religion or belief, such as the Nether-lands, but also countries with regressive human rights records, such as Brazil,Hungary, and Poland.”16The members’ commitments are very ambitious indeed, like upholdingtheir state obligations under international law in general, being inclusive,including cross-regional engagement and being committed to pursuing in-ternal-external coherence on matters relating to FoRB. They also commit tolaunch new religious freedom alliance” [6 Feb. 2020], https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2020/02/06/more-two-dozen-countries-launch-new-religious-freedom-alliance, accessed on: 29. Aug. 2023.)14 U.S. Department of State: Declaration of Principles for the International ReligiousFreedom Alliance (5 Feb. 2020), https://www.state.gov/declaration-of-principles-for-the-international-religious-freedom-alliance/, accessed on: 29. Aug. 2023.15 Banks: Two dozen.16 Humanists UK: UK signs up to US-led ‘International Religious Freedom Alliance’ (6Feb. 2020), https://humanists.uk/2020/02/06/uk-signs-up-to-us-led-international-religious-freedom-alliance/, accessed on: 29. Aug. 2023.J. Douma: International Religious Freedom (or Belief) Alliance 189taking “a human rights-based approach” to advancing FoRB (essential for Eu-ropean partners and the UN Special Rapporteur), and promote other humanrights that are indispensable for the full enjoyment of the freedom of religionor belief.Moreover, IRFA members should also feel confronted: in a number offounding member states, registration is an issue as well as the intersection-ality, with both being perceived as leading to exclusion and the conflictingimplementation of human rights.Putting words into practiceFrom the outset, Brownback surrounded himself as chair with trusted part-ners, inviting the Brazilian, Netherlands and UK representatives to join theSteering Committee and creating an Informal Council of Experts of renownedexperts and trusted IRF friends.17 In earlyMarch 2020, a firstworkingmeetingtook place in Geneva, elaborating the Declaration of Principles and the workagenda.Thatmeetingwas held back to backwith the regularmeeting of the ICGon FoRB, and in the margins of the regular session of the UN Human RightsCouncil. IRFAmembers briefed their ICG friends and discussed prospects formembership with Canada, Denmark, Norway and Sweden and discussed theoption of becoming a “friend” at least.From then, IRFA started meeting on a monthly basis, including virtuallydue to Covid. Since ambassador Brownback had shown that he was preparedto also adopt the “B” in the alliance’s name,Denmark was easily able to join inmid-2020 when the name was changed into the International Religious Free-dom or Belief Alliance. Norway followed slightly later.At the Geneva meeting, the Netherlands – connecting to a suggestion ofKosovo at IRFA’s launch, and supported by Gambia in Geneva – proposed dis-cussing the nexus “Gender and FoRB.”The Dutch initiative built on a Danish-Norwegian initiated report “Promoting FoRB and Gender Equality in the Con-17 The Steering Committee members were João Lucas Quental Novaes de Almeida, min-ister in the Brazilian Foreign ministry (until summer 2023); Jos Douma, the Nether-lands Special Envoy for Religion and Belief (until mid-2022); and Rehman Chishty, MPand the PM’s Special Envoy on Religion or Belief (until mid-September 2020). Thecomposition of the Informal Council of Experts is never formally disclosed.190 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionstext of theSDGs,”presented in themargins of theUNHumanRightsCouncil.18While still a friend of IRFA and prior to joining the alliance, Denmark took theinitiative to lead the workgroup.The group regularly briefed the plenarymeet-ings anddrafted relevant parts of the joint statements at theMinisters’ Forumsin 2020 and 2021, and a specific statement for the London FoRBMinisterial inJuly 2022.Estonia led the “Protecting Religious Sites Workgroup,” preparing a state-ment on the protection of places of worship. It was adopted at the Ministers’Forum in November 2020.19 The subject had received attention in special ses-sions ever since, including in a statement issued at the London Ministerial inJuly 2022.20Shortly after the launch of the alliance, Australia joined it, represented byits ambassador in Washington. Ambassador Sinodinos joined the SteeringCommittee and presented the idea to study the abolishment of the deathpenalty for blasphemy and apostasy. The discussions in the Australia-ledworkgroup resulted in a report prepared by external experts and supportedby members of the workgroup named “Killing in the Name of God,” publishedin autumn 2021. It inspired the civil society organization (CSO) Jubilee Cam-paign to start a lobby for amending the UN resolution on a moratorium onthe use of the death penalty, due in November 2022. IRFBAmembers were noteffective in supporting this lobbying in the preparatory process, but eventuallyeighteen IRFBA members released a well-documented statement to support18 Petersen, Marie Juul: Promoting freedom of religion or belief and gender equalityin the context of the sustainable development goals: A focus on access to justice,education and health. Reflections from the 2019 expert consultation process, Copen-hagen: The Danish Institute for Human Rights 2020, https://www.humanrights.dk/sites/humanrights.dk/files/media/document/_%2019_02922-22%20freedom_of_religion_or_belief_gender_equality_and_the_sustainable_development_%20fd%20487747_1_1.PDF, accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Estonia: International religious freedomalliance adopts an Estonia-led Declaration on Safe Places of Worship (8 Nov.2020), https://vm.ee/en/news/international-religious-freedom-alliance-adopts-estonia-led-declaration-safe-places-worship, accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.20 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, United Kingdom: Statement onfreedom of religion or belief and cultural heritage (7 Jul. 2022), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/freedom-of-religion-or-belief-and-cultural-heritage-statement-at-the-international-ministerial-conference-2022/statement-on-freedom-of-religion-or-belief-and-cultural-heritage, accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.J. Douma: International Religious Freedom (or Belief) Alliance 191the initiative, just before the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Third Committeecast a vote.21At the launching dinner, the ForeignMinister of Togo suggested an initia-tive for an African vision for FoRB. It was worked out by Togolese diplomatsand U.S. experts, supported by somemembers of the Steering Committee andCouncil of Experts.They developed a stimulating concept note, with a view togarner wide African support for FoRB before the 2063 jubilee of the AfricanUnion. This is yet to be followed up. Other workgroups such as those on edu-cation, humanitarian aid and technology were less productive yet.In November 2020, the first annual meeting took place, called the Minis-ters’ Forum and held in the margins of the (virtual) WarsawMinisterial to Ad-vance FoRB.22 The collective IRFBA statement – adopted by consensus – of-fers useful insight into aspirations, work programs and accomplishments,23as does the statement of the (also virtual) 2021 Ministers’ Forum.24 Some am-bitions such as taking country action as a group regrettably proved too far-fetched.In every respect, it was clear that the IRFBA was a US-driven entity, butalready under Brownback’s chairmanship the monthly meetings had a struc-ture and climate facilitating a true and open discussion. Active participantslearned to cooperate, exchange information and stimulate coordinated– if notcommon – action. However, it also became clear that the IRFBA was not verydifferent from other international alliances and coalitions, in the sense thatonly a small number of participants were active, as shown by participation inso-calleddeepdives (closed-doordiscussionson topics andcountry issues) and21 U.S. Department of State: IRFBA Statement on Blasphemy and Related Offences (7Nov. 2022), https://www.state.gov/irfba-statement-on-blasphemy-and-related-offences/, accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.22 Please note that this ministerial was held to advance FoRB and no longer IRF. Formore details, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland: Ministerial to Ad-vance Freedom of Religion or Belief 2020, https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/FORB2020, accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.23 U.S. Department of State: A Shared Vision for Advancing Freedom of Religion or Belieffor All (17 Nov. 2020), https://2017-2021.state.gov/a-shared-vision-for-advancing-freedom-of-religion-or-belief-for-all/index.html, accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.24 U.S. Department of State: Statement from the International Religious Freedomor Belief Alliance Ministers’ Forum (23 Nov. 2021), https://www.state.gov/statement-from-the-international-religious-freedom-or-belief-alliance-ministers-forum/,accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.192 Signs of Hope and Proposals for SolutionsTwitter campaigns. Some Twitter campaigns like those by the U.S., UK andNetherlands (supported byCanada andSweden) on the plight of Bahá’ís in Iranandanother one to support the leader of theNigerianhumanists attracted con-siderable attention.Consolidation and striving for effectivenessAs a consequence of the U.S. presidential elections inNovember 2020, Ambas-sador Brownback stepped back as chair in January 2021 and was replaced bythe Netherlands Special Envoy.25 TheDutch chair – strongly supported by thesecretariat in theOffice of International Religious Freedom in theDepartmentof State – consolidated the alliance. By Summer 2021, a set of rules and proce-dures has been adopted and implemented.Apart from structuring the alliance as a body, theDutch chair also investedin honoring the commitments. Internal-external coherence was placed on theagenda by asking one member to describe internal issues by responding tothe fact that it was listed in the 2021 Open Doors’ World Watch List. Themember made a presentation and entered into discussion, but also protested– supported by others – against the introduction of peer reviews.The chair also involved theCouncil of Experts in placing “current issues” onthe agenda, hoping that a discussion would lead to coordinated action to chal-lenge persistent violationsandabuses.Supportedby thenewUKEnvoyFionaBruceMP, the chair and secretariat increased the frequency of group statements.IRFBA has added value to many member states’ activities on FoRB. Evenduring the Covid period, when it only met virtually, IRFBA facilitated mem-ber states representatives to familiarize themselves with issues and colleagues.Initiatives like theEstonian-led declaration on religious sites offeredmembersconfronted with actual conflicts and/or legacies of war and occupation an op-portunity to make their plight heard and recognized. Moreover, the Togoleseinitiative for an African view on FoRB – for instance – generated a lively dis-25 Since Rehman Chishty had stepped down as the UK Envoy, the vice chair was vacantand taken by Australia. Chishti’s successor as PM’s Special Envoy – Fiona Bruce – joinedthe Steering Committee, as well as the Director of the IRF Office in the State Depart-ment, Dan Nadel (since no new IRF Ambassador had been nominated yet). João LucasQuental Novaes de Almeida stayed on for Brazil.J. Douma: International Religious Freedom (or Belief) Alliance 193cussion in the Council of Experts – but not among member states – on theimportance of traditionwhen propagating and defending FoRB.After taking over as chair as of January 2022, the UK PM’s Envoy for FoRBinvested in involving members, enlarging the alliance, preparing the LondonMinisterial in July 2022 and intensifying cooperation with the Council ofExperts. Furthermore, there was the first country visit (Algeria) for an IRFBAchair. In March and November 2022 and March 2023, the chair profited fromthe relaxing of Covid measures to host physical meetings again in Geneva inthe margins of the UNHuman Rights Council session, and in New York in themargins of theThird Committee meetings.IRFBA is “consensual” and “voluntary,” with all positive and negative con-sequences. Given the capacity of many of the members’ Ministries of ForeignAffairs,26 it was to be expected that only a limited number of member states’representatives intervene in IRFBAmeetings and/or contribute to statements.Nonetheless, IRFBA still falls short of ambassador Brownback’s ambition to“get into action, call people mandated to act.”A striking example is a statementmade in December 2021 on the situationof Jehovah’s Witnesses.27 Only twelve member states supported the statement– the lowest score between all the statementsmade–whereas no referencewasmade to any specific country and the text was strict rights-oriented.Similarly, the alliance and its members fail to follow up the statementsmade. As Knox Thames wrote: “the challenge is ensuring these efforts movebeyond statements to consequential diplomacy that prompts change on theground for the persecuted.”28 Only in one particular case was sound follow-up noticed. Many IRFBA members supported a UK-initiated statement onAfghanistan in September 202129 and – although the details escaped publicattention– theU.S. andBrazil have cooperated since then in facilitatingmem-26 As one member put it: “How can I ask for support for a statement on Myanmar whenwe don’t have an embassy over there and a small regional department?”27 U.S. Department of State: Statement on Jehovah’s Witnesses (17 Dec. 2021), https://www.state.gov/international-religious-freedom-or-belief-alliance-statement-on-jehovahs-witnesses/, accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.28 Thames, Knox: Five Predictions for 2022 (31 Dec. 2021), https://www.knoxthames.com/post/five-predictions-for-2022, accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.29 U.S. Department of State: International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance State-ment on Afghanistan (10 Sep. 2021), https://www.state.gov/international-religious-freedom-or-belief-alliance-statement-on-afghanistan/, accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.194 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionsbers of religious minorities to emigrate from Afghanistan to safe countries,including Brazil.Since early 2023, most statements are only made by the IRFBA chair.IRFBA’s credentials and solidarity were tested seriously in the aftermath ofthe London Ministerial, when one of the adopted statements on “freedomof religion or belief and gender equality”30 was removed from the Foreign,Commonwealth andDevelopment Office’s (FCDO)website a few days after themeeting, changed without true consultation of all 22 signatories and postedagain with the original date (“updated 7 July”), with a mere eight signatories.The FCDO kept the original preamble, with as its last paragraph: “As such,FoRB serves not only to protect people from discrimination, inequality, andviolence; it can also serve as a source of empowerment for those who findinspiration and strength in their convictions to fight for gender equality andjustice.”However, by deleting a reference to “discriminatory personal status laws,”they undermined a central objective of IRFBA – the freedom for women tochoose their religion – and deleting reference to “sexual and reproductivehealth and rights” and “bodily autonomy” they in effect undermined the imageof FoRB, exemplified by the new last sentence: “support and build capacities oflocal religious and belief leaders.”The FCDOdefended its action by stating that “itmade the changes in orderto focus on core issues and ensure consensus between signatories”31 and “to30 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, United Kingdom: Statement onfreedom of religion or belief and gender equality (7 Jul. 2022), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/freedom-of-religion-or-belief-and-gender-equality-statement-at-the-international-ministerial-conference-2022/statement-on-freedom-of-religion-or-belief-and-gender-equality, accessed on: 29 Aug. 2023.31 Davies, Lizzy: “UK under international pressure over deletion of abortion commit-ments” (22 Jul. 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/jul/22/european-countries-pressurise-uk-over-removal-of-abortion-commitments-liz-truss; Davies, Lizzy: “UK in diplomatic standoff over deletion of abortion rights fromgender statement” (28 Jul. 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/jul/28/uk-in-diplomatic-standoff-over-deletion-of-abortion-rights-from-gender-statement. The matter prompted the Guardian to criticize the ministerial atlarge in a third article, complaining about dignitaries and organizations invited, as ifthey were there due to their conservative views on certain women’s rights: Davies,Lizzy: “UK government honoured anti-abortion figure before editing women’s rightsstatement” (9 Aug. 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/J. Douma: International Religious Freedom (or Belief) Alliance 195make the final statementmore inclusive of all perspectives and views, to allowfor a constructive exchange of views on all issues.”32EvaluationNeumanadvised theBidenadministrationnot to resign fromIRFBAbut ratherexpand and reform the alliance, recalibrated to be consistent with the humanrights of all. Reflecting on his comments, some “right-wing populist” govern-mentswere indeed eager to join, but –whatNeuman calls –“rights-respectingcountries” also accepted the invitation after the Trump administration accom-modated their wishes and international norms. Therefore, reform and recal-ibration and the aspiration of a genuinely evenhanded approach to religiousfreedom started from the date of inception. However, the UK Foreign Secre-tary’s action after the London Ministerial shows how difficult it is to be con-sistent in this. IRFBA’s relationship with the wider human rights environmentmight therefore continue to suffer from “mutual misunderstanding and biasentrenchment.”33IRFBA’s history till early 2023 has proven to be a track record of balancedstatements, notmerely in support of “coreligionists” of certainmember states,as Neuman feared.Onemight wonder why IRFBA did not go further and trulytake action. As a consensual network of states with different traditions andpriorities, IRFBA’s effectiveness is still limited after three years. Moreover, bystudying the series of statements made, one might also question why somegovernments abstained from a number of statements. Indeed, it is strikingthat statements from early 2023 have only been issued by the chair.The ambiguous support for statements, the lack of follow-up, the passiverole of quite some members – in particular those from Africa – and the ar-aug/09/uk-government-award-anti-abortion-figure-sam-brownback-edited-reproductive-rights-statement, all three articles accessed on: 29. Aug. 2023.32 UK Parliament: International Ministerial Conference on Freedom of Religion or Belief.Question for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (21 Jul. 2022), https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2022-07-21/hl1992, ac-cessed on: 27 Aug. 2023.33 A term used by Knox Thames/Peter Mandeville: “Maintaining International ReligiousFreedom as a Central Tenet of U.S. National Security,” in: United States Institute ofPeace no. 513 (2022), p. 7, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2022-11/sr_513_international-religious-freedom-us-national-security.pdf, accessed on: 29. Aug. 2023.196 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionsticulated position of (members of) the Council of Experts (whose compositionis not publicly available) may undermine a balanced diplomatic approach andcreate the risk of IRFBA not being seen to promote FoRB as a human right butrather as a voice of the Global North, representing Christian interests.Some member states may have argued for “supremacy” of IRF over otherrights–asNeuman feared–but there areno recordsof themdoing so in IRFBAmeetings,apart fromoneor twoministers explicitly referring to only theplightof persecuted Christians. Moreover, I should add that the opposite is also notthe case: no member state has ever argued for supremacy of “human rights ofwomenand sexualminorities”over freedomof religionor belief.Theprinciplesadopted as of February 5, 2020 and the fruitful cooperation with and partici-pation by the UN Special Rapporteurs on FoRB have proven that IRFBA is fullysupportive of the human rights complex and thework of existinghuman rightsmechanisms.The consecutive chairs have made serious efforts to mind internal-exter-nal coherence, but some of the founding members still do not like “examiningtheir own failings as well as those of others,” as Neuman put it. Evenmore, ex-amining the failings of others is also not welcome by some of those members,as indicated by support for the statements made.All chairs between 2020 and 2023 attempted an inclusive approach, includ-ing cross-regional engagement, although expandingproveddifficult. IRFBA is stilltoo much of a Global North engagement. The number of states with a Chris-tianmajority and/or tradition is far larger than the number of – for instance –Muslimmajority countries.The principles and the criteria formembership area prime hindrance for involving more states in the Global South.The numberof countries respecting relevant articles in the ICCPR – subscribing to the 1981United Nations Declaration – let alone the EU Guidelines on FoRB is limited.Additionally, some “rights-respecting countries” remain reluctant to join.The European Union – its FoRB Guidelines being mentioned in the Statementof Principles – is sorely missed.This reluctance can be related to the burden ofthe Trump administration, with persisting fear of undermining or replacingexisting human rights mechanisms, or with diverging priorities if not values.Added value is still to be proven, since coordinated action does not dependon having a wide alliance. The results might also be achieved between (some)individual states and the multilateral structures.3434 Take – for instance – Uzbekistan, which was a Country of Particular Concern for theU.S. from 2006 until 2017. After a visit by the UN Special Rapporteur on FoRB, theJ. Douma: International Religious Freedom (or Belief) Alliance 197Although IRFBAwas initially seenby someas threatening the InternationalContact Group on FoRB, its focus on advocacy has identified perspectives forthe ICG to concentrate on FoRB as a human right per se, and for concertationand cooperation in the UN framework. Accordingly, Knox Thames was partlycorrect when he wrote in the weeks before the 2022 London Ministerial onFoRB: “countries have strengthened their coordination” through the IRFBA,whichnow includes 40 nations. It seems that the issue is finally “receiving the attentionit deserves.”35IRFBA’s engagement with independent experts, CSOs and interest groupshas built a consensual approach of the defense of FoRB, whereby faith-basedorganizations among the CSOs respect the human rights framework andshared values, while still propagating their own views. This engagemententails a certain risk of tunnel vision, which no doubt also exists in otherplurilateral alliances and coalitions, like the Media Freedom Coalition, theFreedomOnline Coalition and the Equal Rights Coalition.However, even if IRFBA shares this risk with other plurilateral allianceswhere governments work closely together with CSOs and interest groups,IRFBA’s relationship with the wider human rights environment might stillcontinue to suffer from “mutual misunderstanding and bias entrenchment”36due to its populist beginning.country was listed on theWatch List in 2018 and 2019 and struck from that list in 2020,determining that it no longer engaged in or tolerated “severe violations of religiousfreedom.”35 Thames, Knox: The London Blueprint for Progress (3 Jul. 2022), https://www.knoxthames.com/post/blueprint-for-progress, accessed on: 29. Aug. 2023; italics by the au-thor.36 Knox: Maintaining International, p. 7.Populism in the Land of EqualityCross-Party Consensus in the Face of ExtremismJorunn ØklandIn many European countries, right-wing populist forces are currently tryingto claim ownership of issues such as religious freedom and “Christian (family)values.” The idea seems to be that open democracy places Christianity underthreat. The detachment from the context of human rights and discussions ofhow we can live together peacefully in multi-religious societies with sharedcommon ground in discourse and law blurs the concepts of freedom anddemocracy.However, in the case of Norway, it can be observed that neither the topicsof “religious freedom” nor “gender ideology” vs. “Christian values” are centraltargets of right-wing populist appropriation and reinterpretation; rather, theNorwegian Progress Party – the most influential right-wing populist force inthe country – focuses on a different human right in its attempts at appropria-tion: gender equality.This chapter describes these peculiarities and offers ex-planations of how these trends have come about.The role of religious freedom in Norwegian politicsInNorway,all parties except theProgress Party have included a sectionon free-domof religion or belief in their party programmes. Some political groups liketomore strongly emphasise the Christian aspects; however, in general there isa broad understanding of the advantages of freedom of religion or belief. Thebroad support means that religious freedom is not controversially politicised.Moreover, this situation has a historical and material basis. After the tiesbetween the state and the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Norway were dis-solved a few years ago, the agreement was that the Church of Norway wouldcontinue with some legal and constitutional ties to the state for practical and200 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionshistorical reasons.1 During the 16th century Reformation, the (Danish) Crowntook the Catholic Church’s property, finances and priests in Norway, whichwas a Danish colony at the time. Not honouring the lasting responsibility thatcamewith this takeoverwhen the (now)Norwegian state no longerwanted anychurch ties would be equal to historical robbery.The solution is that religion isstill financed by the national budget, but now various organised religious com-munities (including the secular humanists!) above a minimum size receive asum approximately equivalent to the pro capita sum that the Church of Norwayreceives.This solution means that everyone feels they are well served with thestatus quo, and freedom of religion is a no-brainer.One can speculate why the Norwegian Progress Party has taken a differ-ent route than many of its international sister parties in questions relating togender and freedom of religion. A symptom of the different route is that giventhe current political polarisation in the USA, the current leader Sylvi Listhaugbroke the tradition of previous Progress Party leaders attending the annualmeeting of the U.S. Republican Party this year (2023).Some traits in the roots of this party may explain its difference from pop-ulist parties elsewhere in Europe. In the 1970s, it started as a populist partyopposed to the famously high Scandinavian taxes, Value Added Tax (VAT) andstate monopolies on the sale of alcohol. While Christians across the politicalspectrum agreed that restrictive alcohol policies were positive, the ProgressParty took a radically different stance. In this and other respects, they madelittle effort to appeal to conservative Christians.Only recently – after populist parties in many countries have become apower to reckon with – has the current leader Sylvi Listhaug started to don acrucifix around her neck, and the party has aligned itselfmorewith Christian-populist parties elsewhere in Europe. Nonetheless, the crucifix does not makeup for an embarrassing ignorance about Christianity in the party in general,although it has perhaps somewhat improved with the recent attraction ofChristian voters. Traditionally, Norwegian clergy and crucifix-wearing Chris-tians voted for the Christian-Democratic party, merging the Christian love ofone’s neighbour and the baptismal formula “you are all one” with the SocialDemocratic “you are all equal.” This broad coalition has secured Norway’sstrong engagement in international humanitarian and peace-keeping efforts.1 Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway (1814/2023), § 2 and 4, https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/1814-05-17, accessed on: 4 Jun. 2023.J. Økland: Populism in the Land of Equality 201“Gender ideology” vs. “traditional Christianity”: Not a winning issuefor populists in NorwayIn general, it is striking that unlike inmanyotherEuropeanandWestern coun-tries, the narrative of “Christian values” and their defence – which is particu-larly popular among right-wing populists2 – hardly plays a role in the politi-cal discussion in Norway, not even in the thematic field of gender and family,which is oneof the favourite topics of populists for culturewars elsewhere.Thissection summarises reasons for this trend.Realized gender equality immunizes against anti-feminist populismTraditional, Christian thought is often nodded to in the international, right-wing populist repertoire on gender and family. Various expressions are gath-ered on the internet (blogs, web pages, etc.), where international, comprehen-sive discourse and content-sharing is taking place among the like-minded.3Thus, the internet also facilitates the assertion of Christian points of referencefor political purposes, especially regarding gender, equality and family. Im-portant platforms for the spread of populist gender ideology belong in the do-mains of the two former superpowers, the USA and the former Soviet Union.42 I will not deal with theology as such, but observe that a religion whose first writer(St. Paul) transmitted the earliest baptismal confession (“There is no longer Jew orGreek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all ofyou are one in Christ Jesus.” Galatians 3:28) is taken hostage under a modern populist-reactionary politics of gender, at the expense of more central, theological questionsthan the issue of whether a woman should take on paid work in addition to caringfor any children and husbands. I use the word “reactionary” because I see populismsmore as radical reactions to recent events than as conservative continuities of pastreligious tradition.3 Mazzoleni, Gianpietro: “Populism is Better Understood in its Relation with theMedia,”in: Mojca Pajnik/Birgit Sauer (eds.), Populism and the Web: Communicative Practicesof Parties and Movements in Europe. London: Routledge 2018, unpaginated preface;Zuckerberg, Donna: Not All Dead White Men: Classics and Misogyny in the DigitalAge, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2018.4 In Økland, Jorunn: “Populisme i likestillingslandet,” in: Kristin Graff Kallevåg/SvenThore Kloster/Sturla J. Stålsett (eds.), Populisme og kristendom, Oslo: CappelenDamm Akademisk 2021, pp. 68–85, on which this chapter is based, I develop the con-cept of “internet populism” in more detail and scope.202 Signs of Hope and Proposals for SolutionsHowever,while such gender ideologymay enjoy a sort of eternal life on theinternet, being accessible to all parties, movements or individuals across theglobewho seek it out, it conceals deep differences and tensions on the ground.For example,much of this repertoire is off the populist agenda in Norway, de-spite–orperhapsbecauseof–the country’s strong,conservative religiousher-itage.Today, institutions, laws, andmost religious communities operate basedon more inclusive notions of gender equality and freedom that function verywell according to all parameters: in fact, in 2012, the then Prime Minister ofNorway, the economist Jens Stoltenberg (who is nowNATOSecretaryGeneral),said that “theMinister of Finance should thank Norwegian women every day!”His point was that Norwegian wealth and welfare systems are – contrary towhat many assume – not primarily built on revenues from North Sea oil, butrather thenear full participationofwomen in thepaidworkforce: “If thepartic-ipation of Norwegian women in the work force had been reduced to the OECDaverage, the value loss would exceed the value of the Norwegian oil fund com-binedwith the projected future value of the oil still under the (North) seabed.”5This quote illustrates why populist versions of Christian family values arenot particularly compatible with material “facts on the ground” in Norway,and are therefore not found to be rational or appealing even among adherentsof the parliamentary party most often identified with right-wing populism,the “Progress Party.”6 Compared to international populist trends, even theProgress Party may come across as feminist and secular.The deterring effect of extremism: How Breivik’s anti-feminist 2083manifesto turned “Christian values” into a narrative that not evenright-wing populists want to be associated withI make a clear distinction here between populism’s substantive-content andstrategic-political sides. Populism – and extremism – may borrow from tradi-tionally Christian theologies of gender and family content-wise (substantive),but they strongly differ in how they mobilise the value systems for their re-spective strategies (political demagoguery or violence). If “the people” sharetheir view on the substance (for example “Christian family values”), populists5 NTB – The Norwegian News Agency: “Kvinnejobber mer verdt enn oljen” (8 Mar.2012), https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/3JOEv/kvinnejobber-mer-verdt-mer-enn-oljen, accessed on: 1 Jun. 2023.6 Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party), https://www.frp.no, accessed on: 25 Sep. 2023.J. Økland: Populism in the Land of Equality 203can rightly claim to represent the people and their true will.7 Populism andextremism can further share views on the content substance of freedom ofreligion and how far it should reach, and they tend to share an enemy imageof equality, feminism and feminists. What separates them is the strategy forimplementing policy content. Where populism engages in political struggle,extremism takes up arms.The point of this delineation of the distinctions between populist and ex-tremist takeovers of an established body of thought regarding values, genderand family is as follows: when examining the content sides of populist ideology,it can also be relevant to draw in written sources that are usually understoodas right-wing extreme, and consider how they represent traditional Christianviews. “Traditional values” in Norway are still associated with historical Chris-tianity, fixed roles for men and women, and the white, patriarchal, heterosex-ual nuclear family, even if a deeper understanding of what it entails is lost.I will select an example that is uncomfortably close at hand – the “mani-festo” behind the terrorist attacks on the Oslo Government Headquarters andUtøya island’s Labour youth camp on 22 July 2011, killing 77 people – to definewhat is Christian and what is not according to the extremist by analysing hisown uses of the label “Christian” about thinking, identity, tradition, etc.8Hours before the attack, the pseudonym Andrew Berwick (Anders B.Breivik) sent his over 1,500-page manifesto “2083 – A European Declarationof Independence” to an e-mail list.9 The version referred to here is the onepublished only two days later, on The Washington Post’s website.10 “2083”is mostly an edited and annotated collage of fragments from the internet.The introduction asserts that Muslim immigrants and feminists togetherwith multiculturalists are working to destroy Christian Europe. Accordingly,European men must go to war to take back authority, to rescue Europe. Inillustrations and the subtitle “De Laude Novae Militiae Pauperes commili-7 Graff-Kallevåg, Kristin/Kloster, Sven Thore/Stålsett, Sturla J.: “Kapittel 1: Populisme ogkristendom – kollisjon eller koalisjon?,” in: Kristin Graff-Kallevåg, Sven Thore Kloster,Sturla J. Stålsett (eds.), Populisme og kristendom, Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk2021, pp. 13–28, p. 20.8 Graff-Kallevåg: Populisme.9 The presentation is based on my previous publications in the area, such as Økland,Jorunn: “Feminismen, tradisjonen, og forventning,” in Anders Ravik Jupskås (ed.),Akademiske perspektiver på 22. Juli, Oslo: Akademika 2013, pp. 115–128.10 This near-original manifesto was not paginated, so page numbers are approximate.204 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionstones Christi Templique Solomonici,” Breivik stages himself within amilitary-Christian-religious framework, as a pioneer, commander and Templar.Initially, the terrorist’s anti-feminismwas relatively frequentlynoted in themedia, since his main target on Utøya island had been former Prime Minis-ter (and among many other things also former Director-General of the WorldHealth Organization) Gro Harlem Brundtland. Multiculturalism and islamo-phobia came to dominate the further discussion.The manifesto’s invocation of Christian authority and tradition nevercaught noticeable public attention, despite the fact that the single word“Christian” is found one or more times on over one-third of the 1,518 pages.By comparison, “multicult-” is found as part of a compound on “only” 453pages. In my opinion, this lack of address of the very frequent Christianreferences is due to the religious illiteracy among Norway’s “chattering” andwriting classes, which again means that few commentators and researchersever noticed the way in which Breivik operationalised European Christianheritage for terrorist purposes. However, the Norwegian right-wing-populistblogger Fjordman – for example from whom Breivik also copy-pasted 39 fullessays into “2083” (“Fjordman” is mentioned on 76 pages) – felt abused. Onhis blog (now removed), Fjordman had repeatedly warned against Muslimimmigration to Europe and the loss of European, “Christian” values.11 Thejournalist and writer Anja Sletteland – who had long been worried aboutright-wing populists like Fjordman – concluded shortly after the attack that“it is time we realise that the anti-Islamic, anti-social democratic and anti-feminist ‘underdog’ has become a power factor in Norway.”12Sletteland was soon followed by other commentators who noted to theirsurprise that most of the manifesto’s ideological content is not extremist inthe meaning of inciting violence. Nonetheless, it spread conspiracy theoriesand assessments that were increasingly heard from populists around Europe,Russia and theUSA.Therefore, it tookdays before investigators and journalistsconnected the manifesto with the terrorist act.However, in its latter “Further Studies” part, the manifesto includes an in-terview with the “Justiciar Knight Commander of the PCCTS, Knights Tem-plar,” commonly believed to be a fictive interview that Breivik conducts with11 Strømmen argues that Fjordman was a full-blown fascist who inspired Breivik’s ex-tremism, see Strømmen, Øyvind: Det mørke nettet: Om høyreekstremisme, kontraji-hadisme og terror i Europa, Oslo: Cappelen Damm 2011.12 Sletteland, Anja: “Kommentar,” in: Dagens Næringsliv (2 Aug. 2011), p. 3.J. Økland: Populism in the Land of Equality 205himself.13 In general, it is on thefinal 150 pages of themanifesto that he ismostvisibly present as an author, not only a copy-pasting editor.He proposes an ex-tremist-militant strategy to reach a final solution (including death lists on thefinal pages):14“Obviously, the PCCTS, Knights Templar does not have mass appeal as weare a relatively cynical/cruel/goal oriented armed resistance group. How-ever, our primary foundational principles (…) still have mass appeal and aresupported by as many as 50–60% of all Europeans. ... Of course, this doesnot mean that we will use less brutal methods in our operations. It onlymeans that our foundational ideological principles will have mass appeal toa majority of Europeans. In comparison, the foundational principles of Na-tional Socialism or white supremacy groups in general does not have massappeal and is supported by less than 10%, in many countries less than 5%.”15The manifesto’s extremist “launch” on 22 July 2011 threw all of the populist,copy-pasted content and the more or less involuntary contributors into an ex-tremist spotlight. Thus, the distinction that I make in this essay between dif-ferentways of operationalising overlapping ideological content (populist or ex-tremist) was confirmed – including by the manifesto author himself – in thefictive interview towards the end.It should be mentioned in passing that the summer of 2019, Norway wasclose to experiencing another terrorist act by a single, young white male: hav-ing been radicalised while attending a one-year Christian college programme(“Folkehøyskole”), Philip Manshaus killed his own seventeen-year old adoptedsister Johanne Zhangjia Ihle-Hansen (born in China) in a leafy suburb outsideOslo, before he approached the local mosque with the intention to kill Muslim(immigrant) men gathered for prayer. Two retired men who had arrived earlymanaged to prevent further killings by seizing the heavily armed young manand holding himuntil the police arrived.No one has found reason to blame the13 Berwick, Andrew: 2083: A European Declaration of Independence, pp. 1349 ff., http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2011/07/24/National-Politics/Graphics/2083+-+A+European+Declaration+of+Independence.pdf, accessed on:24 Jul. 2011.14 He shares personal reflections and experiences during the preparation phases, bomband explosive production, preparation of the terrorist attack including schedule/logof the preparations July 1–22 (pp. 1437–1472).15 Berwick: 2083, p. 1381.206 Signs of Hope and Proposals for SolutionsChristian college, but perhaps there needs to be an increased awareness of howto phrase the legitimate desire that Christianity will survive in Europe. UnlikeBreivik,Manshaus did not leave clues in writing.16Gender equality as a populist value?Muchofwhat the “2083”manifesto presents as the “traditional” gender order isbarely 100 years old, not preceding the industrial revolution. It is therefore not“traduced”over centuries.The leap from themanifesto’s “traditional”genderor-der to theProgressParty couldnothavebeengreater.Aspreviouslymentioned,it arose as a populist reaction,male-heavy and secular.The party opposes gen-der quotas, with meritocratic arguments. Nonetheless, since 2006 the partyleaders have been women. One female leader more or less appointed her suc-cessors: another woman, as well as a man who gave up a brilliant career as apolitician to follow his wife for her dream job in the USA and was “ordered” toreturn for a comeback. In the case of another high-profile couple in the party’sinner circle, it was the wife who became a government minister.While I couldcontinue, the examples illustrate a distinctive feature of populist currents intoday’s Norway, namely that “real populists” do not practice gender-conserva-tive ideology. The Progress Party in particular has done much to incorporategender equality as part of its populism.This leads to the rhetoric being differ-ent from the kind of populist rhetoric that we find elsewhere in Europe andon the global internet, where it is about returning to patriarchal family values.Indeed, the visible leadership figures in the Church of Norway also do not usesuch rhetoric, this is why the quasi-religious, patriarchal gender ideology inthe online “2083” manifesto crashes so completely in Norwegian “facts on theground.”Has “equality” as a value then assumed a new function as an importantmarker of difference in the populist rhetorical distinction between “ethnicNorwegians” and “immigrants”? Absolutely. Whether intended or not, theeffect of the Progress Party taking ownership of “state feminism”17 is that theygain more ammunition for another of their core causes: immigration. When16 But see Hammer, Anders: Terroristen fra Bærum – Radikaliseringen av Philip Mans-haus, Oslo: Stenersen 2022.17 Hernes, Helga M.: Welfare State and Woman Power: Essays in State Feminism, Oslo/Oxford: Norwegian University Press 1987.J. Økland: Populism in the Land of Equality 207refugees come to Norway, they are already trained in gender equality at theasylum reception centres, and the Progress Party is particularly keen to protectNorwegians against immigrant influence from foreign patriarchal cultures.The historical backdrop may explain some of the curiosities described: af-ter Norway became independent in 1905,males were in sole control of the Par-liament (Storting) for only eight years before the country became the world’sfirst independent nation to introduce universal female suffrage in 1913.The frontfighters for the women’s vote had received their leadership training in priestlyfamilies, as wives and daughters running the vicarage. Naturally, this has af-fected Norwegian collective self-understanding. When the Storting discussedthe opening of allpublic offices forwomen in 1911/12, only the parliament pres-ident’s double vote ensured that the proposal did not go through,with gender-exclusive exceptions being made for clerical and military offices.18 The “2083”manifesto’s dream of returning to a past with Christian patriarchs and sub-missive, pious wives thus crashes not only in today’s Norwegian political andecclesiastical reality but also in Norwegian history.This backdrop further undermines explanations of anti-equality populisminNorwaywith reference tomen’s experience of a loss of superiority as a resultof new equality policies.Breivik andManshaus related to an abstract populus on the internet, whileNorway’s populusmoved to another place over a century ago.19 This in turn il-lustrates how “populism” remains difficult to pin down ideologically in relationto “democracy,” because the perception of the people on behalf of whom oneclaims to speak is constantly changing and varies between countries.ConclusionIn the Norwegian context, there is reason to question how Christian “tradi-tional” family values are, how traditional they are if they arose in the late-19thcentury, and howNorwegian they are, given that women have been full citizensinNorway almost from the day of its independence.WhenNorwegian internetpopulists yearn for a past that never existed, it is therefore important to meet18 Hinnaland Stendal, Synnøve: “... under forvandlingens lov”: En analyse av Stortings-debatten om kvinnelige prester i 1930-årene, Lund: Arcus 2003.19 Brubaker, Rogers: “Why Populism?,” in: Theory and Society 46 (2017), pp. 357–385, p.373.208 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionstheir universalist claims with concrete stories from Norwegian political andreligious history. I assume that this also applies to other countries.The chapter has presented the cognitive dissonance that arises in the gapbetween amanifestomainly composed by copying and pasting from the globalpopulist internet and the conditions on the ground in Norway, in church, his-tory and the political practice of politics.The brief explanation concerningwhypopulism seems to be less attractive as a political ideology in Norway is that:first, people have seen and experienced for themselves the beneficial results ofan equality-based society where people are not pitted against each other; sec-ond, the recent right-wing extremist terror attack in Oslo in 2011 (and 2019)put the ugly face of right-wing ideology on display; and third, even populistrhetoric has to incorporate gender equality to remain plausible and appealing.It is too early to say how this will align Norwegian-style populism with pop-ulism elsewhere in Europe.The first part of this chapter prepared for what came in the second part: ina country where right-wing populism is not a significant political force on theground, populist ideas about a Christian Europe threatened by immigration,Islam and falling birth rates among white people are still available via the in-ternet. I acknowledge the presence of such arguments in populist political dis-course, and distinguish them from extremist uses of the same ideas. Indeed,the distinction is found in the “2083”manifesto itself. Nonetheless, in Norwayit was this general populist discourse that took control over two young, white,vulnerablemaleswhoproceeded to engage in violent action.Norwayhas learntthe hard way that populist rhetoric should not be excused or underestimated,as with certain recipients it can lead to extremist action.Populist Appropriation and Reinterpretationof Religious FreedomThe Special Responsibility and Concern of the Churchesand Religious CommunitiesKatja Dorothea Buck, Bernd Hirschberger and Katja VogesRight-wing ideologies are in fundamental contradiction to the basic contentsofmany religions. InChristian faith, commandment of love of one’s neighbourexcludes group-focused enmity per se. Churches and religious communitiesall over the world have a special moral responsibility in the fight against right-wingpopulismand extremism.Theyneed to take a stand againstmisanthropicideologies and discrimination and can play a key role at various levels whenpopulist actors try to reinterpret the universal right to freedom of religion orbelief (FoRB) and use it to serve their own interests.Furthermore, the commitment against right-wing populism and extrem-ism is a question of interreligious solidarity, especially for Christian churchesinmost European countries,which can operate in democratic and free spaces.The major churches in Germany also expressly acknowledge this repeatedly.1However, as the largest religious community inEurope,Christian churches arealso called upon to stand up in solidaritywith Christianswho live as aminorityin other countries against the damage to religious freedom caused by a pop-ulist reinterpretation. They need to object to disproportionate restrictions onFoRB, because such restrictions can be abused by autocratic states as a pretext1 Only recently, this acknowledgement was renewed in the light of the COVID-19 pan-demic by the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue and the World Council ofChurches in their joint statement: Serving a Wounded World in Interreligious Soli-darity: A Christian Call to Reflection and Action During COVID-19 and Beyond, WCCPublications/PCID 2020, https://www.oikoumene.org/sites/default/files/Document/ServingWoundedWorld.pdf, accessed on: 21 Jul. 2023.210 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionsto relativise their own evenworse violations of this right to freedom, followinga pattern of “whataboutism.”In addition to moral responsibility, churches and religious communitiesalso have specific resources and potential for the fight against right-wingpopulism and its temptations: especially in a changing world shaken by var-ious (existential) crises, many people are looking for meaning, communityand identity. Churches and religious communities must not leave this field toright-wing populist and extremist forces. Offering meaning, community andidentity has always been one of the basic functions of religious communities.If this need remains unsatisfied, right-wing populist and far-right extremistforces can easily take advantage of this situation, simulating an (exclusive)sense of belonging, and thus offer a generally exclusionary identity.Thisworksall the better the more strongly people feel overwhelmed by an increasinglycomplex world. Churches and religious communities are therefore challengedmore than ever to provide real alternatives to the fatal and harmful illusorysolutions offered by populism and extremism.However, religious communities themselves are by no means immune topopulist sentiments. For example, the fear of Islam–which is perceived as for-eign and unknown –makes quite a few parishioners of Christian churches inGermany and large parts of Europe susceptible to prejudice, resentment andpopulist narratives such as concern for the Christian Occident and supposedChristianvalues.Someright-wingconservative,populist andextremistgroupsthat are church-based or church-affiliated (or claim to be so) actively partici-pate in the appropriation and reinterpretationof religious freedomand spreadcorresponding narratives. Thus, headlines such as “Muezzin call to prayer inCologne –politics courting ‘radical headscarf Islam’–knife in the back of inte-gration” or “Catholic bishops’ denial of reality in the debate with Islam” are notuncommon on the traditionalist internet portal kath.net, which is financed byprivate donations.2In some cases, open alliances between church actors and populist politi-cians are already evident. For example, the former right-wing populist Brazil-ianPresident Jair Bolsonaro owes his election victory in 2018 not least to strongsupport from the circles of Evangelicals and Pentecostals.3 The former Pres-2 https://kath.net/suche.php?suche=islam, accessed on: 1 Jul. 2022.3 See chapter “Religious Freedom for Christian Majorities: The Brazilian Case”.K. D. Buck/B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: The Responsibility of Religious Communities 211ident of the United States Donald Trump also benefited massively from thesupport of the “Christian right.”4The susceptibility of such Christian actors to populist arguments is in turnwhat extremist actors from the far right try to exploit. For example, they oftenuse Christian symbols in a decontextualised way and incorporate them intotheirmisanthropic ideological framework.5 In the process, obvious contradic-tions between the far-right ideological way of thinking and central Christianprinciples of faith (such as the contradiction between group-focused enmityand the commandment of love of one’s neighbour) are deliberately hidden orcovered up.The appropriation and reinterpretation often represent a profana-tion of what is Christian, reducing it to something purely cultural-folkloric.In some cases, attempts by the far right to get closer to churches with theaim of using church representatives for their own interests and thereby gain-ing legitimacy can also be observed. For example, the far-right Identity andDemocracy (ID) group in the European Parliament nominated the ChaldeanArchbishop of Mosul, Najib Mikhael Moussa, for the Sakharov Prize 2020, notwithout inciting anger about the immigration of Muslims at the same time.6A member of the parliamentary group contacted church dignitaries in Ger-many to promote this nomination, arguing that together they could convincechairpersons of other parliamentary groups, which was highly unlikely given4 See chapter “Populism, Religious Identity, and the Instrumentalization of ‘ReligiousFreedom’ in the United States during the Era of Donald Trump”.5 See e.g. NBC News: “Trump Stands In Front of Church Holding Bible After ThreateningMilitary Action Against Protesters” (2 Jun. 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0oRQF68psdY, accessed on: 24 Jul. 2023; AfD spokesman Hans-Peter Hörner showsthe crucifix while Imam Ahmed Gezer calls for prayer from the roof of the mosque:Kromer, Hardy: “AfD sagt Kundgebung ab – Albbündnis veröffentlicht Appell fürReligionsfreiheit” (7 May 2020), https://www.swp.de/lokales/hechingen/ramadan-und-8.-mai-in-hechingen-afd-sagt-kundgebung-ab-_-albbuendnis-veroeffentlicht-appell-fuer-religionsfreiheit-46034346.html, accessed on: 24 Jul. 2023. In this context,the Freedom Party of Austria’s (FPÖ) strategic rapprochement with the Church is alsointeresting: Mühlberger, Andrea: “Rechtspopulismus im Zeichen des Kreuzes” (29May 2009), https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/rechtspopulismus-im-zeichen-des-kreuzes-100.html, accessed on: 24 Jul. 2023.6 Anderson, Christine (@AndersonAfdMdEP): Der Erzbischof von #Mossul, NajibMicha-el Moussa, kämpft im #Irak gegen die Verfolgung von #Christen durch den #Islam undwarnt vor den Folgen ungeregelter muslimischer #Migration. Die ID-Fraktion nomi-niert diesen mutigen Mann für den #Sakharov Preis! #AfD (7 Oct. 2020), https://twitter.com/AndersonAfDMdEP/status/1313805433161777154, accessed on: 24 Jul. 2023.212 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionsthat four parliamentary groups had already declared themselves in favour ofawarding the prize to the Belarusian opposition.7 On several occasions,Mem-bersofParliament fromright-wingpartieshavealso travelled to countries suchas Syria or Armenia where the Christian population is under pressure for do-mestic or foreign policy reasons. At meetings with Christian representatives,they presented themselves as the only sincere supporters of the interests of op-pressed Christians abroad.If the churches refuse to cooperate or even criticise the right, they aresometimes sharply attacked by the far right. For example, in Germany, theProtestant and Catholic churches have already been the target of accusationsfrom the far-right party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland,AfD) because their positions on the most important social issues are diamet-rically opposed. In June 2019, for example, theThuringian state parliamentarygroup of the AfD –with the support of other prominent representatives of theparty –published a paper entitled “Unholy Alliance–ThePact of the ProtestantChurch with the Zeitgeist and the Powerful,” which criticises the EvangelicalChurch in Germany (Evangelische Kirche inDeutschland, EKD) for its position onrefugee aid and its commitment to climate protection, among other things,and complains about an exclusion of the AfD on the part of the churches.8Overall, the defamation of church representatives with a different opinion isa common pattern in the rhetoric of the far right. They are portrayed as rep-resentatives of a “politicised” institutional church9 running after the zeitgeist,thus distancing themselves from the “true” faith and representing neither thefaith nor the people.7 European Parliament News: Sakharov Prize 2020: the nominees (17 Sep. 2020), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20200917STO87301/sakharov-prize-2020-the-nominees, accessed on: 24 Jul. 2023.8 See Lohmann, Heinz-Joachim: “Kommentar zum Kirchenpapier der Alternative fürDeutschland: Unheilige Allianz. Der Pakt der Evangelischen Kirche mit dem Zeitgeistund den Mächtigen,” https://www.eaberlin.de/aktuelles/2019/pressemitteilung-kirchenpapier-afd/kommentar-zum-kirchenpapier-der-afd.pdf, accessed on: 24 Jul. 2023.9 In German often the expression Amtskirche is used in a pejorative way by the far rightfor its criticism of the official churches.K. D. Buck/B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: The Responsibility of Religious Communities 213Church engagement against the right-wing populist appropriationof religious freedomContradictDue to their moral responsibility as well as their position in society, it is im-portant that Christian churches do not allow themselves to be taken over.Thisrisk of appropriation exists specifically in dealing with mandate holders fromthe far right. In democratic processes, representatives can also be elected whoseek to distort or abolish human rights and/or democracy.The question is howchurches should deal with them. For example, in 2019 there was an invitationfrom the far-right party AfD to the German Bishops’ Conference (DeutscheBischofskonferenz, DBK),10 which represented a feint or a dilemma: if the invi-tation was accepted, the AfDwas given legitimacy; on the other hand, if it wasrejected, the AfD could present itself as a victim of exclusion. Therefore, howshould it be dealt with? In principle, respect for democratic decision-makingand democratically legitimised office applies. However, this respect mustnot be confused with a right to social and political acceptance for right-wingextremist parties and politicians.11 Nor is there any taboo on contradictinganti-human statements or an undermining of human rights. On the contrary,precisely due to the special public reach that results from a church office,churches and their representatives must contradict particularly clearly andloudly. It must also be understood that contents that are contemptuous ofhuman rights must not be given a stage at church events.1210 Alternative für Deutschland: Joachim Kuhs: AfD lädt Bischofskonferenz zum Dia-log ein, https://www.afd.de/kuhs-afd-laedt-bischofskonferenz-zum-dialog-ein/, ac-cessed on: 24 Jul. 2023.11 There is no such right as the EKD aptly states: Dernbach, Andrea: “Evangelische Kir-che zur AfD: ‘Kein Recht auf gesellschaftliche und politische Akzeptanz’” (2 Aug.2019), https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/kein-recht-auf-gesellschaftliche-und-politische-akzeptanz-4654960.html, accessed on: 24 Jul. 2023.12 While the DBK and EKD are very clearly opposed to right-wing ideas and populistnarratives, some evangelical and far-right Catholic actors in Germany have difficultyin clearly distancing themselves, see also the observations of Liane Bednarz at anevent of the Heinrich Böll foundation: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung: Die Angstprediger –Wie rechte Christen Gesellschaft und Kirchen unterwandern (21 Jun. 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bVmfXRha5AU&t=3568s, accessed on: 24 Jul. 2023.214 Signs of Hope and Proposals for SolutionsIn 2018, a controversial discussion arose after the participation of an AfDpolitician on a podium at the German Katholikentag inMünster led to protests.As a result, both the Katholikentag and the German Protestant Kirchentag (theregular large-scale meetings of the laity in the two major German churches)decided not to invite any more representatives of the AfD in the future. Theyargue that group-focused enmity is to be clearly and unequivocally opposed.Far-right ideas that fundamentally contradict the Christian image of humanbeing should not be given a platform.There are particular tensions in countries where far-right parties havemajor influence through a large parliamentary group and/or governmentparticipation. To what extent are churches prepared to accept disadvantagesfor themselves when they contradict the positions of the far right? In suchcontexts, contradiction can be associated with painful consequences, for ex-ample the cancellation of financial support, of rights and resources (culturalsupport, support for church youth, education and social work, voluntary workand associations, support for church development cooperation, exemptionfrom taxes, etc.). However, in order to avoid denying oneself and one’s ownconvictions, the consistent answer here is also to accept painful consequencesin case of doubt.Opposition from churches is urgently needed, especially regarding the hu-man right to religious freedom, which is being reinterpreted and instrumen-talised by populist and far-right extremist actors.The appropriation of Chris-tian identity must not go unchallenged for the sake of the Christian witness.Equally, solidarity with Christians in need must not be falsely played off as acounterargument to universally valid of FoRB.Educate and leave no spaceTo ensure that the opposition to populism and extremism does not remainwithout content, it should go hand in hand with educational and public rela-tions work, strengthening a Christian position that takes a human rights ap-proach in its commitment to FoRB. In doing so, it is important to show that theChristian image of human being is only compatible with a decisive commit-ment to religious freedom as a universal right to freedom and does not allowany reinterpretations.The visibility of church actors, human rights educationwith a focus on FoRB and networking with other human rights actors are im-portant to counter misunderstandings and convey an understanding of whyreligious freedom is an essential component of indivisible human rights.K. D. Buck/B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: The Responsibility of Religious Communities 215Even though representatives from churches and politics report growingmistrust and dwindling acceptance of churches, Christian churches and theirorganisations in Germany still have reliable contact and liaison points in pol-itics. The human rights commitment of church organisations and especiallytheir expertise and international networks continue to be appreciated.Here, itis necessary to bring the churches’ expertise regarding the human right to reli-gious freedom into politics and show that they are important actors in humanrights work. It should also be discussed collectively how the suffering religious(alsoChristian)minorities in regions of theworld that currently receiveno spe-cial public attention can be helpedwithout falling into clientelistic or paternal-istic patterns.Furthermore,politics canbe encouraged to promote actions andinitiatives that focus on the value of FoRB for the whole of society.Opposition to populism and educational work by the churches for the uni-versal right to religious freedom must not be limited to discussions with po-litical representatives. As far as possible, no room should be left for the instru-mentalisationof religious freedom.Therefore, it is important that churches in-volve themselves in the broader public with their own information, initiativesand continuous public relations work. Christian churches in Germany have al-ready positioned themselves as strong and serious actors in the field of reli-gious freedom with various initiatives.13 Church relief organisations are alsovisible with their commitment to human rights and religious freedom; for ex-ample through the promotion of projects in the field of interreligious dialogueand peace work, even if sustainable aid is more difficult “to sell” than suppos-edly simple answers and convenient illusory solutions.Leaving no roomalsomeans strengthening interreligious initiatives,mak-ing successful initiatives and cooperations visible and forging broad alliances,includingwith non-church actors who stand up for the indivisibility of humanrights, such as the cooperation between the Pontifical Mission Society missio13 See e.g. the country reports on religious freedom by the Pontifical Mission Societymissio Aachen, the joint reports of the German Bishops’ Conference and the Protes-tant Church in Germany on religious freedom worldwide (Sekretariat der DeutschenBischofskonferenz/Kirchenamt der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland [eds.]: 3.Ökumenischer Bericht zur Religionsfreiheit weltweit. Eine christliche Perspektive aufein universelles Menschenrecht [= Gemeinsame Texte Nr. 28], Bonn/Hannover 2023),the initiative “Solidarity with persecuted and oppressed Christians in our time” ofthe German Bishops’ Conference; the days of remembrance for persecuted Christians,which take place in the Catholic Church on St. Stephen’s Day and the initiatives of theEKD on Reminiscere Sunday.216 Signs of Hope and Proposals for SolutionsAachen and Reporters without Borders, who campaigned together for the re-lease of a Vietnamese blogger.14This literally suggests combining the advocacyfor religious freedom with the advocacy for other human rights, such as free-dom of the press or women’s rights, and creating synergies in correspondingcooperations and thus reaching other circles that have not yet been confrontedwith the relevance of religious freedom.15Successful educationalwork ismademoredifficult by amedia logic that re-wards polarisation, sensationalism and simplification – including in the formof quantification in rankings –with attention. Accordingly, it is important forchurches to consciously seek dialogue withmedia representatives on the topicof religious freedomand tirelessly express their humanrights-guidedperspec-tive. It is necessary to reflect together on how to address sensitive concernssuch as legitimate public safety interests without appealing to populist senti-ments or accepting collateral damage to religious freedom.Open learning spaces for religious freedomthrough interreligious dialogue and ecumenical learningNowadays,manymembers of non-Christian religions live in Europe, althougheven after years they are still perceived as foreign by large parts of the popula-tion. Real encounters do not take place often. A typical reflex to this insecurityis to retreat into one’s ownworld.The demarcation from the foreign –whetherit is an individual or a different opinion – and the search for community withlike-minded people are obvious. Reinforced by media debates about Islamistviolence andaperceivedoverburdeningby excessivemigration, correspondingexperiences of foreignness or the fear of it are a breeding ground for populismand exclusion.In view of the challenges that globalisation poses to people, churches andother religious communities can consciously contribute to enabling people todeal constructively with experiences of foreignness, fears and sometimes also14 missio Aachen: missio und Reporter ohne Grenzen gemeinsam für verfolgte Christenin Vietnam | missio (1 Feb. 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-bEDh0MjBU,accessed on: 24 Jul. 2023.15 See e.g. the publication of the Norwegianmission and human rights organization Ste-fanus Alliance International: Freedom of religion or belief for everyone: Women infocus, 2021, https://www.stefanus.no/english/women-and-forb/, accessed on: 24 Jul.2023.K. D. Buck/B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: The Responsibility of Religious Communities 217conflicts to create a sustainable basis for community in this way.16 Interreli-gious dialogue and ecumenism are spaces in which churches can lay the foun-dations for constructive coexistence, a learning experience that in turn alsomakes people more resistant to the appropriation of right-wing populist ac-tors. In such learning spaces, an awareness of the necessity of a human rights-based approach to religious freedom can also grow.Interreligious dialogueInterreligiousdialogueplays a vital role in countering the appropriationof reli-gious freedomby right-wing populist actors. First of all, dialogue itself is to beunderstood as an expression of the fundamental Christian conviction that un-derlies the churches’ commitment to religious freedom as a universal humanright: from a Christian perspective, dialogue is not only important to defendhuman dignity together but carries its own value as a place of a joint searchand encounter with God.Interreligious dialogue is also strategically important because it gives thecommitment to religious freedomgreater credibility andabroader impact. In-terfaith coalitions–aswell as statements ona commonunderstandingof FoRB–can showpoliticians and society that the commitment to religious freedom isnot about clientelism.Through the lens of interreligious dialogue, it becomesevident that the appropriation of religious freedom leads to violations of thisvery freedom. Church partners worldwide report that only through interreli-gious dialogue can living together and the situation of religious freedom beimproved in the long term.The commitment to religious freedom in interreligious dialogue also high-lights the importance of a differentiated approach in order to first create acommunicative basis for a dialogue on religious freedom. For example, a dis-tinction shouldbemadeaccording to the severity of violationsof religious free-dom, rather than generally speaking of “persecution of Christians” even in thecase of isolated minor discrimination. Only through a differentiated percep-tion and communication can it be clearly stated where situations are not to be16 See e.g. the reflection on a constructive approach to fear within the framework of theConcerted Action 2023/2024 by Justitia et Pax Europe: Facing our Fears and Recon-necting the World (22 Feb. 2023), http://www.juspax-eu.org/en/home/meldungen/Concerted-Action-2023-2024.php, accessed on: 24 Jul. 2023.218 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionstoleratedand less existential problemscanbediscussed together and improvedwithout alienating the other party through undifferentiated statements.17Finally, interreligious dialogue helps to work on attitudes. Interreligiousdialogue creates curiosity about others, helps with an understanding of whatis foreign as an enrichment and not as a threat andmakes positive experiencespossible. In this way, interreligious dialogue at all levels is part of the churches’commitment against the appropriation of religious freedom.Positive dialogueexperiences – including from churches worldwide – need to be communi-cated, and corresponding networks have to be strengthened. Churches havethe structures to do this at grassroot level. Where people experience interre-ligious dialogue as beneficial, the appropriation of religious freedom hardlyhas a chance of success.Ecumenical learningEcumenism represents diversity per se and offers spaces in which the accep-tance of differences can be learned. This is helpful in order to be alert to theappropriation of religious freedom by far-right extremist or right-wing pop-ulist actors and raise the voices together against such tendencies.Sometimes denominational diversity within Christianity is understood asa troublesome challenge, especially when there is a background desire for “theChristians” or “the churches” to speak with one voice. There is also no unityof opinion on religious freedom in some ecumenical contexts, especially whenone churchhas to assert itself as aminority in its context,while other churches’freedom is guaranteed and protected by the state.However, if diversity is not defined a priori as a deplorable state but as anatural result of thedevelopmentof a religionover themillennia, inwhichpeo-ple have come to different views of faith and the Gospel, new possibilities forlearning together open up. The common foundation – faith in Jesus Christ –supports, strengthens and encourages people to engagewith the other.Differ-ences in theology and understanding of what church means cannot and mustnot be dismissed.Rather, it is precisely in the exchange about these differencesthat there is the chance to better understand not only the other but also one’sown view.17 Voges, Katja: Religionsfreiheit im christlich-muslimischen Dialog. Optionen für einchristlich motiviertes und dialogorientiertes Engagement, Zürich: TVZ 2021, p. 340.K. D. Buck/B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: The Responsibility of Religious Communities 219With the various exchange and study programmes, the churches alreadyhave numerous opportunities to empower people to deal positively with for-eignness in a globalised world.18 Anyone who has had the experience of beinga stranger has a different perspective of people from other countries and re-ligions and can guide them and others when it comes to living together andintegration andwhen it comes to not being taken over by right-wing extremistand populist actors in questions of religious freedom.Ecumenical learning can also take place at the parochial level if localparishes consciously approach local Migrant Churches, offer them spacesand if the joint use of church spaces also provides opportunities for exchangeduring activities such as coffee at church, congregational lunches, leisureactivities, etc.Overall, interreligious and ecumenical learning changes the view of theother and thus also strengthens awareness of the importance of religious free-dom and the notion that religious freedom applies equally to all. Such spacesof dialogue are also only possible in contexts in which a certain degree of re-ligious freedom exists, which in turn sensitises people to recognise far-rightappropriations of religious freedom as being hostile to dialogue.However, interreligious and interdenominational encounters can also“tip over” and intensify experiences of strangeness if the dialogue is not con-sciously conducted and strategically accompanied. Interreligious dialogueand ecumenical exchange need experience and know-how, and they have tobe taught and studied.19 Churches can strengthen and promote these pro-grammes and make them even more visible in their contexts and beyond, sothat interreligious dialogue and ecumenical encounters are not perceived asthe specialty of a few but rather valuable and important tools of the churches,18 E.g. Studium in Israel (Theological study year at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem);Studium im Mittleren Osten (SiMO); Interreligious Studies in Japan Programme;Bread for theWorld Scholarship Programme; Intercultural Theology in Hermannsburgand Göttingen; Study Programme at the Ecumenical Institute in Bossey; Study Pro-grammes at the Ecumenical Theological Institute Al Mowafaqa in Rabat; EcumenicalVolunteer Programmes of mission agencies, etc.19 Repp,Martin: “Globale theologischeAusbildung imZeitalter zunehmenderGlobalisie-rung. Die Aufgabe interreligiöser Studienprogramme für multireligiöse Gesellschaf-ten,” in:Martin Repp (ed.), Theologische Ausbildung imZeitalter zunehmender Globa-lisierung. Ökumenische und interreligiöse Studienprogramme in Indien, Israel, Japanund dem Libanon, Leipzig: EVA 2022, pp. 113–128.220 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionsenabling people to locate themselves in an increasingly complex world and notto be blinded and appropriated by populist and extreme right-wing narratives.Meaning, community and identityAt thebeginningof this paper, the specific resources andpotentials of churchesfor the fight against right-wing populism and its temptations were addressed:in aworldwheremany people feel a lack of orientation andmeaning, churchescan create meaning, community and identity and thus offer a true alterna-tive to illusory solutions of populism and extremism. In order tomake full useof these resources, it is essential that the churches’ potential is perceived andrecognised in the broader society. A prerequisite for this is to overcome thedeep credibility crisis in which the churches find themselves in Europe andpartly also in other continents – not least the faulty and slow coming process-ing of sexualised violence and the adherence to problematic structures havealienated large sections of society from the churches and undermined theirposition as trustworthy institutions that offer support.This lost trustmust be regained so that churches are generally perceived ascontact partners in difficult life situations and dealing with existential ques-tions. Debates about church structures must undoubtedly be held.The obser-vation that debates within churches take up somuch space that people’s ques-tions ofmeaning and faith are neglected shouldmake us think. If the churchesdo not take up these existential questions of the people, create real spaces ofencounter and seek new and unusual ways, there is a danger that the spacewill also be taken up by right-wing populist actors.Beliefs, Brains and Breaking ChainsHow Education on “Living Together” can PromoteFreedom of Religion or Belief in Lebanon amid risingPopulist NarrativesAnna Maria DaouIntroductionInterest in theprotectionandpromotionof freedomof religionor belief (FoRB)has significantly increased during the past decade in a progressively diverseworld in general, and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region inparticular.Usually consideredasaWesternconcept thatdoesnot resonatewiththe religious and cultural values of the area, the term has not previously beendevoted much attention, is relatively under-researched, or uses frameworksfrom Western literature to develop claims that are – more often than not –contextually spurious.Furthermore, the rise of exclusionary populism across countries hasposed significant challenges to the principles of FoRB and “living together”through propagating speeches laden with hate and calls to violence especiallyagainst religious minorities and groups whose beliefs are different fromthose in power. In addition, many individuals – including the non-religious– face structural discrimination in schools, places of employment, and localcommunities.However, advancements are also being recorded around the world by civilsociety organizations adopting a human rights approach in promoting inclu-sive citizenship and living together. For instance, several organizations – in-cluding Adyan Foundation for Diversity, Solidarity andHumanDignity, basedin Beirut – invest considerable effort in formal and non-formal “education onliving together” programs to increase awareness on the concepts of FoRB, di-222 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionsversity, and citizenshipwhile supporting activists in theirmission to challengediscriminatory practices, engage in policy reform, and inspire change.Furthermore, the additional layer of opening up spaces for dialogue thatallow both students and activists to share their experiences, pose their ques-tions and discuss best practices strengthens their knowledge and provides aplatform for cross-regional cooperation.Therefore, my research project aims at exploring how “education on livingtogether” – which includes education on FoRB – is one tool that can be usedinmitigating the adverse effects of exclusionary populist narratives while fos-tering respect for diversity.This couldmanifest in the form of classes, courses,initiatives as well as peer learning and support provided through coalitions ornetworks. Based on the above, I argue that:• Raising awareness of one’s self and the “different” other increases under-standingofdiversity,pluralismandFoRBwhile equipping individualswithsufficient knowledge to deconstruct fear that is sometimes utilized by pop-ulist leaders and parties to create “in” and “out” groups.• Encouraging students as well as activists to be proactive rather than reac-tive in the face of discrimination through supporting their initiatives forprotecting FoRB and promoting “living together” increases cross-commu-nitarian solidarity and widens the definition of who the “people” are.• Using knowledge, influence and recorded changes in attitudes andpercep-tions of FoRB and diversity can help to advocate for new policies and re-forms that promote inclusive citizenship and strengthen social cohesion.By further exploring this three-layer dynamic, I would be able to develop aset of recommendations for different stakeholders on how to better targetprograms related to FoRB and “living together.” However, this article doesnot claim that “education for living together” is a wand that will magicallyreverse the negative effects of populism, nor does it seek to present it as a“one-solution-fits-all” that works equally in all contexts. It simply seeks tofurther study how this method can be used as an awareness tool in societiesthat are prone to misinformation and hate speech.For the purposes of this essay, I will use FoRB and religious freedom some-what interchangeably, despite the fact that the former has a broader defini-tion. In some instances, I will also refer to “education on diversity” in additionto “education on living together” to differentiate between the theoretical andpractical aspects of learning. Finally, religious minorities will be used to referA. M. Daou: Education on “Living Together” in Lebanon 223to groups that are smaller in number, or who find themselves excluded in a so-ciety where the majority of people are from another religion.Populism, “othering” and the construction of fearLiterature onpopulism is abundant.The complexity of the termat handhas ledscholars – including political scientists, sociologists, historians and philoso-phers – to find a definition that encompasses its different layers. Despite “al-most” being impossible, they succeeded in pinpointing important elementsthat can be used to further understand the dynamic of populism and its conse-quences on individuals, groups and societies. Based on the many definitionsdeveloped throughout the years, I will refer to the following components toprovide a general framework for the subsequent sections:• An inherent focus on a homogeneous definition of “the people,” as the onlyones able to legitimize the understanding of democracy and democraticdecision-making, which is why populism incessantly calls on “the people,”“the under-privileged,” “the righteous” or the “other 99%”;1• A “Manichean” or “us vs. them” construction that pits one group against theother and causes conflicts in diverse societies, thus hindering policies thatpromote religious freedom and inclusive citizenship;2• An anti-pluralist approach, where populism implies that only a selectedgroup is considered as part of the “people,” creating a dichotomy between“in” and “out” groups as defined by those in power.3The aforementioned features can easily be manipulated to create an “other”that can hold the blame for the shortcomings of state and non-state institu-tions.However, the issue lies in our construction of “us” and “them.”Therefore,one might ask: who is considered “privileged” and who is not? Are refugeesreally the ones less marginalized than citizens in Western communities? Do1 Katsambekis, Giorgos: “The Populist Surge in Post-Democratic Times: Theoretical andPolitical Challenges,” in: The Political Quarterly 88 (2016), pp. 202–210.2 Sengul, Kurt: “Swamped: The Populist Construction of Fear, Crisis and Dangerous oth-ers in Pauline Hanson’s Senate Speeches,” in: Communication Research and Practice6 (2020), pp. 20–37.3 Müller, Jan-Werner: What is Populism?, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press2016.224 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionsreligious minorities have more privileges or rights than the majority groupsin different MENA countries? The answers to these questions lie in the salientperceptions of the “people” and “enemy,”whose characteristics are defined anddevelopedbypopulist individuals or groups,basedon their interests andgains.One can also consider that populism is notmerely a term but rather a pow-erful tool for political mobilization and communication. Capitalizing on the“fear” and “ignorance” factors, exclusionary populists usually look for “scape-goats” to blame for ruining their “ideal” society because they are “different.”4For example, this dynamic is quite evident among right-wing leaders in theWestwho promote Islamophobia under the pretense thatMuslims have differ-ent values than their own, and that they are merely the protectors of diversity,equality, freedom and tolerance, while they are actually clearly violating someof the basic tenants of FoRB.5 Similarly,Christians andother religious and eth-nicminorities in theMENA region are also prone to discriminatory narrativesandexclusionby Islamist populistswho focus in theirnarrativeson the“purity”of Islamand the refusal of “Western-imposed” values towhich they believe thatmost non-Muslim groups adhere.Furthermore, both religion and politics have a strong connection to “fear.”It could also be said that populism and “fear” are correlated, meaning that thehigher the fear, the stronger the populist narrative, and vice versa.6 Populistleaders often refer to the overly simplistic claim that certain religions are in-herently violent, and that followers of this religion are automatic perpetrators.Thus, they neglect studying the intricate interplay of political, historical andsocio-psychological factors that contribute to human rights abuses in generaland FoRB in particular in diverse contexts.7 In fact, it is quite common to seethat religious groups who are persecuted in one country can be perpetratorsin another where they are a majority or hold power. Furthermore, the Social4 Bergmann, Eiríkur: “Populism and the Politics of Misinformation,” in: Safundi 21(2020), pp. 251–265.5 Sengul, Kurt: “Swamped: The Populist Construction of Fear, Crisis and Dangerous oth-ers in Pauline Hanson’s Senate Speeches,” in: Communication Research and Practice6 (2020), pp. 20–37.6 Palaver, Wolfgang: “Populism and Religion: On the Politics of Fear,” in: Dialog 58(2019), pp. 22–29.7 Bielefeldt, Heiner: “Freedom of Religion or Belief – A Human Right under Pressure,”in: Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (1/2012), pp. 15–35.A. M. Daou: Education on “Living Together” in Lebanon 225Identity Theory8 posits that individuals belong to different social categoriesand have multiple identities that might become salient based on certain cues,whether social, economic, cultural, religious or political. This is particularlytrue for members of minority groups, including immigrants, who often havetwo or more cultural identities that can bemanipulated through populist nar-ratives,whichheightens feelings of fear andperceived threat andmight hindertheir freedom in expressing their religious beliefs.Because contemporary populism generally rejects all forms of social andcultural pluralism while promoting the idea of “one homogeneous group,”9and given that most people do not feel invested in the defense of humanrights, we can observe that the “ethos of solidarity”10 is weak in some areasand stronger in others. Furthermore, people’s interest in getting to know the“different other” is not always piqued especially if they live in a homogeneouscommunity, with no access to people who believe, think or act differently thatthey do. The importance of diversity in the realm of FoRB is due to the factthat it extends beyond differences in belief systems and rites to encompass theintrinsic value of human dignity that should be respected by all.Education on “living together”: The key to counteractpopulist narratives and promote religious freedomAdyan Foundation focuses on the following two layers of “education on livingtogether”:a) Building the capacities of children and youth towards respecting the rightto difference with an openmind and positivity in thought and behavior;b) Strengthening the spirit of initiative and active participation in public life,within a framework of cross-cultural and cross-sectarian partnership in8 Tajfel, Henri/Turner, John: “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior,”in: Stephen Worchel/William G. Austin (eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relation,Chicago: Hall Publishers 1986, pp. 7–24.9 Palaver: Populism and Religion.10 Alston, Philip: “The Populist Challenge to Human Rights,” in: Journal of Human RightsPractice 9 (2017), pp. 1–15.226 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionsview of collaborating towards realizing the “common good” and buildingan effective inclusive citizenship.11One can notice that the terms used in this definition are quite general andglobal. The intention behind this explanation was to allow different individu-als and organizations to contextualize terms in such a way that resonates withtheir local community. In fact, most of the corpus on diversity managementhas been developed in theWest andmight not work as efficiently – if at all – incontexts such as theMiddle East, due to different cultures, values, history andlanguage being used.12Therefore, the contextualization of policies and curric-ula in diversitymanagement is important, although it should not be an excuseto enhance divisions and abuse differences. This is not always easy given thatmost stakeholders lack the know-how due to limited resources or insufficientcapacity-building on diversity management or education on “living together.”A good example of this is the work that Adyan Foundation has done inits non-formal educational programme “Training of Trainers on Freedom ofReligion or Belief,”which is the translated Arabic version of the course also im-plemented in English on the FoRB learning platform.This course is presentedonline twice a year, once for trainers, civil society actors andpolicy-makers andonce for a specialized group of individuals interested in learning about FoRB,such as journalists, faith-based activists and artists. Adyan Foundation notonly translated the content but also contextualized it to become fit for MENAparticipants. It did so by focusing on the narrative of “inclusive citizenship”and how it related to FoRB rather than simply relying on Western definitionsand mechanisms, added a module on understanding FoRB from a religiousperspective, and alluded to declarations in the area that were developed forpromoting and protecting FoRB. In addition, it changed examples to includeboth violations of FoRB in the region as well as advancements being made inthis field.Similar programs are considered important because they increase learn-ers’ knowledge on human rights in general and FoRB in particular, which canbeempoweringbecause it increases their agencyandshifts theirperceptionsof11 Adyan Foundation: “Defining Education on Living Together,” in: Adyan’s Annual Report2018–2019.12 Hennekam, Sophie/Tahssain-Gay, Loubna/Syed, Jawad: “Contextualizing DiversityManagement in the Middle East and North Africa: A Relational Perspective,” in: Hu-man Resource Management Journal 27 (2017), pp. 459–476.A. M. Daou: Education on “Living Together” in Lebanon 227themselves and others from merely “victims” and “perpetrators” as presentedin the populist narrative to “active citizens”working together to build commu-nities and achieve justice.13 However, acknowledging that narratives related toFoRB are not the same everywhere is important to avoid unifying experiencesand undermining real claims of discrimination by certain “out-groups.”14Because we distinguish between education of human rights (which ismainly theoretical) and education for human rights (which includes the prac-tical aspect of it), scholars on multicultural education agree that “learningabout, through, and for diversity and plurality is at the very heart of citizen-ship education.”15 In order for such a type of education to work in schools andcenters, it is important that the values and ideals presented resonate with theexperiences of students and learners. In other words, citizenship educationin general focuses on one belonging to a nation-state, a unified “group,” butsometimes ignores one’s multi-layered identity and commitment to theirgroups and local communities.16 Therefore, education on “living together”extends beyond assimilation and seeks to help students and learners to un-derstand that they can be part of both the general “national civic culture” andtheir “specific cultural communities,”17 making them less prone to populistnarratives that sometimes capitalize on the fear of losing one’s identity.In her article “The Role of Peace-Education as a Coexistence, Reconcilia-tion and Peace-Building Device in Ethiopia,” Abdi defined education not onlyas a place to acquire knowledge but also as a place to develop one’s attitudes,values and behavior.18 This definition brought me back to the term “commu-nity of inquiry,” where individuals consider themselves “one among the oth-13 Osler, Audrey H.: “Higher Education, Human Rights and Inclusive Citizenship,” in:Tehmina N. Basit/Sally Tomlinson (eds.), Social Inclusion and Higher Education, Bris-tol: Bristol University Press 2012, pp. 295–312.14 Osler: Higher Education.15 Veugelers, Wiel/De Groot, Isolde: “Theory and Practice of Citizenship Education,” in:Wiel Veugelers/Fritz Oser (eds.), Education for Democratic Intercultural Citizenship(= Moral Development and Citizenship Education 15), Leiden/Boston: Brill 2019, pp.14–41, p. 14.16 Banks, James A.: “Human Rights, Diversity, and Citizenship Education,” in: The Educa-tion Forum 73 (2009), pp. 100–110.17 Banks: Human Rights.18 Abdi, Megersa Tolera: “The Role of Peace-Education as a Coexistence, Reconciliationand Peace-Building Device in Ethiopia,” in: The Electronic Research Journal of SocialSciences and Humanities 2/2019, pp. 61–74.228 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionsers” and where seeking knowledge is an intersection of their own ideas, beliefand values with those of others.19 In other words, the questions of “who am I?”and “what do I think andwhy?” are insufficient as they should also be asked re-ciprocally with other members of one’s community.This notion is particularlyinteresting when relating it to populism, as members of communities can bedifferent, and it posits that in order to understand one’s self it is necessary tounderstand all surrounding people. This can increase awareness, reduce fear,build solidarity and strengthen social cohesion.Because schools are also considered communities and places of contact,they play a significant role in embedding values and norms.20 In our definitionof education on “living together,” the second component focused on strength-ening the spirit of initiative and active participation. Similarly, Westheimeridentifies three versions of “good citizens” that I will apply to frame AdyanFoundation’s educational “Alwan” programme:• Personally-responsible citizens are the oneswho respect the law,volunteer,are honest, respectful and self-confident.• Participatory citizens do not merely volunteer, but participate in the orga-nization of events, meaning that they are active in civic affairs and sociallife.• Social justice-oriented citizens are the ones who are always seeking to findways to improve their societies.They volunteer and organize, but they alsoask the difficult questions to try to find the root causes of problems.Therefore, developing educational programs that create active social justice-oriented citizens is extremely important to change attitudes and behavior to-wardsdiversity, increase the scopeofwho“thepeople”are andeventually de-le-gitimize discriminatory and divisive populist narratives.“Alwan” (meaning colors) is a non-formal educational programme runby Adyan Foundation since 2007 in both public and private schools all overLebanon. It provides young people between the ages of 15 and 17 with lessonsaimed at promoting “living together” through active and inclusive citizenship,19 Splitter, Laurence J.: “Enriching the Narratives we Tell about Ourselves and our Iden-tities: An Educational Response to Populism and Extremism,” in: Educational Philos-ophy and Theory 54 (2020), pp. 21–36.20 Westheimer, Joel: “Civic Education and the Rise of Populist Nationalism,” in: PeabodyJournal of Education 94 (2019), pp. 4–16.A. M. Daou: Education on “Living Together” in Lebanon 229developing resilience to face extremist and sectarian narratives, and spreadingawareness on the importance of participating in public life to promote humandignity and inclusive sustainable development. In particular, the programmeis centered around three key concepts: religious diversity, partnership, andcommunity service. The programme curriculum is delivered in the form ofextracurricular clubs of 15 to 20 members and includes a blended learningapproach between structured classroom and experimental sessions. It also in-cludes debates, an inter-club excursion to discover the Lebanese heritage anda cross-communitarian social project. As is evident, the programme works ontwo layers, namely knowledge and action.In 2021, Adyan Foundation commissioned Ecorys – a research and consul-tancy company – to undertake a two-year-long evaluation of the Alwan pro-gramme. Based on the initial – and not yet published – draft of the mid-linereport, this impact evaluation is being developed using qualitative interviewswith a variety of programme stakeholders, combined with a quantitative sur-vey to be completed by participants and non-participants of the programme.The main objective is to evaluate the actual impact of the programme twelveyears after its start in 2019 to ascertain whether it fulfilled its objectives of de-veloping knowledgeable, inclusive and active citizens.Based on the initial results, it became clear to us that the programme re-mained relevant to the Lebanese context throughout, especially through its fo-cus on teachings and practices of other religions and its promotion of inter-religious understanding and FoRB. In addition, it performed extremely well inbringing people together, especially through excursions and community ser-vice initiatives that broke “barriers,”which are –more often than not –used toignite dormant or new conflicts.There were also strong stories of change thathave been gathered by students and teachers showing clear improvements inAlwanparticipants’ attitudes,behavior,andknowledge regardingdiversity and“living together.” Naturally, there are some areas that also need improvement,including – but not limited to – updating the curriculum to become more re-flective of new changes, finding better strategies to record change, increasingthe element of contact, and better engaging other stakeholders such as parentsto ensure that the educational process does not end in school.Despite these discrepancies, “Alwan” remains an important example onhow education on “living together” – which includes the promotion of con-cepts such as diversity (natural differences present in society), pluralism (themechanism by which diversity is managed), personal and collective freedoms(including FoRB) – can develop a well-informed, active and inclusive citizen.230 Signs of Hope and Proposals for SolutionsSuch a modality will reduce the effect of populist narratives of individualsbecause it broadens one’s definition of the “people,” deconstructs the “us” ver-sus “them” binary through promoting solidarity, and builds a “plural” societywhere individual identities and differences are celebrated.What is the way forward?In conclusion, we have seen that both diversity training and diversity educa-tion can play an important role in fostering an inclusive society andmitigatingthe negative effects of populism through developing knowledge, challengingstereotypes and transforming attitudes.In order to effectively counteract negative populist narratives, I proposethe series of recommendations below:• Build the capacities of teachers, school administrators and trainersthrough courses on diversity, FoRB, and inclusive citizenship to help stu-dents to think critically, question, understand their environment, careabout public issues and become empathetic.• Involve parents in formal and non-formal educational programs to ensurethat what students learn extends beyond the realm of the school (for thoseprograms implemented in schools).• Include the notions of diversity, FoRB and inclusive citizenship in exist-ing history, social studies and religious education curricula, while takinginto consideration religious,ethnic,and linguistic differences aswell as themultiple understandings of citizenship and diversity.• Create safe and respectful learning environment where students fromdifferent backgrounds can interact and listen to different perspectivesthrough developing dialogue guidelines or “social contract.”• Work on the macro level through developing comprehensive educationalpolicies that address the root causes of populism and promote inclusivecitizenship andFoRBat all levels.This includes incorporatingmulticulturalperspectives in textbooks, encouraging cross-cultural exchanges, and de-veloping community service initiatives. General educational policies andguidelines such as the Toledo Guidelines and the Human Dignity Educa-tional Program can be used as starting points.A. M. Daou: Education on “Living Together” in Lebanon 231• Integrate the content of declarations and promote FoRB and education on“living together” in a practical manner in schools, training and learningcenters, places of worship, businesses and local communities.• Increase cross-collaboration between schools and other agents of changeto provide additional programs, workshops and extracurricular activitiesthat promote FoRB and inclusive citizenship. By leveraging their expertiseand resources, these organizations can contribute to well-rounded pro-grams that refute divisive narratives and promote social cohesion.By working together, teachers, schools, trainers, government agencies, civilsociety organizations and other stakeholders can collectively harness thepower of formal and non-formal education to foster critical thinking, empa-thy and solidarity, which can become powerful weapons against exclusionarypopulism. However, it does not end here, as education is only one step in thedevelopment of inclusive citizenship. It would be quite simplistic for us to saythat this would be sufficient to “eliminate” populism. Scholars and practition-ers should be aware that there are a multitude of social, economic, religiousand political factors at hand, all of which should be addressed for developingjust and inclusive societies.Social Media as a Tool against PopulistAppropriation of FoRB and for Promoting FoRB?Challenges, Ideas and StrategiesJulia Bauer, Juliane Chakrabarti and Bernd HirschbergerThe words “Der ISLAM kann sich NICHT auf die Religionsfreiheit berufen!”(“ISLAMmay NOT invoke freedom of religion!”) are emblazoned at the centreof a tweet by the Saxon parliamentary group of the far-right party Alterna-tive for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD). The parliamentary groupattributes this quote to the new-right professor emeritus Dr Karl AlbrechtSchachtschneider, whom they had invited to a hearing in the Saxon parlia-ment as an “expert.”1 As of 4 May 2023, the tweet had collected a total of 191likes. By comparison, themost popular post on the account of the Federal Gov-ernment Commissioner for Freedom of Religion or Belief (@ReligionBund)counted just 68 likes at the same time.2 A Facebook post by the Saxon AfDparliamentary group with the same content even collected over 1,800 likes.3The associated YouTube video – which contains a whole series of distortionsandmisinterpretations of religious freedom–made it among the top 20mostviewed German-language videos on the keyword “Religionsfreiheit” (“religious1 AfD-Fraktion Sachsen (@AFD_SLT): Am 31. März 2023 sprach Prof. Dr. Karl AlbrechtSchachtschneider als Experte im Sächsischen Landtag zum #AfD-Gesetzentwurf fürein Kopftuchverbot in Schulen und Kindergärten (3 Apr. 2023), https://twitter.com/AfD_SLT/status/1642825189493727233, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.2 Number calculated with the following tool: https://www.vicinitas.io/free-tools/download-user-tweets?tracker=%40ReligionBund, accessed on: 6 Sep. 2023.3 AfD Fraktion Sachsen: Am 31. März 2023 sprach Prof. Dr. Karl Albrecht Schachtschnei-der als Experte im Sächsischen Landtag zum #AfD-Gesetzentwurf für ein Kopftuch-verbot (3 Apr. 2023), https://www.facebook.com/AfD.Fraktion.Sachsen/posts/pfbid0DoSrymemxCo31wZr6YCeBc2c33fytar36Rgbf1pAoTE37BgMaXWPEaSQZTeMKA7ql, ac-cessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.234 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionsfreedom”) with over 19,400 views.4 The above example already indicates thatthe attempts of the far-right to appropriate and reinterpret religious freedomare not limited to the analogue world. Social media platforms are gratefullyused, and sometimes with considerable reach. This article not only discusseshow to counter populist appropriation and reinterpretation of religious free-dom in the digital space, but also looks at how engagement in socialmedia canstrengthen this right to freedom.Attacks on religious freedom in social media:Narratives and strategiesTaking a look at German-language tweets on the keyword of “religious free-dom” in the spring of 2023, one can find a large number of contributions prob-lematising religious freedom targeting religious (non-Christian) minorities.5Many users claim that it is being made use of to defend or even promote reli-gious extremism; for example the notion that a foreign ideology is being im-posed on the population under the guise of religious freedom. Users cite Is-lamism and alleged Islamisation in particular as threats made possible by re-ligious freedom. Some Twitter users simply reject religious freedom based onan anti-liberal attitude.Other Twitter users see the danger of having an ideology imposed on themin current social developments and political decisions and assess this as athreat to their own religious freedom.However, this is mostly not about legit-imate criticism of a disproportionate encroachment on their freedom rights,but rather using religious freedom as a defensive argument against anythingthat contradicts their own views. For example, they present coronavirus pro-tection measures, climate protection measures, divergent ideas regardinggender identity and/or sexual orientation, Islam, the societal “mainstream”and supposed political correctness as a threat to religious freedom.4 AfD-Fraktion im Sächsischen Landtag: Prof. Schachtschneider: Islam kann sich NICHTauf Religionsfreiheit berufen! (1 Apr. 2023), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FTsZIeRulYY, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.5 See the overview of a systematic content analysis of all tweets from the period04/25/2023, 09:23 CEST to 05/05/2023, 09:23 CEST containing the term “Religionsfrei-heit” (“religious freedom”) at the following online attachment: https://link.transcript-open.de/9783839468272/download/001.J. Bauer/J. Chakrabarti/B. Hirschberger: Social Media as a Tool against Populism 235Other users understand religious freedom selectively and discriminateagainst individual religious communities; for example by calling for unjus-tified restrictions on Islam in particular or even putting forward the thesisthat it is not compatible with religious freedom. Frequently, users employthe form of “whataboutism” by referring to violations of religious freedom incountries where the respective religious community constitutes a majority ofthe population. The appropriation and reinterpretation of religious freedomoften functions as a means of targeted disparagement of certain groups ofpeople and particularly affects people of the Muslim faith.These examples indicate that both instrumentalisation of religious free-dom and ignorance about this human right are widespread. For example, reli-gious freedom is reduced to a single aspect and other essential areas of appli-cation and aspects are implicitly or explicitly negated. For instance, the mis-conceptions that “freedom of religion” means “freedom from religion” or thatreligion must be apolitical and a purely private matter are frequently encoun-tered.Theconcept of justified restrictions on religious freedom–which in turnare subject to strict criteria – is also often not properly understood.In addition to the problematic narratives and misunderstandings listedabove that (directly) refer to religious freedom, a large variety of other narra-tives that do not directly refer to religious freedom but are nevertheless harm-ful to it are alsowidespread.For example,hatred,misinformationandconspir-acy theories are spread regarding individual religious communities, especiallyminorities.6 InWestern countries,we often have to deal with anti-Semitic andIslamophobic content.7 Especially accounts that can be assigned to right-wing6 Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung/Auswär-tiges Amt: 2. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur weltweiten Lage der Religionsfreiheit.Berichtszeitraum 2018 bis 2019. [Second Report of the German Government on theGlobal Situation of Religious Freedom. Reporting Period 2018 and 2019] (Oct. 2020),pp. 65–99, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2410402/9e394a9928461b6c4ac0d4368b7a26af/201028-zweiter-bericht-der-bundesregierung-zur-weltweiten-lage-der-religionsfreiheit-data.pdf, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.7 Especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Institute for Freedom of Faith& Security in Europe observed a new wave of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic content:Rose, Hannah: Pandemic Hate: COVID-related Antisemitism and Islamophobia, andthe Role of Social Media, Munich: IFFSE 2021, https://www.iffse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/IFFSE-report-Entwurf-Doppelseiten-12_13-10-21.pdf, accessed on: 8 Aug.2023.236 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionsmilieus spread socialmedia posts that harm religious freedom.However,mis-understandings about religious freedom are also widespread, for example theconfusion of religious freedom with freedom from religion in some emphati-cally secular milieus.Overall, the reinterpretation narratives and misunderstandings about re-ligious freedom shared on social media correlate with those from the “offlineworld” already analysed in the previous chapters. Social media platforms offerparticularly favourable conditions for the rapid spread of problematic narra-tives. The fact that every social media user can also publish and disseminatecontent themselves (“produsage”) makes it possible for right-wing milieus –for example – to achieve high coverage even bypassing the traditional media.Through coordinated hate campaigns and supported by “influencers” fromtheir own milieu as well as fake accounts, corresponding actors fuel the de-bates, introduce problematic narratives into the discourse in a targeted man-ner, remind the people of them8 and deliberately disrupt constructive debates(for example with “derailing” tactics9).Promotion of religious freedom in social mediaEven though far right-wing forces sometimes succeed in dominating dis-courses on social media and thereby harming religious freedom, social mediaplatforms also offer strong potential for promoting religious freedom. Ideally,own positive narratives should strengthen religious freedom. Appropriateoutreach and education work have a preventive effect against attempts atpopulist appropriation and reinterpretation. It can be important and effectiveto reactively use a prepared communicative counter-strategy.8 Kreißel, Philip/Ebner, Julia/Urban, Alexander/Guhl, Jakob: Hass auf Knopfdruck.Rechtsextreme Trollfabriken und das Ökosystem koordinierter Hasskampagnen imNetz, London/Washington D.C./Amman/Beirut/Toronto: ISD 2018, https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ISD_Ich_Bin_Hier_2.pdf, accessed on: 8 Aug.2023.9 Weck, Andreas: “Derailing im Netz: Wie Diskussionen in eine völlig andere Richtunggelenkt werden” (3 Sep. 2015), https://t3n.de/news/derailing-im-netz-636526/, acces-sed on: 8 Aug. 2023.J. Bauer/J. Chakrabarti/B. Hirschberger: Social Media as a Tool against Populism 237Raising awareness and providing education via social mediaSocial media can andmust be platforms for promoting religious freedom andclearing up misunderstandings. Video-based platforms in particular offerstrong potential to address issues of religious freedom in depth. However,looking at videos with the keyword “religious freedom” on the highly fre-quented YouTube platform,10 it is noticeable that among the videos with thehighest reach, it is precisely those by (religiously) conservative or even right-wing actors that are strongly represented. In addition, some professionallyproduced explanatory videos – a few of them from large media companies –also feature among the top ranks. Moderate or progressive religious actorsalso publish videos, but they seem to have a hard time reaching more than athree-digit number of views. It is also noticeable that most of the high-reachvideos focus in particular on controversial issues referring to domestic policy(such as debates on religious dress, circumcision or the question of whetherservices may be denied on account of religious beliefs, for example due toa negative attitude towards homosexuals). The wide-ranging references toreligious freedom from the progressive side tend to focus on opposition toproblematic conservative or right-wing positions and thus primarily have areactive character. This one-sided focus reinforces the widespread misper-ception that religious freedom is a purely conservative issue. Polarising onthe issue of religious freedom and naming only individual (domestic) irri-tants consequently means not working in a solution-oriented way and notpaying attention to important issues such as violations of religious freedomby autocratic and totalitarian regimes worldwide.The challenge for educational work is to break through this narrow focusand place religious freedom as a human right in the centre of society. Espe-cially in secular societies, it must be communicated why religious freedom isnot only relevant for those who see themselves as deeply religious or claim tobe so. Persistence and thoroughness are as much in demand as creativity anda sense for the dynamics of discourse.The following aspects are likely to be de-cisive for the chance of success:10 See keyword searches in German and English for the term “Religionsfreiheit” or “free-dom of religion”: https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=religionsfreiheit&sp=CAM%253D and https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=%22freedom+of+religion%22&sp=CAM%253D, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.238 Signs of Hope and Proposals for SolutionsHuman rights approach as a baseline: In order to overcome misunder-standings and avoid even replicating suchmisunderstandings in the course ofone’s ownwork,awareness-raisingandeducationalworkmust alwaysbebasedon the human rights approach. In particular, the principle of the indivisibilityof human rights must be kept inmind and –where it seems appropriate – thecommitment to religious freedommust be integrated into human rights edu-cation in general.Establish partnerships: It is important not only to produce content butalso consider how such content can be disseminated. Without the skills andinfrastructure necessary to build a community, as well as regular and well-placedposts, it is difficult to achieve broad impact beyonda limited circle of ex-perts. Since media professionals are also not immune to the aforementionedmisunderstandings on issues of religious freedom, cooperations are neededthat bring together expertise and reach. The fact that it is possible to developformats that are not only educational but also entertaining for a larger audi-ence is shown by individual positive exceptions that reach tens of thousandsof viewers with their content, such as the YouTube series Abdelkratie by theFederal Agency for Civic Education.11 In addition, there are other successfulformats that counter prejudices and populist agitation against religious mi-norities, such as theDatteltäter YouTube channel.12 Despite lagging behind thepreviouslymentioned coverage, the FoRBLearningPlatformoffers videoswithfive-digit viewing figures.13Adjustment to the target groups: A successful education campaign mustnot only reach and convince those who are already educated and convinced.There is a danger here of “preaching to the choir,” that is communicating inone’s own bubble. Trust and interest are essential prerequisites for a messageto be heard. Accordingly, it is important on which channel, by whom and inwhich style communication takes place. For example, it is unlikely that an offi-cial government campaignwill reach target groups that are particularly criticalof government or disenchanted with politics.14 It is also crucial that the habi-11 Abdelkratie: RELIGIONSFREIHEIT – An was glaubst du? (20 Jun. 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8itQ38ZXxlo&t=28s, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.12 https://www.youtube.com/@datteltater, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.13 https://www.youtube.com/@FreedomofReligionorBelief, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.14 Thus, the official advertising campaign launched by the German government for theCorona vaccination primarily appealed to people who were already convinced of thevaccination. Among sceptics, on the other hand, the campaign hardly met with any re-sponse. (Medianalyzer: Ärmel hoch oder runter:Was bei der Impfkommunikation bes-J. Bauer/J. Chakrabarti/B. Hirschberger: Social Media as a Tool against Populism 239tus and style of the message are well adapted to the target group. If this is notthe case, the probability that the target group will be reached at all is low, in-cluding due to the algorithm. In the worst case, this can even lead to furtheralienation. For example, the message may be perceived as too “top-down,” ar-tificially forced (“cringe”) or inauthentic, patronising or overly academic andabstract. It is also important that those sending the message are perceived asauthentic and not as mere “service providers.”Awareness raising as a cross-generational task: Young people are oftenportrayed as particularly vulnerable and impressionable in a negative sense.However, manipulation is not a problem exclusively for young people. On thecontrary, some empirical research indicates that older people are on averageevenmore susceptible to disinformation.15 Accordingly, there is a need forme-dia and human rights education not only for the young but also for older gen-erations. Mention should also be made of the large group of people who – re-gardless of their age – believe that they have already acquired the knowledgethat they need to lead their lives and therefore hardly notice and accept learn-ing opportunities.Counter-measuresWith the help of populist strategies, attempts are made to devalue, disparageand marginalise other people/groups. People of the Muslim and Jewish faithsare disproportionately affected in the German-language network, wherebyxenophobic motives are often involved as well. This kind of hate speech isproblematic in the sense that online channels now partially have an evenwiderreach than traditional media, reaching an incalculable number of people ina very short time, and there is a danger that hate messages might turn intoactual acts of violence. In order to limit and eliminate communication that iscontemptuous of people (or groups of people), an effort by society as a wholeser sein könnte, https://www.mediaanalyzer.com/studien/aermel-hoch-oder-runter-was-bei-der-impfkommunikation-besser-sein-koennte/, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.).15 Meßmer, Anna-Katharina/Sängerlaub, Alexander/Schulz, Leonie: “‘Quelle: Internet’?Digitale Nachrichten- und Informationskompetenzen der deutschen Bevölkerung imTest” (22 Mar. 2021), https://www.stiftung-nv.de/de/publikation/quelle-internet-digitale-nachrichten-und-informationskompetenzen-der-deutschen, accessed on: 8 Aug.2023.240 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionsis needed, in addition to the development and implementation of educationalprogrammes.Occasionally, it can be observed that social media users take action againstthe instrumentalisation, reinterpretation or devaluation of religious freedomwith their comments and corrections. However, these reactions seem to bespontaneous and not organised. In addition, there are initiatives that gener-ally andwith differentmethodological approaches work against various formsof hatred, group-focused enmity anddisinformation and accordingly also takeorganised action against anti-Semitic and Islamophobic postings. Examplesof such initiatives in German-speaking countries include #ichbinhier16, theNo-Hate-Speech campaign, hzsa:cyberwehr:neuland, correctiv.org, CounterCreators, Amadeu Antonio Foundation,Mimikama and HateAid.Among other things, the initiatives mentioned use strategies of counter-speech. Counter-speech is a concept to secure freedom of expression in thelong term and not primarily a measure to limit the effectiveness of individ-ual, hateful postings. In the case of counter-speech, it is important to considerwhich social dynamics and psychological-cognitive effects are triggered on theusers and how the input interacts with the algorithms of the social networks.There is evidence that coordinated, well-planned counter-speech canquantitatively shift the overall discourse and that the proportion of prob-lematic narratives becomes smaller compared to the proportion of counter-narratives after appropriate actions.17 However, it should be kept inmind thatcounter-speech may increase the visibility of hate comments and communi-cation containing contempt for people. Each additional comment contributesto the algorithm’s assessment of a post as significant. In the worst case, it ispossible that a problematic post only receives attention and is perceived by alarger public because someone reacts with counter-speech (keyword #dont-feedthetroll). On the other hand, if radical users post particularly often andthe silent majority do not contradict these posts, there is the danger that thepositions and the radical minority behind them appear more significant thanis actually the case. Accordingly, the challenge is to find an effective balance16 ichbinhier e.V. is a civil society initiative which supports the facebook counter speechgroup #ichbinhier with over 40,000 volunteer members. The group is taking collectiveaction to combat group-based enmity in the comments section.17 Laufer, Daniel: “Neue Studie zeigt Wirksamkeit von Gegenrede im Netz” (8 Jun.2020), https://netzpolitik.org/2020/reconquista-internet-neue-studie-zeigt-wirksamkeit-von-gegenrede-im-netz/, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.J. Bauer/J. Chakrabarti/B. Hirschberger: Social Media as a Tool against Populism 241of which problematic posts are given attention, and care must be taken not tobe pushed back into being purely reactive.18 Counter-speech is well suited tocounteract the danger of fundamental shifts in discourse. A counter-speechstrategy that does not reproduce hate are solidarity postings on behalf ofvictims of hate speech, especially marginalised groups.If counter-speech is resorted to, it should be ensured that it takes an appro-priate form, because not all forms of counter-speech are equally successful.19As a general rule of thumb, aggressions should be named as such briefly andfactually, and it should bemade clear thatmisanthropic statements are not ac-ceptable and that such views do not represent a majority in the population.However, which style is most successful in detail also depends on the specificcontext.20Overall, the greatest potential of counter-speech seems to lie in activatinga silentmajority and therebymaking problematic content of a radicalminorityless visible.21 Finally, social media can also be used to mobilise for digital civiccourage and raise awareness of the dangers of hate and misanthropy.The na-ture of the algorithms can be used in this sense to amplify positive, respectfuland fact-based messages and increase their visibility compared to derogatoryand hateful postings. The strategy should be adapted to the characteristics ofthe different algorithms of the various networks. For example, on Facebook, awell-structured use of supporting emojis is recommended.However, it seems rather unlikely that counter-speech will also have an ef-fect on particularly radicalised people and that they will be convinced by it. On18 Bromell, David: “Counter-Speech Is Everyone’s Responsibility,” in: David Bromell (ed.),Regulating Free Speech in a Digital Age. Hate, Harm and the Limits of Censorship,Cham: Springer 2022.19 Benesch, Susan/Ruths, Derek/ Dillon, Kelly P./Haji, Mohammad Saleem/Wright, Lucas:“Considerations for successful counterspeech” (14 Oct. 2016), https://dangerousspeech.org/considerations-for-successful-counterspeech/, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023. How-ever, the question of how success is defined and how it can best be measured remainscrucial.20 Binny, Mathew/Punyajoy, Saha/Hardik, Tharad/Subham, Rajgaria/Prajwal, Singha-nia/Suman, Kalyan Maity/Pawan, Goyal/Animesh, Mukherjee: “Thou Shalt Not Hate:Countering OnlineHate Speech,” in: Proceedings of the International AAAI Conferenceon Web and Social Media 13 (1/2019), pp. 369–380.21 Buerger, Catherine: “#iamhere: Collective Counterspeech and the Quest to ImproveOnline Discourse,” in: Social Media + Society 7 (4/2021), https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051211063843.242 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionsthe one hand, it is conceivable that speaking out counteracts the disinhibit-ing effects of the anonymity of the internet (“toxic online disinhibition”).22 Onthe other hand, it is also conceivable that radical users – out of defiance or be-cause they perceive a threat to their identity – will stick to their problematicnarratives or withdraw from the public space and resort to private groups andmessenger services. The results of empirical studies tend to speak for the lat-ter.23In any case, good strategic planning (constant evaluation, accurate calibra-tion of messages) is crucial in counter-measures.24 What is also discussed isthe importance of good coordination and networking for counter-measures tobe successful.25 On the whole, further research on the efficiency of counter-speech is necessary.26Responsibility and obligations of the key stakeholdersThe promotion of religious freedom and successful awareness raising, humanrights education and effectiveness in the fight against ideas showing contempt22 Wachs, Sebastian/Wright, Michelle F.: “Associations between Bystanders and Perpe-trators of Online Hate: The Moderating Role of Toxic Online Disinhibition,” in: Inter-national Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 15 (9/2018), p. 2030, https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph15092030.23 Lopez-Sanchez, Maite/Müller, Arthur: “On Simulating the Propagation and Counter-measures of Hate Speech in Social Networks,” in: Applied Sciences 11 (24/2021), p.12003, https://doi.org/10.3390/app112412003; Saltman, Erin/Kooti, Farshad/Vockery,Karly: “New Models for Deploying Counterspeech: Measuring Behavioral Change andSentiment Analysis,” in: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 46 (9/2023), pp. 1547–1574.24 Winter, Charly/Fürst, Johanna: Challenging Hate. Counter-speech Practices in Europe,London: ICSR 2017, https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ICSR-Report-Challenging-Hate-Counter-speech-Practices-in-Europe.pdf, accessed on: 6 Sep. 2023.25 Laubenstein, Sina/Urban, Alexander: “Case studies: which types of campaign againsthate and extremism on the internet work, which do not, and why?,” in: Johannes Bal-dauf/Julia Ebner/Jakob Guhl (eds.), Hate Speech and Radicalisation Online. The OCCIResearch Report, London/Washington D.C./Beirut/Toronto: ISD 2019, pp. 50–57. Theauthors also list networking, exchange and training as helpful factors, but are not in-dependent in the sense that they have both worked in leadership positions on theinitiatives praised in the article.26 Blaya, Catherine: “Cyberhate: ‘A review and content analysis of intervention strate-gies’,” in: Aggression and Violent Behaviour 45 (2019), pp. 163–172.J. Bauer/J. Chakrabarti/B. Hirschberger: Social Media as a Tool against Populism 243for humanity requires that all relevant stakeholders take responsibility and ful-fil their duties.27 Moreover, showing solidarity with marginalised groups andprotecting them should be one of their most important concerns.More digital civic courageEvery social media user can make a contribution in the form of digital civiccourage. For example, individuals and communities can increase the visibil-ity of positive posts by commenting, liking, saving, forwarding and repost-ing/sharing them abundantly in a positive and laudatorymanner. In addition,users can report posts that violate the guidelines of the social media platformsand – in the case of criminal content – file charges. This requires civil societyactivism and empowerment of the actors to counteract a fight against wind-mills, isolation, coordinated attacks and a possible digital burn-out.Responsibility of (traditional and new) mediaMedia professionals and providers have a special responsibility, being chal-lenged to take on a role as multipliers for awareness raising and human rightseducation. With their wide reach, they are also able to influence the gener-ations that are no longer at school. Media creators and providers can alsopromote awareness raising, human rights education and the fight againstinhuman ideas by giving a wide reach. For example, it would be conceivablefor established influencers to draw attention to populist appropriations andreinterpretations of religious freedom and other human rights in “expose”and “reaction” formats. In order to avoid contributing to the spread of mis-understandings or producing (unintentionally) misleading presentations, aprofound understanding of human rights is necessary for all media makers.2827 Regarding the responsibility of the churches and religious communities, see Blaya:Cyberhate, pp. 163–172.28 In order to generate awareness and impart the necessary knowledge and skills, itmight be helpful to organise workshops on human rights basics for multipliers suchas journalists (e.g. the community toolkit by ichbinhier e.V. “Hass im Netz – Toolkit fürCommunities” can be used for both media makers from the traditional media sectorand high-reach formats in social media like YouTubers). On the one hand, contentbasics could be conveyed precisely and comprehensively so that they are understoodand internalised. On the other hand, they could be motivated to become creative, to244 Signs of Hope and Proposals for SolutionsIt is also important not to consider online and offline separately: misunder-standings take root across media boundaries and digital hatred may lead tophysical violence and serious psychological consequences. Conversely, ap-pearances in traditional media, in parliaments and at demonstrations alsoprovide ammunition for the digital world.The traditional media are thereforealso called upon to critically question their media logics and stop problematicpatterns such as “false balance” and sensationalism. In addition, their ownreporting should be critically evaluated with a view to balance; for exampleregarding the question of how often Islam is reported on and how many ofthe contributions are of a positive nature.29 Stronger diversity in one’s owneditorial team may also be helpful. In addition, it is important to establishhuman rights as a cross-cutting issue in journalism and use language that issensitive to discrimination.Responsibility of platform operators and issues of legal regulationIn some cases, narratives of instrumentalisation, reinterpretation or devalu-ation of religious freedom are also formulated in connection with statementsthat hold criminal relevance (defamation, slander, insult or incitement to ha-tred). In such cases, it is to be expected of the operator platforms that they fulfiltheir legally prescribed obligations (obligations to delete, cooperationwith lawenforcement authorities) as long as the underlying laws are in conformitywithhuman rights. The state in turn also has to ensure that these obligations arefulfilled.30 Social media corporations should also ensure that their algorithmsdo not privilege problematic or even illegal content; for example by rewardingdevelop different formats and forms in order to pass on appropriate content to theirown audience.29 See also Media Tenor: Das Medienbild zum Islam treibt die Angst, http://de.mediatenor.com/de/bibliothek/newsletter/1100/das-medienbild-zum-islam-treibt-die-angst-bedford-strohm-und-papst-franziskus-setzen-positive-akzente-fuer-ihre-kirchen,accessed on: 6 Sep. 2023.30 However, care must always be taken that the prevention of the disseminationof illegal content is not given greater importance than the protection of humanrights such as freedom of expression, information or the press; see also the justi-fied concerns of Reporters Without Borders Germany about the Network Enforce-ment Act: Reporter ohne Grenzen: NetzDG führt offenbar zu Overblocking (27 Jul.2018), https://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/pressemitteilungen/meldung/netzdg-fuehrt-offenbar-zu-overblocking, accessed on: 6 Sep. 2023.J. Bauer/J. Chakrabarti/B. Hirschberger: Social Media as a Tool against Populism 245polarisation with higher visibility. Moreover, it should be ensured that socialmedia corporations do not stint on basic security and moderation tasks sim-ply because they incur additional costs.31Protection of human rights defendersIt is also a cross-cutting task for all actors to ensure the protection of humanrights defenders. People who stand up for human rights often become the tar-get of attacks themselves. For example, human rights defenders are attacked(in a coordinated manner) in the form of “silencing” to keep them from talk-ing and discourage further users from also campaigning for human rights is-sues.32 Attackers often resort to diversionary tactics such as “gaslighting”33 or“whataboutism.” Since attacks are to be expected, the accompaniment of hu-man rights education and advocacy campaigns holds particular importance.Only closemoderation over a longer period of time can ensure clearmessages,otherwise further attacks and a “broken window effect” quickly occur: if thereis no negative reaction to hate comments, the impression is created that suchbehaviourwill gounpunished,which in turn canattract further authors of hatecomments, while other people to whom the campaign is actually directed aredeterred.ConclusionIn order to promote religious freedom and counteract communication thatis contemptuous of human beings as well as populist attempts at appro-priation and reinterpretation in the digital space, awareness-raising andeducational work should receive comprehensive support. In doing so, existingapproaches to human rights and media education should be taken up and31 Lauer, David: “Facebook’s ethical failures are not accidental; they are part of the busi-ness model,” in: AI Ethics 1 (4/2021), pp. 395–403.32 Geschke, Daniel/Klaßen, Anja/Quent, Matthias/Richter, Christoph: #Hass im Netz:Der schleichende Angriff auf unsere Demokratie. Eine bundesweite repräsentati-ve Untersuchung, ed. by Institut für Demokratie und Zivilgesellschaft (IDZ), Ju-ni 2019, https://blog.campact.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Hass_im_Netz-Der-schleichende-Angriff.pdf, accessed on: 8 Aug. 2023.33 “Gaslighting” means systematic questioning/doubting/small-talking about the expe-riences/facts/truths of a person or a group of people.246 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionsmodern (counter-)strategies developed that also focus on solidarity with thoseaffected. Both should definitely be done thoroughly and not simply symbol-ically. In this sense, long-term, sustainable funding must be provided forcorresponding initiatives instead of promotingmany short-term projects thatdo not have an impact beyond the symbolic. It is also crucial that the onlineand offline worlds are always thought of together. There remains a strongneed for research on the dynamics of digital populism and correspondingcounter-measures, and especially research on the question of the effectivenessof counter-strategies is still in its infancy.Conclusion: The Case of Religious Freedomand PopulismWhat Perspectives Can We Develop for aConstructive Culture of Discussion and Problem-Solvingas well as Strengthening Human Rights?Bernd Hirschberger and Katja VogesIn this anthology, the authors have described and analysed, from various per-spectives, how right-wing populists and extremists around the world try toappropriate religious freedom for their own purposes and reinterpret this inline with their inhuman ideologies and anti-democratic objectives. In the pro-cess, it hasbeendemonstratedwhich societal andpolitical dynamics favour thesuccess of corresponding strategies of appropriation. In addition, the authorshave discussed counterstrategies and presented possible courses of action.Within the framework of this project, we have focused on the human rightof freedom of religion or belief (FoRB), which is particularly exposed to theappropriations described above. However, it also becomes apparent that thisphenomenon is part of a comprehensive interpretive struggle for readingand shaping normative foundations of social co-existence at both nationaland international level. Other concepts and terms that are highly relevant tohuman rights – such as democracy, peace, and the interests of certain pop-ulation groups such as workers – are also targeted by populist appropriationand reinterpretation attempts. The appropriation and reinterpretation oftenfollow very similar patterns to those described in this book. In this sense, theanalysis of the appropriation and reinterpretation of religious freedom canalso be understood as an exemplary case study for a populist appropriationand reinterpretation of human rights concepts and language in general.The analyses presented in this book also offer lessons on how to deal withpopulism in general. Conclusions can be drawn on how constructive discourse248 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionson controversial issues can be conducted without compromising and damag-ing human rights. While political parties, media professionals, lobby groupsand religious communities have a special responsibility due to their particu-larly influential roles,ultimately all democrats have aduty to contribute to con-structive discussions. In this sense, the following reflections and conclusionsare addressed to all of these people acting in different areas of society and indifferent roles:Forming new, broad alliancesProtecting and strengthening human rights requires broad-based alliancesand democrats working together constructively:• Interacting respectfully: Unlike right-wing populists and extremists,democrats should never fundamentally deny each other the competenceand integrity to standup for human rights, such as religious freedom.Evenif populists deliberately resort to personal attacks in debates, democratsshould maintain a rational and respectful discourse among themselves.Permanent disputes on side issues, chaos and apoisoneddebate ultimatelymerely benefit populism and harm democracy and human rights.• Giving human rights as common ground priority over politicisation:While it is legitimate (and sometimes necessary) to debate whetherenough is being done for the protection and promotion of FoRB and otherhuman rights, as well as what are the most effective means, there mustalways be consensus among all democrats that the promotion and pro-tection of human rights is a shared goal that takes priority over party andpower-political considerations and interests. Thus, the political debateshould not revolve around the question of whether to protect and promoteFoRB and other human rights but rather what the most effective meansare to achieve this.• Moving away from treating human rights as a niche topic and fromclien-telistic thinking:We need to break free from the prevalent stereotype thatreligious freedom is solely a right for the devout and conservative. Justas women’s rights do not exclusively belong to the left, religious freedomshould not be confined to the conservatives alone. Quite the contrary, thediversity of the human right to religious freedom – which is intended tobe a universal right protecting and empowering every single human beingB. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Conclusion 249– should be explored and used as inspiration for innovative human rightsinitiatives.• Showing political presence and ambition and defining own prioritiesand initiatives instead of withdrawing: Liberals, leftists, greens, socialdemocrats and other progressive or secular-oriented forces should not letprejudices and far-right appropriation and reinterpretation deter themfrom an active commitment to FoRB. A withdrawal without comment –as seen, for example, in the case of the Intergroup on Freedom of Religionor Belief and Religious Tolerance in the European Parliament – only playsinto the distorting far-right narrative that they are the sole political forceconcerned with religious freedom.• Developing discussion and policy-making formats beyond confronta-tion: Democrats should work together to strengthen FoRB, putting asidedivisions into different political camps and interest groups. Confronta-tional debates tend to create entrenched positions and often hinderdemocratic cooperation, which is essential for strengthening humanrights. Actors such as the Christian Democrats – who in many placesidentify particularly strongly with the commitment to the promotion anddefence of FoRB – should seek exchange with social democratic, green,leftist and liberal colleagues to develop cross-party plans to strengthenthis human right. In turn, the latter are called upon to take up seriousoffers of dialogue. Differences of opinion must not lead to a refusal ofexchange, unless the counterpart represents ideas aimed at fighting thevery foundations of liberal democracy. It is also worthwhile to explorethematic facets beyond one’s own party-political horizon and approach toFoRB.• Discovering synergies beyond the usual contacts:When engaging in thepromotion of FoRB and human rights as a whole, it is worthwhile to thinkbeyond one’s familiar network of contacts. For instance, cross-sector col-laborationcanexpand the reachofone’s ownwork topromoteFoRBbeyondthe circle of one’s own contacts andmilieus close to oneself and create syn-ergies in the protection and promotion of various different human rights.For example, a joint campaign by the Pontifical Mission Societymissio andthe German section of Reporters Without Borders advocating for the re-lease of the imprisoned Vietnamese blogger and Catholic priest Nguyen250 Signs of Hope and Proposals for SolutionsVan Ly promoted both freedom of information and FoRB.1 Interesting ini-tiatives have also been taken to leverage synergies between the promotionof FoRB and gender equality.2 Ecumenical and interreligious cooperationcanalso enhance the impact of efforts to safeguardandpromoteFoRB.Fur-thermore, it can strengthen FoRB in a uniquewaywhen secular humanistsand religious communities work together.Strengthening human rights educationComprehensive and quality human rights education is essential:• Demonstrating the significance of human rights in everyday life:Whilethere is broad consensus that human rights are good and important,manypeople have limited knowledge of fundamental human rights concepts. Asignificant number of people perceive human rights as having little rele-vance to their everyday lives.3 The question of whether religious freedomis still necessary in secularised societies often arises. Therefore, it is cru-cial to convey the significance of human rights as vividly and concretely1 missio Aachen: missio und Reporter ohne Grenzen gemeinsam für verfolgte Christenin Vietnam (1 Feb. 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-bEDh0MjBU, accessedon: 25 Aug. 2023.2 Stefanus Alliance International: Freedom of Religion or Belief for everyone: Women infocus,2021, https://www.stefanus.no/english/women-and-forb/, accessed on: 25 Aug.2023; The Danish Institute for Human Rights: Freedom of religion or belief, genderequality and the SDGs 2019–2020, https://www.humanrights.dk/research-project/freedom-religion-belief-gender-equality-sdgs, accessed on: 25 Aug. 2023; Track 2 of theDanish Government’s strategy to promote freedom of religion or belief and protectionof religion or belief minorities: https://um.dk/en/foreign-policy/office-of-the-special-representative-for-freedom-of-religions-or-belief, accessed on: 25 Aug. 2023.3 Ipsos Public Affairs: Human Rights in 2018. A Global Advisory Survey, https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2018-07/human-rights-in-2018-ipsos-global-advisor.pdf, accessed on: 2 Aug. 2023 (Given the chosen wording ofthe question on p. 4, a social-desirability bias is possible, so that the actual gaps inknowledge could be even wider); European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights:Fundamental Rights Survey 2020, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the EuropeanUnion 2020, http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-fundamental-rights-survey-human-rights-summary_en.pdf, pp. 3ff., long version: http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-fundamental-rights-survey-human-rights_en.pdf, accessed on: 2 Aug. 2023.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Conclusion 251as possible, ideally in a way that allows individuals to establish immediateconnections to their own daily lives and their unique personal realities.• Educating about common misconceptions: One objective of strengthen-ing human rights education should also be to clarify commonmisconcep-tions about human rights. Especially regarding religious freedom, manysuch misconceptions exist. For example, in secularised societies, freedomof religion is often confused with a freedom from religion that only toler-ates religion in the private sphere. Another common misconception is toreduce religious freedom for the protection of cultural identities.• Tailoring human rights education and communication to target au-diences: To successfully impart knowledge and simultaneously achievesocio-emotional competence development, diversemethodologies and di-dactics need to be applied and adapted to the individual target audiencesin each case.This applies to both formal educational settings and informallearning environments.• Bringing together expertise and outreach through cooperation: A signif-icant, largely untapped potential lies in bridging academic expertise fromthe scholarly community with the outreach andmedia skills of media pro-fessionals. In this way, formats can be developed that are not only edu-cational and entertaining but also reach audiences beyond the academicworld.• Strengthening media literacy across all age groups: To build resilienceagainst disinformation, raise awareness against misunderstandings andreveal and overcome prejudices that often severely harm human rights,media literacy must be enhanced across all age groups.• Promoting empathy and solution-oriented thinking:Human rights edu-cation shouldnot be limited tohighlighting injustices but should also teachskills and strategies for problem-solving. Journalistic and activist contri-butions on and to human rights should also focus on problem-solving ap-proaches and not stop at the typical approach of “naming and shaming.”Choosing constructive languageDemocrats should practice an appropriate rhetoric and pay attention to usingconstructive language:252 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutions• Do not adopt right-wing populist language: Under no circumstancesshould democrats align their own language with right-wing populistrhetoric or adopt far-right populist narratives. For instance, this includesnot using terms like “wokeness” as an alleged threat to religious freedomor endorsing Islamophobic slogans and conspiracy theories. Studies4 havenot only shown that this is unlikely to be successful in containing supportfor far-right parties, but it also contributes to undermining and erodinghuman rights concepts and normalising extremist and dehumanisingideas and narratives.• Communicate concretely, vividly, understandably, sincerely and in a so-lution-orientedmanner: In public discourse on human rights, it is crucialto communicate concretely, vividly, understandably, sincerely, and with afocus on solutions.There is great potential for improvement in this regardwithout resorting to populist simplifications. Particularly when dealingwith the often-inaccessible legal jargon, a “translation” into a languagethat can be understood in the context of the audience’s prior knowledgeand everyday life is necessary. Technical terms and concepts such as forumexternum or forum internum cannot simply be assumed as common knowl-edge. There is also often a great deal of confusion regarding the questionof permissible limitations on human rights and the limits on the scopeof such limitations.5 It is also important to avoid using clichéd languagethat shies away from commitment beyond purely symbolic acts, especiallywhen political or financial costs are involved. Decision-makers must nothesitate to address problems only because some segments of their sup-porter base might perceive any approaches to solution as an imposition.Such fearful inaction and self-restraint not only leave opportunities for thepromotion of human rights untapped but also contribute to the perceptionof political ineffectiveness,which populist actors often criticise democratsfor.• Remain precise, avoid ambiguity: At the same time, it is important to useprecise language. Ambiguous or vague formulations should be avoided,4 See e.g. Lewandowsky, Marcel/Wagner, Aiko: “Fighting for a Lost Cause? Availability ofPopulist Radical Right Voters for Established Parties. The Case of Germany,” in: Repre-sentation 59 (3/2023), pp. 485–512; Krause, Werner/Cohen, Denis/Abou-Chadi, Tarik:“Does accommodation work? Mainstream party strategies and the success of radicalright parties,” in: Political Science Research and Methods Bd. 11 (1/2023), pp. 172–179.5 Compare the German concepts of Schranken and Schranken-Schranken.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Conclusion 253even if it is a strategy to avoid commitmentor assumptionof responsibility.If there is indeeda significantuncertainty or agap inknowledge, it is betterto acknowledge it as such.The use of formulations that consciously or un-consciously arouse resentments is particularly problematic.For example, ifthe term “political Islam” is used synonymously with the term “Islamist ex-tremism” (an equation that does not typically occur with the terms “Chris-tian democracy” and “Christian fundamentalism”), this highlights Islamistextremism as a problem, but at the same time also falsely suggests thatpolitical engagement motivated by Muslim faith is generally problematic.Such false generalisations not only trivialise the actual extremist threat butalso fuel prejudice against non-extremist Muslims and thus create an at-mosphere that can in turnbe exploitedby Islamist extremists for spreadinghatred.• Do not spread untruths: Unlike populists and extremists, democratsshould take particular care not to consciously or unconsciously contributeto the spread of untruths, misleading representations and false generali-sations and prejudices. For example, churches, politicians and the mediashould beware of falling for phantom debates such as debates about an al-leged renaming of Christmas markets and St.Martin’s processions.Whendemocrats take a stand in such debates, they should first check whetherany serious proposal related to the claim actually even exists at all to avoidreplicating disproven6 conspiracy theory narratives. Indeed, if democratsattack political competitors or religiousminorities usingmisinformation,this not only fuels prejudice but also destroys trust in democracy.• Shape thepolitical agendayourself,developandpresent owncontent: In-steadof only reacting to populist initiatives and external events,democratsshould proactively initiate human rights-related discourses and presenttheir own ideas and approaches for solutions, making visible constructivedemocratic perspectives. For instance, churches can rectify the often-distorted term “Christian values” used by far-right groups by highlightingtheir own understanding of the term, making it clear that love for one’sneighbour andmercy are at the core of Christian values. At the same time,they should engage in a manner that authentically embodies these values,making them tangible. Churches can also use their Christian holidays to6 For fact-checking, see https://www.mimikama.org/klarstellung-zu-st-martin/ and https://www.belltower.news/die-4-besorgtbuerger-theorien-an-denen-man-merkt-dass-weihnachten-vor-der-tuer-steht-46042/, accessed on: 2 Aug. 2023.254 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionsbecome visible in the public sphere and invite participation beyond theirinner circles.• Break out of the negativity bias and create positive visibility for minori-ties: In order to prevent paralysing feelings – such as feeling powerless,overwhelmed,anxious anddisillusioned–frombecomingdominant,pub-lic debates and media coverage should not be limited to the confrontationwith disasters and scandals but also provide space for success stories, pro-posals for solutions and signs of hope. For example, reporting in WesternEurope on Muslims should not be limited to reports on extremist violenceand Islamist threats or on xenophobic and Islamophobic violence or dis-crimination; rather, positive contributions of the religious communities tothe societal life should receive increased visibility.Finding solutions to problems in a level-headedand evidence-based waySolution-findingprocesses shouldbeparticipatoryandcomprehensible aswellas factual and evidence-based:• Establishdifferentiatedproblemdescriptions:Problemsshouldbenamedclearly. However, policymakers, media professionals and other people inpositions of responsibility in particular should refrain from sensational-ism and dramatisation and attach importance to a differentiated and ev-idence-based description and assessment of problems. In order to createa better basis for planning, it is advisable – for instance – to differentiatebetween violations of FoRB according to their severity.This is also impor-tant because it devalues the term “persecution” if even comparatively mildcases of discrimination are labelled as such.Cautionmust also be exercisedwhen using numerical data in human rights reporting (rankings compar-ing the human rights situation in different countries, figures on the num-ber of people affectedbyhuman rights violations,etc.).This cannot bedonein a serious and reliable way without providing context and transparentlydescribing the limits and inaccuracies of the methodology.• Promote quality reporting and sustainability of action: Even in an erawhere live updates and breaking news are increasingly prevalent, thor-oughness should take precedence over speed and quantity. In projectplanning and grant allocation, implementing a smaller number of projectsB. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Conclusion 255of high quality and impact in a sustainable manner should be favouredover a mass of short-lived projects that can at best provide short-lived,merely symbolic accents. Solving complex problems requires persistenceand effort beyond short-term peaks of media attention and waves of out-rage. Media professionals have a special responsibility to realise such astandard.• Move away from a culture of polarisation and outrage, and focus on con-crete projects instead of empty words and pure symbolism:The far rightmust not be allowed to dictate the political agenda for the entire society.The vociferous culture wars fuelled by the far right which often aim in par-ticular at symbolic politics (for example prolonged debates about diversityand inclusive language guidelines, often based on false allegations) divertattention frommore pressing issues and make it difficult to sincerely dis-cuss legitimate and relevant issues of contention.7 Democrats should notengage in such culturewars and instead name their ownpriorities for pub-lic debate and bring realistic proposals for solutions into the discussion.• Be critical but have humility and appreciation for expertise instead ofconsidering oneself an expert on everything and falling for an overesti-mation bias: Especially in agitated debates, it is crucial to recognise thelimits of one’s own knowledge and differentiate wisely between opinionand knowledge. The mass of information available via a short internetsearch query tempts people to see themselves as experts on almost ev-erything, whether football, virology or security policy. Thorough researchrequires considerable effort. Mere opinion pieces are certainly not anadequate substitute for sound analysis, and critical source evaluation ismore important than ever in the digital age.7 How can religious minorities in distress be better supported internationally? How canreligious and ideological radicalisation be dealt with? How can anti-Semitic and othermisanthropic attitudes in migrant and non-migrant populations be effectively coun-teracted and prevented? How can integration be promoted? How can measures toprotect domestic security be designed to be effective but also proportionate? Howcan a cooperative relationship between the state and religious communities be im-plemented without favouring individual religious groups or the state exerting undueinfluence on the internal affairs of religious communities?256 Signs of Hope and Proposals for SolutionsCultivating a constructive approach to fears and distressesFears (and other negative emotions) can be a helpfulwarning sign,but they canalso bemisused as a pretext or excuse andhave a paralysing or evendestructiveeffect. Accordingly, a constructive approach to fears is necessary to effectivelyaddress actual hardships:8• Take each other seriously and recognise the (im)possibilities for discus-sion:9 A liberal democratic society thrives on the fact that there is roomfor different opinions as well as tensions and conflicts. The exchange be-tween people and groups with different views, opinions and backgroundscan even be productive. However, the prerequisite is the willingness to en-gage with other – sometimes even contrary – views and the acknowledge-ment of humandignity.Accordingly, it is important todistinguishbetweensincere concerns and selfish manipulative instrumentalisations of fear. Itmust also be clear that an attitude of openness must not mean feigningunderstanding for problematic thoughts, simply recognising and approv-ing everything and trivialising inhuman positions.On the contrary, takingpeople seriously also means highlighting contradictions and problematicconsequences of their views.• Provide inclusive space for communityand identitybuildingaswell as forthe endowment withmeaning: Religious communities have the potentialto offer real alternatives to the harmful sham solutions that populism andextremism offer to people searching for identity, community, and mean-ing for their lives. In order to fulfil this crucial function, they must be per-ceived as trustworthy points of contact for addressing fears and sorrows,and therefore work hard to regain lost trust.• Prioritise support for the most vulnerable and take the affected individ-uals seriously: At international, national and local levels, special attentionshould be given to those who objectively need help themost. Commitmentto themost vulnerable must be authentic and should not be driven by self-8 See also Justice and Peace Europe: Facing our Fears and re-connecting theWorld. Con-certed Action 2023 – Summary, http://www.juspax-eu.org/en/dokumente/Summary-Concerted-Action-2023-2024.pdf, accessed on: 25 Aug. 2023.9 See also Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz (ed.): Dem Populismus wider-stehen. Arbeitshilfe zum kirchlichen Umgang mit rechtspopulistischen Tendenzen (=Arbeitshilfen Nr. 305), Bonn 2019, p. 72.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Conclusion 257interest or instrumentalised for the sake of positive self-presentation, at-tracting political support, or economic gain. For example, it leaves a bittertaste when the sponsor of an aid project for Christians in the Global Southreleases a glossy promotional video consisting of a string of words of grat-itude from the beneficiaries but does not leave room for the personal per-spectives of those affected.Leave no room for extremism and hateAs extremism and right-wing populism aim to sabotage constructive debatesand solution finding, it is important not to leave any space for these forces:• Do not offer populism and extremism a stage: Representatives of right-wing populist and extremist parties and groups should not be offered astage to spread their inhuman narratives, including at church events.Me-dia and other societal actors should also develop strategies against instru-mentalisation of their discourse platforms and formats from the far rightand particularly avoid a false balance that presents dubious positions asequivalent and gives them legitimacy.• Object strategically: Transgressive behaviour must also be clearly namedas such. If there is a danger of a fundamental shift in discourse throughhate speech and disinformation, counter-speech should be developed anddeployed. However, counterstrategies must be well planned and coordi-nated. It is particularly important to ensure that countermeasures do notsimply lead to problematic narratives receiving attention in the first place.• Resist and counteract normalisation or relativisation: Right-wing pop-ulist, far-right extremist and inhuman ideas must never be normalised orrelativised. If attempts are made to camouflage such views as “bourgeois”or “conservative,” this must be clearly contradicted at all levels of society.• Usewell-founded insteadof emotion-drivencriticism: Even if the contentof right-wing populist and far-right extremist narratives is outrageous,criticism should be as factual and level-headed as possible. By contrast,purely emotion-driven or polemical reactions should be avoided as thisonly provides populists with targets for further attacks.• Protect and support human rights defenders, strengthen (digital) civiccourage: Effective measures must be taken to ensure the protection ofhuman rights defenders. For example, if church members who advocate258 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionsfor church reform processes receive death threats,10 this must not onlybe condemned in no uncertain terms but also have consequences undercriminal law. Civic courage must also be promoted in the digital space.The list of recommendations – which are based on the analyses and researchresults of the authors of this volume – is not to be understood as exhaustive.However, the recommendations show where political and civil society actors,media professionals, representatives of religious communities and society asa whole have the opportunity and the responsibility to resolutely counter pop-ulist appropriations and instrumentalisations of the human right to religiousfreedom and other human rights. Further studies of individual options for ac-tion as well as comparative analyses of the appropriation and reinterpretationof other human rights are desirable.Further facets of the struggle for the interpretation of human rightsillustrated by the example of religious freedomThecase studies in this book have focused on a particular type of appropriationand reinterpretation of religious freedom that is especially relevant in “West-ern” countries, namely the appropriation by right-wing populist and extremistforces. However, other actors who are not usually classified as “far-right ex-tremists” or “right-wing populists” in the narrow sense of the terms also en-danger FoRB in various regions of the world, questioning its character as auniversal right to freedom:• The narrative of threatened religious (traditional) values that need to bedefended – especially against the backdrop of globalisation and seculari-sation – is widespread worldwide. In many countries, nationalists in par-ticular use and fuel this narrative, includingwithout direct reference to re-ligious freedom.This defence of alleged “Christian values” can be observedinmany countries with a Christianmajority, especially in Europe, Americaand Africa. Likewise, radical Islamists and Islamist-oriented state leaders10 See e.g. Kirche und Leben: “Drei prominente Katholikinnen und ihr Umgang mit Hassund Hetze. Morddrohungen gegen Theologin Wuckelt von kirchlichen Reformgeg-nern” (5 Jul. 2023), https://www.kirche-und-leben.de/artikel/morddrohungen-gegen-theologin-wuckelt-von-kirchlichen-reformgegnern, accessed on: 2 Aug. 2023.B. Hirschberger/K. Voges: Conclusion 259present themselves as defenders of Islam and its values and traditions. InIndia,Hindu nationalism is on the rise,which claims to protectHindu tra-ditions and ways of life from alleged external influences and aggressivelyattacks people of other faiths.• In some cases, this narrative of defending religious values is also linkedto a postcolonial critique that questions human rights because they areperceived as a colonial or Western construct imposed without consider-ing other cultural traditions and schools of thought in different regions oftheworld.This argumentation provides a helpful excuse for autocratic andtotalitarian regimes to relativise their own human rights deficiencies andviolations or to exclude and reinterpret aspects of human rights that areinconvenient for them.Such arguments are particularly destructive for in-dividuals from disadvantaged groups as they help to establish and perpet-uate oppression. There is an urgent need for further research in this areataking into account the fact that the recourse to human rights in Westerncountries – especially during the colonial era – was associated with strik-ing contradictions that still persist in neocolonial contexts.• In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, it is noticeable thatgovernments often do not speak of “religious freedom” but “religious har-mony” or “religious tolerance.”However, from a human rights perspective,neither of these alternative expressions is equivalent to “freedom of reli-gion” as the other two concepts ascribe less importance to the aspect offreedom or even suppress it altogether. However, the autocratic regimesof the region in particular benefit from such alternative framing, as it al-lows them to use concessions in the field of interreligious cooperation for abranding strategywhile at the same time covering up unpleasant conflictsand problems.11• Totalitarian regimes such as the People’s Republic of China with its Sini-cization policy pursue aggressive strategies to adapt religious communi-ties to their own ideology and to gain total control. They spread the illu-sion of an unrestricted scope of action for religions in the state, while atthe same time subjecting them to maximum control and suppressing op-11 On the concepts of branding and shaming, see Hirschberger, Bernd: External Com-munication in Social Media During Asymmetric Conflicts: A Theoretical Model andEmpirical Case Study of the Conflict in Israel and Palestine, Bielefeld: transcript 2021,pp. 20–32.260 Signs of Hope and Proposals for Solutionsponents.The aim is to secure their own rule from the outset and avoid anyform of potential opposition.• In the context of wars and (armed) conflict, it can often be observed thatconflict parties deliberately highlight alleged and actual violations of FoRBand other human rights attributed to the opponent side in the sense of ashaming strategy to damage the image of their opponents and thereby re-duce the willingness of third parties to support them, as well as stirring upanger against the opponent among their own supporters.The types of problematic constellations briefly touched upon here require fur-ther research.Concrete case studies examining corresponding patterns aswellas their possible connections with the right-wing populist and extremist ap-propriations and reinterpretations of religious freedomdescribed in this bookwould be desirable.The various problematic tendencies described above attacking the under-standing of religious freedom as a human right can lead to massive damageto FoRB and human rights as a whole, and ultimately to the abolition in theircurrent form as universal rights to freedom,which in turn facilitates concretehuman rights violations. It is therefore particularly important that democratswork together and persistently to counteract such attacks. As described above,there are many opportunities to contribute to this.List of ContributorsJuliaBauer,MA–Professionalmedia educator,works for the organisation ich-binhier e.V. and is responsible for its public relations and educational projectsProfessor Heiner Bielefeldt – Professor of Human Rights and Human RightsPolitics at theUniversity ofErlangen-Nuremberg,UnitedNationsSpecial Rap-porteur for Freedom of Religion or Belief from 2010 to 2016Reverend Dirk Bingener – President of the Pontifical Mission Society missioAachen and of Kindermissionswerk ‘Die Sternsinger’Katja Dorothea Buck – Journalist, Religious Studies scholar and political sci-entist, editor-in-chief of the Schneller-MagazinJulianeChakrabarti,MA–Expert on counter speech, digital civic courage andonline community building, member of the organisation ichbinhier e.V. and ofits steering committeeAnna Maria Daou, MA – Acting director of the Institute for Citizenship andDiversity Management at Adyan Foundation LebanonDr Youssef Dennaoui – Head of a research project on Salafist beliefs in Ger-many and Morocco funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education andResearch (BMBF), research assistant for sociology of religion and Islam at theInstitute ofTheology of RWTH Aachen UniversityAmbassador Jos Douma – Netherlands’ Special Envoy for Religion and Belieffrom 2019 to 2022262 Signs of Hope and Proposals for SolutionsDr Regina Elsner – Appointed professor of Eastern Church Studies and Ec-umenism at the Faculty of Catholic Theology of the University of Münster,research affiliate at the Centre for East European and International Studies(ZOiS) in BerlinDr Leandro L. B. Fontana – Research fellow at the Institute for Global ChurchandMission, Sankt Georgen Graduate School of Philosophy andTheologyProfessor Nazila Ghanea –United Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom ofreligion or belief, professor and director of the MSc in International HumanRights Law at the University of OxfordProfessorT. JeremyGunn–Professor of Law and Political Science at the Inter-national University of RabatDr Bernd Hirschberger – Social scientist and policy advisor at the GermanCommission for Justice and Peace, with a special expertise in human rightspolicies, political communication and conflict resolutionDr Eva Maria Lassen – Senior researcher at the Danish Institute for HumanRightsProfessor Andreas Lob-Hüdepohl – Professor of Theological Ethics at theCatholic University of Applied Sciences (KHSB) in Berlin, director of the BerlinInstitute for Christian Ethics and Politics (ICEP), member of the GermanEthics CouncilProfessor Jorunn Økland – Professor at the Centre for Gender Research andthe Faculty ofTheology,University ofOslo,Chair of the TranslationCommitteeof Norwegian Bible SocietyDr Rita Perintfalvi – Postdoctoral research fellow at the Institute of Old Tes-tament Biblical Studies at the Faculty of CatholicTheology at the University ofGrazDrMarie Juul Petersen–Senior researcher at the Danish Institute for HumanRightsList of Contributors 263Friedrich Püttmann – Associate researcher at the French Institute for Anato-lian Studies (IFEA) in Istanbul, PhD candidate at the European Institute of theLondon School of Economics (LSE)Dr Katja Voges – Head of the Human Rights and Religious Freedom Team atthe Pontifical Mission Societymissio AachenBishop Dr Heiner Wilmer SCJ – Bishop of the diocese of Hildesheim, presi-dent of the German Commission for Justice and PeaceProfessor Valentine Zuber – Director of studies at the École Pratique desHautes Études (PSL University) in Paris, chair of Religions and InternationalRelationsAcknowledgementsWe would like to express our sincere thanks to all those who made the publi-cation of this book possible: the authors for their contribution to this volume;the staff of the Episcopal Action Adveniat for Latin America and the Caribbean,and Renovabis, the solidarity initiative of the German Catholics with the peo-ple in Central and Eastern Europe, for their advice and recommendations; theSecretary General of the German Commission Justitia et Pax, Dr Jörg Lüer, forhis support of the project and his valuable feedback; Xinia Katzwinkel of theGerman Bishops’ Conference for translating texts into English; Adam Moun-sey for his conscientious proofreading; and Sebastian Laschet for his supportin preparing the manuscript.About the cover designThe cover of the book features the Human Rights Logo. The logo was selectedas part of an international competition organized by the “A Logo for HumanRights” initiative.Thewinning design by Predrag Stakic fromSerbia combinesthe shape of a hand with the shape of a bird (for more information, see https://www.humanrightslogo.net/en/competition, accessed on: 26 Oct. 2023). Thedesign is available to everyone at no cost as an open source product for thepromotion and protection of human rights The authors have chosen the sym-bol for the cover of the book because the book is dedicated to exactly this goal.The book’s analyses and proposed solutions aim tomake an innovative contri-bution to the protection and strengthening of human rights and to motivatepeople to engage in corresponding action. Moreover, the choice of the coveris intended to emphasize the importance of thinking about religious freedomfrom the logic of the universal and indivisible human rights: religious freedomis complete only as a part of human rights and, vice versa, human rights wouldbe incomplete if religious freedom, which covers a fundamental dimension ofhuman existence, were missing.Editingorganisations:PontificalMissionSocietymissioAachenandGermanCommis-sion for Justice and Peace.BerndHirschbergerworks as a human rights advisor for the German Commissionfor Justice and Peace. Before starting a career as practitioner, he graduated with aPhDdegree from the Ludwig-Maximilians-UniversitätMünchen, examining exter-nal communication during asymmetric conflict in social media.Katja Voges is head of the Human Rights and Religious Freedom Team at the Pon-tificalMission SocietymissioAachen.From2013 to 2015 she taught French, religiouseducation and physical education at a secondary school, followed by study and re-search stays on intercultural and interreligious dialogue in Rabat and Paris. Shewrote her theological dissertation on the topic of religious freedom in Christian-Muslim dialogue.

Clean Full Text

Language

Doi

Arxiv

Mag

Acl

Pmid

Pmcid

Pub Date

Pub Year

Journal Name

Journal Volume

Journal Page

Publication Types

Tldr

Tldr Version

Generated Tldr

Search Term Used

Reference Count

Citation Count

Influential Citation Count

Last Update

Status

Aws Job

Last Checked

Modified

Created